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Full text of "Government agricultural resettlement policy and the responses of farmers in Zimbabwe"

GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE 
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE 



By 

KOFI I AWAB I-A!1EYAW 



A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN 
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 



1988 



Copyright 1988 
by 

Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw 



To 



Naana Afia Apomasu (Asantewaa) who lies permanently at 
peace interred on December 19, 1986, at Sawua, Asante Region 
of Ghana, West Africa, among her royal Oyoko ancestors. 

"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!" 

Wo nana Kofi Kwabi, mebaa asuogya se mere bepe biribiri aba 
fie de abehye wo anuonyam naanso owuo koronfoo aama maanhu 
wo bio. Ei! Eye nokware, Nananom kaa se , 

"Owuo kura ade a IJkwa entumme ngye." 

Owuo busuoni wave me ade; waraa meedi awerehoo wo asuogya ha. 
Apomasu! Wo nananom ne abusua nyinaa yekae wo dabiara. Yenim 
se wogyina yakyi akyinapa. 

"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!" 



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 



The major funding for the field research for this dissertation was 
provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, New York, 
under a Developing Country Fellowship (Number 4500-4201). I am forever 
indebted to the Foundation for this support which enabled me to collect data 
in Zimbabwe in 1985. 

In Zimbabwe I was affiliated to the University as a Research Associate. I 
am grateful to Professor Gordon Chavunduka who chairs the Department of 
Sociology for making this possible. My friend and Shona teacher Dr. Norris 
Dembetembe, Chairman, Department of African Languages and Literatures was 
quite helpful in arranging permission for ray stay and research. I am equally 
thankful also to Dr. Langford Chitsike, then the Principal Secretary Ministry 
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, and his staff for the invaluable 
assistance and cooperation without which the research would not have been 
possible. Here, I have to mention the Director, Department of Rural 
Development, the Chief Resettlement Officer and the Regional Rural Development 
Officer, Mashonaland Region. The Provincial Agricultural and Technical 
Extension Officer, Mashonaland Central Province and his field staff in 
Bindura, Mount Darwin and Shamva Districts were all immensely helpful. 

Special thanks are due my senior investigator Mr. Gerald Mlambo, an 
ex-guerrilla combatant during the country's liberation war and former 
Resettlement Assistant in charge of the Karoi District. Research Assistants 
Jabulani, Chazungwiza and Nicholas Kanokanza were indeed "real comrades" to 

iy 



m 



,e. I will remain ever grateful for their friendship, the diligence and the 
dedication with which they assisted in this research. Through these 
individuals I experienced rural Zimbabwe in ways that would not have been 
possible otherwise. 

Still in Zimbabwe, many individuals were extremely supportive of my 
research with their time and other resources. The list is endless. I would 
like to single out ray old time friend Mr. Victor Kwasi Nartey and his family. 
Sincere thanks also go to Dr. Kwasi Agyepong-Boateng and his wife Akosua , Dr. 
Kwarae Asumadu, Messrs. Ayensu, Bonsi , Mate-Korle and Ambaah for according me 
the traditional Ghanaian hospitality anytime I called on them. As the saying 
goes: "Me daase a ensa!" I am most particularly indebted also to my two 
Tanzanian friends Mr. Suleimani Hashim Alii and Ms. Maryam Omar for their 
company and providing me with various forms of assistance during the 
fieldwork. Tlie numerous Zimbabwean friends and colleagues, deserve special 
thanks. Among them are Dr. Mandivamba Rukuni, Department of Land Management, 
and Dr. Florence Chanakira, Department of Biology, both at the University of 
Zimbabwe, Messrs. CP. Maziofa, Chinyuke and J. P. Ngorima and all his 
colleagues the Resettlement Officers, DERUDE, Mashonaland Region and Messrs. 
Mashayamombe and Muzhuzha , AGRITEX, Mount Darwin and "Mwanangu" Cosmas 
Nyadzayo. To Philip Kofi Amoah and family, University of Swaziland, Manzini, 
say thank you also. 

I lack the appropriate words to convey my deepest gratitude to the many 
farmers, rural dwellers, public servants and research informants who willingl' 
accepted me into their homes, farms and meetings. I appreciate the assistance 
of Mr. Matiza, Chirume Secondary School, Mr, Macho koto, Chindunduma Primary 
School, and the Principals and teachers of Magadzi, Mudzinge, Mukwari and 
Muringamorabe schools in Mufurudzi. To Messrs. Ennias Mutyambizi and Peter 



Kanyandura of Gatu village, Garikai Sigauke of Chitepo, India Dyariwa of 
Nehanda, Kenneth Gadaga of Sanye village 9, Godfred Dimba of Simba Youth, 
Lukson Chihuri of Goora, David Matope of Kandeya, the respective Chairmen of 
Development Committees in the villages and the Sabuku or the chiefs and 
headmen of the villages and homesteads where I worked I respectfully ask that 
my heartfelt salute be traditionally accepted on behalf of all the farmers of 
Zimbabwe: Pamberi ne Kurima! „ To Amai Getrude Mukoka of Mupedzanhamo 
village, Mufurudzi Scheme and all the Vanamai who always so kindly cooked 
sadza ne muriwo for us I say: Tatenda chaiso! . 

Here at the University of Florida I am most especially thankful to 
Professor Brian M. du Toit ray committee chairman, graduate advisor, teacher 
and friend for his interest in my work and well-being, patient guidance and 
personal and professional support. His office and home were always open to me 
and there is no way that I would have survived the frustrations and ordeals of 
the course work and dissertation phases of my graduate work without his 
encouragement which prods me on to "hang in there." The wise direction and 
deep involvement of all the remaining members of my committee in the 
preparation of this dissertation also merit appreciation. I wish to thank Dean 
JIadelyn M. Lockhart, Dr. Paul L. Doughty, Dr. Robert Lawless and Dr. Peter J, 
van Blokland for their individual and collective assistance in this regard. To 
Dr. R. Hunt Davis, Center for African Studies, and Dr. Ronald Cohen, 
Department of Anthropology, I owe a debt of gratitude in all respects. 

Many colleagues and friends at the University of Florida have in various 
ways also facilitated my studies, the analysis of the field data and the 
writing of the dissertation. Julian Arturo , Jim McKay and Jon Benjamin were 
very helpful with aspects of my data analysis especially the computer 
programs. Gary and Nancy Gullic. Dr. David Suggs, Dr. Geeta Chowdhry, Sara 



Norton and Carol Lauriault also deserve many thanks for their intellectual 
support and assistance. 

The following individuals and families have contributed so generously to 
my stay and education in this country in such important ways that I can hardly 
forget about them. First and foremost I deeply appreciate the intellectual 
guidance of Dr. Barry L. Isaac a dear friend and teacher, who first opened my 
eyes to the exciting field of cultural anthropology when I studied under him 
for the M.A. at the University of Cincinnati. To Mr. and Mrs. Huie Proffit as 
well as my friends Dennis and Debbie Harrington, Barbara Huels and Tim 
Jackering all of Cincinnati, Ohio, I say thank you. Ken Terrell, Dr. Aletta 
Biersack, Dr. Michael Yaw Boateng, Dr. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong , Frank Yeboah, 
ICwabena Okrah, J. P. Owusu-Ansah, Arnold and Pat Fergus, James Ansoanuur and 
Elizabeth Essel and their children Freida, Mwitse and George have all been of 
immense support. Similarly, I acknowledge Kwasi Yamoah, Ernest Yaw Kwarteng, 
Isaac Nketiah, Kofi and z\kosua Akuraanyi , Kwadwo Agyeman, Kwarae Akosah and 
Herman Kofi Duh respectively, for their invaluable assistance both in Ghana 
and here in the United States. 

I wish to thank also Dr. Kwaku Ti^umasi-Ankrah who helped to arrange for 
ray graduate education in this country and also contributed in many ways to my 
upkeep and that of my family. It has been a rather long and hard road and 
Kwaku and his wife Comfort and children Kwasi, Kwadwo and Amma deserve my 
heartfelt appreciation for everything. The same gratitude goes to ray in-laws 
Mama Joana Osei Bemma, St. Croix, Virgin Islands and her children and Mr. and 
Mrs. Anane Sekyere, Tema , Ghana. Professor S. K. B. Asante , United Nations 
Institute for Namibia, Lusaka, is indeed a nana to whom I owe so much for 
making it possible for me to travel to Zimbabwe and, more importantly, for the 
immeasurable benefits that I derive from our association, his intellectual 

vii 



acumen, worldly experience and traditional wisdom. 

My own family, the immediate and the extended, is worthy of mention for 
the "sacrifice" which has made it possible for me to travel all this long way 
My wife Amma provided much of the financial support for my graduate studies 
and part of the dissertation fieldwork. I am most exceptionally indebted to 
her forever for her love, understanding and support. Similar thanks go to our 
children Adwoa Asantewaa, Adwoa Durowaa, Amma Kyerewaa , Kwasi Twumasi-Ankrah 
and Kwadwo Awua . Finally, to my parents Francis Ko j o Yinkah and Akua Manu, my 
brothers and sisters I convey my sincere and heartfelt appreciation for the 
prayers and encouragement which have seen me through graduate studies. 



viii 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS tv 

LIST OF TABLES ^iii 

LIST OF FIGURES . 

ABSTRACT 

CHAPTERS 

I INTRODUCTION i 

The Background to the Research Problem. ....... 1 

The Research Problem. ...... ..... 5 

Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks. ........ 13 

Scope of the Study. ................. 18 

Notes 

II BACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE 24 

Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting 24 

Historical Setting. , . ........ 32 

The Evolution of the Land Problem .......... 35 

Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler 

Land Expropriation Policies 38 

Postindependence Development Challenges 

and Prospects 59 

Notes 58 

III THE LITERATURE REVIEW 62 

Introduction. . . .......... 62 

The State and Agricultural Development Policy .... 63 
State Ideology, Public Choice and the 

Individual in Development ............. 67 

Small hold er Agriculture and Development 72 

Cooperatives and Agricultural Development ...... 75 

Rural Development ..... ....... 82 

Poverty-Focused Development Strategies. ....... 87 

Land Reform , 95 

Land Resettlement 97 

Household Dynamics and Developmental Cycle. ..... 101 

Conclusion ................. 107 

Note. 109 

ix 



IV FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY HQ 

Background Developments Towards Fieldwork 110 

The Extended "Sondeo": Initial Months 

of Fieldwork. . , . m 

Getting a Closer Look at Resettlement 

Policy and Devevelopment Implementation ...... 117 

Ethnographic Survey and Observations 122 

Data Collection Techniques 126 

Study Variables , 128 

Sampling Techniques ..... ...... 128 

Data Handling and Analysis , 137 

Notes 140 

V AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL 

DEVELOPMENT POLICY. I45 

Introduction. ... ............ 145 

Resettlement Policy Objectives. . 146 

The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the 

Government's Development Policy .... 149 

The Structure and Organization of Resettlement. ... 151 
The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture 

and Rural Resettlement. 154 
The Ministry of Local Government, Rural 

and Urban Development 156 

Other Ministries , I57 

Land Acquisition and Tenure 163 

Resettlement Planning 165 

Resettlement Scheme Models 167 

Model A Resettlement Program 167 

Model B Resettlement Program 169 

Model C Resettlement Program 171 

Model D Resettlement Program 172 

Selection Criteria and Procedures and 
Allocation of Holdings to Farmers: The 

Case of Model A Schemes I73 

Implementation Structures and Process: The 

Case of a Model A Normal Intensive Scheme ..... 175 

Conclusion 179 

Notes ...!!.*] 180 

VI CONTINUITY IN CHANGE: THE PRESERVATION OF THE OLD 

AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FARMING SYSTEMS 185 

Introduction. . ......... 185 

The Large-scale (European Commercial) 

Farm Sector 135 

The Sraall-Scale (African Commercial) 

Farm Sector 190 

The Communal Area (Peasant) Farm Sector 193 

Resettlement Program Farms 199 

Conclusion. ... ...... 203 

Note 903 



X 



VII CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO 
RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS: MASHONALAND 
CENTRAL PROVINCE. ........ . 204 

Introduction 204 

Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues From 

the Commercial and Communal Areas' Farmers. .... 205 
The Large-scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura 

Intensive Cultivation Area 205 

The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa 

Nyaj enj e and Karuyana 207 

The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madziwa 

and Kandeya 209 

Farmers: Taeir Social and Demographic 

Characteristics 210 

Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation 
of the Government's Resettlement Policies and 

Programs 223 

The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and 

Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes. . . . 223 
The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, 
Kushingirira and Siraba Youth Model B Producer 

Cooperative Schemes 225 

Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About 

Life Situation. 246 

Farmers: Their Material Resources and 

Capital Assets 954 

Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints 264 

Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle, 
Micro-Level Agricultural Characteristics 

and Economic Performance 275 

Conclusion ^ 935 

Notes , 289 

VIII THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT 295 

Evaluating Change and Development .... 295 

Macro-Level Costs, Development Inputs and 

Economic Projections 298 

Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political 

Performance of Resettlement Schemes 309 

Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model A Schemes. 310 
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B 

Cooperative Schemes , 31 7 

Mufurudzi Scheme as an Illustrative Case of 

Model A Resettlement. 338 

Muf urudzi : The Foundations of a Successful 

Agricultural Resettlement Scheme. ......... 348 

Simba Youth Scheme as an Illustrative Case of 

Model B Resettlement 355 

Simba Youth: Economic Performance and the 

Genesis of a Problematic Agricultural 

Resettlement , 375 

Conclusion 373 

Notes 380 



XI 



IX CONCLUSION. 383 

Summary of Findings ..... 383 

Macro-Level Impacts of Resettlement , . 386 

Micro-Level Impacts of Resettlement .... 390 

Policy Implications for Development ......... 394 

Recommendations and a Discussion 397 

The Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes 397 

The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes. ..... 399 

The Non-Governmental Organizations 402 

The Agricultural Finance Corporation. ....... 404 

Conclusion 409 

Notes 410 

APPENDICES 

A Developmental Cycle Typology ... 412 

B Evaluation Study Variables , . 413 

C Model B Producer Cooperatives Management Survey. ... 416 

D Case Study Variables 417 

E List of Resettlement Models and Schemes in Zimbabwe. . 426 

F Resettlement Application Form 428 

G Resettlement Permits ....... .... 431 

REFERENCES 437 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. , 494 



xii 



LIST OF TABLES 



TABLES 



Page 



2-1 



Distribution of Natural Regions, Rainfall 
and Related Farming Systems in Rhodesia. 



31 



2-2 



Proportion of Total Land Under Various 
Ownership Categories in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe 



41 



2-3 Proportion of Land Ownership in Zimbabwe 

by Natural Regions, Race and Farming System. 43 

2-4 Population Pressure in Relation to Carrying 

Capacity in the Communal Areas of Rhodesia 43 

2-5 Distribution of Personal Income in Rhodesia. ... 46 

2-5 Distribution of African Cash Wages in Rhodesia 46 

4-1 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: List of 

Villages, Maize Productivity and the Villages 

Selected for Case Study. 130 

4-2 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Villages, 
Households and the Number Selected and 

Interviewed for Case Study 132 

4-3 Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes: 
Villages, Households and the Number Selected 

and Interviewed for Case Study 133 

4-4 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: 
Reported Membership and the Number of 

Members/Households Interviewed 134 

4-5 Communal Area (Peasant) Sector: Areas, 

Subdivisions, Households Selected and Interviewed 136 

4-6 Small-Scale Commercial Farmers Sector: 

Area, Households Selected and Interviewed. .... 138 

4- 7 Large-scale Commercial Farmers Sector: Area, 

Farmers Identified, Sampled and Surveyed ..... 138 

5- 1 Zimbabwe: Provincial Distribution of Resettlement 

Models and Schemes, September 1985 ...... 148 

5-2 Government Agencies and Their Respective 

Duties in the Area of Resettlement . 159 



XXIX 



7-1 Mashonalaad Central Province: Farmers' Home Country 212 

7-2 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Home Province .... 212 

7-3 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Communal Area .... 213 

7-4 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Age . , 213 

7-5 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Gender 215 

7-6 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' fferital Status. . . . 215 

7-7 Mashonaland Central Province: Marriage Structures of 

Male Farmers 

7-8 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Wives Married 

by Male Farmers Since 1980 216 

7-9 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Living 

Children of Farmers ^18 

7-10 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Children 

Born to Farmers in 1980-1985 , 218 

7-11 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Level of 

School Completed 219 

7-12 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Non- 
Agricultural Skills. . . , , 219 

7-13 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers Household Size .... 221 

7-14 Mashonaland Central Province: Distribution of 

Household Developmental Cycle Types. ...... 222 

7-15 Model A Schemes: Farmers' First Source of 

Information About Resettlement Program ... 224 

7-16 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Reasons for Resettlement ..... 224 

7-17 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Recommendation to Improve 

the Effectiveness of Resettlement Team 226 

7-18 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers' 

Occupations Prior to Joining the Cooperative . . 228 

7-19 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers' 

Residence Prior to Joining the Cooperative 228 

7-20 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers' 

First Sources of Information About the Cooperative ..... 229 

7-21 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members 

Reasons for Joining the Cooperative 229 

xiv 



7-22 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Some General 
Responses to Resettlement and Organizational Issues 
Relating to Their Cooperative 231 

7-23 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members' 

Duration of Stay in Their Cooperatives ...... 234 

7-24 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members' 

Expected Incomes for Work Done in 1984-85 Season 234 

7-25 Communal Area: Farmers' Responses to Issues Relating 

to the Communal Land Problem and Resettlement. . . 236 

7-26 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' If Relatives 

Have Been Resettled and in Which Model . 238 

7-27 Mashonaland Central Province: Commercial Farmers' 
Ratings of Issues About Government's Agricultural 
and Resettlement Policies 240 

7-28 Mashonaland Central Province: Commercial Farmers' 

Responses to Other Questions About the Resettlement 

Program 240 

7-29 Resettlement and Small-Scale Commercial Farmers' 
Responses as to Where Lands are Available for 

Resettlement ...... ?41 

7-30 Mashonaland Central Province: Resettlement and 
Area Communal Farmers' Responses Towards Common 

Access to Resettlement Resources 243 

7-31 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Rating of 
Government's Policy to Socialize the Country's 

Agriculture 9^5 

7-32 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' 

Recommendation for Better Agriculture for 

the Country 245 

7-33 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Conception 

of Attributes of a "Good Life" (Upenyu Hwakanaka) 248 

7-34 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Response 

as to Whether or not Good Life is Possible in this 

Area/ Farming System for Farmer and Children. . . 248 

7-3 5 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preference 
for Job Location if Wage Emplo}mient is the Only 

Option for Achievement of a Good Life 250 

7-36 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preference 
for Farming System if Agriculture is the Only 

Option for Achievement of a Good Life 250 



XV 



7-37 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Choice of 

Likely Items in Wich to Invest $1,000 ........... 252 

7-38 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Choice of 
Post-School Profession for Their Children 
Compared With Self-Choice By Graduating Students 

From Mufurudzi Model A Scheme Elementary Schools . 252 

7-39 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preceptions 

of Life Situations ..... ..... 255 

7-40 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Ownership 

of Household Items 257 

7-41 Mashonaland Central Province: When Household 

Material Items Acquired 258 

7-42 Mashonaland Central Province: Whether Farmers' 

Purchased Clothing Items in 1985 259 

7-43 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Ownership 

of Production/ Capital Assets 260 

7-44 Mashonaland Central Province: When Production/ 

Capital Assets Acquired. . . . . , 261 

7-45 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Cattle 

Owned by Farmers 263 

7-46 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Donkeys 

Owned by Farmers 263 

7-47 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Goats 

Owned by Farmers ............. .... 265 

7-48 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Sheep 

Owned by Farmers 265 

7-49 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 
Problems They Faced in the Initial Years of 

Resettlement ........... 267 

7-50 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 
Problems Tney Faced at the Beginning of the 

1985-86 Season 269 

7-51 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 

Sources of Problems They Faced at the Beginning 

of the 1985-86 Season 9ftQ 

7-52 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 

Problems They Encounter With the Agricultural 

Finance Corporation , 270 



XV i 



7-53 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 
Problems They Encounter With the Grain 

Marketing Board. „ C71 

7-54 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 
Problems They Encounter With the Cotton 

Marketing Board. ^ 97^ 

7-55 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 

Their Resettlement Scheme Needs 273 

7-56 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of 

Who to Provide Resettlement Scheme Needs 273 

7-5 7 Communal Area: Farmers' Identification of 

Problems Affecting Their Agricultural Performance 274 

7-58 Communal Area: Farmers' Proposed Solutions to 
the Problems Affecting Tlieir Agricultural 

Performance. ..... 276 

7-59 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle 

Types and Mean Household Producer Units 278 

7- 60 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle 

Types and Mean Household Consumer Units, . 278 

7-61 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle 

Types and Mean Household Head of Cattle Owned 280 

7-62 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle 

Types and Mean Household Hectares Cultivated 280 

7- 63 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle 

Types and Mean Household (91 Kilograms) Bags of 

Maize Retained for Consumption ...... 284 

7-64 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle 

Types and Mean Household Net Farm cash Flow. ... 284 

7-65 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Producer and 
Consumer Units Ratio, Mean Hectares Cultivated 

and Mean Net Farm Cash Flow 287 

7-66 Model A Schemes: Producer Units and Mean Per Capita 

Net Cash Income. , 288 

8- 1 Zimbabwe: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural 

Development Budget Expenditure 1981-82/1985-86 . 299 

8- 2 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of 

Return Selected Model A Normal Intensive Schemes . 302 



xvil 



8-3 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of 
Return for Selected Model B Producer Cooperative 
Schemes , 3O3 

8-4 Zimbabwe: Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital 
Expenditure and Balance for Model A and Model B 

Normal Intensive Schemes as at July 31 , 1985 305 

8-5 Mashonaland Region: List of Resettlement Models 

and Schemes December 1985. ..... . 311 

8-6 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers' 

Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles 

in Model A Schemes 3^4 

8-7 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers' 

Evaluation of Implementation Agencies and Related 

Services in Model A Normal Intensive Schemes 316 

8-8 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers' 

Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles 

in Model B Schemes 319 

8-9 Mashonaland Region: Model B Producer Cooperative 
Schemes' Management Committees Identification of 
Problems and Their Suggested Solutions .... 321 

3-10 Mashonaland Region: Government's Grants, Expenditures 
and Balance on Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes 
From 1980 to July 31 , 1985 323 

8-11 Mashonaland Region: Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) Loans to Selected Model B Producer Cooperative 
Schemes ^ 325 

8-12 Mashonaland Region: NonGovernmental Organizations 
(NGOs) Aid and Financial Assistance to Selected 

Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes 326 

8-13 Mashonaland Region: Target Membership and Trends 

in Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes, 1983-1985 336 

8-14 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Number of 

Households, Arable and Livestock Capacities 340 

8-15 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Project Costs, 

Expenditure and Balance as at July 31 , 1985. . , 347 

8-16 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Build-TJp 

to Target Income Levels. 349 

8-17 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Livestock 

Build-Up to Target Income Levels 35O 



xviii 



8-18 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Summary of Crop 

and Livestock Build-Up to Target Income Levels 350 

8-19 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in 

Households' Land Use Intensity, 1982-83/1984-85 355 

8-20 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Households' 

Land Use Characteristics, 1984-85 Season 356 

8-21 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in 

Households Maize Productivity 358 

8-22 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in 

Households Cotton Productivity . . 359 

8-23 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in Maize 

Production, Household Retention and Sale 361 

8-24 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in Mean 

Household Maize Retentions for Domestic Use 362 

8-25 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in the 

Build-Up of Cattle Herds , 363 

8-25 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Costs and 

Returns, 1984-85 Season 364 

8-27 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme: 
Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital Expenditure 
and Balance as at July 31, 1985 367 

8-28 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme: 

Cropping Budget 37O 

8-29 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme: 
Membership and Cropping Management Problems, 

1984-85 Season 373 



xix 



LIST OF FIGURES 



FIGURES Pages 

1- 1 Zimbabwe: Resettlement and Rural Development 

Mod el .... 15 

2- 1 Zimbabwe: Admninistrative Provinces 25 

2-2 Zimbabwe: Regional Distribution of 

Cultural Groups. ....... , 27 

2-3 Zimbabwe: Distribution of Natural Regions 30 

4- 1 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Schemes and 

Areas Visited During Various Phases of the 

Field Research , 114 

5- 1 Zimbabwe: Organizational Structure of Resettlement 

Administration and Implementation. 152 

7-1 Mashonaland Central Province: Case Study Areas 206 

7- 2 Good Life-Difficult Life Continuum 253 

8- 1 Mashonaland Region: Distribution of Resettlement 

Models and Schemes ........ 312 

8-2 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Resettlement 

Villages and Adjoining Farming Systems .... . 341 

8-3 Mount Darwin and Bindura: Probability of Rainfall 

in Excess of 15 millimeter Occurring Within a Pentad 

Versus The Possibility of a Dry Spell in Excess 

of Twenty Days 343 

8-4 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme: 
Projected Build-Up to Target Membership Compared 



With Trends in Actual Membership, 1981-1985 376 



X3C 



Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of 
the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 

GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE 
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE 

By 

KOFI AKWABI-AMEYAW 

April 1988 

Chairman: Professor Brian M. du Toit 
Major Department: Anthropology 

This dissertation is based on fieldwork carried out in the Ministry of 
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and also among farmers in Zimbabwe, 
Southern Africa. It examines (1) the resettlement policy formulated and 
implemented by the government since independence in 1980 and (2) employs 
Fortes' concept of developmental cycle in domestic groups to study aspects of 
the responses of the country's farmers towards the policy and its programs. 

The on-going project seeks to resettle 162,000 landless African families 
on Europe an- owned lands which were either abandoned or are currently 
underutilized. In the government's view the program is necessary to redress 
years of forced removals of Africans from their ancestral lands onto marginal 
agricultural areas by Rhodesian settler administrations, a problem that 
resulted in nearly a decade of a bitterly fought liberation war. The 
government hopes also to ensure a broad based economic growth by integrating 
the existing dualistic African subsistence-oriented and the European 
commercialized sectors of the country's political economy. Critics of the 
program cite a dialetical contradiction between greater equity on the one hand 
and sustained economic growth on the other to argue that Zimbabwe may lose on 
both the growth and the equity fronts. 



XXI 



The research examined the program implementation through (1) the study of 
official records of development inputs and outcomes, (2) direct observation 
and (3) regional case study survey interviews of 630 farmers across the 
existing farming systems, namely, the (i) Large-Scale (European) Commercial, 
(ii) Small-scale (elite African) Commercial, (iii) Communal Area (African 
peasant), (iv) resettlement Model A individual households and (v) the 
resettlement Model B Producer Cooperatives sectors. 

The study found that (I) the government is making tremendous progress 
with the provision of the basic needs of these rural people; (2) the great 
majority of peasant farmers especially the Model A resettled families are 
agriculturally quite productive; (3) there are macro-level problems, however, 
such as low membership in the Model B cooperative schemes which seriously 
affect their performance and productivity; (4) contrary to the critics- 
predictions resettlement has not impacted negatively on commercial agriculture 
and economic growth; and (5) contrary to the government's developmental 
assumptions resettlement is not reducing but rather it is accentuating, at the 
micro-level, the already existing socioeconomic differentiation within and 
between these rural societies. 



xxii 



CHAPTER r 
INTRODUCTION 



The Background to the Research Problem 

Rural and agricultural development in Zimbabwe, the most recent of the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to attain political independence, is an 
epitome of the variety of problems, the challenges and the strategies of 
nation-building and economic development that confront the continent. The 
mobilization by African countries of their predominantly rural-based human, 
institutional, material and other resources for economic growth and 
development is a monumental task. Of crucial concern presently and in the 
long-run is the ability of these countries to successfully motivate and 
sustain the capacity of the rural sector to produce adequate quantities of 
agricultural and other materials to meet both their subsistence and market 
demands , 

The period since the late 1960s has been particularly devastating for the 
political economies of many the countries. Generally, progress has been made 
in various fields of endeavors such as the provision of basic human needs 
including health facilities and educational opportunities. However, most 
countries continue to experience declining per capita food production, low 
agricultural output and negligible economic growth. The major consequences of 
this state of affairs include severe hunger, starvation, malnutrition and 
deaths in some places. 

Indeed, countries of widely differing political and developmental 
ideologies, historical backgrounds, geographic sizes and economic resource 
bases are all equally afflicted with one or the other dimension of this 



2 

problem. The Afric an food crisis , as the problem has come to be 
conceptualized in the international community, is real. It relates in the 
broadest contexts to questions of development policy, strategies and 
outcomes . 

The seriousness and the global implications of the crisis are emphasized 
succinctly by John Lewis who writes: 



For several years now, much of the international 
community's time for the discussion of development 
has been preempted by Sub-Saharan Africa. The news 
there is nearly all bad. In a region where independent 
governments have been pursuing explicit, often formally 
planned, development efforts for a quarter-century, 
where dozens of aid donors have been at work for much 
of that time, and where both investment and aid per 
capita have been fairly high by Third World standards 
for many years, average per capita incomes are actually 
lower than they were fifteen years ago ... By and 
large, the continent has become one great composite 
case of development not working. (Lewis 1986:17) 



Students and analysts of African development and underdevelopment offer 
various explanations to account for the lack of economic growth and the 
consequent developmental crisis that engulf the continent.^ 

One major area of criticism, which is very well articulated in the 
literature, concerns the development policies pursued by these countries. 
Recently, for instance, Robert Bates (1984a) has charged that many African 
governments follow policies that foster agricultural decline. The World 
Bank's (1981) policy paper Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Agenda for Action, echoes a similar view that blames Africa's "overextended 
public sector" for the crisis. Benno Ndulu (1986), writing about governance 
and economic management in Africa, takes up this point. He argues that too 
much preoccupation by these governments to participate in every area of 
development endeavor has created situations where the available expertise and 



resources are spread thin thus making it difficult to set their priorities 
right. 

There is also the other school of thought which, while recognizing the 
primacy of the state, however, dwells on the forces and relations of 
production. Goran Hyden (1983) argues its case when he suggests that several 
economies in Africa are grinding to a halt because it is both risky and 
costly to operate a modern state on precapitalist modes of production and 
organization. 

Yet other critics perceive the problem at the micro-level. Uma Lele 
(1975), for instance, attributes the lack of success in African development 
to inadequate knowledge of local technical possibilities, small-farmer 
constraints and local institutions." 

At any rate, the state has become a hypertrophic institution in Africa. 
Given its developmental apparatus, policies and particular ideological bent, 
it has increasingly assumed the controlling role over every aspect of 
development. Therefore, in any attempt to evaluate the climate and 
environment for agricultural and related development or the lack of it in 
Africa one needs to approach the state, perhaps, as the most important of all 
the phenomena to understand. 

Equally significant is the role that farmers' institutions play in the 
overall process of change and development. Since these institutions, 
especially the social organization of the forces and relations of production, 
are primarily expressed through household dynamics, one needs also to 
understand the structures, processes and variations within and between 
households . 

Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, became independent in April 1980 after a 
decade of liberation war. This fact is important for at least two reasons. 



First, the birth of the country coincided with the most grim period when all 
of Africa faced a severe economic development crisis. Second, as the 
literature reviewed in Chapter III below indicates the documented experiences 
with specific policies and of countries which have trod the development path 
much longer are voluminous. Zimbabwe can therefore learn and draw important 
lessons from these cases in the process of formulating or adapting 
appropriate and workable policies to suit its needs and aspirations. 

In summary then Zimbabwe represents both a challenge and an opportunity 
especially in terms of development choice and practice in Africa."^ The 
question arises, however, as to what outcome observers of the country's 
contemporary development scenario must expect in the future. Nevertheless, 
the policies that are being formulated and implemented today will shape at 
least the results which are likely to be realized principally in the 
short-terra and perhaps in the long-run. 

At independence, the government set out to tackle its problems of 
nation-building and economic development through the use, among others, of a 
rural development strategy that centers on planned resettlement schemes. This 
is part of the Lancaster House agreement which worked out an independence 
constitution for African majority rule in the country. In line with the 
agreement the government of the United Kingdom partly financed the initial 
purchase by the Zimbabwean government of 1.1 million hectares of abandoned 
or underutilized European-owned lands to resettle 18,000 African farm 
families (Harbeson 1980). It was projected then that by 1985 a total of 
162,000 such families would be resettled at the cost of about $400 million. 

Bill Kinsey (1982:92) points out that the resettlement is the major 
rural development activity and the only sustained public sector program in 
Zimbabwe that has the potential to affect fairly immediately and 



5 

significantly the economic welfare of large numbers of rural dwellers. 

This dissertation seeks therefore to examine the policy dimensions and 
the socioeconomic aspects of the implementation of the resettlement. It will 
also discuss how Zimbabwean farmers view the entire resettlement exercise in 
the general context of the country's agriculture along with their opinions 
about the problems and prospects associated with it. 

The Research Problem 

The on-going resettlement of 162,000 farm families on new agricultural 
lands is a massive egalitarian commitment on the part of the government. Like 
all other public sector development programs in the country the parameters of 
resettlement are set in the ideological context of socialism. As numerous 
other experiences bear out this fact has significant implications for the 
nature of state policies and involvement relating to the means and the ends 
of development (see for instance, Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kenya 1965; 
Nyerere 1968; Samoff 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ellman 1981; Munslow 
1983). 

Specifically, the government of Zimbabwe seeks through policy changes to 
effect structural and other needed transformations in the distribution of the 
country's agricultural land resources. This is to achieve stated policy 
objectives. Among them is the rehabilitation of the landless and the 
unemployed on abandoned and underutilized land as a way of ensuring full 
economic production and improving rural living standards (Zimbabwe 1981a:2). 

Part of the government's rationale for embarking on a resettlement-based 
rural development policy is also provided by the then Prime Minister and now 
President Robert Mugabe. In his address to nations and international aid 



6 

organizations at the 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and 
Development he reiterated that his 

Government clearly cannot accept a state of affairs 
in which millions of our people are condemned to a 
life, nay a mere existence, characterised by stagnation, 
hopelessness and desperation. Our struggle for national 
liberation — protracted, incalculably costly and herculean 
as it was — would lose meaning were we, in the moment of 
victory and the era of peace, to allow millions of our 
people to wallow in poverty and degradation as victims 
of forces beyond their control. (Zimbabwe 1981c:31) 

Given the historical background of the political economy of previous 
land distribution policies in the country, the postindependence agrarian 
reforms and resettlement have met with popular support from the great 
majority of the people. This support emanates largely from the populace which 
clamors for social or redistributive justice. There are others, however, who 
are disappointed with resettlement for various reasons. These fall into two 
different social classes. 

In the first category are a number of effectively landless, prospective 
applicants and others who are on waiting lists for resettlement. Many of 
these people lament the slow pace of current resettlement. Some in particular 
are even shocked at the inaction of the government to expropriate all 
European farms. As one informant quipped, "the government owes us a duty to 
confisticate and distribute the vast hectares of our ancestral lands which . 
were previously stolen and are currently being held by so-called European 
owners." Such critics either impatiently or justifiably accuse the government 
of softness, breach of promises made during the liberation war and even for 
condoning the status quo in so far as racial inequities in land 
distribution are concerned. 

The disappointments of these critics were first articulated by Andre 



Astrow (1983) and more recently in a publication edited by Tbbo Mandaza 
(1986). In the latter Sam Moyo (1986) argues that contrary to state 
propaganda and widespread publicity abroad less than 20 percent of the 
peasantry have profited from the so-called success story of Zimbabwe's 
agriculture, particularly in terras of the land redistribution program. 

On the other hand there are some European and African commercial farmers 
who oppose resettlement. Their argument is that resettlement is likely to be 
detrimental to the conservation of the fragile natural resource base of the 
country. They charge that overstocking, uncontrolled land use and poor 
agricultural practices are a characteristic of "inexperience" farmers such as 
the resettled. Thus, they predict resettlement will surely lead to the 
underdevelopment of the country's agriculture. In their view resettlement is 
nothing more or less than the mere extension of the pitiful human and 
ecological conditions that are found in the so-called communal or African 
rural areas into the Intensive Cultivation Areas (ICAs) or the commercial 
farm lands. 

These views were re-echoed in June 27, 1985, by a former leading 
opposition politician in the country, Joshua Nkomo now Zimbabwe's Second 
Vice-President. In response to questions about resettlement in a Face to 
^^^^ interview on Zimbabwe television, Nkomo, then President of the 
Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe All Peoples Union (PF-ZAPU), had this to say: (1) 
The ZANU-PF government's resettlement program was destructive; (2) it was 
turning rich fertile farm land into deserts; (3) it was wasting millions of 
acres; (4) taking two thousand people from the communal [African rural] areas 
and settling them on a farm which used to be managed by one man was turning 
the resettlement areas into communal areas and (5) that the whole country 
needed resettlement and not only a few.^ 



The central focus of the anti-resettlement criticism has also been 
related to a series of substantive issues that, in summary, question the 
efficacy of resettlement as the correct strategy to achieve stated 
developmental objectives. This criticism is built upon the theoretical and 
conceptual arguments in the rural development literature. It asserts that 
there is a dialectical contradiction between greater political and social 
equity on one hand and sustained economic growth on the other. 

Bill Kinsey (1982:93), articulates this viewpoint cogently with a 
prediction that the Zimbabwean "society may lose on both the growth and 
equity fronts." Specifically, he (Kinsey 1982) raises the following 
additional concerns, arguing that 



1. resettlement as an instrument for the implementation of 

a policy of egal itar ianism cannot be operated consistently 
in terras of its own objectives without at the same time 
reducing to unacceptable levels commercial agriculture's 
important contribution to the national economy; 

2. resettlement on the scale now envisaged may do severe 
damage in the short run to the economic growth potential 
of the agricultural sector as a whole, thereby reducing 
the resources available to the government for future 
investment in promotion of development; 

3. resettlement on an individual basis will create powerful 
class interests that will be more difficult to reform in 
the future than is the conflict between black and white 
interests at present. 



Some of these views are shared, for instance, by other critics including 
Malcolm Blackie ( 1982) and the Whitsun Foundation (I^mitsun 1983). 

These matters contested by the various observers have important 
ramifications for evaluation research. Of particular interest are (1) the 
issues that governmental policy about agriculture, resettlement and rural 
development seeks to address, (2) the outcomes of such policy, in terms of 



9 

its intended and unintended consequences and (3) the attitudes and responses 
that the implementation of such policy is likely to generate among the 
supposed beneficiaries. 

The research problem then is essentially an evaluative one. It is 
organized around the state on the one hand and individual rural households on 
the other. This study is mindful of the nature and levels of the 
interactional network which links the two major actors in the development 
arena. The choice of actors reflects the reality which obtains in Africa. It 
also accords active rather than passive roles to the state and households. 
The respective and mutual capacities of both the state and households to 
create innovative opportunities and to provide the necessary and sufficient 
supportive or participatory conditions for development are immense. 

The state in Africa is the principal, if not the exclusive initiator and 
executor of development policy. Even where private or voluntary and 
non-governmental organizations are an important agency for development it so 
happens that the framework for their operations are set and are closely 
monitored also by respective governments. More importantly, the state is the 
provider of most of the public or collective goods which are used for rural 
development. That is the case in Zimbabwe where in undertaking resettlement 
and rural development the state makes available, free of charge or at below 
market prices, resources that range from land through social and physical 
infrastructures to production incentives. 

Similarly, the cumulative socioeconomic activities of African farm 
households often make a lot of difference between the success and failure of 
government's induced rural development programs such as resettlement.^ Xn 
rural Zimbabwe co-residing composite households living in homesteads which 
dot the spatial scene of the African and Communal Areas are recognizable 



10 

decision-making, production, consumption and reproduction units that 
development planners and executors have to deal with. 

On the basis of the foregoing facts one can deduce from the agricultural 
resettlement policy of the government that it is being implemented in the 
national interest and for the benefit of the rural people. By providing land 
and other basic needs to the rural poor the government hopes to facilitate 
equity and justice as a way of ensuring productivity, economic growth and 
development . 

Farm households and rural dwellers in general are hardly consulted and 
they do not participate in the formulation of policy nor in the 
identification of projects that may be essential to their welfare. 
Surprisingly however, they are often openly supportive of the rural 
development objectives of governments. They welcome whatever production 
resources and incentives which are made available to them. This does not mean 
that these individuals behave and act according to development planning 
projections. As individuals or even groups of like-minded persons they have 
their respective and different development agendas or goals. Indeed, in the 
case of households these are individually differentiated as it is most often 
the case by such factors as (1) demographic characteristics, (2) risk 
averseness, innovativeness and attitudinal profiles and (3) access to 
production assets. Their decision-making calculi, expectations and behaviors 
within the government created developmental environment are also guided by 
differential altruism and self interests. These concerns are in many cases 
not necessarily congruent with the somewhat ideal projections which are made 
by government planners. 

Thus, it is theoretically possible for the state to use incentive or 
reward systems such as the provision of basic human needs and public goods to 



positively influence rural households and thereby achieve stated 
developmental goals. It is important to recognize, however, that since 
different households perceive such influence differently and invariably even 
respond differently to the same stimuli there is always the possibility of 
the occurence of other scenarios in developmental expectation. For example, 
the internal dynamics within and between households as well as any 
disagreements in the agendas of households and that of the government may 
change the outcomes of policy goals and result in diverse and differential 
impacts among the beneficiaries. 

This hypothesis will be elucidated and empirically examined in rural 
Zimbabwe. The study will therefore be concerned with the gathering, analysis 
and use of relevant qualitative and quantitative information to facilitate 
the following: 



1. assessment of the means and ends of the agricultural 
resettlement policy, articulated by the government since 
1980, against the backdrop of the historical evolution 
and the political economy impacts of the country's racial 
patterns of land distribution; 

2. examination of how the resettlement policy is being 
implemented, both at the national, provincial and selected 
individual scheme levels; 

3. eliciting the respective responses of farmers, in terms 
both of their attitudes and perceptions as well as the 
constraints and the performance outcomes that characterize 
their farming systems; 

4. evaluation of the discernible socioeconomic and political 
impacts of aspects of the resettlement which have been 
implemented so far in terms of any differences in opportunity 
or incentive systems, access and control over development 
assets as well as in quality of life. 

Eight years into Zimbabwe's independence and egalitarian resettlement 

and rural development it will be interesting to observe how different 

household structures and organizations are faring in terms of the following 



12 

proxy indices of social formation: (I) ownership of i.) cattle, which is a 
major attribute of a "good life" ( upenyu hwakanaka ), ii.) selected 
household items such as radios, watches and beds and iii.) selected capital 
assets such as ox-carts, plows, sprayers and cultivators; (2) intensity of 
land use; (3) household labor productivity for the tv70 major crops, namely, 
maize and cotton; (4) farm net cash flow; and (5) the quantity of maize 
retained for household consumption. 

Following the lines used in the pioneer work by Hadley Cantril (1963) 
about peoples' concerns and aspirations in the context of socioeconomic 
gratification and quality of life this study will also examine the Shona 
concept of "upenyu hwakanaka" (good life) in much detail. Similar studies in 
Afr ica done, for instance, by Jean Due (1980) in rural Kenya show that an 
individual's estimation of his or her present situation on the basis of 
recollection of the past and perception of the future has significant 
implications for development. Equally important for this study is the work 
done by Robbins and Thompson (1974) on gratification orientations and 
individual modernization in rural Buganda in Uganda (see also Thompson 1975). 

Using a "self-anchoring" scale in the form of a three step stairway 
representing upenyu hwakanaka-upenyu hwakaoma (good life-bad life) 
continuum Zimbabwe farmers will be asked to objectify their life situations 
for the periods before independence in 1980, then 1985 and for 1990. In 
addition, they will be asked to (1) define what to them is the essence of 
development or the attributes of a good life and (2) to specify what they 
will do with an amount of $1,000. 

A systematic field study along these lines may generate the needed 
relevant data to shed light on some of the questions that at least bear on 
the short term dimensions of the research problem. 



13 



Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks 



The Zimbabwean resettlement experience provides an almost ideal 
substantive environment to isolate and study the critical variables that 
relate to the performance of policy programs and social theories in real 
situations of change. It is reflected in the chapter on literature review 
below that far too little attention is paid by anthropologists to how 
development policy decisions initiated by governments get or fail to get 
transformed into impacts. This problem is underscored by Fernea and Kennedy 
(1966:349) who point out that very few studies have been made of processes of 
change as they happen. Consequently, theories of development are yet to fully 
benefit from all dimensions of the intriguing grassroots dynamics that 
characterize the behavior and actions of individuals and their institutional 
relationships with forces of change and development. 

An important aspect of social theory bearing on the research problem 
which is vital for anthropological enquiry into development is the link 
between policy, the environment for its implementation and the kinds of 
responses that are generated in development programs. This issue is 
particularly germane, for instance, in studying agricultural resettlement or 
any development programs which involve human relocations. That is so because 
the anthropological literature on relocation, in general, is critical of such 
programs viewing them as being disruptive of peoples lives. 

Notwithstanding the fact that such a view may be true, it raises serious 
methodological problems as to what dynamics of change lead to which outcomes 
and in what situations. It is legitimate to assume here that only some and 
not all relocations or resettlements worsen the quality of life of the 



14 

affected people. If this is true, then anthropological research design for 
evaluating such programs has to do more by specifying what determinants and 
relationships facilitate or inhibit particular processes of development in 
given circumstances or situations. An analytical model or a conceptual 
formulation that addresses such methodological deficiencies in evaluation 
studies will aid in a better understanding of the issues at play. 

For example, Cleveland (1971) states that under favorable conditions 
there is high achievement rate for implementing expressed policy. Similarly, 
it is argued by others that value-based actions of policy makers may be most 
determinative of ultimate policy and that articulated goals exert significant 
influence upon behavior (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971; Brewer and Brunner 1975). 
In the same vein, Ronald Havelock (1979) demonstrates that awareness and 
interest are important correlates of acceptance and adoption of particular 
innovations by individuals as well as groups. 

Granting that these assumptions hold there is no reason why the rather 
informative anthropological and other studies of resettlement should not be 
able to utilize them to provide the kinds of useful theoretical insights and 
concepts that explain success or failure of grassroots development. 

Development as a concept may either be an end in itself or a process to 
an end. This study, being an anthropological evaluation of an on-going 
development program, approaches resettlement as a special kind of a social 
organization process that seeks to achieve desirable ends for rural 
Zimbabweans. The process is viewed as multifaceted in nature. Its end or 
policy objectives may only materialize given a particular constellation of 
factors and environments. In order for the resettlement to achieve any 
identifiable impacts or outcomes it is necessary that the clearly distinct 
components or clusters of variables which characterize it have to be 



15 

manipulated, harmoniously integrated and mutually sustained. These components 
are (1) policy, (2) implementation, (3) intervening conditions and (4) the 
beneficiaries . 

A simplified analytical framework is introduced here in the form of a 

resettlement and rural development model. This framework uses the four 

independent or determining variables to provide the broad parameters of the 

organizational structures and relationships that initially conceptualize the 

nature of the development process under study (Figure 1-1). The model provides 

for the following: (1) program inputs in the form of the government's policy 

objectives, resources and implementing structures which are considered here to 

be a necessary condition for development; (2) policy beneficiaries who respond 

to program incentives or inputs in the context of their own respective 

interpretations or conceptions of what development objectives are; (3) the 

effects and reactions to intervening political, social and economic conditions 

both by the government and the policy beneficiaries alike; and (4) the 

creation of intended or unintended impacts or development outcomes. These 

compartimentalized entities may be seen as constituting program inputs, the 

bridging outputs or the proximate and ultimate goals of development. The 

analytical specifications of this model conform to those recognised by many 

6 

policy and evaluation studies. 

Ideally, development theory should provide sufficient explanation of how 
a rural development process based on resettlement programs of this nature is 
able to transform policy objectives and resources into desirable ends. But 
there is a paucity of pertinent information on that in the development 
literature.^ One therefore has to look elsewhere beyond the abstract into 
substantive areas of empirical reality or the contextual rural situation for 
conceptual guidance. 



16 



Obj ectives 



Policy- 



Resources 



"A" 



Implementing Agencies 
and Structures 



Beneficiaries 

s — 



Intervening Conditions 



Impacts 



Program Inputs 



Bridging Outputs 



Proximate/Ul timate 
Goal s 



FIGURE: 1 - 1 



ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL 



17 

Given our research problem and the analytical framework proposed for this 
study, it will be heuristically fruitful to evaluate aspects of the 
resettlement program in terms of the concept of developmental cycle in 
domestic groups ( Fortes : 197 1 ) . According to Meyer Fortes (1970:7), domestic 
groups have no permanent existence through time, in that each group comes into 
being, grows and expands and finally dissolves (see also Goody 1971). 

As already indicated, demographic and social differentiation as well as 
the structural dynamics within and between households are crucially important 
in accounting for the success or failure of the formulation, planning, 
implementation and outcomes of development policy and programs. Household 
economic performance is the crucially determinant variable in the overall 
prospects for a successful rural development and resettlement outcome in 
Zimbabwe. Tlie application of Fortes' paradigm to evaluate such performance 
will immensely improve our understanding of the role of social organization in 
development and change. As argued by its proponent, Meyer Fortes (1971:3), the 
"developmental factor is intrinsic to domestic organization and to ignore it 
leads to serious misinterpretation of the descriptive facts." 

This study conceptualizes the household developmental cycle in rural 
Zimbabwe into four structurally distinct but sequential phases.^ These are 
(1) establishment, (2) expansion, (3) consolidation and (4) decline. Two 
special "phases," namely. Single and Other are added (see Appendix A). The 
application of such dynamic variables as age, conjugal form and gender of the 
household head, the presence or absence of extended-kinship relations and the 
structural state of fission of the household makes it possible to duplicate 
other sub-types of the major phases, ^ This added flexibility to the 
framework may facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of the data and a 



18 



better understanding of any patterns or variations than would otherwise be 
the case. 

Scope of the Study 

This introductory chapter defines the research problem, the analytical 
and conceptual frameworks and the scope of the study. Chapter II reviews the 
background material on the geography and history of Zimbabwe. It traces the 
peopling of the country and emphasises the political economy dimensions of 
the evolution of racial dichotomy in land ownership and land use during the 
settler period of colonial Rhodesia. It then examines the impacts of various 
colonial land policies on rural Africans. Finally, it reviews the 
post-independence development challenges and prospects that confront 
Zimbabwe . 

Chapter III is the review of the literature. It covers (1) the state and 
agricultural development, (2) state ideology, public choice and the 
individual, (3) the smallholder and cooperative modes of production, (4) 
rural development, (5) poverty-focused strategies, (6) land reform, (7) 
resettlement programs and (8) household dynamics and organization. The 
emphasis here is to draw out the lessons that these issues raise in either 
effecting or stifling change and development in Africa and other developing 
areas. The purpose of such a review also is to provide the theoretical and 
the substantive contexts for describing the on-going development 
experimentation within Zimbabwe. 

Chapter IV outlines specific aspects of the fieldwork and research 
methodology. It covers the initial experiences and the kinds of environments 
within which the study was done. It describes the data sources and collection 



19 

techniques, study variables, sample units and analysis. 

Chapter V deals with the main dimensions of the government's 
resettlement policy in terms of its structural and organizational components. 
These are the objectives of resettlement, land acquisition, planning and 
implementation models, farmer selection and land allocation and the 
implementation and administrative set ups for the program. Chapter VI 
provides contextual background notes about (I) the old farming systems of the 
country, namely, the large and the small-scale commercial as well as the 
communal sectors and (2) the newly introduced systems made up of the 
resettlement sector farms. Of the latter only the two important models, that 
is, the Model A Normal individual household schemes and the Model B 
collective schemes are examined. The Chapter provides the prelude to the 
presentation of farmers' interview responses to the resettlement program. 

In Chapter VII the analysis and description of a case study of the 
responses of Zimbabwean farmers towards the resettlement policy and programs 
initiated and being implemented by the government are offered. Based on 
survey interviews, key informants interviews and observations in the 
Mashonaland Central Province this case study covers farmers in the six major 
farming systems in the country. The chapter is divided into seven parts to 
cover (1) the background responses of the so-called commercial farmers, (2) 
the social and demographic characteristics of farmers and their households, 
(3) farmers' attitudes and perceptions about their life situations, (4) 
farmers' assessment of resettlement and aspects of the government's policies 
on agriculture and rural development, (5) household material resources and 
capital assets that farmers possess, (6) farm-level problems encountered by 
farmers and (7) household developmental cycle, micro-level agricultural 
characteristics and economic performance. 



20 

Chapter VIII returns to the resettlement schemes. It presents the 
economic feasibility or pre-implementation performance expectations of 
selected schemes and models of the resettlement. A preliminary and general 
evaluation of the actual performance and the problems associated with the 
schemes implemented in the three provinces in the Mahonaland Region are 
given. The achievements and the disappointing outcomes of a contrasting Model 
A scheme and a Model B scheme chosen from a case study in the Mashonaland 
Central Province are also presented in this chapter. 

Chapter IX is a summary and discussion of the research findings, 
recommendations and conclusion. Its looks at the political economy and social 
dimensions of macro and micro-level impacts of resettlement in Zimbabwe and 
also the policy and theoretical implications of the findings for rural 
development planning and evaluation studies. 



21 



Notes 



1. ) The causes of agricultural underdevelopment in Africa have over the 
years been an issue of a long shifting debate. It used to be fashionable in 
the past to cite social attitudes and cultural barriers to efficient and 
productive resource allocation and utilization by traditional farmers as an 
impediment to growth. Latter critics then blamed the problem on one or more 
of these institutional deficiencies: (1) land tenure systems and practices; 
(2) lack of credit and savings; (3) non-availability of production and 
marketing incentives; (4) policy bias for state-controlled, large-scale and 
mechanized production units; (5) urban food subsidies and changing consumer 
tastes; and (6) industrialization and the consequent neglect of the 
small-holder rural producer. The current thinking on the issue, apparently is 
not about the failure of African farmers anymore or the lack of institutions 
per se but rather the failure of ineffective and perverse agricultural 
policies formulated and implemented by African governments. 

2. ) For additional overview of the food problem, an elaboration of the 
various policy and substantive aspects of it, as well as its impacts on the 
general economic crisis facing the continent see Bates and Lofchie (1980), 
USDA (1981), Hyden (1983), Dharam and Radwan (1983), Lofchie and Commins 
(1984), Delgado and Mellor (1984), Barker (1984), Berry (1984), Gusten 
(1984), Christensen (1984), Rose (1985), Brown and Wolf (1985), Due (1986), 
Eicher (1986a, 1986b), Hansen and McMillan (1986), Ravenhill (1986), Berg and 
Whitaker (1986), Mellor (1986), Baker (1987). 

3. ) Gordon' ( 1984) is right in pointing out that Zimbabwe is a dialectician's 
dream. Both the Left and the Right, respectively, see the future of the 
country in antithetical terms. Consequently, the role of Zimbabwe in shaping 
the particular kind of development ideology that will eventually emerge in 
Africa is being closely watched. For instance John Iliffe (1983:43) argues 
that, "[t]he future of Zimbabwe will be a fascinating test of the relative 
strength in modern Africa of state policy as against inherited objective 
reality. And the future of Zimbabwe is absolutely vital to the future of 
capitalism in Africa." To this Rafael Suarez (1984:12) adds that the 
postindependence record of the country is a mixed one and that if Prime 
Minister Mugabe continues to talk like Marx and act like Keynes, the country 
could turn out to be a strong, wealthy and stable place indeed. For other 
perspectives on this debate see, for example, Bratton (1977, 1978, 1981), 
Yates (1980), Munslow (1980a, 1983), Ballance (1981), Libby (1984). 

4. ) In June 1985, prior to Zimbabwe's second general elections, leaders of 
all the political parties in the country were respectively interviewed about 
domestic and international issues. Resettlement was an important question 
that came up among many others. On June 28, 1985, Nathan Shamuyarira, 
Minister of Information appeared on national television as the spokesman for 
the ruling ZANU-PF party. He responded to the assertions made by Nkorao the 
previous day by saying that Nkomo was not in agreement with land reform and 
resettlement at the Lancaster House negotiations [in London where an 
independence constitution for Zimbabwe was worked out] and that he, Nkomo, 
did not support the policy while serving as a Cabinet Minister in the ZANU-PF 
government . 



22 



5. ) Both the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa have used various 
methods including legislation and even coercive measures to penetrate and 
manipulate traditional or indigenous systems and institutions. In many- 
instances these systems have been eliminated or altered substantially into 
becoming mere carbon copies of what they used to be in pre-colonial times. We 
can mention authority and power structures such as chieftaincy, certain 
lineage and family rights and obligations in respect of bethrothal, marriage, 
divorce, property transfers, and collective ownership or access to particular 
resources. Yet, as Goran Hyden (1983) convincingly dem^onstrates for Tanzania 
and it is common place throughout Africa, the state is unable successfully to 
"capture," intrude, coerce, or even bribe the rural people to either 
eliminate, modify, or "modernize" the indigenous agricultural syst ems and 
their related institutions. 

6. ) For example, Hunter ejt al^ ( 1976:10) suggest at least four criteria 
to analyse rural development. These are (1) the technical, ecological and 
economic situation of the farming community concerned; (2) the attitudes, 
capacities and needs of the farmers themselves; (3) the nature of the 
marketing and processing channels; and (4) the administrative resources of 
the government as the directing agency of change. 

7. ) Economics has played a dominant role in every attempt at constructing 
development theories. In this context macroeconomic problems have almost 
always consLi Luted the key issue in the discipline. In microeconomic thinking 
development implies some definite change either in the rate of growth, the 
structure of the economy, or both. But as Lancaster (1973:710-711) points 
out, "historically, economic development was not the product of conscious 
economic policy. Modern economics, which grew up with the development of 
European industrialization over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was 
on the sidelines explaining what was happening rather than causing it to 
happen." Subsequently, distinct thoughts in economic history, namely, 
classical, neo-classical, Keynesian, Marxist, structuralism, modernization 
and dependency have all been overtly macro-dimensional. As a result they have 
not been able to successfully account for what causes or does not cause 
development to occur at the grassroots or at the micro-level in such specific 
locations as households. (See, for example. Hill's (1986) criticism. For 
another penetrating assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
micro-economic policy analysis in the area of development see Adelman 1975b; 
Hirschman 1981; Rhoads 1985; and Hill 1986). 

8. ) Low (1982a:144) elaborates upon Fortes developmental cycle classifying 
domestic groups into establishment, expansion, consolidation, fission, 
decline, and female-headed (see also du Toit 1974:290fn). 

9. ) Using essentially Low's (1982a) classification derived from Fortes' 
framework the developmental cycle in rural Zimbabwe is conceptualized to 
comprise the following phases: (1) single; (2) establishment; (3) expansion; 
(4) consolidation; (5) decline; and (6) other. Unlike Low I do not see 
fission and f emale-headedness as distinct phases because both are conditions 
that may be associated with any of the six phases delineated here, 
particularly consolidation and decline. The operational definition of each of 
my phases are based on the age composition and structural state of the 
household. For instance, a young adult who is never married and is not a 



23 



dependent qualifies as single. A young couple with an only/or without a child 
is categorised to be in establishment. Spouses still in the prime of 
reproduction with the last child not more than 4 years of age are in 
expansion. Spouses with older children the last of which is 5 or more years 
qualify to be in consolidation. 

The decline phase is made up of older people with households where sons and 
daughters, now grown, have fissioned out. The category "Other" contains all 
cases that do not fit neatly into any of the five proceeding phases. These 
phases are conceptual states derived from household structure and 
organization. They reflect the socio-deraographic realities of rural Zimbabwe 
to which they are applied here. The utility of the model is enhanced by 
building into it additional flexibility using the following information: (1) 
the gender and marital state of the _de facto household head; (2) whether 
marriage is monogamous or polygynous; (3) the presence or absence of kins and 
affines; and (4) whether the household is pre-fission, fissioning, or 
post-fission. See Appendix A for the resultant typology. 

10.) Fortes (1949:63-77) first used the developmental cycle frame of analysis 
among the Tallensi to account for variations in the synchronic constitution 
of what he called the agnatic joint family. It is apparent that he did not 
fully utilize the concept as much as he should to elucidate the emergence, 
growth and decline of Tale households. Indeed, he concentrated on the 
constant fissioning of homesteads which he blamed on intra-sibling conflicts. 
Elsewhere (Fortes 1970:vii), he was unable to apply the concept to the 
Ashanti situation because he found that culture to be "much more complex." 
Similarly, a recent application of the concept by San j ek (1983:330-343) to an 
urban African situation only succeeds in the designation of household 
residence roles without yielding any insights into how these roles impact on 
specific developmental processes. 

The inability on the part of these and other researchers to successfully 
apply the concept to situations of change and development stems from the fact 
that they have essentially conceived it in static terms and consequently 
impose it on functional structures. They are thus unable to grasp and utilize 
the essential dynamics of gender, age, conjugal form, and other internal 
features which are in constant interaction within and between different 
households at different phases of the cycle. Yet, it is these dynamics rather 
than the cycle per se which render the concept hueristically useful. A 
similar criticism applies to many development-oriented and applied studies, 
particularly in Farming Systems Research and Extension, which use the 
household as units of analysis. Cases in point include Shaner et al. 
(1982), Norman (1982), and McMillan (1986). 



CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE 



Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting 

Zimbabwe, with a total area of 390,759 square kilometers, is a landlocked 
country that is situated in the southern African region. It lies approximately 
between Latitude 15° 30' south and Latitude 22° 30' south and 
Longitude 25° 00' east and 33° 00' east. 

The Zambezi river forms a major portion of the northern and western 
boundaries of the country while the Linapopo river constitutes the southern 
boundary. In the east and northeast the country shares a border with 
Mozambique, in the northwest with Zambia, southwest with Botswana and in the 
south with South Africa. Politically, Zimbabwe is divided into eight 
administrative provinces. These are Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, 
Mashonaland East, Manicaland , Midlands, Masvingo, Matabeleland North and 
Matabeleland South (Figure 2-1). 

The most recent population census conducted in 1982 gives a preliminary 
total population figure of 7,546,071, of whom less than 200,000 were whites. 
Harare, the capital city, has an estimated population of 656,011. It is 
followed by Bulawayo , 413,814 and Chitungwiza, a dormitory suburb of Harare, 
with 172,556 people. The annual population growth rate averages about 3,1 
percent. The corresponding figure for the urban population is about 7.2 
percent or more, including rural in-raigration (Zimbabwe 1982a). Currently, 80 
percent of the entire population live in the rural areas and the majority of 
these people earn their livelihood directly from agriculture, 

24 



25 




MOZAWBIGUE 



FIGURE 2 - 1 
ZIMBABWE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROVINCES 



26 

Most Zimbabweans, nearly 80 percent of the African population, belong to 
one or the other Shona or Mashona ethno-linguistic group (Sullock 1928; 
Gelfand 1965; Bourdillon 1976). The Ndebele or Matabele is the other major 
cultural group. The rest are the Sena, Tonga, Sotho, Venda and the Hlangwe 
(Xay 1970:28). All these various societies in Zimbabwe are patrilineally 
organized. They also inhabit geographically distinct home regions some of 
which are cut by the country's international boundaries (Figure 2-2). The 
European population, though numerically less significant, constitutes a 
distinct economic power in the country. 

The topography of Zimbabwe is dominated by the Highveld. This is a large 
plateau occupying 20 percent of the land area which runs through the center of 
the country from the southwest to the north. Its general altitude is about 
1,200 meters above sea level though it occasionally rises to over 1,700 
meters. In the east, along the border with Mozambique, the plateau develops 
into a ridge of escarpments where the Inyangani reaches a height of almost 
2,500 meters above sea level. Of the remaining area of the country, 60 percent 
has an altitude of between 600 meters and 1,200 meters above sea level and it 
is termed the Midveld . The third physiographic region of the country is the 
Lowveld formed by the valleys of the Zambezi in the north and west, the 
Limpopo in the south and the Sabi-Lundi basin in the south-east. These valleys 
range in altitudes from between 300 meters to 900 meters above sea level (Fair 
1964; Andrews 1964; Kay 1970:13; l^^litlow 1982). The geological base of 
Zimbabwe consists mostly of granites and other igneous and schistose rocks. 
The soils are predominantly sandy with heavier loams and clays occuring in 
relatively small local areas (Miller 1982:10). 



27 




FIGURE 2-2 
ZIMBABWE: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
CULTURAL GROUPS 



Source: Kay 1970:27 



28 

Although Zimbabwe lies entirely within the tropics most of the country- 
experiences sub-tropical climate. Rainfall is seasonal and extremely variable 
(Ngara 1983). It ranges on the average from over 1,500 millimeters annually in 
limited areas of the eastern Manicaland Province to below 300 millimeters in 
the Lowveld. Tl;ie rainy season is unimodal and occurs between the summer months 
of November and April. Generally, the rains are more reliable in the north and 
less so in the south. Likewise, the seasonal total is also more reliable than 
the monthly total. 

Generally, July is the coolest month and October the warmest. Temperature 
intensity corresponds closely with altitude. For instance, Harare on the 
Highveld at a height of about 1,500 meters above sea level has a mean 
temperature of 14°C in July and 22°C in October. In the low-lying 
Zambezi valley, however, the respective means are 20°C in July and 
30°C in October. A wide diurnal range characterizes the winter months. 
Night frosts. that can occasionally be very destructive are not uncommon on the 
high plateaus (Kay 1983:945; McNaughton 1983). Most of the Midveld and Lowveld 
areas carry wooded savanna vegetation. The Highveld, on the other hand, 
consists of savanna grassland with patches of montane forests particularly in 
the eastern Manicaland Province. 

On the whole, the topography, soils and climate of Zimbabwe do not favor 
intensive agricultural production (Miller 1982:10). More than 75 percent of 
the country is subject to conditions that make dryland crop production a risky 
venture. Drought is a persistent problem (Denny 1983; Gammon 1983). Poorer 
sandy soils predominate over most of the land thus severely limiting their use 
for cropping. Only 37 percent of all areas in the country receive more than 
700 millimeters annual average of rainfall considered adequate for intensive 
and semi-intensive farming (Miller 1982:10). 



29 



Even then, when soil quality and land capability are taken into 
consideration, only about 7 to 8 percent of the entire country is suitable for 
intensive dryland cultivation (I^mitsun 1983:12). In sum, Zimbabwe is not as 
well endowed with inherent agricultural resources as it is often claimed. It 
is rather its agricultural expertise which has led to past agricultural 
surpluses, not the resource base (Whitsun 1983:13). 

The authoritative survey of the agricultural potential of the country, 
published by Vincent and Thomas (1960), attests to this fact. Their 
agro-ecological survey, updated by the Department of Agricultural and 
Technical Extension (AGRITEX), uses the rainy pentad criteria to delineate 
Zimbabwe into five Natural Regions (Figure 2-3)."^ These are Region I 
covering 2 percent of the country. Region II 15 percent, Region III 19 
percent, Region IV 38 percent and Region V 27 percent. The regions correlate 
with potential crop yields and livestock carrying capacities of the land. The 
regions and associated features are shown in Table 2-1. 

Agricultural output patterns also show a spatial distribution that 
corresponds with enterprise specialization in the various provinces. Thus, 
among other commodities, Manicaland is noted commercially for tea and 
deciduous or tropical fruits, Masvingo for sugar and beef, Matabeleland North 
and South for beef, Midlands for dairy and other livestock products and the 
three Mashonaland Provinces for maize, tobacco, cotton, soya beans and other 
crops. For instance, in 1980 Mashonaland produced 90 percent of all maize, 92 
percent of the tobacco, 73 percent of the cotton, 63 percent of the wheat, 87 
percent of the soya beans, 94 percent of all peanuts and 87 percent of the 
sorghum making the region Zimbabwe's primary bread basket and source of 
agricultural exports (Whitsun 1983:51-53). 



TABLE 2 - 1 

DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS, RAINFALL AND RELATED 
FARMING SYSTEMS IN RHODESIA 



NATURAL 
REGION 


AREA OF 
COUNTRY 
(%) 


RAINFALL INTENSITY 
( mm/ year ) 


RELATED FARMING 
SYSTEM 


I 


2 


Hleh 
(1,000 or more) 


^-'C ^ -L Cl X X i/ C-VJ. CtLILL 

Diversified 
Cropping 


T T 3 ^ K 


1 J 


Moderate 
(750-1,000) 


Intensive 
Cultivation 


III 


19 


Moderate but Erratic 
(650-800) 


Semi- Intensive 
Cultivation 


IV 


38 


Low 
(450-650) 


Semi-Extensive 
(Ranching) 


V 


27 


Low and Erratic 
(Below 650) 


Extensive 
(Only Ranching) 



Sources: Whitsun (1983:6-7); Billing (1985:6-7). 



Historical Setting 



32 



The past of Zimbabwe is one of large immigrations and settlement shifts. 
David Beach (1980:4) speculates that from about 30,000 B.C., Late Stone Age 
hunter and gathering people who spoke one of the Khoisan group of languages 
had lived on and around the plateau or Highveld. Relying on the available 
archaelogical records Beach (1980:12) identifies that the Early Iron Age 
which is associated with immigrant Bantu-speakers existed round about A.D. 
180. Later Iron Age people who probably included a great many of the Early 
Iron Age groups first appeared circa A.D. 900. By about 1500 they had become 
well established as the Shona speakers with dialect clusters such as the 
Zezuru, Karanga, Kalanga, Korekore, Manyika, Nyanga, Ndau or Shanga (Beach 
1980: 14-18) . 

State formation has also been a feature of Shona polity since the Late 
Iron Age. Four major precolonial states are delineated by David Beach 
(1980:36). These are (1) Zimbabwe which flourished in the south of the 
plateau before about 1500; (2) Torwa which existed around Kharai in the 
southwest from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries; (3) its 
successor, the Changamire state, which lasted until the 1840s; and (4) the 
northern state of Mutapa which survived in one form or another from at least 
the fifteenth to the late nineteenth century, Stanlake Samkange (1969:5) 
argues, therefore, that the Mashona up to the mid-nineteenth century had 
occupied undisturbed all the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo rivers 
stretching eastwards as far as the sea.^ 

From about 1850 onwards the dominance of the Shona, at least 
politically, started undergoing profound transformations with the influx of 
other groups who now form part of the wider Zimbabwean society. For instance, 



33 

the Nguni-speaking Ndebele immigrants under Mzilikazi established themselves 
in the southern part of the plateau north of the Limpopo in 1839-40 (Beach 
1980:226). This development was followed almost immediately by the arrival of 
European settlers. The first of these to make any lasting contacts with the 
Ndebele were the missionaries of the South African based London Missionary 
Society who opened a station at Inyati in 1859 (Nelson 1975: 16). 

In 1888 John Moffat, son of one of the missionaries and the 
representative of the British government in South Africa to the Ndebele 
throne, extracted a treaty from King Lobengula. The import of the treaty was 
to the effect that the Ndebele would not enter into any foreign 
correspondence, treaties or land alienation without prior consultation with 
and approval from the British High Commissoner for South Africa. Shortly 
after this treaty, C. D. Rudd , an agent of Cecil Rhodes a British concession 
seeker who saw himself as the champion of British values and interests in 
Africa obtained a concession from Lobengula for metal and mineral rights 
(Nelson 1975:19). 

On the basis of the Rudd Concession the British government in 1889 
granted a royal charter to Rhodes and his British South Africa Company. The 
charter, according to Percy Hone (1909:1), authorised the company "to take 
over the vast tract of country extending from the Transvaal to Lake 
Tanganyika. . . . The whole territory was named after the conceiver and 
founder of this great project, Mr. Cecil Rhodes." In early 1890, Rhodes sent 
a party of 200 pioneers and 500 mounted mercenaries to claim Ndebele 
territory as a private estate of the company. The following year the Pioneer 
Column entered Mashonaland. 

The British Order in Council of 1891 also placed the company's territory 
under the protection of the queen and authorised her high commissioner in 



34 

South Africa to "administer justice, collect taxes and promote law and order; 
but in practice these functions continued to be carried out by the charter 
company." (Nelson 1975:20). The entry of the Pioneer Column to Mashonaland, 
Hone points out , 

was followed by an influx of white people from the 
southern colonies and from Great Britain. Some entered 
this unknown country for the love of adventure, others 
in the hope of gaining wealth, and a few with the 
intention of settling permanently on the land and 
turning their attention to farming. (Hone 1909:13) 

In 1893 the Column, under Jameson, the then Company administrator of 
Mashonaland, entered Bulawayo and militarily occupied Matabeleland . Three 
years later there was the Matabele uprising which was followed by the more 
protracted Mashona rebellion of 1896-7 (Tsomondo 1977; Beach 1979). 

Both of these early indigenous revolts against settler rule, widely 
referred to as the first chlmurenga or liberation war by Zimbabweans, were 
ruthlessly quelled and the alleged perpetrators severely punished. In 1898, 
"regulations for the good government of the natives" were proclaimed by the 
Company on behalf of the British Crown. As Terrence Ranger (1967:311) 
asserts, "in many ways [the rebellion] was a watershed; after the risings few 
things were the same as they had been before. . . . Southern Rhodesia moved 
steadily towards settler supremacy." 

It was not until 1923 that Southern Rhodesia made a direct transition 
from chartered company rule to a Crown colony status with "responsible 
self-government" still under the control of European settlers (see Gann 
1965). According to Windrich (1975:xvi), union with South Africa was rejected 
as an alternative and a financial settlement with the British South Africa 
Company brought an end to nearly thirty-five years of Company rule. 



35 



The grant of a self-governing status apart, the next major political 
development in the history of the colony did not occur until 1954. That year 
Britain amalgamated Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring colonies of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This created the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, also referred to in some of the literature as the Central African 
Federation. The Federation, strongly opposed by the burgeoning African 
nationalists of the three colonies, was short-lived and broke up in 1963. 

The following year both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved 
political independence becoming Zambia and Malawi respectively. The colony 
was also now known simply as Rhodesia. Two years after the dissolution of the 
Federation, in November 1965, Rhodesia made a "Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence." This development occured because its minority white settler 
regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith failed to get Britain 
to agree to its conditions for independence. 

Rhodesia's independence, illegal in the eyes of Britain and the 
international community, invited worldwide condemnation, non-recognition and 
the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions. For fourteen years, until the 
birth of a new Zimbabwe, Rhodesia held on amidst the bitter liberation war 
waged by the African nationalist armies. 

The Evolution of the Land Problem 

The annexation of Southern Rhodesia and the grant of self government to 
the colony by Britain in 1923 turned out to provide the settlers with the 
carte blanche that enabled them to legislate segregation as the bedrock of 
minority white supremacy in the country. This act unleashed far-reaching 



36 



consequences on later developments In the country. George Kay, in looking at 
the human geography of the impacts of this colonial policy, indicates that 
segregation gave 



rise to a racial division of land and natural resources 
which places most of the natural assets of the country in 
European hands. It has led to geographically separate and 
distinctive residential zones and social facilities in 
areas where, for economic reasons, both Europeans and 
Africans must live in close proximity to common work-places. 
It has divided employment into African and European jobs. 
(Kay 1970:330) 



Specifically in terms of agriculture and incidentally African interests and 
livelihood in Southern R.hodesia land was the crucial issue and still remains 
so. During the colonial period two significant pieces of legislation were 
promulgated that permanently and differentially altered access to land along 
racial lines. These were the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land 
Tenure Act (1969). (See Jordan 1979). 

Indeed, even before the enactment of these Acts land apportionment had 
already began with the Pioneer Column in the early 1390s. Writing about his 
impressions of the agricultural potentialities of the country around the same 
period, Knight, though rather ethnocentric, was quite poetic in his report 
that 



[W]hen one has travelled day after day across the flowerly 
veldt . . . when one beholds the magnificent crops which 
reward the lazy Kaffir for a mere scratching of the soil, 
but a soil inexhaustibly rich . . . one realises that the 
title of the Promised Land was not altogether wrongly 
bestowed on this fair region. (Knight 1895:29) 



Consequently, with the pioneers' occupation of this apparently fertile 
territory the rewards of free or cheap lands, that they had been promised, 



37 



began in earnest. In the Matabeleland highveld for example, according to 
Knight's observation. 



a large number of farms have already been pegged out. Of 
these some 700 are 'volunteer farms,' which were granted 
free to the men who took part in the late expedition. Each 
volunteer farm is 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), carrying with 
it a nominal annual quit rent of ten shillings. . . . Farming 
rights, entitling the holder to peg out 3,000 acres, can also 
be bought directly from the Company at e ighteenpence an acre. 
(Knight 1895:30) 



Elsewhere in Matabeleland, Knight (1895:34) indicates that "one syndicate 
alone [possessed] a magnificient estate of 80,000 acres." Similar rewards 
obtained in Mashonaland where he gives the following account: 

Special farming rights were granted to members of the 
old Pioneer Force. . . . These, like the volunteer rights 
in Matabeleland, entitle the owner to peg out a farm free 
of any conditions as to bona fide occupation. These 
pioneer farms are of 3,000 acres each. (Knight 1895:35) 

From the beginning of the 1890s the settlers started creating the 

"reserves." These consisted of blocks of land set aside under the supervision 

of traditional or community elders for the use of indigenous Africans. The 

first of these was demarcated in Matabeleland. By 1902 most of the Reserves 

in Mashonaland had also been allocated and the African population had been 

moved into them (Riddell 1978a:7). George Kay (1970:49) notes that a decade 

later in 1913, there were "no less than 104 Native Reserves . . . established 

and they ranged from 5,000 acres to 1,500,000 acres." In 1923 the new 

Southern Rhodesian Constitution which transferred the country from Company 

rule to a self-governing colony also confirmed the Reserves as a separate 

3 

socio-economic and political entity. 

The consolidation of settler land holdings was one major activity 
facilitated by the creation of the Reserves. By 1396, the settlers had 



38 



managed to expropriate 15 million acres (Riddell 1978b:5). Five years later 
they had 19 million acres which they increased to 31 million by 1925. This 
included "nearly all land over 3000 feet within 25 miles of the railways." 
(Kay 1970:50). To place this fact in context it should be kept in mind that 
the total land size of Southern Rhodesia at this time was 96.4 million acres 
(38.6 million hectares). 



The Land Apportionment Act was introduced in 1929 but enacted the 
following year and made effective in 1931. The Act did more than merely 
formalize the on-going institutionalization of the division of land along 
racial lines as a legal fact (Bannerman 1982). In addition, it implicitly, if 
not directly, prescribed the concept of "parallel or separate development" as 
official policy. It also intensified the forced removal of many Africans from 
their original homes, then declared European areas and their settlement in 
the Reserves. Elsewhere, Roger Riddell has shown vividly the quantitative 
dimensions of subsequent removals by stating that 

[Bjetween 1931 and 1941, 50,000 people were moved [and] 
'\|^, between 1945 and 1959 another 85,000 were moved. Since 
1964 at least another 88,000 people have been resettled, 
most being evicted from European land where they were 
classified as 'squatters.' . . . The most recent policy 
of settlement has come about as a consequence of the 
present war and it is estimated that 500,000 people have 
been moved into 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages. 
(Riddell 1978a:8-9) 



Another major development emanating from the Land Apportionment Act was 
the creation of the so-called Native Purchase Areas. The purchase areas 
originally covered 3.2 million hectares or nearly 8 percent of the total land 



Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler 
Land Expropriation Policies 



39 

size of the country (Kay 1970:93). For the first time these areas offered the 
right to freehold tenure to Africans. However, this offer was only to a cream 
of progressive farmers who, in the words of Roger Riddell (1978a:8), had 
"proved their farming abilities by obtaining Master Farmer certificates and 
who have the money to buy the land." (Riddell's emphasis). (The current 
production levels and aspects of the socio-deraographic and agricultural 
situation of farmers in two former Purchase Areas are dealt with in the case 
study of farmers' responses which is reported in Chapter VII below. These are 
Ghesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Commercial Areas in the Mashonaland Central 
Province) . 

The segregationist provisions of the Land Apportionment Act were 
implemented for twenty years without much thought about the negative 
consequences that increasingly became manifest in the Reserves. The 
consequences, many of which still persist, included overcrowding, 
overstocking, deterioration of natural resources, landlessness , unemployment, 
declining or stagnant per capita incomes and general underdevelopment 
(Hamilton 1964; Sutcliffe 1971; Mswaka 1974; Phimister 1974; Clarke 1974, 
1975, 1977b; Whitlow 1930; Mashiring wani 1983). Though these problems were 
associated initially with the Reserves, their cumulative repercussions were 
national in the sense that the "excess" influx of the African population into 
the urban areas threatened European urban lifestyles and privileges. 

To stem this trend, the Native Land Husbandry Act was passed in 1951. It 
provided, among other things, regulations for enforcing (1) conservation 
measures, (2) good farming practices, (3) appropriate stocking rates, (4) 
allocation of grazing rights and (5) the consolidation of arable plots in the 
Reserves into compact holdings (Pendered and von Memerty 1955; Garbett 1963; 
Riddell 1978a; Duggan 1980). The Act, however, cannot be said to have 



40 

achieved any of its objectives. By 1962 it had already been abandoned. Seven 
years later, in 1969, as part of the Introduction of the Republican 
Constitution, the forty year old Land Apportionment Act was also updated with 
the enactment of the Land Tenure Act. The new Act set aside 2.6 million 
hectares of the total 38.6 million hectare land area of the country as 
National Land and divided the remaining 36 million hectares equally into 
African Areas (18 million hectares) and European Areas (18 million hectares). 

This in effect generally meant that in absolute terms each African 
communal area or peasant cultivator held 24 hectares as against 185 hectares 
owned by each African elite or freehold farmer in the Purchase Area. In 
further contrast, every European farmer owned nearly 2,300 hectares. On the 
average therefore Europeans cultivated farms that were about 100 times larger 
than their counterparts in the peasant sector (Riddell 1980:3). Table 2-2 
presents an indication of the distributional pattern of land ownership over 
the fifty year period up to 1981. 

The magnitude of the inequities in the land distribution was not 
lessened but was rather perpetuated by the Land Tenure Act. The Act also 
maintained the status quo in respect of the pattern which ensured the 
better endowed agro-ecological regions for the European settlers (Table 2-3). 
j As Billing (1985:36) points out, 74 percent of the African or Communal Areas 
lie in the Natural Regions IV and V which are considered unsuitable for crop 
production. This means that only one-fourth of these Areas are located in the 
better Natural Regions I, II and III. In contrast, 52 percent of the European 
or Large-Scale Commercial Farming areas are in the Natural Regions I, II and 
III. The remaining 48 percent which are found in the poorly endowed Natural 
Regions IV and V are used mainly as either ranching or irrigation 

\ 

^\^enterprises . 



TABLE 2-2 

PROPORTION OF TOTAL LAND UI^^DER VARIOUS OWNERSHIP 
CATEGORIES IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE 





1931 


1950 


1969 


1981 


Communal Area 


22.4 


25.5 


41.3 


43.9 


Small-Scale Commercial 


7.7 


5.9 


3.8 


3.8 


Large-Scale Commercial 


50.8 


49.6 


40. 1 


36.8 


The State 


19.1 


18.9 


14.7 


15.5 



NUMBER 
HOUSEHOLDS 
1981 



716, 500 
8,519 
4,926 
0 



Sources: Data for the respective years comes from the the following 

sources: 1931 (Kay 1970:51); 1950 (Dunlop 1972:1); 1969 
(Dunlop 1972:1); 1981 (Zimbabwe 1982a:64). The number of 
households comprising each category is given by the Whitsun 
, Foundation (1983:28). 



Note: Communal refers to the African peasant or smallholder unit 
formerly known as the Reserve or Tribal Trust Land. The 
Small-Scale Commercial is what used to be called the Native 
or African Purchase Area. The Large-Scale Commercial is 
mainly the v^Jliite or European Area. The State-owned land was 
previously referred to as National Land and it comprises 
areas designated as Forest, Undetermined, or Unassigned. 
In 1981, there were a total of 6,034 Large Commercial Farms 
some of which were owned and operated as agricultural or 
ranching estates by local and multi-national companies 
rather than by farm households (see Chapter VI below for a 
review of these farming systems). 



42 

Notwithstanding the ecological poverty of the lands in the Communal 
Areas, the size of farm households increased rather than decreased over time 
doubling about every thirteen years. Given the physical restrictions imposed 
by the land the coping mechanism applied to accomodate the additional 
household members was the gradual turn over of the land designated as 
suitable only for grazing purposes into arable cultivation. This rather 
extensive land use system had the cyclical effect of accentuating the pasture 
problems of the African areas (Cleghorn 1950; Floyd 1959; Jordan 1964). 

According to Roger Riddell (1978b:9) 50 percent of the grazing land in 
the Communal Areas in 1965 was classified as either bare or heavily 
over-grazed, and by 1977 seventeen times as much land in those Areas was 
being cultivated as was ecologically desirable. Indeed, by 1970 the annual 
population growth rate in the Communal Areas was 3.4 per cent on the average. 
At the time over 47 percent of all the men resident there were landless and 
in the age group under 30 years the percentage was as high as 81 (Weinrich 
1975a:8). Male absenteeism was generally high and in many households farming 
was typically carried out by the older men, the women and the children 
(Johnson 1971:32). 

The state of environmental constraints and population pressure which 
currently faces the Communal Areas has been calculated by VThitlow (1980) and 
it is reproduced here in Table 2-4. He shows that two-thirds of these African 
lands experienced pressure which ranged from "some" to "desperate." The 
pressure intensity he reports for these areas also varied from a low of 2 to 
a high of 5 times. 

The human dimensions that are manifest in this state of ecological 
crisis are also brought out starkly in the government commissioned Chavunduka 
Report. The Commission, which conducted a comprehensive enquiry into 



TABLE 2-3 
PROPORTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN ZIMBABWE 
BY NATURAL REGIONS, RACE AND FARMING SYSTEM 

NATURAL REGION PROPORTION OF AREA IN REGION 





AFRICAN/ 


AFRICAN/ 


EUROPEAN/ 




COMMUNAL 


COMMERC lAL 
"/ 

h 


COMMERCIAL 


I 


1.0 


1.0 


2.0 


II 


8.0 


18.0 


27.0 


III 


17.0 


38.0 


22.0 


IV 


45.0 


37.0 


26.0 


V 


29.0 


7.0 


22.0 




100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



Sources: Billing (1985:36 Table 10) and Riddell (1978a 
:51 Table 17). 

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest decimal point 
and so may not add up to exactly 100 percent. 



TABLE 2-4 

POPULATION PRESSURE IN RELATION TO CARRYING 
CAPACITY IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS OF RHODESIA 

PRESSURE NATURE OF PERCENTAGE OF 

INTENSITY PRESSURE COMMUNAL LAND 



Balance or none - 32.7 

2 - times some 29,8 

3 - times great 12.9 

4 - times extreme U.7 

5 - times desperate 12.9 



Source: Whitlow (1980:178 Table 2). 



44 



Zimbabwe's agricultural industry, examined the pitiful conditions which 
obtain in many of the Communal Areas. It states: 

Some 57 percent of the communal and small scale farming 
areas, with 83 percent of their population, had densities 
in excess of the critical level. Taken over the country 
as a whole, the 1969 population was 40 percent in excess 
of the critical level; by 1972 it was estimated to be 85 
percent in excess and was projected to be 210 percent by 
1984. (Zimbabwe 1982a:23) 

It is not only in the area of land distribution that the negative 
effects of segregation impacted on Africans. The pricing and marketing 
policies of the government also limited the entry and full participation of 
.African farmers in the commercial agriculture sector. For instance, 
legislation notably the Maize Control Act (1931) and the Tobacco Marketing 
Act (1936) prevented Africans from growing crops that competed in the market 
with European farm produce (Nelson 1975:283). In the specific case of maize, 
the major crop cultivated by Africans, the European farmers at various times 
put pressure on the government to discourage its surplus production on the 
African farms (Dunlop 1970:11). In the Native Purchase Areas the government 
imposed a 10 percent levy on all commercial produce (Clarke 1976). 

As a consequence of these policies the cash earnings of farmers in the 
Reserves were low, averaging only $153 per year (Nicolle 1971:1). The more 
active males migrated out of these Reserves to provide cheap wage labor on 
European-owned farms, particularly in flue-cured tobacco production which is 
notably labor intensive (Duncan 1973:1). In 1971, only 7 percent of the 
laborers on the tobacco farms earned as much as $21 a month which constituted 
the highest wages paid. It needs to be pointed out though that some of these 
laborers received additional subsidies in the form of maize meal and other 
rations from their European employers (Chavunduka 1972). 



45 



According to Weinrich (1975a:S) per capita income from African lands 
fell by 50 percent between 1958 and 1970. By 1977 the estimated monthly 
household income in the Reserves was $12 as compared with farm workers on 
European-owned farms who earned $19, other African employees $67 and European 
employees $513. Thus, the ratio between European earnings and those of 
African rural households was in the range of 43:1 (Brand 1981:46). In a 
comparative analysis which examined the distribution of personal income in 
Rhodesia, Sutcliffe concludes: 

The rough indications are that the wealthiest 4 to 6 per 
cent of the population of Rhodesia have received between 
50 and 60 per cent of total personal income. On the face 
of it, if this is compared with what similar evidence is 
available for other countries, then personal income seems 
to be distributed more unequally at least at the top end 
of the distribution than in any any other country for 
which data are available. (Sutcliffe 1971:38) 

The nature of the distribution of personal earnings within Rhodesia over 
the years is illustrated by Table 2-5 below. For example, in 1958 the 
Africans who constituted 95.2 percent of the population earned only 43.5 
percent of the total personal income. Elsewhere, Good (1974:18) reports that 
"the overwhelming majority of the population is in a state of increasing 
poverty and is in no position to contribute to what might otherwise be the 
development of Rhodesia." He quotes the following statistics reproduced here 
in Table 2-6 and showing the distribution of cash wages paid to Africans in 
June 1972 to support his assessment. Writing about the same issue Roger 
Riddell ( 1978a: 10) also demonstrates that in 1976 , when the poverty datum 
line for a rural family of five was estimated to be $43.73, some 85 percent 
of all Africans employed in European agriculture received cash wages of less 
than $20 a month. 



TABLE 2-5 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN RHODESIA 



EUROPEAN, ASIAN AND COLORED 



AS PERCENTAGE AS PERCENTAGE 

OF TOTAL OF TOTAL 

POPULATION PERSONAL INCOME 



1946 


3.8 


49.4 


1950 


4.8 


58.2 


1955 


5.4 


59.5 


1960 


6.2 


61.2 


1965 


5.1 


58. 1 


1968 


4.8 


56.5 



Source: Sutcliffe (1971:38 Table 4). 



TABLE 2-6 
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN CASH WAGES 
IN RHODESIA 

MONTHLY CASH WAGE NUMBER OF WAGE 

EARNERS 



Under 10 245,410 

10 - 20 172,610 

20 - 50 251,270 

90 - 150 9^270 

Over 150 3^800 



Source: Good (1974:18). 



47 



Detailed elaboration of the extent of these inequities as well as their 
short and long-term policy implications for the country are given by Duncan 
Clarke (1977a). His study of income and wealth distribution in Rhodesia for 
the period 1965-1974 indicates that 

[Ejuropean income sources have remained very diverse despite 
reliance on some notable areas of income earning. . , . (They) 
earn around 62 percent of all cash wages . . . about 44.6 
percent of income from unincorporated enterprise and probably 
in excess of 90 percent of dividend and profits from companies 
and abroad. Europeans are on average 'well covered'in terms of 
pensions, medical aid, life assurance and compensation for 
workmens' accidents. These elements help provide income, 
stability and security. 'European society' has thus 
developed as an affluent stratum of the Rhodesian social 
formation, becoming steadily richer in material terms over 
time, (Clarke 1977a: 15, his emphasis) 

Given the substantial irregularities in data sources and from his analysis of 
African incomes Clarke (1977a:46) arrives at the conclusion that a comparison 
of average European and African incomes was not a very meaningful exercise. 
He (Clarke 1977a:46-47) asserts, however, that "Africans have received a 
diminishing share of disposable incomes since 1967," indicating that in the 
period 1965-75, the Af rican/European income gap widened substantially. 

The problems of the Reserves are synthesized by Cross in the following 
wo rd s : 



In recent years the situation in the Tribal Trust Lands has 
become increasingly serious. While incomes from sales have 
risen from $13 per capita in 1965 to $29 per capita in 1976, 
the estimated availability of food has deteriorated 
significantly. The overall result is that standards of 
nutrition . . . today are well below those for the nation as 
a whole, and the Tribal Trust Lands have become net importers 
of food. In addition . . . population pressure in tribal areas 
have reached a point where a breakdown of society in some areas 
has begun to take place. Traditional social security systems 
can no longer meet the requirements of the population simply 
because the natural resources tliat are the foundation of the 
system are no longer adequate to the task, (Cross 1976:185) 



48 

While per capita African iacoraes in the Reserves more than doubled from 
$13 to $29 between 1965 and 1976 (Cross 1976:185) there was only a 40.5 
percent rise in the consumer prices for the period 1965 to 1974 (Clarke 
1977a:42). Under the normal circumstances this situation should translate 
into improved standards of consumption and living for rural Africans. All the 
available evidence, however, indicates the contrary. The most probable 
conclusion from the information about nutrition is that the increase in 
Communal Area market sales did not reflect the achievement of surplus output 
above household subsistence requirements by the Africans. 

Many observers note in summary that the African population was cast for 
the most part in the role of poorly paid laborers, often as migrants, on the 
white farms or mines or as domestic workers and work-seekers. In that 
situation they rather precariously lived in "locations" on the edge of the 
"white" towns or else remained as the family residue eking out a partial 
living in increasingly overcrowded reserves (Duncan 1973; Harris 1974; Clarke 
1974, 1977c). It is this "appalling economic and ecological conditions of the 
African rural areas," in the words of Dunlop (1974:177), which "undoubtedly 
[v7as] the most critical economic problem facing the Rhodesian Government." 
(An account of the socio-demographic and economic situation relating to the 
current farming system and agricultural production levels in three Communal 
Areas are given as part of the case study of farmers' responses in Chapter 
VII below. These cover a total of eleven subdivisions within Madziwa, Bushu 
and Kandeya, all in the Mashonaland Central Province). 

In contrast to the plight of Africans, particularly those in the rural 
areas, the following benefits enumerated by Lionel Cliffe (1981:9-10), among 
others, were all available and preserved predominantly, some exclusively, for 
whites. These are (1) vast stretches of the best land; (2) mineral 



49 

concessions; (3) ownership of the industry that had grown up in the last 
fifty years; (4) freehold rights in the urban areas; (5) professional, 
managerial and skilled jobs; and (6) the advantages of a sound basic 
education. 

The case is always made to the effect that the European sector is the 
goose that lays the golden eggs. While there appears to be no major debate 
about that fact, there are critics, however, who have viewed that 
contribution differently. Roger Riddell , for instance, argues that the 
impressive overall figures for European farm production disguise serious 
misuse and non-use of large areas of land in the European areas. He (Riddell 
1978b: 11-13) cites evidence relating to the 1975-76 growing season to show 
that (1) only 15 percent of approximately 3.6 million hectares of potential 
arable land in the European areas were being cultivated, (2) 60 percent of 
the total of 6,682 European-owned farms were not profitable enough to qualify 
for income tax payments, (3) in the most productive area of the country, the 
Ilazoe Valley area, approximately over a quarter of the land was not being 
cultivated, (4) in the beef producing areas of the Matebeleland and Midlands 
Provinces between 40 and 60 percent of the farms were non-viable and they 
were characterized by serious mismanagement and overstocking leading to 
serious veld destruction and (5) in 1977 a study by the Rhodesian National 
Farmers' Union reported 30 percent of all the European-oxraed farms to be 
insolvent . 

Inspite of these, as Riddell observed, inefficient white-owned farms 

were 

able to survive because of a wide range of assistance 
given, both directly and indirectly, to European 
agriculture in the form of loans, price supports, 
capital grants, the low wage structure and 'artificial' 
land prices. (Riddell 1978b:12) 



50 



Elsewhere, Riddell (1978c:l&) elaborates this point in specific terms by 
stating that between 1973 and 1975 the government paid out $55.2 million for 
subsidies, losses and assistance in the European agricultural sector, an 
average of $8,000 per farming unit. 

Good (1974, 1976), In evaluating the economics of settler colonialism in 
Rhodesia, supports Riddell's (1978a, 1978b) low estimation of most 
European-owned farms characterizing them as Inefficient because the white 
farmers were mostly propped up by state policy In the form of elaborate 
subsidies, protections and restraints from corapetitlon and reliance on cheap 
African labor. Tnis Issue is very strongly pursued by Arghirl Emmanuel (1972) 
who points out that settler colonialism rather than being economic is 
excessively wasteful of human and material capital."* (.inspects of 
Large-Scale Commercial Farming as well as the responses of European farmers 
in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area in the Mashonaland Central Province 
are reported as part of the case study in Chapter VII below). 

The African discontent against white minority rule In the country was 
nurtured in the context of this background of Increasing human and other 
problems in the Reserves (Stannlng 1967; Wrathal 1968), racial conflicts 
(Klnloch 1978), the "deterioration of Rhodesia's white society," (Clements 
1969), the Impoverishment and proletarianization of the African population 
(Arrlghi 1967:32, 1970; Palmer 1977:241; Palmer and Parsons 1977), the myths 
about the inherent efficiency of white farmers (Emmanuel 1972; Good 1974, 
1976; Riddell 1978b) and the impacts generated by the various settler 
policies and Legislative Acts relating to the land (Pollack 1975; Rennle 
1978) and the politics and general problems of development (Barker and Hume 
1977). 



51 

Richard Brown, ia a summary paper on Zimbabwe's recent history, puts the 
problem in perspective by arguing it this way: 

[Ljand shortage and overcrowding, compulsory destocking, 
and the forcible removal of Africans . . . struck at 
the roots of both rural and urban life [and] acted as 
a catalyst for mass nationalism. (Brown 1983:948) 

Elsewhere, Barry Munslow makes a similar point asserting that 

[T]he land issue was and still remains the central political 
issue in the country. . . . The long nationalist guerrilla 
struggle from 1956 to 1980 relied on mobilizing peasant 
grievances about the land to gain support, and Robert 
Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party — the Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front — swept to power in the 1980 independence 
elections because the electorate trusted that his party would 
get back the land. (Munslow 1985:41) 

This view is also shared by Terrence Ranger (1985:14) who attributes the deep 
consciousness and the mass participation of Zimbabwean peasants in the 
guerrilla war to their "demands for their lost lands." 

Beginning with the apparently ineffectual April 1966 "Battle of 
Chinoyi" , waged by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 
what the Mrican population prefer to call the second chimurenga or 
liberation war started (Kapungu 1974). In an account given by Richard Brown 
(1983:949), well-attested acts of brutality by the security forces of the 
white minority settler regime increased internal discontent and ensured a 
ready and at times overwhelming supply of new recruits for the guerrillas. He 
argues further that this rather antagonistic situation was exacerbated by ( 1 ) 
the imposition of collective fines, (2) the ill-organized and drastic removal 
of several thousand rural Africans from their homes into "protected villages" 
or "strategic resettlements" on suspicion of helping the guerrillas and (3) 
the shooting of many curfew-breakers. 



52 

Anna Weinrich (1977), also looking at the same problem, provides a 
comprehensive account of the difficulties unleashed by the protected villages 
policy and mentiones (1) the deterioration of health conditions, education 
and other social services, (2) the imposition of physical hardships 
especially on women and (3) the disruption of agriculture and family life. 

The intensification of the war, amidst mounting civilian casualties and 
increasing international isolation of Rhodesia, continued until about 
December 1979. At that time a cease-fire and transitional arrangements for 
African majority rule were agreed upon at the British-sponsored Lancaster 
House Conference in London leading to a democratic election in February 1980 
and the birth of independent Zimbabwe in April 1980 (Morris-Jones 1980; Dayal 
1984). 

Post-independence Development Challenges and Prospects 

With the formal achievement of independence Zimbabwe entered into a 
decisive period of social, economic and political transition. The country 
faced both short-term and long-term challenges. The immediate or short-term 
concern was the rehabilitation of the war-torn countryside. In the view of 
the government there was no doubt that "compared to the rest of the country, 
the rural community experienced the highest degree of human suffering as well 
as property and physical infrastructure destruction" (Zimbabwe 1931c:50). 

Shortly after independence the government solicited for international 
assistance to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. This was 
at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development organized in 
Harare in March 1981. There the government listed the following physical 
damages: (1) 1,830 boreholes; (2) 425 dams and weirs; (3) 1,200 diptanks ; 



53 

(4) thousands of kilometers of fencing that used to confine infected cattle 
to limited areas; (5) 70 out of the 120 stock marketing or sale pens; (6) 
some 2,000 of the approximately 2,500 primary schools; (7) 180 of the 243 
rural clinics; and (8) much of the telecommunication equipment in the rural 
areas (Zimbabwe 198 Id : 29-33 ) . 

Coenraad Brand (1981:49), in turn, documented the human aspects of the 
destruction. According to him (1) more than 7,000 African civilians were 
killed, (2) agricultural production was disrupted through harrassraent and 
uncertainty, (3) an estimated third of the 3 million head of cattle in the 
Communal Areas was lost through disease, theft and forced sales or slaughter, 
(4) half a million people were herded by the government into some 230 
fortified "protected" or consolidated villages, (5) thousands fled into the 
towns and between 100,000 and 150,000 across the borders into neighboring 
countries, (6) more than 1,600 schools were closed down affecting some 
433,000 children, or nearly half of the total normal African enrolment, (7) 
by mid-1979 36 percent of the rural clinics were no longer operating and 
there were only three doctors left in the fifty or so mission hospitals 
across the country, half of which had been closed or had greatly reduced 
their services, (8) thirteen bus companies operating in rural areas had 
abandoned 57 percent of their routes and services had been substantially 
reduced on many others after they had lost a fifth of their fleet in landmine 
or other incidents and (9) a considerable proportion of small rural business 
enterprises were boarded up or had been burnt down. 

Touching on the long-term the major problem that Zimbabwe faced at 
independence was the need to redress the socioeconomic imbalances caused by 
years of separate development along racial lines. ^ This task called for 
appropriate development policies and strategies (see Munslow 1980a). 



54 

In this, policy makers and planners were presented by interested 

analysts with what appeared to be mutually exclusive options. Even before 

independence the lines had been drawn in debates emerging between advocates 

of evolutionary or reformist policies and those of radical or transformation 

alternatives (Muvingi _et al ♦ 1981; Bratton 1981; Bush and Gliffe 1984; 
6 

Gordon 1984). The central premise of the debates focussed on the 
structures of the political economy created and maintained by the Rhodesian 
state and inherited by Zimbabwe (Stoneman 1981). 

At any rate, while the debate still goes on Zimbabwe appears to have 
pursued policies that are pragmatic and, at least in the economic sphere, are 
paying dividends.'^ For instance, the period since independence can be 
divided into three phases. 

The first phase is the high growth period of 1980 and 1981 when the 
economic growth rate was 12 percent. The period coincided with good rains, 
unusually favorable conditions arising from independence, the lifting of 
international economic sanctions as well as buoyant world demand for the 
country's exports. 

The second phase is the period from 1982 to early 1984 which was 
characterised by severe drought conditions, the world recession and poor 
economic performance. During the period the economy registered an annual 
average decline of almost 3 percent in real terms. There was substantial 
reduction in agricultural output which necessitated the import of 340,000 
tonnes of maize and 120,000 tonnes of wheat in 1984. Between 1982 and 1984 
per capita income, in real terms, fell by a total of 4 percent from its 1980 
level. There was a balance of payments problem, high rates of inflation which 
hovered around 15 percent, low investment and high unemployment. 



55 

Phase three of Zimbabwe's economic life, starting from 1984-35 to the 
present, shows the beginnings of a recovery. The period has been 
characterised by good agriculture, higher agricultural incomes that are 
boosting domestic demand and by favorable export demand conditions (see 
Novicki 1983; Zimbabwe 1984a, 1985a, 1986a; The Economist 1986; Green and 
Kadhani 1986). 

The rather impressive economic performance recorded by Zimbabwe is 
discussed by van Buren (1986:1123-1124) whose account is summarized here. 
For the first time since 1981 the country's economy started registering 
positive real growth in 1985 with an estimated real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growing about 7 percent that year. In nominal terms Zimbabwe's GDP grew 
from $3,226 million in 1980 to a projected $7,770 million in 1986. Surpluses 
in the trade, current-account and overall balance of payments were registered 
by the economy in 1985. Exports also rose steadily in value from $999 million 
in 1982 to an estimate $1,750 million in 1985. In contrast, the value of 
imports increased but more slowly from $1,087 mill ion in 1983 to a projected 
$1,450 million in 1985. The country's trade balance also rose from a deficit 
of $115 million in 1982 to a surplus which by September 1985 was 3290.4 
million. Inflation was less than 10 percent by the middle of 1985 having 
dropped from a high of 25 percent in 1983. 

This is significant because over most of Africa today even the least 
minimal economic growth is a welcome exception rather than the rule. Of more 
significance though is the diverse base of this growth. For instance, the 
non-material production sector grew by almost 3 percent, the material 
production sector by about 13 percent, distribution by over 12 percent, 
transport and communications by 6 percent, construction by 6 percent, the 
value of mineral production by 15 percent and manufacturing by 12 percent. 



56 



/ Of the most specific importance, in the wider African context, is 
agriculture which contributed the largest share to growth. It recorded in 
real terms almost 30 percent increase in 1985. In terras of value total crop 
deliveries to marketing authorities increased by 53 percent during that year 
compared with 1984 (Zimbabwe 1986a) . 

It is important to note also that in May 1985 Zimbabwe became the first 
and only African state to join the international community to provide its own 
food aid to the famine victims of Ethiopia by sending 25,000 tons of maize. 
From mid-1985 to early 1986 the following purchases of Zimbabwe grain were 
made: (1) the European Economic Community (EEC) purchased 25,000 tons of 
maize for delivery as food aid to Mozambique and Zambia; (2) the United 
Nations World Food Program purchased and distributed large quantities of 
maize for drought hit countries of southern Africa; (3) Japan bought 9,000 
tons of maize which were supplied to Zambia; (4) the government of the United 
Kingdom purchased 14,500 tons as donation to Mozambique; (5) Australia bought 
30,000 of maize for distribution as food aid in Africa and (6) South Africa 
also obtained a sizeable portion of its maize requirement from Zimbabwe (van 
Buren 1986:1124). 

According to The Economist (1986:15), 1985 saw a 118 percent rise over 
1984 in sales from Communal and Resettlement Areas as compared with 48 
percent increase from the commercial farming sector. The relative share of 
the Communal and Resettlement Areas of the total national marketed output of 
$1,077 in 1985 was 21 percent. This is in stark contrast to a share of 
between 4 and 8 percent until independence. For instance, in maize production 
the Communal and Resettlement or the so-called subsistence sector sold almost 
half of the 1.82 million tonnes delivered to the marketing organizations and 



57 

performed almost as well in terms of cotton production (The Courier 1986:30). 

The African Business has placed this success story in perspective 
stating : 

The ingredients for success are well-known: generous and 
prompt payment for farmers, rapid expansion of collection 
and storage facilities, more credit and agricultural advice 
for peasant farmers. (The African Business 1986:13-17) 

Zimbabwe's tremendous success in stimulating small-holder or peasant 
farmers to grow more food has created massive agricultural surpluses. At the 
end of 1985 the Grain Marketing Board was sitting on 1.4 million tonnes of 
maize with the experts estimating that that stockpile could grow to more than 
2 million tonnes at the end of the 1986-87 marketing year. That represents 
over 5 years of domestic consumption needs. 

In looking at Zimbabwe's success story and in presenting this rather 
optimistic assessment of its current situation we need reminding that on the 
whole the country is not favored for sustained agricultural output. This 
point and the fact that cyclical drought is a major constraint are clear 
indication that a much longer-term outlook is called for to evaluate the 
permanence of the country's apparently impressive agricultural performance so 
far . 

This perspective provides the substantive background for evaluating the 
literature on land reform and resettlement, poverty and equity, rural 
development, agriculture and economic growth, the state, household dynamics 
and organizational forms in terms of their relevance to the government's 
policies and on-going programs of change in postindependence Zimbabwe. 



58 



Notes 



1. ) A rainy pentad is defined as the center of three 5-day periods (pentads) 
which together receive more than 40 millimeters of rainfall, and two of which 
receive at least 8 millimeters (Whitsun 1983:6). 

2. ) The history of the early and continuous settlement of Zimbabwe by 
indigenous Shona populations is very important to many Zimbabwean historians 
and intellectuals for two main reasons. Firstly, they fastidiously assert 
that claim of nativism to counteract rival claims by some European settlers 
and historians of Southern Africa that much of the region was not occupied 
prior to early European expeditions there in the sixteenth century. Secondly 
and central to this assertion, is the controversy that used to surround the 
question as to who the original builders of the Great Zimbabwe acropolis are. 
As the noted historian Peter Garlake (1973:12) argues "probably no other 
prehistoric site has given rise to such strong , widespread and often bizzare. 
emotional response." The official policy of the Rhodesian government in 
respect of the origin of the ruins was that it could have been the work of 
any builders be they Phonecians, Arabians, or some central African group. The 
majority Zimbabweans found the ambiguity created by this policy thinking 
irksome. Great Zimbabwe is a structure and S3nnbol of immense pride among the 
Mashona. Consequently, they feel insulted by the "settlers" refusal to 
acknowledge the genius , heroism and past glory of what they regard as the 
dominant state-level culture in the region centuries before the advent of the 
Europeans. (See also Garlake 1974, 1982). 

3. ) From that time until today the Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands have 
remained physically intact. Though the Communal Land Act of 1982 repealed all 
the enactments which established the Reserves it legally reconstituted and 
renamed them as the "Communal Areas." The Act also vested the general 
administration of all the areas so designated in the newly created District 
Councils rather than in the chiefs or traditional authorities. The 
government, through the National Agricultural and Rural Development 
Coordination Committee (NARDCC) , is currently working on an elaborate 
Communal Lands Development Plan. The objective of the Plan is to rehabilitate 
the Communal Areas and integrate them fully into the productive and market 
sector of the country's political economy. 

4. ) This view is shared by Riddell (1978b: 12) who supports the argument with 
figures showing that 72 percent of all European farmers cover only 23 percent 
of the European land area and produce 21 percent of the total output of that 
sector, while 5 percent of farms account for 50 percent of the land and 
produce 48 percent of the output. (See in addition Biermann and Kossler 
1980). However, Paul Mosley (1983), in his study of the settler economies of 
Kenya and Zimbabwe challenges this characterization as stereotypic and 
overgeneralized . He (Mosley 1983:177) admits, however, apparently in 
contradiction to his challenge, that "what is truly distinctive of the 
settler agricultural economy is not so much its low average efficiency as the 
very wide range of efficiency levels which it managed to contain and the 
skewness of the distribution within this range, with a minority of highly 
efficient, frequently foreign-owned concerns counter balancing a majority of 
inefficient, amateur, farmers who obtained low yields." 



5. ) In the socio-political sphere the notorious animosities between the 
majority Shona cultural group, most of whom subscribe to the ruling ZANU-PF 
party and the minority Ndebele among whom the PF-ZAPU is dominant are the 
obvious opprobrium which mars the peaceful co-existence of all Zimbabweans 
and the development of the country. This problem goes back to at least a 
century with the arrival, conquest and apparent brutal subjugation of the 
Shona by the Matabele. There Is an apparent mutual distrust and suspicions of 
each other by the leaders of these two societies and their respective 
political parties. 

Joshua Nkomo used to be referred to undisputedly as the "Father of the 
Nation," for his role in the country's liberation struggle. He teamed up with 
Robert Mugabe in the final years of the liberation war to present a common 
"patriotic front," against the forces of the European settlers (see Mugabe et 
al . 1978). After independence Mugabe appointed Nkomo, though a leader of the 
opposition party in the National Assembly, to a cabinet position in the 
government. However, when security forces discovered catches of arms and 
ammunitions on PF-ZAPU property Mugabe sacked Nkomo and accused him of 
planning the violent overthrow of the government. 

Thereafter the destructive activities such as killings, rape and burnings 
commited by bands of so-called Ndebele dissidents in parts of the country 
started. Many Shonas then saw flkomo as the "Father of Dissidents." Nkomo, 
himself a Kalanga (an offshoot of the Karanga sub-division of the Shona) 
identifies more with the Ndebele from his base in their traditional capital 
Bulawayo. The activities of the bandits have always been ruthlessly punished 
by the government's security forces. In both cases many innocent civilians 
have suffered including a group of foreign tourists allegedly murdered by the 
dissidents in 1983 and missionaries also killed in late 1987. In the early 
1980s the international community focussed its attention on Zimbabwe. The 
western media highlighted the alleged human rights abuses and atrocities 
indiscriminately meted out to the Ndebele by the so-called North Korean 
trained and Shona constituted Fifth Brigade. For a period, Nkomo fled the 
country in a brief self-imposed exile in Britain accusing the government of 
attempts to kill him. 

From 1985 serious efforts were made by Mugabe and Nkomo and their 
respective party leaders to strike a reconciliation towards the healing of 
old wounds. These efforts which were prolonged and broke do^ra many times 
eventually bore fruit on December 31, 1987 when a settlement was publicly 
celebrated. That day Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as the 
first Executive President of the Republic of Zimbabwe while he appointed his 
old-time opponent Joshua Nkomo as one of the two Vice-Presidents of the 
country. The country became a one-party state with the absorption of the 
opposition PF-ZAPU by the ruling ZANU-PF. 

Whether or not this second attempt at national reconciliation will last and 
promote the genuine integration of the interests and aspirations of both the 
Mashona, the Matabele and the other cultural groups as well as Zimbabweans of 
European ancestry is an issue which cannot be easily and seriously 
conjectured upon in this dissertation 

6. ) In the search for an appropriate development policy or strategy the 
government has been treading a tightrope of differential trade-offs. Since 
independence the major preoccupation of most observers appears to be with 
questions in respect of maintaining the production levels of large-scale 
commercial agriculture, one of the main sources of foreign exchange. This 



60 



invariably means, both in the short-terra and the long-run, leaving the 
European-owned lands more or less untouched. 

Such a situation poses immense ethical and ideological dilemmas to the 
government in view of its explicit commitment to eqal itarianism , social 
justice, and a Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism (see ZANU-PF Election 
Manifesto 1985, 1980). Even within the government itself, as well as in the 
ruling ZANU-PF party, there are veiled factional squabbles. One faction, the 
radicals would want the government to live up to its expectations by ridding 
the country of such age-old European privileges as land and access to other 
means of production. The opposing group of pragmatists would rather want a 
gradual transformation which recognizes and uses the available European 
expertise and capital stock to generate economic growth (see Libby 1984). 

In the midst of all this the postindependence relationships between 
Africans and Europeans, surprisingly, does not exhibit the kinds of open 
confrontations that many pessimists predicted. In the urban areas some 
African workers serve both the European and elite Africans as domestic 
servants. In the rural areas many Africans continue to work as laborers in 
Europe an- owned farms. Some Europeans who emigrated before or at independence 
are said to be returning. So far it appears that the government has succeeded 
in fostering the workable multi-racial society that it promised to establish. 
This does not mean that the Africans are content with their living conditions 
and incomes which are still comparatively minimal by the standards of the 
European population. 

Except perhaps in the classic case of some landless Africans squatting on 
Europe an- owned lands the general feeling, especially in industrial 
establishments and other spheres, is that Zimbabwe Africans look to the 
government to promote egalitarian policies that seek to redress past 
injustices that they suffered under previous settler administrations. 

7.) Obviously not everybody would agree with this seemingly optimistic 
compliment. For instance, Roger Riddell (1984:463) in an apparently 
well-balanced analysis of the performance of the economy since independence 
has come to the following conclusions: (1) that the economy has performed far 
better than that of Zimbabwe's neighbors but a large part of the reasons for 
this was due to unique circumstances that no longer exist; (2) many of the 
gains of equity and the reduction of poverty achieved in the 1980-82 have now 
been reversed; (3) the prospects for medium to long-term growth are not as 
good as the economic planners of the country have had us believe although far 
better than the pessimists would lead us to think; and (4) the transformation 
of the economy desired by the government has been far slower than expected. 

Andre Astrow (1983:1) on the other hand offers a more radical assessment in 
observing that "after several years of independence, little meaningful 
change has actually taken place, while significant tensions have emerged 
between the Mugabe government and the African people. Today the state 
apparatus has remained virtually intact and the basic economic structure of 
the country unchanged. While the white settlers have seen most of their 
privileges preserved, African workers who have gone on strike, and landless 
African peasants squatting on "white" land, have been repeatedly faced with 
severe repression by the government. Moreover, not only has the government 
failed to promote socialism in Zimbabwe, but on the contrary, has 
successfully worked to strengthen its economic ties with imperialist 
countries, placing Zimbabwe firmly in the Western camp." (See Ibbo Mandaza 
(1986) for an additional leftist criticism of the government's performance in 
the area of resettlement and agrarian reform) . 



61 



Yet another issue which may be of major concern, apart from the land 
question and the ethnic conflicts, relates to trends in public expenditure. 
According to van Buren (1986:1123), there was a decline in the private 
sector's share of this from 63 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1982 and that 
the country's Five-Year Development Plan, introduced in April 1986 and 
covering the period 1986-90, forecasts a further decline to an average of 43 
percent annually over the Plan period. At least to advocates of minimal 
government intervention in economic matters this development is undesirable. 



CHAPTER III 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 



Introduction 

Tlie research problem is to evaluate how agricultural resettlement policy, 
initiated by the government since independence in 1930, is affecting household 
performance responses and the quality of life in rural Zimbabwe. The 
government's policy is explicitly expressed in official publications and 
pronouncements about (I) the redistribution of the country's agricultural land 
resources, (2) the rehabilitation of the country's poor on these lands and (3) 
the provision of facilitative services and basic needs to the resettled. The 
broad objective of this policy is to achieve growth and development and to 
ensure equity. 

The literature that is reviewed here is varied, though it is restricted 
to the broad parameters of the substantive and theoretical matters which form 
part of the agricultural dimensions of development. At the macro-level, the 
issues that the discussion covers relate to aspects of the role that the state 
plays in development. Specifically, it explores the areas of agricultural 
policy and implementation, the promotion of the smallholder and the 
cooperative modes of production and the consequences of these developments so 
far for the .African condition. For the micro-level, the discussion examines 
household dynamics and organizational forms in the context of change. The 
systemic linkage between the two levels are reviewed here by examining the 
literature oa rural development, poverty-focused development, land reform and 
resettlement programs. 

Thus the purpose of the review is to provide a general framework within 
which to assess some of both the macro-interests and the micro-concerns that 

62 



63 

dominate on-going debates about agricultural development. This is meant to 
serve the following objectives: (1) facilitate the selection of background 
materials about the research problem; (2) guide the placement of the selected 
materials in the wider developmental and African perspective; and (3) assist 
in defining and refining the research variables as well as the analytical 
concepts that are used in the study. 

The State and Agricultural Development Policy 

Today, economic development places an even more onerous burden on the 
state as a political institution than in the past. This responsibility ranges 
from the selection of the most efficacious bundle of economic policies to 
ensuring a conducive political and administrative framework for development 
irrespective of particular policies (Sandbrook 1985, 1986). John Lewis 
(1986:29) extends this observation further by pointing out that governments 
are essential to (1) establish policy environments, (2) develop the physical 
and human infrastructure for development and (3) carry out the functions that 
would never for reasons of scale or externality be adequately initiated by the 
private sector. In the view of Lewis there is no substitute for the continuing 
lead that governments must supply to development-promotion effort. 

Support for this assessment of the central role of the state in 
development is given by many experts including John Mellor. Mellor (1986:84) 
sees such a role as critical to agricultural and employment-oriented strategy 
of development in the developing world. He argues that because agriculture is 
organized on a small-scale basis, substantial public sector investment in that 
sector is needed in the form of transportation, power, communication, 
research, education and input supplies systems. 



64 

Some of the cogent socio-economic rationales that justify government 
intervention in agriculture are suggested by Joseph Stiglitz (1987:43-44). He 
lists the following reasons: (1) incomplete markets in insurance futures and 
credit, (2) public goods and increasing returns, (3) imperfect information, 
(4) externalities and (5) income distribution. Stiglitz argues the point 
further that in the real situations of most developing countries the free 
market's own allocation within this framework is either inefficient or 
otherwise unacceptable to policy makers thus necessitating the intervention of 
the state. 

Other important policy issues about the agriculture of the developing 
countries include, for instance, the need to sustain the ecological balance in 
the natural resources exploitation of these fragile tropical and subtropical 
environments. Throughout these countries the current major policy concern, 
however, relates to the possibilities for production increases. Increased farm 
output is achieved through (1) the expansion of area cultivated, (2) increased 
yield per unit area, (3) shifts in cropping patterns toward higher-yielding 
crops and (4) increase of the number of annual harvests. This growth calls for 
increased inputs of labor, land, water and capital, as well as the 
introduction of technical innovations (Ruthenberg 1985:1). The issue of how to 
relate any or all of these investments to possibilities for production 
increases come under the rubric of agricultural policies. 

These and other policy matters continue to dominate the on-going analysis 
to rethink African agricultural development strategies, particularly the role 
that the state must play in this endeavor. The dilemma posed for a consensual 
resolution of the contradictions posed by Africa's policy effort is very well 
recognized. For instance, Jennifer Whitaker offers a commentary on this 
paradox by stating: 



65 



As usual, the Westerners are drawing sweeping conclusions 
about what Africa ought to do. And, as usual, the Africans 
have neither the flexibility nor the wherewithal to either 
reject the advice totally or follow through on it fully. 
(Whitaker 1986:1) 

Akroyd (1985) recognizes that there is no one best set of policies for 
agricultural development and that any such policies must reflect the 
political, economic and socio-cultural aspirations of each nation. He laments 
(Akroyd 1985:102), however, that there "are countries in Africa where policy 
guidelines are vague and diffuse, and some where clear policy guidelines and 
objectives seem not to exist." Other writers appear to be suggesting that 
policy per se might not be the answer but rather as constituting the problem 
itself. Heyer _et_ al . (1981), for instance, argue that attempts to develop 
African agriculture through a network of sophisticated policy instruments 
implying a manipulable and predictable environment have backfired in virtually 
all instances. 

African governments, by necessity, have to address specific agricultural 
objectives if they are to move from a state of stagnation or decline into one 
of growth and development. Currently, some of the most common of the 
agricultural policy agendas recommended for various countries include such 
issues as: (1) national and regional food self-sufficiency and food security 
(OAU 1981; Norman 1984; Asante 1986); (2) combating hunger (Eicher 1986a); (3) 
diversification of agricultural output and the raising of rural incomes and 
living standards (Hinderink and Sterkenberg 1983); (4) whether to promote or 
de-emphasize export-led growth (World Bank 1981; Berg 1986; Green and Allison 
1986); (5) conservation of natural resources, equitable distribution of real 
and money income, and equitable regional development (Akroyd 1985); and (6) 
the transformation and acceleration of agricultural-based growth into a 



66 

cumulative employment generation and industrial-oriented growth (Mellor 1986). 

Such policies as these are made within broad frameworks to support, for 
instance, (1) a smallholder-led farming strategy (Johnston 1986), or (2) 
socialist agriculture (Munslow 1985), through (3) institution building 
(Leonard 1986), or (4) the use of a particular problem diagnosis and extension 
approach such as farming systems (Fresco and Poats 1986) and (5) which may be 
targeted for a special or neglected group such as women (Spring 1986; Guyer 
1986a) . 

These policy-initiated development activities entail heavy financial, 
logistical and administrative burdens. This is even more so in such areas as 
project planning and implementation (Gaitskell 1968). Critics of the state's 
role in development therefore caution governments to constantly seek ways of 
transferring such activities as marketing and input distribution to the 
private sector. From this perspective some adversaries and analysts of the 
postindependence state in Africa have blamed too much public sector 
involvement in agricultural pricing, marketing and distribution for the woes 
of the continent (see World Bank 1981; Bates 1984a; Due 1986; Ndulu 1986). 

Other critics, mainly the political scientists on the other hand, have 
looked at the relationships between the poor performance of African countries 
and such themes as (1) the dominant ideology of the state (Young 1982), 
particularly socialism (Isaacman 1979; Munslow 1984); (2) personal rulership 
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982); (3) clientelist politics (Ravenhill 1986); (4) 
affection and patronage (Hyden 1986); (5) the "overdeveloped" state (Leys 
1976; Saul 1979); and (6) ethnic loyalties (Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1976). 

An articulation of these criticisms of Africa's bad economic policies, 
political vanity and patronage, premature bureaucratization as well as 
bureaucratic sclerosis convinces Sandbrook (1986:319) to perceive the state as 



67 

"part of the problem of economic stagnation" in much of the continent. 

The autopsy of the African state conducted by these critics, however 
informative as it may be still leaves at least two questions unanswered. If 
the state is "part" of the problem, what constitutes the other part?. Does it 
mean then that doing away with the involvement of the state will result in the 
realization of the development dreams of Africa?. These are important matters 
that only a holistic perspective on the macro and raicrodynamics of the 
development process can help to elucidate. 



State Ideology, Public Choice and the Individual in Development 

Ever since the colonial days social justice and equality have remained a 
major issue of concern in the policy agendas concretized in the political 
manifestos and the pronouncements of African leaders. With political 
independence most countries flirted with concepts that promoted various brands 
of egalitarian ideals. These ideals were shaped into what was articulated to 
be African socialism (Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kopytoff 1964; Kenya 1965; 
Babu 1981). Supposedly founded on the customary norms and practices and the 
ethical principles of traditional Africa this kind of socialism only proved to 
be theoretically attractive. In practice, it turned out to be woefully 
inadequate and contextually unsuited to the capitalistic demands of the modern 
state in so far as economic growth and development were concerned. 

Given the essentially precapitalist nature of this 
tradition-circumscribed socialism and the realization that it is unworkable in 
Africa's changed socioeconomic and political circumstance some leaders 
abandoned the pursuit of that normative or nativistic ideal quite early. Yet, 
others pursued it by importing Marxist-Leninist ideology and conveniently 



68 

equating it with African communal ism (see for instance, Nkruraah 1965). 

Contrary to the belief underlying this thinking the political and 
economic methods, such as collective production systems associated with 
imported socialism, are not congruent with the humanistic and social ideals of 
Africa. For example, there is no empirical support for the view that communal 
forms of living, consumption and even resource exploitation in traditional 
Africa are synonymous with the imperatives of collective ownership, 
accumulation, management and production of goods which characterize 
Marxism-Lenninism. The inability of Tanzanian policy makers to appreciate this 
fact explains the costly failure of their uj amaa or collective villagization 
experiment (Hatmann 1981). 

Elsewhere in Africa, the promotion by governments of collective and state 
farms in the 1960s and 1970s, to the complete neglect of individually-owned 
and managed farms, was based on this erroneous notion that the prevailing 
social organization of production is collective. The costs of the crises that 
this wrong policy initiated are documented for such countries as Ghana 
(Miracle and Siedman 1968a, 1968b) and classically for Tanzania (Coulson 1969; 
von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; Samoff 1981; Ergas 1982). The case of these 
failed experiments have raised serious developmental questions as to the 
relevance and applicability of the Soviet model (Miller 1977) or the Chinese 
experience (Shillinglaw 1971) and even generally agrarian socialism (Ellman 
1981) to the African condition. This does not suggest, however, that the 
solution is automatically found in capitalist agriculture which system is also 
frought with obstacles (see Dickinson and Mann 1978). 

Another pertinent issue that is brought up in the context of the 
foregoing discussion in the area of development has to do with individual 
effort and rewards as opposed to collective responsibility and welfare. Amity 



69 

or kinship communalism persists in contemporary African societies to the 
extent that it provides a necessary defence machanism in the external 
relations of its members to others outside it (see Elias 1962). In such a 
situation, as the noted ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski (1939:954) rightly 
points out, "the individual obviously has to become cognizant of [the group] 
charter [and] to develop the social attitude and personal sentiments in which 
the bonds of organization consist." However, this fact and the apparent 
placidity and solidarity, that is internal to group or kinship organization, 
do not relegate the individual to the status of an unknown quantity when it 
comes to the question of distribution of rewards and resources. 

It is in this perspective that additional conceptual issues such as 
incentive systems for individual effort and productivity, access to private 
ownership, popular participation and public choice assume paramount roles in 
current thinking about development. For instance, advocates of public choice 
are generally suspicious of interventionist or government-sponsored welfare 
and redistribution programs. In their view development is facilitated by less 
government, more market and privately-organized collective initiative. In 
effect, by conditions where public choice or the spontaneous and voluntary 
arrangements of the ends and means of development ultimately prevail (see 
Buchanan 1986). 

Public choice proponents recognize the need for equality of access to 
economic and political resources, that is, to open franchise and full 
participation in the development process by everybody. But as Buchanan and 
Tullock show (1962:64) "participation in collective activity is costly to the 
individual" in terms of externalities and constitutional decision-making. Thus 
the rational utility-maximizing individual seeking to minimize the imposition 
of external cost on him, as a consequence of the behavior of others, "may find 



70 

it advantageous either to enter into voluntary contracts aimed at eliminating 
externality or to support constitutional provisions that allow private 
decisions to be replaced by collective decisions" (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962:71). 

It needs to be noted though that much as public choice holds promise for 
sustained and democratic effort at development it "has little relevance for a 
society that is characterized by a sharp cleavage of the population into 
distinguishable social classes or separate social, religious, or ethnic 
groupings sufficient to encourage the formation of predictable political 
coalitions and in which one of these coalitions has a clearly advantageous 
position at the constitutional stage" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:80). 

Secondly, the logic of collective action, which is basic to the operation 
of public choice, by its very nature always results in differential benefits 
or rewards in terms of whether we are dealing with small as opposed to large 
groups or in market as contrasted with non-market situations. According to 
Mancur Olson (1965:33) this is so because of the economic facts of 
suboptimality or inefficiency and the fixidity or limited nature of the 
benefits of group goals (see Olson 1965:37; Hardin 1982). 

These issues about group actions and individual participation and 
benefits in societal governance and development reflect the same conceptual 
analysis of organizations by anthropologists who perceive such matters in 
terms of the "image of limited good." The respective predictions arrived at by 
public choice analysts and those of limited good, however, appear to be 
fundamentally at variance. 

Public good is limited. In the view of students of public choice the 
individual would reap the maximum benefit if he or she engages in collective 
action. On the other hand, George Foster (1965) the originator of the concept 



71 

of limited good suggests that the fixed and limited nature of public resources 
in traditional, peasant societies or static economic systems is an effective 
check on group mobilization and collective action. Consequently, there is a 
fear in such societies that if some individual gets more of the limited 
resources then others will get less ipso facto. Under such circumstance 
voluntary cooperation is inhibited and extreme individualism becomes 
preferable to collectivism. 

The extent to which effective administrative mechanisms can turn around 
these problems of development is discussed by various analysts. There are 
suggestions, for example, that call for emphasis on (1) citizen or community 
or popular participation (Cook and Frederickson 1977; Cernea 1983; Gould 

1985) , (2) administrative experimentation (Mosher 1967) or administrative 
coordination (Leach 1982) and (3) the increased involvement of private 
voluntary organizations (Gorman 1984) in the planning and management 
(Garcia-Zamor 1985) of client-centered development (Thomas 1985). These issues 
cannot be evaluted outside the important on-going policy debate about Africa's 
appropriate mode of agricultural production, that is, the forces and relations 
which govern the organization of farm activities and outputs (see Lemarchand 

1986) . 

African governments are concerned about which kinds of agricultural 
organizations are ideologically or politically preferrable to tackle their 
socio-economic developments. In this context the facts raised in this 
discussion so far have wider implications for reviewing the two most important 
arrangements covered extensively in the literature about African agriculture, 
namely, the smallholder and cooperative farming. 



Smallholder Agriculture and Development 



72 



Smallholder agriculture, usually also referred to as traditional, 
peasant, low-resource, family farm, or subsistence production predominates 
over all of Africa. The literature which deals with the various dimensions of 
it has been so copiously referenced that it does not require any extensive 
review here. In the last two decades, however, a number of studies have 
explicated the dynamism of small farmers and challenged many of the 
conventional orthodoxies, such as the laziness and irrationality of the 
farmers who engage in smallholder production. 

Today there is an increasing realization among researchers that small 
\ farm units are the most feasible and cost-effective means of attaining the 
multiple objectives of development (Johnston 1986:160). It is now accepted 
that traditional farmers with access to strategic services and infrastructure 
such as credit tend to accept risks and adopt extension recommendations such 
as high yielding technology. 

The seminal work on transforming traditional agriculture, published by 
Theodore Schultz (1964), sets the stage for the theoretical modelling of 
smallholder farming. Other publications following it take a substantially 
closer look at aspects of the economics of traditional agriculture such as 
technological and institutional constraints (Mellor 1966; Hayami and Ruttan 
1971; Johnston and Kilby 1975). 

Broader analytical perspectives specifically on the African materials are 
provided by other researchers such as Ruthenberg (1968) and Cleave (1974), 
just to mention a few. Over the same period, extended empirical studies with 
the aim to obtaining detailed understanding of present production processes 
and decision behavior in traditional agriculture were conducted in various 



73 

countries. These, for instance, include farm management studies in Northern 
Nigeria (Norman 1973, 1982; Norman e_t al . 1979), Sierra Leone (Dunstan 
1972; Dunstan and Byerlee 1976, 1977), in colonial Rhodesia (Johnson 1963, 
1964a, 1964b, 1970, 1971; Massell and Johnson 1968) and Montague Yudelmann's 
(1964) monumental study covering south central Africa, mainly Rhodesia. 

Recent policy interests in the problems and prospects for the 
transformation of smallholder agriculture have also benefitted from two 
publications, the first edited by Robert Stevens (1977) and the other written 
by Hans Ruthenberg (1985). The authors synthesize various micro-level 
hypotheses generated by earlier studies and have tested and refined them in 
the light of current developments occurring within agricultural growth of 
developing countries. 

The work by Stevens (1977) comprises a collection of regional field 
studies which (1) illustrates in depth the nature of the low-income trap of 
small farmers., (2) provides detailed examples of development strategies that 
have led to major increases in production and eraplojrment on small farms and 
(3) outlines major thrusts for government policies and programs that will 
accelerate small-farm income growth. 

The theoretical path adopted in Ruthenberg's study places the highest 
priority on the role of technological and other innovations in the process of 
agricultural growth. That idea is an apparent incorporation of a paradigm 
about change which goes back to Homer Barnett's (1956) original proposition 
that innovation is the basis of culture change. Ruthenberg conveys the 
optimism that with effort, patience, understanding and care, innovations to 
improve the incomes of millions of small farmers can be Identified, appraised 
and implemented in ways that are attractive both to farmers and to the wider 
economy. 



74 

Given the corpus of recently assembled empirical evidence in support of 
the high performance of many traditional farmers around the world, the 
relative efficiency of smallholder agriculture is no longer questioned. This 
fact notwithstanding, an agricultural economy which is wholly dependent upon a 
smallholder system has certain limitations. 

Dorner and Kanel (1977:5) discuss at least two of them. First, a highly 
0 productive smallholder system requires an elaborate service structure which is 
both expensive and time-consuming to develop. Consequently, a government 
cannot deal effectively with such a system until all the necessary 
infrastructure is in place and markets have begun to function more or less 
competitively. The second problem is that the smallholder system, dependent 
upon individuals rather than the collective, can allow great inequalities_to 
develop. Such inequalities may be a function of variations in individual 
entrepreneurial abilities. Whatever their cause, they can accumulate over time 
and present serious obstacles to achieving a resolution of problems such as 
equity and even economic growth. 

Yet one other issue that is raised in the literature which has important 
implications for development is the relationship between smallholder producers 
and the state. According to Gavin Williams (1976:149), peasants tend to suffer 
under almost all forms of externally designed strategies of change undertaken 
in Africa. His contention is that because of the nature of the peasant mode of 
production in the political economy of the continent (1) the underdevelopment 
of peasant production is a condition for the development of capitalist and 
state production and that (2) this condition serves the interests of the state 
and its beneficiaries rather than promotes the livelihood of the people. 

This view of the parasitic and exploitative nature of states' domination 
over their seemingly helpless smallholder farmers contrasts sharply with Goran 



75 

Hyden's (1980) characterization of African peasantries as uncaptured and 
consequently resistant to the intrusions of the forces and pressures of the 
state . 

Cooperatives and Agricultural Development 

Production cooperatives are an option to individually owned and operated 
smallholder or family farms. The modern cooperative institution denotes a wide 
range of organizational forms which involve varying activities. In the 
agricultural sector these include, among others, the more common situations 
where individual farmers cultivate their own farms while banding together to 
take advantage of services such as input and credit procurement and marketing. 
More rarely, and usually at the encouragement or even the coercion of the 
state, there is also the producer cooperative. At the very advanced phase of 
this continuum, the ownership of land and other resources as well as the 
organization of production calls for a substantial element of collectivization 
as it is found in socialist communes (Galeski 1971, 1977; Francisco _et al. 
1979). 

The role of cooperatives in the development of the developing countries 
first engaged the attention of the United Nations Organization in the 1950s. 
Subsequently, towards the end of the 1960s, it commissioned various analytical 
and case studies into rural cooperative movements (see Carroll et al . 1969; 
UNRISD 1975), and also covered Africa (see Apthorpe 1972a, 1972b), Asia (see 
Inayatullah 1972) and Latin America (see Borda 1971). Throughout Africa the 
colonial administrations in many but not in all cases encouraged the formation 
of cooperatives as part of the promotion of community development (Widstrand 
1970). 



76 

To the agricultural societies of rural Africa the idea of cooperation has 
never been a novel concept. In most places traditional and informal 
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges, some of which are still performed today, 
were practiced in the past. These involved the pooling of such scarce 
resources as labor power oftentimes for the mutual benefit of participants. 
Subsidiarily also, cooperation on a larger scale was part of festive or 
competitive community display in various traditional societies (Erasmus 1956; 
Dore 1971). 

Many researchers have studied aspects of this system of customary values 
exhibited in traditional cooperation. For instance, Moore (1975) has a 
typology of such cooperation and he has also looked at the economic importance 
and other advantages that it generates in rural areas. In Africa mention can 
be made, among others, of Migot-Adholla's (1970) study of traditional society 
and cooperation and Gulliver's (1971) work about such cooperation among the 
Ndendeuli of. Tanzania. 

A major feature of traditional cooperation in rural Africa manifests 
itself in the form of group participation in various farm tasks. Every peasant 
society in Africa has a name for such cooperation, which for example is 
referred to as nnoboa among the Akan of Ghana and nhimbe among the Mashona 
of Zimbabwe. Moise Mensah (1970) reports about group farming in Dahomey, now 
Benin while Anthony Ellman (1970) also observes it in Tanzania. 

In another setting, Brian du Toit (1969) examines the functioning of 
informal grassroots cooperation among the Bantu-speaking groups of South 
Africa. His study traces the problems associated with the transformation of 
traditional cooperation through rural-urban migrations and networks into the 
modern cooperative system. He shows also that such revitalized institutions 
are major avenues for culture change in African urban settings. 



77 

The stated objectives and the recognized economic and social advantages 
of the modern cooperative are quite obvious. Agarwal (1976) discusses many of 
them and Joy (1971) takes a look at the existing social factors which are 
favorable to successful cooperatives. Under the capitalist system of 
production cooperatives render valuable services which range from the 
economies of scale, enhancement of private property, market competition and 
the profit motive to the maximization and utilization of scarce resources (Roy 
1981:29). 

Elsewhere, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 1982:1) has cited 
the following advantag es that are often sought by socialist countries through 
the establishment of cooperatives: (1) economically, it speeds the growth of 
output and incomes by allowing more rational use of land and labor, providing 
an essential underpinning for the accumulation process, both local and 
national; (2) socially, collectivization eliminates exploitative class 
relationships and prevents their reemergence, alleviates absolute poverty by 
delivering basic welfare services and reduces unacceptably high levels of 
inequality between households, villages and regions; and (3) politically, it 
allows the Integration of rural producers as active subjects rather than 
passive victims of the national development process with the collective as 
both an instrument of state-led mobilization and a framework for democratic 
participation and grassroots initiative. 

In the view of Texier (1974:1) the cooperative still appears to be the 
most appropriate organization for mobilizing the efforts of the community for 
agricultural development. The voluminous study by Robert Bideleux (1985) 
provides additional insights into the successful achievement of many of these 
goals by various communist countries. Nigel Swain (1985) also documents the 
success story of cooperative agriculture in Hungary. 



79 

second relates to possible explanations and the policy ramifications of the 
failure. A selective characterization of these aspects of the cooperative 
failure in Africa may be made from the existing literature. 

Invariably, cooperatives have not only failed in terms of economic output 
but they have not measured up to the hopes and expectations held by their 
sponsors, and even the majority of the participating members. Goran Hyden 
studied the management problems of some African cooperatives. According to him 
(Hyden 1970a:12) they "are not only inefficient, but plagued by dishonesty, 
misappropriation of funds and favoritism." Similar problems are documented at 
length in such places as Nigeria (King 1975; Beer 1980; Fabiyi 1983; Okuneye 
1984), Ghana (Miracle and Seidman 1968b), Ghana and Uganda (Young _et al . 
1981), and in Tanzania (Newiger 1968; Cliffe 1970). 

In relation to the important policy question of equity, Hyden (1970a: 12) 
has this to say about the cooperatives: "they have so far proved unable to 
promote the principle of equality." Serious as this finding is it is not 
unique to Africa in that Orlando Borda (1971:ix) reports a similar situation 
in Latin America where he concludes that the effect of the cooperatives "in 
the long run has been to preserve, sometimes even strengthen, the prevailing 
system of inequality." For Asia, Gunnar Myrdal (1968:1335), likewise, 
observes: "the notion that cooperation will have an equalizing effect is bound 
to turn out to be an illusion . . . the net effect is to create more, not less 
inequality" (see also Munkner 1977). 

In explaining the failings of cooperatives Texier (1974:2) takes the 
stand that cooperation itself is not at fault but rather the way it has been 
introduced into traditional rural environments. He attributes the problem to 
cultural contradictions arguing that: 



78 

In countries such as Israel, with its kibbutz and moshav collective 
systems of rural settlement and production (Weintraub 1971; Don 1977), and for 
most of rural Europe and North America cooperatives have been of immense 
benefit to small farmers. These benefits include, among others, access to 
extension, credit and input services at substantially reduced costs to the 
individual members of these cooperatives. Other instances of successful 
cooperatives are documented for Latin America (Carroll 1971). By and large, 
however, the modern cooperative, as Schaffer and Lamb (1981) indicate, does 
well only in economically advanced countries. 

Given the foregoing facts one can appreciate the near-dogmatic acceptance 
of cooperatives and their promotion in the agricultural policy agendas of 
independent African countries (Widstrand 1970; Bardeleben 1973; King 1981; 
Ladipo 1981; Okafor 1983; Ahwireng-Obeng 1986). For most African countries, 
particularly those which have an affinity for agrarian socialism, the modern 
cooperative seem to have the answers to such pressing problems as the 
eradication of absolute poverty (Lele 1975) and the promotion of equity 
(Putterman 1983). 

Yet, the literature indicates the overwhelming failure of modern 
Z cooperatives and other public sponsored agricultural production schemes 

throughout the continent. For example, Carl Eicher (1986a) states: "After 25 
years of independence, there are no models of agrarian socialism , . . that 
have produced a reliable agricultural surplus." Earlier, Eicher and Baker 
(1982:205) alluded to the theoretical and policy implications of the problems 
of cooperatives by emphasising that failure "has been a common denominator 
under civilian, military, capitalist, and socialist governments." 

Two issue are pertinent to putting this failure in the context of 
agricultural policy. Tae first is about the nature of the failure itself. The 



80 

1 [T]he actual consequences of trying to introduce into a 
traditional environment the cooperative system which are 
successfully practised in Europe and in North America under 
very different circumstances and for the benefit of very 
different kinds of communities has in fact been to consolidate 
the traditional system and to encourage further social 
stratification by creating new opportunities for class 
exploitation by small privileged groups. (Texier 1974:3) 

Internal organization and member commitment and morale are problems 
mentioned by Dorner and Kanel (1977:8), who argue further: "It is a delusion 
to expect that group farms have such obvious benefits to members or such 
decisive economic advantages to make it possible to overcome easily the 
organizational problems." 

The Institute of Development Studies siimmarizes the forceful criticisms 
voiced against producer cooperatives. It states (IDS 1982:1) that (1) the 
heavy hand of the state in collectives negates the potential advantages, 
wasting valuable economic resources through inefficient planning and 
irrational constraints on local autonomy, (2) collectives serve as a mystified 
legitimation for higher-level decisions rather than as a vehicle for true 
democratic participation and (3) collective forms of agriculture are used as 
an instrument for state control of the rural areas and procurement of cheap 
agricultural products rather than as a context for speedy and egalitarian 
rural development. Obern and Jones (1981) discuss many of these and other 
critical factors affecting the cooperatives. 

Dealing specifically with the African experiences, Paul Collins 
(1980:288) puts the causes of the failure in perspective pointing out that "a 
lot of rhetoric about African co-operatives is misleading where it links their 
organization to aspects of pre-capitalist or 'traditional' village life." 

In fact, the notion of traditional cooperation, exchange and communal 
support systems is a principal feature of social organization throughout 



Africa. This truism which is apparently the basis of the policy thinking 
shared by many African leaders influences their priority preference for the 
cooperative mode of production (see Nyerere 1968). One thing, however, appears 
to be amiss here. There is ample evidence from all over Africa showing that 
the similarities in the perceived and actual objectives notwithstanding the 
modern cooperative, as it is known in the West (Roy 1981; Sargent 1982) or in 
the East (Bideleux 1985), does not operate with the same principles as 
traditional African cooperation, 

A similar thesis about the confusion of African norms with collectivism 
is advanced in a volume on African cooperatives and their efficiency, edited 
by Carl Widstrand (1972). There the failure of the cooperative movement in 
most of the continent is attributed to the inability to appreciate the 
difference between African collective values and the requirements for a formal 
cooperative . 

This same point is poignantly conveyed in another way by Paul Bohannan. 
Writing about the different issue of exchange and investment in an African 
society, namely, the Tiv of Nigeria, Bohannan (1955:60) nonetheless argues 
that "market behavior and kinship behavior are incompatible." George Dalton 
(1967:78) provides additional support for this view by arguing that "to retain 
indigenous social organization in the new economies of markets and machines is 
obviously impossible." 

These views reinforce Hyden's (1970a:13) observation that "traditional 
communalism has turned out to be more of a liability than an asset to modern 
cooperative development." It was Meyer Fortes (1969) who stressed the primacy 
of amity to kinship relations, a normative fact which has significant policy 
implications for the development of cooperatives. However, many analysts who 
have worked with various African societies will agree with Hamer's (1982) 



82 

observation among the Sadama of Ethiopia that rivalry and taking kinsmen for 
granted, that is, self interest rather than altruism, is a reality of 
cooperative organization and management (see also Hamer 1981a, 1981b). 



Rural Development 

The concept of rural development is now a catch-phrase in contemporary 
Africa. This is understandable because Africa is essentially a rural 
continent. In terms of population and settlement distribution, location of 
natural resources, patterns of economic activity and hence the potential or 
prospective sources of growth and development rural Africa presents dynamic 
perspectives. The worldwide significance of the need to develop these areas is 
stressed by the United Nations, which argues: 

[R]ural development can help to smooth the transition between 
rural and urban life, and to narrow the gap between them in 
living standards, by disseminating urban attitudes, providing 
job opportunities and introducing education, health and welfare 
services, public utilities and communal facilities. It can also 
provide city people with the pleasure of access to the 
countryside for recreation. (United Nations 1974:59) 

Giving high priority to rural development programs would make a lot of 
sense because of these and other concerns such as their high potential to 
effect (1) the eradication of poverty (Chambers 1983); (2) improving quality 
of life (Thomas and Boyazoglu 1978); (3) stemming the tide of rural-urban 
drift (Chambers 1974); (4) improving land tenure systems (Cohen 1980a); and 
(5) strengthening the balance of payments, creating mass markets for 
non-agricultural goods and services and making food available to the growing 
populations (Daniel et al. 1985). 



83 

Indeed, Heyer _et _aK (1981), looking at the nature and the size of the 
institutional establishment that services rural development in Africa, suggest 
rather sarcastically that rural development has become a big business. For one 
thing, it is in the area of rural development that most people ever come face 
to face with government officials or experience the benefits that are 
controlled and distributed by the state. It is safe to assume on the basis of 
this fact that the ability of the state to reach out and win the confidence 
and the support of its farm and rural citizens is conditioned largely by the 
effectiveness of the rural development policies and programs that the 
government implements. 

There are as many different definitions of the concept of rural 
development as there are interested analysts and practitioners. For example, 
the World Bank (1975:3) sees it as a means for reducing poverty, increasing 
production or raising productivity. In the Bank's view rural development "is 
concerned with the modernisation and monetisation of rural society, and with 
its transition from its traditional isolation to integration with the national 
economy." For Uma Lele (1975:20) it means improving living standards of the 
mass of the low-income population residing in rural areas and making the 
process of their development self-sustaining. 

Jansma (1981:285) takes rural development to involve an overall 
improvement in the economic and social well-being of rural residents and the 
institutional and physical environment in which they live. In the view of 
Eicher and Baker (1982:59 fn2) the distinguishing characteristics of rural 
development programs include increased rural welfare, agricultural 
productivity, participation and broadly shared benefits. Robert Chambers 
(1983) contends that rural development can be redefined to include enabling 
poor rural people to demand and control more of the benefits of development. 



84 

The history of rural development has passed through different phases. 
Consequently, the concept assumes a plethora of aliases such as (1) community 
development (Apthorpe 1961; Brokensha and Hodge 1969; Phillips 1969), (2) 
modernization (Mazrui 1968; Hunter 1969; Shapiro 1975; Uchendu 1978; Agyeman 
1981), (3) rural change (Uchendu 1968), (4) social change (Magubane 1971), (5) 
integrated rural development (Godart 1966), (6) agricultural development 
(Bates and Lofchie 1980), (7) economic development (Boserup 1970; Due 1980), 
(8) agrarian change (Boserup 1965; Bates 1984b; Berry 1984) and (9) 
poverty-focused development (Adelman 1986). 

Beginning from the 1950s community development was proposed by the 
British Colonial Office to help to prepare dependent territories for 
independence by improving local government and developing them economically. 
The term spread rapidly to various external donor agencies and organizations, 
particularly the United Nations. The idea behind it was embraced by 
governments such as the United States, which provided funding and personnel to 
promote it. Anglophone Africa became one of the major testing grounds for 
community development ideals (see Holdcroft 1978). The concept and programs of 
community development also caught on in Francophone Africa in the 1960s where 
it was known as animation rurale (Charlick 1980). The community development 
idea, however, was short-lived. 

In his criticism, Manghezi (1976) labelled the strategy of community 
development as being suspect. He argued, among other things, that its 
underlying theory placed value on order and stability rather than on conflict 
and contradiction thus glossing over fundamental class inequalities and 
antagonisms in Africa. 

The view about the failure of the model, shared by Eicher and Staatz 
(1984:8), is that community development grew out of the cold-war atmosphere of 



85 

the 1950s when western foreign assistance programs were searching for a 
non-revolutionary approach to rural change. Its advocates therefore assumed, 
rather wrongly, that development can be achieved through the direct transfer 
of western agricultural technologies and social institutions such as local 
democracy to the rural areas of the Third World. 

With the demise of community development in the 1960s-1970s, integrated 
rural development became the vogue. Its rise was also in response to such 
factors as (1) the failure of the so-called green revolution to make any 
impact in Africa and elsewhere (Eicher and Baker 1982:61) and (2) the 
realization that isolated or sectoral projects hardly accomplish anything 
(Hippel and Fischer 1985:11). 

A comprehensive evaluation of integrated rural development projects in 
Eastern, Southern, and West Africa was undertaken by Uma Lele (1975), In it 
she recommended that because of severe lack of trained manpower it was 
appropriate for projects to only begin with a few simple interventions aimed 
at removing critical constraints before any attempt was made to phase in other 
programs . 

Dupriez (1979) conducted a similar review of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) funded projects in Africa. He found that there was 
overcentralization which denied the farmers the much needed opportunity to 
participate in project decision-making. More seriously, he observed that the 
project administrators ignored social structures and economic and political 
hierarchies by tending to regard rural communities as undifferentiated masses. 

■there is very little doubt that integrated rural development as a whole 
ever measured up to the expectation that it was hoped to generate. According 
to Robert Chambers (1974:22) the failure of rural development efforts in 
Africa is due to (1) lack of high-level manpower, (2) poor attitudes among 



86 

public servants, (3) a lack of integration and coordination and (4) 
inappropriate structures. Some of these criticisms of integrated rural 
developments, are echoed by Ruttan (1975) in his skeptical assessment of such 
proj ects . 

For his part, Lakshmanan (1982) suggests that given the often mutually 
inconsistent objectives of rural development any efforts that seek to achieve 
the conflicting objectives at the same time can lead to further 
disillusionment. Another analyst, John Mellor (1986:73) supports these 
findings and argues that (1) almost universally, integrated rural projects 
failed as a result of excessive complexity and lack of central support 
services, (2) the projects tended to raid the national institutions of 
personnel and (3) they were never integrated into the national support 
structures for agricultural growth. 

At the intellectual level, Cohen (1980a) reports major gaps in the 
literature in terras of formulating a coherent theory and guidelines to 
facilitate the work of rural development practitioners. This deficiency is 
perhaps explained by a fact put forward by Azam (1986) that there is a very 
high turnover in rural development thought. He argues that a preoccupation of 
the development experts with "new ideas" is prejudicial to the essential 
process of learning by experience. He attributes the widening gap between 
development theory and achievement in the field to this preoccupation. 

In addition, Azam (1986) makes two important points that are relevant to 
the future of rural development policy in Africa. He argues that for rural 
development to be successful it has to be growth-oriented, egalitarian and 
democratic and that rethinking is needed not for building a new development 
design but to eliminate faulty thinking accumulated over the years. 



87 



Poverty-Focused Development Strategies 

The genre of development philosophies which embraces this paradigm 
comprises such concepts as the Basic Needs Approach (Ghai et al . 1977; 
Streeten 1981, 1986; Stewart 1985), Growth With Equity (Jegen and Wilber 
1979), Redistribution With Growth (Chenery _et al . 1974) and Redistribution 
Before Growth (Adelman 1978, 1986). The central theme underlying this 
essentially reformist paradigm is poverty eradication. 

The need for a new paradigmatic look at the poverty issue arose out of 
the perceived inability of traditional market-oriented development theories to 
induce a "trickling-down" of the benefits of growth to the poor (Lele 
1984:447). 

Poverty is a relative concept that defies any crisp definition. 
Operationally, however, it relates to the minimum or basic needs of people and 
their ability to meet those needs. Poverty-focused strategies always make a 
fundamental distinction between absolute and relative poverty. The extent of 
inequality in a given situation is a function either of absolute or relative 
poverty. 

According to Van Weigel (1986:1424) absolute poverty is characterized by 
(1) persistent undernutrition, (2) illiteracy, (3) unsafe drinking water, (4) 
inadequate sanitation, (5) parasitic disease, (6) severely limited access to 
health care and (7) bleak prospects for productive employment. Relative 
poverty on the other hand refers to the extent to which the income share of 
groups of individuals or households differs from their population share 
(Ahluwalia 1974:6). 



88 

Strategies with anti-poverty focus essentially seek to attack absolute 
poverty. In the words of one believer and proponent of this school of thought, 
Irma Adelman (1986:49), the prime objective of economic development assistance 
should be the reduction in the number of people living in a state of absolute 
deprivation. In the view of Robert Chambers (1983) the nature of poverty is 
the result of five interlocking features. These are (1) lack of material 
assets; (2) physical weakness; (3) isolation from others and from sources of 
communication; (4) vulnerability in the face of uncertainties and risks; and 
(5) political powerlessness . Elsewhere, he indicates also that poor rural 
people are 

typically unorganized, inarticulate, often sick, 
seasonally hungry, and quite frequently dependent 
on local patrons. They are less educated . . . less 
likely to use government services. . . . Further, 
they are relatively invisible, especially the women 
and children. (Chambers 1978:209) 

Leftwich and Sharp (1976:212) contend that poverty is a reality that 
needs to be studied, understood and appreciated. In this context poverty 
eradication becomes the central issue in the development agenda. Dudley Seers 
(1973) who is a champion advocate of this view suggests that the questions to 
ask about a country's development are 

What has been happening to poverty?. What has been happening 
to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all 
three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond 
doubt this has been a period of development for the country 
concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been 
growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be 
strange to call the result "development," even if per capita 
income doubled. (Seers 1969:3) 

For Africa, varying estimates of the population that may be categorized as 
poor range from 40 to 60 percent (Bequele and van der Hoeven 1980). But this 



is for the period before 1980. Since then the overall trend has been one of 
increasing deterioration (Daniel £t al. 1985). 

The Basic Needs Approach was proposed in 1976 as a new development 
strategy by the World Employment Conference in conjunction with the 
International Labor Office. In development planning the approach emphasizes 
social welfare functions as a response to absolute poverty (Hopkins and van 
der Hoeven 1983). According to Ghai et al^ (1977) the basic premise of the 
approach is that development policies must be formulated to satisfy basic 
human needs through the alleviation of poverty and reduction of inequality. 
Some of the major features that distinguish Basic Needs from alternative 
strategies include its focus on micro-level consumption and the provision for 
such consumption in the form of public goods by the state (Weigel 1986). 

The underlying theory is that the market system does not traditionally 
cater for the critical needs of the poor. Consequently, such areas as health 
care, clean water, sanitation and education are better catered for by the 
government. The political or ideological foundations of the approach in the 
prioritization of development goals are alluded to by one of its major 
proponent, Paul Streeten (1981). In his view development projects should be 
more concerned with directly improving the welfare of the poor rather than 
concentrating on macro-objectives such as increasing aggregate growth rates. 
Streeten (1981) goes further to suggest two competing ways of defining a Basic 
Needs Approach to development. These are (1) to treat it as an all-embracing 
and exclusive development strategy and (2) to pursue it as a strategy which 
supplements and complements existing strategies. 

Other writers have discussed various dimensions of the issues involved in 
the Basic Needs Approach. For instance, Weaver (1979) believes that the 
satisfaction of basic human needs must be the goal of development. From this 



premise he examines the relative efficacy of using three broad strategies to 
facilitate this goal. These are (1) the traditional capital-oriented or growth 
maximization model, (2) the revolutionary socialist-oriented model and (3) a 
reformist growth with equity-oriented model. Based on this framework he 
(Weaver 1979:19-20) also argues for the systematic organization of development 
thinking and efforts around meeting basic needs of food, safe drinking water, 
clothing and shelter, medical care and education, 

Hopkins and van der Hoeven (1983) take up the issue of how Basic Needs 
should be incorporated in development planning. Ghai and Alfthan (1977) also 
examine the conceptual basis of the approach and the empirical work that needs 
to be accomplished to make it operational. The normative issues raised by the 
approach are discussed by Lee (1977). At the methodological level, Khan (1977) 
reviews the problem of production planning for basic needs. He shows why a 
simple reliance on conventional multi-sector planning model will be 
inadequate. In his view (Khan 1977) a basic needs plan will have to take into 
account the close interrelationship among basic needs targets, the production 
structure and the distribution of income. 

By and large, poverty is conceptualized as being essentially a rural 
problem. Policies for its eradication have therefore focused on agriculture. 
However, Richard Sandbrook's (1982) treatment of the issue is done purely with 
an urban perspective. He defines the goals of the Basic Needs Approach to be 
(1) the redistibution of income, (2) reorientation of production systems and 
(3) the provision of equitable access to improved public services, Sandbrook 
criticizes both the Basic Needs approaches advocated by the World Bank (1975) 
and the International Labor Office (Ghai et al_^ 1977). In his judgement the 
former is too conservative to offer any hope for a genuine assault on poverty 
and the latter is too radical, Utopian and unrealistic. Yet, his prescriptive 



91 

solution at best is even more controversial. He believes (Sandbrook 1982) that 
the development strategy of basic needs can be achieved in Africa only through 
a class struggle that generates a progressive political transformation. 

Though economic growth is a necessary condition for sustained development 
it does not by itself alleviate the problems which afflict the poorest 
segments of the population. These problems include, among others, the lack of 
access to education, health care, employment, production resources such as 
land and equitable income. It is Glower et al^ (1966) who did a classic 
study of Liberia to illustrate that in most developing countries impressive 
economic growth rates are not necessarily accompanied by socioeconomic 
development . 

Indeed, according to the Kuznets' (1955) divergence-convergence 
hypothesis the initial phases of the development process correspond with 
substantial increases in the inequality of income distribution. Though the 
inequality ultimately improves at later stages of industrialization (see 
Kuznet 1955; Adelman and Morris 1973; Ahluwalia 1976) it is empirically 
correct to assume that the poor can suffer from growth in both absolute and 
relative terms. But whether or not the poor become poorer over time depends 
upon the kinds of policies that are implemented. In this context Adelman 
(1986:51) argues that if the share of the income accruing to the poor declines 
more rapidly than overall income rises, then they are loosing from growth. 

Like other poverty-focused strategies of development, a principal thesis 
of the Redistribution Before Growth Approach is that the poor benefit more if 
policy specifically ensures (1) distribution of assets to cover them, (2) 
facilitates the institutionalization of their assets accumulation as well as 
(3) their access to the market. In the view of its chief advocate, Adelman 
(1986) the approach tackles the poverty problem first to achieve the following 



92 

policy targets: (1) increase the quantity of assets owned by the poor, for 
example, through land reform; (2) increase the volume of their market sales 
through generating demand for the output of their labor intensive industries; 
and (3) increase the prices of the services that the poor sell especially 
through improved terms of trade. 

This development model is viewed to be productivity-oriented in that it 
aims to raise the incomes of the poor by increasing their productivity and 
their access to productivity enhancing assets. The importance of a systemic 
and integrated approach to realize the utility of this strategy is clearly 
underscored by Adelman who argues that 

strategies for poverty alleviation are not compatible with just 
any kind of economic growth. . . . The most effective approaches 
entail a combination of several elements. . . . The sequence 
(being) implementing asset-oriented policies and institutional 
changes designed to give the poor access to high productivity 
jobs before , not after, shifting development strategies . If 
that is done, there is no "trade-off" between growth promotion 
and poverty alleviation. The same development strategy is then 
optimal for both goals. (Adelman 1986:64-65. Her emphasis) 

The Redistribution With Growth approach is based on a philosophy which 
posits that the objectives of growth and egalitarian income, emplo3rraent and 
assets distribution are not necessarily in conflict. More significantly, it 
points out that the incomes and wealth of the affluent do not have to be 
reduced as a condition for achieving improved conditions for the poor. It 
therefore supports policies that seek equitable distribution in ways that do 
not slow down rates of growth within the economy. 

Chenery et_ al . ( 1974), the major spokespersons for this approach, 
advocate for a differential allocation of a larger share of the proceeds of 
economic growth to assets accumulation by the poor. The rural emphasis of this 
approach is argued by Ahluwalia (1974:19). His view is that given the scale of 



93 

the poverty problem and the limited capacity of other sectors to expand 
productive employment a viable strategy for raising the incomes of the lowest 
40 percent of the population in developing countries must necessarily focus on 
the agricultural sector. Yoder (1979) even provides a theological perspective 
on Growth With Equity arguing that it is a Christian imperative and moral 
obligation to ensure that the poor benefit from growth. 

In the African context, Diana Hunt (1975) takes a look at the interplay 
between growth and equity as they manifest in the distribution of economic 
status and opportunity in the flbere area of rural Kenya. Gavin Williams (1982) 
also reviews the need for the state in Zimbabwe to ensure equity and growth. 
This work contrasts with another by Bill Kinsey (1982) in which he critically 
examines the contradictions between equity and growth in Zimbabwe. Bill Kinsey 
(1984) offers a similar critique of the equity and growth issues in Malawi 
while Elliot (1983), earlier, observes that the two issues represent 
unresolved conflicts in the development efforts of Zambia. 

These and other critics of the Poverty-Focused Approaches cite a host of 
flaws that detract from their utility. Higgins (1981), for example, in 
criticizing Basic Needs mentions the paternalism that it creates and the 
culture-relativity that is implied in the definition of its key components as 
major weaknesses. Other problems have been associated with it including the 
following mentioned by Weigel (1986:1427): (1) the tendency to confuse needs 
with preferences; (2) the overdrawn hierarchical distinction between material 
and non-material needs; (3) the high priority that is often assigned to the 
subjective concept of security in the hierarchy of needs; and (4) the tendency 
to identify needs in terms of pathologies associated with deprivation of 
particular goods. 



Yet, in the thinking of other critics the whole idea of equity or 
redistribution which embraces these approaches is bad enough. For instance, 
Bauer (1981) professes the view that redistributive and welfare policies are 
hinderance to productivity and that they produce situations in which the poor 
might be more equal but worse off than without such policies. For his part 
Alain de Janvry (1983:258) sees the Basic Needs Approach as nothing more than 
institutionalized charity. In his view all the poverty-focused strategies 
address policy issues in an ad hoc way and this is because of their 
fundamental limitation of theoretical poverty. Ayres (1983:79) also alludes 
the theoretical deficiency which plagues these approaches pointing out in 
addition that they give insufficient attention to the factors that generate 
poverty and only explain poverty in a causal chain that borders on the 
tautological . 

At another level, Denis Goulet (1979) takes a rather philosophical look 
at the competing theories of needs in relation to the question of values. He 
makes an important point that the risk of ethnocentrism and bias is inherent 
in any attempt to analyze fundamental human needs. This issue raises a number 
of ethical questions which most often do not feature in the calculus of the 
agenda of development planners and practitioners. 

A more articulate response to the critics of the Basic Needs Approach is 
offered by Weigel , whose argument is that 

[T]he controversy surrounding the "Basic Needs Approach" (BNA) 
to economic development largely stems from the fact that it 
introduces several anomalies which cannot be resolved by the 

received" paradigm of neoclassical economy theory. I suggest 
that the presence of anomaly is not indicative of the conceptual 
infeasibility of the BNA, but instead reflects the profound" 
inadequacies of our current stock of interpretive paradigms. 
Consequently there is an urgent need for us to reexamine some of 
the core assumptions underlying the economic, political and 
ethical paradigms which inform our understanding of human life. 
(Weigel 1986:1423) 



95 



With this call Weigel (1986:1423) chides that the issue of Basic Needs in 
overcoming poverty is one of the few instances in history where rhetoric has 
given rise to thought. 



Land Reform 



Land or agrarian reformism in Africa does not have the comparatively long 
history nor even the kind of regional importance that the phenomenon invokes 
in the political economy of Latin America. In that part of the world agrarian 
reform dates back to at least the 1850s in Mexico and to the 1960s in Cuba (de 
Janvry 1983:197-8). Elsewhere, in the Middle East for instance, the specific 
impacts of land reform in various countries are elaborated upon by Doreen 
Warriner (1969). In Africa, the only substantial land reform attempted 
recently have been in Kenya (see Wasserman 1976) and in Ethiopia (Brietzke 
1976; Stahl 1977). 

Peter Dorner's (1972) publication, based mainly on his extensive Latin 
American experience and, to a lesser extent, Asia and Africa provides a major 
elaboration on the economics of land reform. In this respect, Dorner's work 
builds upon earlier studies such as Eckstein's (1955) review paper on the 
subject and Raup's (1967) chapter on the relationship between land reform and 
agricultural development. Expanding Warriner's (1969) definition, Dorner sees 
land reform 

in a narrow sense [to] refer to measures to redistribute 
land in favour of peasants and small farmers. More broadly 
it may be taken to embrace consolidation and registration 
in areas where customary tenure is prevalent and also land 
settlement on new lands. (Dorner 1972:11) 



96 

Many analysts similarly view such reform and its potentials within the 
overall requirements of development. Land reform is pursued for its assumed 
ability to serve a dual developmental purpose, namely, as both a 
redistributive instrument and a vehicle for achieving increased productivity 
or growth. 

For instance, Dorner (1972:19) believes that "while land reform is not a 
sufficient measure and needs to be accompanied by many other programmes, it is 
often essential for providing a stable base for a country's future economic 
and political development." Likewise, Warriner (1969:50) suggests that 
"production can only increase if [land reform] is accompanied by investment in 
the social and economic infrastructure." The theory then is that at least for 
countries where land issues dominate the rural political economy reform is a 
necessary condition for growth and development. But in order to enhance growth 
and development reform policies need to be complimented by the kinds of 
infrastructure which facilitate productivity (see The World Bank 1975b). 

A rather interesting perspective on the long-term prospects of land 
reform is offered by de Janvry (1983). His critical evaluation of the 
political, economic and social implications of land reforms leaves him with 
one conviction. He (de Janvry 1983:221-223) asserts emphatically that once 
reform policies have succeeded in eliminating "precapitalist social relations 
in the rural agricultural sector" reform as a tool for development loses its 
legitmacy and importance. Lehmann who earlier perceived the "death of land 
reform" argues a similar view stating: 

[I]f the problem is poverty and inequality, landlessness 
and the unequal distribution of land are only partial 
causes thereof. The strategy for the removal or reduction 
of inequality and poverty is not adequately formulated in 
terms of the distribution of land, and must be approached 
differently. (Lehmann 1978:344) 



97 

Yet, Vernon Ruttan (1986), reviewing land reform programs in the context 
of the Latin American experience, believes that a large number of countries 
there have been successful in removing some of the most obvious sources of 
inefficiency and exploitation associated with the traditional hacienda system. 
At the same time, however, he is skeptical of land reforms arguing that there 
appear to be relatively few areas where they have been accompanied by the 
policies needed to sustain productivity growth in the small peasant sector. He 
(Ruttan 1986:52) adds: "there are even fewer areas where the . . . reforms 
have succeeded in resolving the problems of equity in the agrarian structure." 

The important point to observe about development is that no particular 
program ever succeeds by itself. Bell and Duloy (1974:16) drives home this 
message by arguing that "land reform needs to be associated with a rural 
development strategy to have a really major impact on rural poverty." ' 

Land Resettlement 

Conceptually, resettlement or colonization is an aspect of settlement. 

Settlement is defined by the World Bank (1978:5) as the "planned or 

spontaneous movement of people to areas of underutilized agricultural 

potential, both rainfed and irrigated." 

Christodoulou (1965) points out that land settlement as a measure for 

tackling land problems has had an almost universal appeal. There is hardly a 
country in the world which has not undertaken at one time or another a land 
settlement program. Consequently, Roider (1971:14) quoting other sources, 
indicates that: "Perhaps in no field of agricultural development do there 
exist so many unsatisfactory projects as in the area of resettlement." 



98 

The objectives of land settlement are many and varied and they include, 
for example, one or more of the following listed by Christodoulou (1965:1): 
(1) the use of "new" land and water resources; (2) the settlement of 
unpopulated or underpopulated or frontier areas; (3) the creation of model or 
new type communities; (4) the modernization of agriculture; (5) the increase 
or diversification of agricultural production; (6) the employment of 
unemployed groups; (7) the provision of greater opportunities for 
underemployed farmers; (8) settlement or resettlement of various groups such 
as nomads, refugees, war veterans, immigrants, people from depressed or 
overcrowded areas; (9) the creation of new institutions such as co-operatives, 
or of new forms of land tenure and farm organization, demonstration farms, 
training or retraining establishments; and (10) generally a new departure in 
farming or development in rural areas or regional development. 

Land resettlement as a major rural development strategy has been reported 
upon extensively. Numerous studies, particularly in Africa, have observed the 
respective experiences of settlers be they refugees or forced or voluntary 
relocatees (de Wilde 1967; Shaw 1967; Chambers 1969; Scudder and Colson 1979; 
Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). 

The performance of resettlement programs is an issue of immense interest 
to anthropologists and other social analysts. What accounts for particular 
performance outcomes and levels are described in various reports without any 
standardized evaluation criteria (Palmer 1975). 

For instance, the following variables are cited among others in the 
literature to explain the "success" or the "failure" of respective programs: 
(1) settlers willingness to cooperate and modernize as well as the personality 
and ideals of program managers (Hutton 1968); (2) the traditional social 
structures and customary values of settlers (Cosnow 1968); (3) the complexity 



99 

of the administrative set up of programs as well as the systematic 
relationships among managers and settlers within a given socio-political and 
economic environment (Chambers 1969); (4) the nature of the attention paid in 
the planning process to local conditions and sensitivities (Lurasden 1973); (5) 
the macro-level financial costs and the micro-level benefits and profitability 
(Roider 1971); (6) the availability and suitability of service infrastructure 
(Lawson 1968) and (7) the stresses experienced by relocatees as well as the 
strategies that they utilize in the face of particular problems (Scudder and 
Colson 1982). 

The resettlement literature on Africa recounts in almost all instances 
the failure of such programs, the traumatic experiences of settlers, the 
unanticipated consequences and the negative impacts that have resulted from 
many planned resettlements. 

Cases in point include Sutton's (1977) account of the Algerian trauma as 
well as the farm settlements in Nigeria evaluated by Olatunbosun (1967) who 
suggests several modifications including, for example, the determination of 
the property and degree of indebtedness of each farmer, retrenchment of excess 
staff and increased participation in decision-making by farmers. 

Similarly, in case studies of smallholder agriculture in Tanzania, 
underemployment is regarded by Ruthenberg (1968) as the serious problem on 
resettlement farms. He observes also that farmers are very conservative 
towards innovations where subsistence crops and livestock are involved. This 
unwillingness on the part of most settlers to adopt new technology is also 
mentioned by Reining (1982) in his study of the Zande in southern Sudan. 

Likewise, the Gezira scheme in Sudan is dubbed as an illusion in 
development by Barnett (1977, 1981). He argues further that the organizational 
structure of the program led to a decline in the quality of life for the 



100 

tenants and that the production of cotton, the main crop, offered the tenants 
little if any return. Thayer Scudder (1973; 51), providing a social 
organizational perspective on resettlement, observes that relocated people 
behave in their new environment as if society was a closed system. 

Arthur Lewis (1964:299-309) also recounts the African experiences wifh 
resettlement and labels them as a failure. He explains that 

government-organized and executed programs generally fail because they do not 
adequately address issues relating to the choice of suitable land, the right 
settlers, infrastructure, capital resources, land tenure and acreage and 
organizational structures to cater for settler activities. 

Silberfein's (1977) work supports this contention. She similarly argues 
that most planned settlements around the continent are a disappointment both 
from the economic and social points of view. She (Silberfein 1977:19) 
attributes this problem to overcapitalization and insufficient attention to 
crops, settlers and equipment. 

Elsewhere, James (1983) arrives at the same conclusion stating: 
"Project-level studies of new agricultural settlements in developing countries 
indicate privately financed settlement has been almost universally more 
successful than government-financed schemes in terms of economic efficiency 
measures such as benefit cost ratios." 

Other studies in various Africa situations report the specific dimensions 
of the failure. Evidence from the following two countries are illustrative. In 
Kenya, von Haugwitz (1972) recalls the inability of many settlers on 
smallholder farms to repay their farm loans and credits. In Ghana, the problem 
is one of settlers being caught up in a dependency and complaining syndrome. 
This was the case at New Mpamu and other settlement towns built by the 
government in the 1960s for over 80,000 families inundated as a result of the 



101 

Volta River Hydro-electric project (Doodo 1970). At the Daraongo Land 
Development Scheme, undertaken by the British colonial administration in the 
1950s, the few families that agreed to be settled were pampered into becoming 
"spoilt children" through government's provision of "free housing, free 
medical treatment, free mechanical cultivation of their farm and other baits" 
(Quansah 1972:22). In the similar case of the Kamba tsetse fly eradication and 
agricultural resettlement scheme, when subsidies and gift incentives were 
phased out settlers eventually abandoned and departed from the programs 
leading to the termination of resettlement operations by the colonial 
government (Hilton 1959). 

The general theoretical feeling with resettlement programs therefore is 
that they hardly live up to their projected expectation. At best they only 
succeed in catering for the welfare needs of the poor condemning them 
subsequently to a life of dependency on free dole. At worse, as Thayer Scudder 
(1982:12) has forcefully summarized, the "negative costs of relocation, like 
ripples, spread far beyond their points of origin by demoralising families, 
breaking up kin groups, and dividing whole communities and regions." 

Household Dynamics and Developmental Cycle 

In most rural societies very few people live by themselves. In the 
developing countries, in particular, agricultural households are the main form 
of socioeconomic organization (Singh et aU 1986:3) in terras of production 
and consumption (Overholt et al^ 1986:21). This is more so in Africa where 
Moock (1986:1) observes that household-based cropping and herding communities 
constitute the mainstay of agriculture. 



102 

Households in rural Africa have been much studied by anthropologists and 
other scientists interested in issues such as social structure, development 
and change (see for instance, Dorjahn 1977; Isaac 1982). Many analysts utilize 
the household concept in most current studies especially in terms of the 
dynamics of inter- and intra-household processes. These include (1) Jane Guyer 
(1986b) who uses an anthropological perspective to apply the household concept 
and analysis to the problems of farming systems research; (2) Katharine McKee 
(1986) in a discussion of methodological issues in farming systems research; 
and (3) Sara Berry (1986) who also takes up the issue of macro-policy 
implications of research on households and farming systems. The concept has 
also been used in case study contexts by (1) Christine Jones (1986) in her 
examination of bargaining processes as a response to the introduction of new 
crops in North Cameroon; (2) Pauline Peters (1986) in her study of the 
management of cattle, crops and wage labor in Botswana; and (3) by Delia 
Mcliillan (1986) in her analysis of production and exchange relations among the 
Mossi of Burkina Faso. 

Many economists have also used households to look at the relationships 
between social organization and domestic economies (Hill 1975; Shaner et al. 
1982; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). Of primary concern to these 
agricultural economists are a variety of household issues relating to 
decision-making, resources allocation and participation and management 
strategies . 

The household developmental cycle concept, introduced into the analysis 
of social structure by Meyer Fortes (1949), provides important heuristic 
framework for the socioeconomic analysis of traditional or smallholder 
farming. In a seminal investigation, originally published in 1925, the Soviet 
economist A. V. Chayanov described peasant agricultural behavior in 



103 

post-emancipation European Russia. In this work, the translation of which is 
authored by Thorner _et al. 1966, Chayanov goes beyond the demographic facts 
of the cycle to articulate the empirical relationships between household 
structure and production activity. He states: 

Since the labour family's basic stimulus to economic activity 
is the necessity to satisfy the demands of its consumers, and 
its work hands are the chief means for this, we ought first of 
all to expect the family's volume of economic activity to 
quantitatively correspond more or less to the basic elements in 
family composition. (Thorner 1966:60) 



Over the last few years many researchers who are involved with kin-based 
or domestic household economies have used or tested Chayanov's paradigm (see 
Sahlins 1971, 1974; Hunt 1979; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). The major 
preoccupation of these studies has been to empirically replicate the 
apparently tautological thesis, or Chayanov Rule, which states that: 

[T]he smaller the relative number of workers the more they 
must work to assure a given state of domestic well-being, 
and the greater the proportion the less they work. 
(Sahlins 1974:89) 



In exploring this thesis many researchers have calculated the household 
consumer/worker ratio and used it as proxy for an "index of household economic 
strength." This index embodies a fundamental limitation in analysis in that 
the ratio is pre-determined , rather incorrectly, by an oversimplified blanket 
process. Traditionally, the ratio is calculated by simply categorizing the age 
cohorts up to 15 years and above 64 years to comprise the consumers. Likewise, 
those in between 15 and 64 years are taken to be the economically active and i 
thus assumed to be the workers. ' 

Such a dichotomous conception of workers and consumers reflects only the |, 

reality of western industrial societies where child labor and, to some extent, ■ 

I 
i 

I. 
I 



104 

old-age labor are not encouraged and economically recognized. It also creates 
the erroneous impression that households are divided into a mutually exclusive 
dichotomy of workers who do not consume and of consumers who do not work. Such 
faulty assumptions are not borne out by the reality of the African situation. 

In her classic critiques of the household concept in African studies, 
Jane Guyer (1980, 1981, 1986b) discounts the upsurge in treating the household 
as the fundamental unit to data collection and analysis. She makes a valid 
case by pointing out that 

[With] a methodology based on household as a major analytical 
concept, one cannot look at three critical factors, all of 
which seem to be changing in Africa today, with very important 
consequences: the relationship between older and younger men; 
the relationship between men and women; and the relationship 
amongst domestic groups in situations where wealth or control 
of resources vary widely. (Guyer 1981:99) 

On the basis of this criticism, Guyer (1981:98) is categorical in her 
conclusion that the household "model is inaccurate for Africa." Elsewhere, she 
(Guyer 1986b:95) argues further that, a related concept, namely, "the 
developmental cycle of domestic groups, also presents problems of definition 
and understanding." 

This criticism does not appear to bother the micro-economists working in 
the area of household studies. Ignoring the apparent definitional semantics of 
anthropologists, they have found the household a useful unit the behavior of 
which they analyze by applying the "utility-maximizing framework" (see Barnum 
and Squire 1979:26-27). 

Given the complexity of the activities engaged in by agricultural 
households most of the economists who rely on the utility model resort to a 
conventional approach that makes a number of simplifying assumptions to 
achieve analytical solutions. Their premise is that the purpose of households 



105 

decision-making behavior is to maximize a utility function. The fundamental 
assumptions of this analytical model are the household's (1) consumption of 
Z-goods (non-market commodities produced and consumed by the household), (2) 
leisure, (3) own consumption of agricultural output and (4) consumption of 
market purchased goods. 

Others have used a variety of operational specifications for their 
models. But there are several limitations with these so-called traditional 
approaches in economics to explaining household performance (see Singh et 
al' 1986:22-25). Singh _et al^ (1986), view the models of the traditional 
approach as difficult and costly to estimate. They propose instead a solution 
that considers households as price takers. In their analysis conceptualizing 
households to be price takers enables the researchers to use the "profit 
effect" as the convenient proxy motivating household behavior (Singh et al. 
1986:9-10). 

The use of sophisticated models which incorporate such legitimate and 
important objectives of economic activity as profit illuminates the 
decision-making behavior of rural households. There is the strongest 
likelihood, however, that such models fail to grasp the totality of the 
crucial objectives that characterize household decision matrices. For example, 
profit is not necessarily the means nor the end of the "dreams" sought by such 
households . 

In rural Zimbabwe it is definitely not the observed and reported dominant 
behavioral trait; neither is it the overriding objective in the calculations 
of the agricultural households studied. Indeed, one can cite normatively 
satisfying values such as prestige, status enhancement and the need to fulfil 
cultural obligations as important considerations. Profit maximization is 
certainly important. Perhaps what is lacking to make it theoretically relevant 



106 

to our substantive context is an operational definition to cover these rather 
primary social objectives of rural households. 

This response also returns to the issue of conceptual limitations raised 
by Jane Guyer (1981, 1986) in relation to the household and the developmental 
cycle concepts. Her criticism about definition is valid to the extent that 
many analysts have perceived the units which make up these models as static 
entities. In the illustrative case of the cycle for example, the crucial 
structural phases have been defined solely in terms of the age of the 
household head. Important as the _de jure head may be in the general frame 
of reference, such a restrictive definition does not always contribute to a 
better understanding of the respective strengths and limitations of the other 
dynamic forces within the household. This flaw is quite prevalent in 
households which have _de facto female heads. 

More significantly, a static conception of developmental cycle cannot be 
used to explain change. But models as conceptual and analytical tools are 
constructed to reflect the researcher's perception of the reality that is 
observed. There is nothing sacrosanct about them. 

Low (1986a, 1986b) has recently operationalized Fortes' phases of the 
cycle for Swaziland. If additional refinement in two areas of the analytical 
model that the concept generates is done, it can provide analysts with a 
powerful anthropological tool to explain variations in intra-household 
economic performance. The first requirement is to define phases of the 
developmental cycle on the basis of multiple criteria rather than only by the 
age of a household head. The second is to assign age category weights to all 
household members and use these to calculate an index of household (1) 
producer unit and (2) consumer unit. 



107 

Indeed, that is what Diana Hunt (1979) does in her study of household 
resource allocation in Mbere, Eastern Kenya. An index so calculated has 
obvious explanatory power that is more objective and useful than one which 
sees each household member exclusively as either a producer or a consumer. 
Thus, contrary to Guyer's impression, in rural Africa, as in many other 
places, one can delineate households and their respective developmental cycles 
and use them to understand the "realities" of development. 

Conclusion 

Many African states have experimented with a variety of the development 
strategies discussed in this review. Most of these countries are now under 
intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund and western donor 
agencies and countries to shift their development emphasis away from the 
poverty-focused and equity models on to so-called growth-oriented programs. To 
most economists this is the call for minimal government or public 
interventions (Buchannan 1985), or the operation of the free market (Bauer 
1981). In Bauer's view the market rewards everybody what he or she deserves. 

The arguments proposed in support of this call for radical changes in 
policy are summarized by Staatz and Eicher (1986:61). These include (1) the 
realization that an economic base has to be put in place before any 
investments in basic needs can be financed and sustained and (2) the 
increasing evidence which shows that it is impossible to achieve any decent 
living standard for the bulk of the rapidly growing populations simply by 
redistributing existing assets. 

With the publication of the World Bank's (1981) scathing criticism of 
Africa's "welfare-oriented development policies," the debate about the 



108 

appropriate development strategy has shifted from equity issues to economic 
growth. Eicher (1986a) has written recently about strategic issues to combat 
hunger and poverty on the continent. According to him many economists now 
contend that expanded growth and international trade are the key to increasing 
food security. It is their conviction that the benefits from faster growth 
will "trickle down" to all members of society, thus enabling them to purchase 
their food needs (see Eicher 1968a:258).^ 

The debate about Africa's development proceeds in a circular fashion. 
Prior to the 1970s it used to be the vogue to emphasize growth. Welfare issues 
became important from then to the early 1980s. This was so because of the 
failure of the benefits of growth to improve the living conditions of the 
majority rural poor in most of the continent. Now, in the second half of the 
1980s, while African governments would prefer to promote both equity and 
growth at the same time they are being told, in the words of Whitaker 
(1986:1), "about what [they] ought to do." The impression is created that the 
African policy makers do not have the answers to their problems; neither do 
their external financiers, advisors and directors. Development in Africa has 
thus become a gamble or an experimental process without controls. 

In the judgement of this study, however, the contradictions generated by 
the development literature emphasize a missing link. The question to resolve 
is how the structural constitution, the social organization and the internal 
management of agricultural household units combine to respond in particular 
ways to development incentives that are provided by the state. Anthropology 
can explicate and use dynamic micro-level concepts such as the household 
developmental cycle in relation to the macro-contexts of government policies 
to provide better substantive and theoretical insights into what appears to be 
the unexplained "parts" of the causes of Africa's economic stagnation. 



109 



Note 



1.) The argument that growth ever "trickles down" to the poor is discredited 
in the evaluation of many skeptics. The evidence from many so-called 
developing countries of growth without development (see Glower _et al . 1966) 
and of the lack of impact of the green revolution (see Cleaver 1972; Griffin 
1974) in respect of the poor is overwhelming. 

The debate about trade is equally heated. According to Bauer trade acts as a 
channel for the flow of human and financial resources and for new ideas, 
methods and crops. For him it also provides a large and diverse source of 
imports and opens up markets for exports. He is convinced also that it is 

altogether anomalous or even perverse to suggest that external commercial 
relations are damaging to development or the living standards of the people of 
the Third World (see Bauer 1981). 

On this issue many skeptics cite protectionism, high tariffs and import 
costs and other policies which discriminate against developing countries 
especially African primary exporters in the international market. They see 
these as negating any likely benefits that accrue to these countries in their 
bilateral relations with the developed world (Arnold 1980; Asante 1981, 1984). 

For a balanced and comprehensive critique of the "market myth" and other 
pertinent issues that are also raised by the World Bank (1981) in its Agenda 
for Accelerated Development in Africa and Africa's responses Co them see 
Green and Allison (1986). 



CHAPTER IV 
FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 



Background Developments Towards Fieldwork 

The decision to undertake dissertation fieldwork in Zimbabwe stems from 
my long-standing interest in the southern African region as a whole. Around 
the summer of 1982 I stumbled across a rather sketchy report about efforts 
underway in that country to resettle returning refugees and the landless. This 
immediately aroused my curious interest and set me off in search of more 
material about the resettlement program. I got only a few papers published by 
Harberson (1980), Bill Kinsey (1982) and a couple of feature articles in the 
African Report including one written by Frank Ballance (1981). 

Having read these papers I was in a position to synthesize a few ideas 
into preliminary research questions. I had the personal experience and 
familiarity with West Africa. I felt then that an exposure to another region 
of the continent, ideally southern Africa, would add a beneficial perspective 
to my experience. I believed also that such an exposure would facilitate my 
understanding of the wider regional dimensions of the problems and prospects 
for African development better. 

The African food crisis engaged international attention at the time and I 
was looking for a policy-oriented dissertation problem that would enable me to 
observe closely (1) how government policies are implemented in rural Africa 
and (2) how African farmers respond to such policies in situations of on-going 
change and development. The implementation of a massive agricultural 
resettlement and rural development program in Zimbabwe thus offered the 
opportunities and the challenges which I was lookinc^ for. 



IIU 



Ill 

After over a year of arranging and waiting for the necessary permission 
to travel and conduct the research I arrived in Zimbabwe in January 1985. The 
fieldwork was carried out between the months of February and December 1985. 

The Extended "Sondeo": Initial Months of Fieldwork 

I used the period from early February to the end of March 1985 for 
preliminary and informal study of and familiarization with various issues 
relating to resettlement and rural development in the country. The informal or 
direct observational approach is increasingly being used in applied settings 
such as project evaluation and farming systems research. It is regarded as an 
effective initial strategy for the quick probing of research problems within 
specific geographic locations or fields of interest. Hilderbrand (1981) terms 
it the "sondeo," while others refer to it variously as rapid assessment or 
appraisal, diagnostic or exploratory survey and reconnaisance study (see for 
instance Chambers 1981). 

The informal study is defined by Dillion and Hardaker as involving 
generally 

familiarizing oneself with the area or problem, talking 
to appropriate informants such as farmers, farm workers, 
storekeepers, moneylenders, officials, religious or social 
leaders, and seeking out and reviewing such other relevant 
information as may be available in publications, government 
or private records. (Dillion and Hardaker 1980:21) 

The activities undertaken during the "sondeo" phase consisted of a 
combination of learning experiences. These were in the form of library 
research, participation in various workshops, meetings and extensive travels. 
In Harare, most of my time was devoted to commuting between the then Ministry 
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the National Archives and the 



112 

libraries at the University, the Zimbabwe Institute of Development, the 
Central Statistical Office and in the Herald House. 

At these places I read materials that specifically dealt with the 
evolution of the land question as well as about the country's agriculture. In 
the Herald House, where the nation's leading daily newspaper "The Herald" and 
the weekly "The Sunday Mail" are published, I was fortunate to be allowed 
access to the library. From the press clippings I got inklings into rather 
diverse views and concerns about agriculture, the resettlement and rural 
development issues from the perspectives of the cross-section of Zimbabweans. 

In the course of the "sondeo," I also obtained annual reports and 
pertinent statistical information from the head offices of the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Cotton 
Marketing Board (CMS) and some farm management data from the offices of the 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). 

The library research was invaluable for documenting the perspectives that 
are conveyed in Chapters I and II above. These are in respect of (1) 
resettlement as a substantive issue of research interest and (2) the evolution 
of the land problem which necessitated the formulation and implementation of 
the resettlement policy in postindependence Zimbabwe. The perspectives gained 
from the readings also linger on throughout the dissertation as they are 
concretized in various expressions and ideas embodied in the other Chapters. 

In early February 1985, I sat in a Farming Systems course organized 
jointly by CIMMYT, Nairobi, and the Department of Land Management, University 
of Zimbabwe. This was for participants drawn from a number of African and 
overseas countries. The course afforded the opportunity for my first exposure 
to rural Zimbabwe. I participated in a field team diagnostic survey of 
smallholder farm problems in the Mangwende Communal Area, Murewa District, 



113 

Mashonaland East Province (see Figure 4-1). We visited the homesteads and 
farms. We also conducted extensive informal interviews and observed aspects of 
the social and economic activities of these rural households. These 
experiences directly benefited the redesign of my research especially in terms 
of refining the study items. 

After the initial familiarization with the administrative set up and work 
of the various departments, sections and the staff at the flinistry of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rural Development I settled down to utilize the materials in 
the Ministry's small library. Tliis contained mainly unpublished reports and 
mimeographs relating mostly to the feasibility and planning aspects of 
individual resettlement schemes throughout the country. I maintained close 
contact with the Ministry during the entire fieldwork and also participated as 
an outsider in some of its activities. 

For instance, my first visit to a resettlement scheme was made on March 
6, 1985. I accompanied a Senior Resettlement Officer in the Department of 
Rural Development (DERUDE) to attend an Axea Board Meeting at the Mufurudzi 
Model A Intensive Resettlement Scheme, Shamva District, Mashonaland Central 
Province (see Figure 4-1). This meeting or musangano is held every quarter. 
It is a kind of educational get together. At the meetings various provincial 
and district heads of government agencies and the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) dealing with resettlement meet face-to-face with the 
resettled farmers. The purpose is to discuss and mutually learn about matters 
affecting the schemes from the perspectives of the officers, the farmers and 
their chosen representatives who serve on the VIDCOs , WARDCOs and the Area 
Board . ^ 

On this first visit, I had the chance to talk both to resettled farmers 
and various officers. I also toured and observed a number of resettlement 



114 




FIGURE 4 - 1 

MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND AREAS VISITED 
DURING VARIOUS PHASES OF THE FIELD RESEARCH 



115 

villages and farms and saw the set up of the Rural Service Center. Finally, we 

stopped at the Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme, that being the 

first of a number of study and social visits I later undertook to the 
2 

scheme (see Figure 4-1). 

During March 18 and 19, I attended the preliminary sessions of a one-week 
training course that DERUDE organized for all Resettlement Officers from the 
Mashonaland Region at the Kentucky Hotel, Harare. The opening address was 
delivered by the Mashonaland East Provincial Governor, Senator Rwizi Ziyenge. 
This was followed by speeches from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rural Development and from the Director, DERUDE. 

These respectively dealt with the ideological, bureaucratic and technical 
aspects of the government's resettlement and rural development policies. There 
were invited lectures from the representatives of such agencies as AGRITEX, 
the Natural Resources Board and the Department of Cooperatives (DECODE) which 
are involved with implementing these policies. Other speakers also presented 
materials touching on the nature and problems of their work in the 
resettlement schemes. The contributions from the Chief Resettlement Officer, 
the Regional Rural Development Officer and the participating Resettlement 
Officers were extremely relevant and informative for my work in their detail 
of the grassroots dynamics of development program implementation and impacts. 

I left the course to participate in a three-day plenary session on the 
Elaboration of the Communal Lands Development Plan. This was organized on 
behalf of the government by the National Agricultural and Rural Development 
Coordination Committee (NARDCC) at Juliasdale, Nyanga District, Manicaland 
Province, from March 20 to 22, 1985. 

This national workshop was opened with a policy address by the Minister 
for Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the Honorable Moven Mahachi . 



116 

This was followed by others, including one from the Principal Secretary of the 
Ministry, which elaborated on specific aspects of resettlement policy. The 
session also brought together a selection of the country's experts whose 
duties cover the communal or African rural areas. Among the participants were 
(1) various provincial governors and administrators; (2) invited faculty from 
the University and the Zimbabwe Institute of Development; and (3) top 
officials from the various Ministries, Parastatals and Public Organizations. 

Being a meeting of political leaders, academics, bureaucrats and 
technocrats, the forum was provided to evaluate the engaging issues of the 
deterioration as well as the possibilities for rehabilitation of the Communal 
Areas. Resettlement was an important component of the debates. The emergent 
perspectives of the workshop ranged from the practical, ideologically 
"down-to-earth," the theoretical to the economically and technically feasible. 
It thus proved fruitful for my study in facilitating a better 
conceptualization and focus on the pertinent issues in the relationships 
between the resettlement programs and the development of the Communal Areas. 

By the beginning of April 1985, I had gained substantial amounts of 
inside knowledge and background information about various aspects of the 
resettlement and rural development all through the readings, meetings, 
workshops and travels. I was then in the position to redesign the research to 
better deal with the dynamics of policy and the contradictions generated by 
their implementation. 

At this point I decided to structure the main aspects of the field 
research into two parts. The first covered the broad or macro-issues of policy 
and its implementation. The second related to the processes of rural 
development and the responses to resettlement at the farmers' or micro-level. 



117 



Getting a Closer Look at Resettlement Policy 
and Development Implementation 

To tackle the first part of the research project it was necessary for me 
to maintain a base in Harare. My objective for this phase was to get a closer 
look at resettlement policy and the structures and processes of 
implementation. This task was confined to DERUDE and other Sections of the 
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development using these as my data 
sources. DERUDE coordinates at the national level the implementation of the 
resettlement in all the eight administrative Provinces of the country. 

Here I applied a combination of ethnographic and quantitative data 
gathering techniques within anthropology and policy evaluation frameworks (see 
Coleman 1975; Cook and Scioli 1975; Johnson 1975; Patton 1980; Casley and Lury 
1982; Agar 1986). Specifically, through the use of participant observation, 
formal and informal discussions, interviewing and the review of records and 
other documents I was able to obtain the kinds of information which are 
pertinent to various aspects of the research questions. 

After taking a more general look at the problems, the achievements and 
prospects of implementation at this highest level I concentrated on the three 
Provinces in the Mashonaland Region. These are Mashonaland East, Central and 
West (see Figure 2-1). They are all managed from one central office in Harare 
under a Regional Rural Development Officer and three assisting Senior 
Resettlement Officers. 

In collecting data about these Provinces I continued to use some of the 
methods which I applied during the "sondeo" phase. For example, at various 
times m April and May 1985 I again participated in travels accompanying 
senior officers of DERUDE on their routine visits to individual schemes. In 
the process of these rather short trips I was able to monitor aspects of 



118 

program implementation such as farmers' access to and use of resettlement 
infrastructures. I also continued to observe more closely variations in 
farmers' responses and problems as they expressed them to government 
official s . 

One of these trips was on April 3 and 4. In the company of Senator 
Mudhomeni Chivende, the Provincial Governor of Mashonaland West, the 
respective Administrative Officers for Kadoma and Chegutu Districts, the 
Regional Rural Development Officer and a Senior Resettlement Officer I toured 
the following resettlements: (1) Jondale/Bumbe , Muzvezve and Jompani Model A 
Normal Intensive Schemes; (2) Ngezi, Chegutu 6 and Hamilton Hills Model A 
Accelerated Intensive Schemes and (3) Tashinga Model B Producer Cooperative 
Scheme (see Figure 4-1). This was another opportunity to learn more about 
various issues on development and their elaboration as viewed by national 
leaders such as the Governor. Among the many issues that resettled farmers 
brought to the attention of the Governor in the various places we visited 
were, for instance, poach grazing, squatting and the security situation."^ 

Again in the compaay of the United Kingdom-Zimbabwe Resettlement Review 
Team, I travelled through the Mashonaland Central Province. This was on April 
22 when the Team inspected the Mount Darwin Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, 
Mount Darwin District, and the Batsiranayi Model B Producer Cooperative 
Scheme, Shamva District (see Figure 4-1). On this particular trip I observed, 
among other things, the following activities: (1) plowing competition among 
the Model A resettled farmers and the problems that they face in manually 
tilling their land; (2) immediate post-harvest storage techniques for maize; 
and (3) the additional responsibilities imposed on women's time in the 
production of vegetables for household consumption. In the Model B scheme I 
had the chance to ask questions and learn about the kinds of assistance that 



119 

Producer Cooperatives receive from the government and from the 
non-governmental organizations. 

My other travels with DERUDE officers, respectively, were to the 
following resettlements: (1) Pote 2 Accelerated Intensive Scheme, Karoi 
District, Mashonaland West Province on May 13; (2) the Copper Queen Normal 
Intensive Scheme, Gokwe District, Midlands Province on May 17 and 18; (3) 
Muzvezve Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, Kadoma District, Mashonaland West 
Province on June 3; and (4) Kubudirira Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme, 
Shamva District, in the Mashonaland Central Province on July 10 (see Figure 
4-1). The Pote 2 and the Copper Queen trips were undertaken in the midst of 
the evacuation of groups of squatters from the former scheme and their 
resettlement in Copper Queen. Being one of the most controversial issues in 
resettlement implementation the squatter issue presents serious and 
politically charged problems to the government. The two trips gave me the rare 
opportunity to follow up on my readings of various memoranda about squatting 
with field observations.'^ 

In the course of these travels I took extensive notes and had the 
opportunity to deepen my interaction with resettled farmers and government 
officers. I gained broader perspectives on the resettlement and better 
insights into the problems, the achievements and the challenges within the 
individual schemes than would otherwise have been possible. I was able also to 
pretest some of my research questions with both the farmers and the officers. 
More importantly, these "official" trips gave me the recognition and the 
necessary contacts at the national, provincial, district and the scheme 
levels. This facilitated an easy establishment of rapport and the acceptance 
of my research by the numerous informants and respondents particularly during 
the critical phase of the survey research when I operated independently. 



120 

Apart from DERUDE and its Resettlement Section the other documentation 
used in the preparation of Chapters V and VI was obtained from the Evaluation 
and Monitoring Section of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural 
Development. Operating within these agencies from a distance I was able to 
examine and extract a wide range of information from the monthly, quarterly 
and annual reports that are routinely issued by DERUDE. 

These reports provide summaries of the progress and problems relating to 
all resettlement schemes in each of the eight administrative Provinces in the 
country. The reports follow a standard format. They are divided into four main 
headings to cover Administration and Finance, Resettlement, Planning and 
Statistics, respectively. Under each heading brief but comprehensive summary 
accounts of relevant developments are given for various sub-headings or study 
items and variables. Among these, for instance, are those which cover 
staffing, agricultural developments and social and community development. 

The section reporting various statistics provide aggregate data for each 
Province. This is broken down into the following categories: (1) resettlement 
model; (2) scheme name; (3) district of location; (4) total area of the scheme 
and its extent within particular natural regions; (5) number of families that 
the scheme is planned for; (&) the month's allocation of families for 
resettlement in the scheme; and (7) the total number of families that have 
taken up resettlement in the scheme. 

In addition, figures about what are termed "primary" and "secondary" 
development, respectively, are also given. The former covers such specific 
infrastructures as boreholes, wells, cattle dips and roads. Secondary 
development refers to schools, classrooms, teachers houses, clinics and staff 
houses. The total number of such infrastructures planned for each scheme is 
given along with information about the state of their respective development 



as to whether or not the particular service has been provided and is 
operational . 

In June 1985, a set of three self-administered evaluation questionnaires 
was given to all the Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region. The 
officers were asked to rate various indicators or study items relating to the 
different resettlement models and schemes that they had managed.^ 

The study items, chosen to reflect the special characteristics of each of 
the three resettlement models, asked for the Resettlement Officers 
perceptions' about the following: (1) the attitudes and performance of the 
resettled farmers; (2) the input performance of various implementing agencies 
and service organizations; and (3) the current problems and the long-term 
prospects for the schemes. The questionnaire about the Model A Normal 
Intensive Schemes contained 38 items, that on the Model A Accelerated 
Intensive Scheme had 19 items, while there was only 9 items on the Model B 
Producer Cooperatives (see Appendix B, Tables B-1 to B-3). 

Finally, in October 1985, a 26 item questionnaire was also mailed to four 
selected Model B Producer Cooperatives in the Mashonaland East and three in 
the Mashonaland West Provinces to elicit the responses of the respective 
Management Committees about issues ranging, among others, from the number of 
existing committees to recommendations for solving the problems of the 
cooperatives (see Appendix C). 

I personally interviewed the management of seven of the eight Model Bs in 
the Mashonaland Central Province during the same period. In all then, 15 of 
the 21 Model Bs in the Region were covered in this Management Survey. Tliey are 
Batsiranayi ,^ Chakoma , Kubudirira, Kuenda, Kurima Inhaka , Kushingirira and 
Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central; Kumhanya , Marowa , Tabudirira and Tamuka in 
Mashonaland East and Ganyangu, Mukuwapasi and Nyamakate in Mashonaland West 



122 

Provinces, respectively (see Figure 8-1). The data obtained for the first part 
of the research is presented in Chapter VIII below. 

Ethnographic Survey and Observations 

For the second part of the research, I decided to take a detailed 
regional look at the outcomes and the responses to resettlement as they are 
manifest at the grassroots, that is, at the level of farm households and 
villages. The proposal was to do this within the context of the general 
agricultural and rural development processes going on in one of the Provinces. 
It became clear to me from the very beginning that a case study approach was 
the best methodology for looking at the micro-level issues of farmer 
responses, attitudes, perceptions and problems. 

Consequently, I decided to select the Mashonaland Central Proviace for a 
regional case, study. The choice of this Province was a purposive decision 
which was influenced by at least three important considerations. 

The Province is certainly the primary agricultural area in the country 
(see Chapter II). It offers a unique and contrasting distribution of all the 
major farming systems available within close proximity of each other. 
Secondly, peasant families from some of its former Tribal Trust Lands are 
among the most politically conscious in the country. Areas such as Dande (Lan 
1985), on the northern border with Mozambique as well as Chiweshe and 1-Iaziwa 
(Wienrich 1975) were actively involved in one way or another with the land 
question. 

Many of the so-called strategic villages or "keeps" were set up in these 
areas by the Rhodesian regime. The spirit mediums and the young men and women 
in various parts of the Province were among the early converts who committed 



124 



and Lury strongly argue. In their view 



case studies may be the evaluator's most *pfropriate tteditw 
for investigating causality. They are certainly simpler to 
organize thatt tlie longitudinal data series with its demands 
for an appropriately timed baseline and a continuation beyond 
the implementation period. (Casley and Lury 1982:28) 

For the case study I felt that its central focus of ^rgani^^tlon mm 
be the Mel A mrmal mteasiv* variant, obviously the most widespread and 
currently the most Ittfdreant of all the resettlement models (see Chapter V 
below) . There were two Model A Normal Intensive Schemes in the Province In 
1985. These are (I) Mufurudzl in the Shamva District and (2) Mount Darwin 1„ 
the Mmmt Darwin Dlsttlct (Figure 8-1). At the time, the Mutungagore 
Accelerated Intensive Scheme and the recently acquired adjoining farms, all in 
the Centenary District, were in the process of being consolidated and planned 
to resettle 298 families. Tke scheme was also being upgraded to form the third 
Normal Intensive Scheme in the Province to be palled Karuyana. 

Thus, having decided to focus the case study primarily around the Model A 
project, Mufurudzi became the obvious choice, tte scheme has been in operation 
siflce 1980 and thus is much older than the others. It also has the Urgest 
number of resettled farmers, 566 in all. Moreover, Mufurudei has proceeded 
beyond the "uncertain" to a more "assured" developmental stage. In terms of 
Thayer Scudder^s (1984) typology of resettlement evolution, the Mufurud.i 
scheme has moved from the "conservative, risk averse, closed and transitional 
stage" into one of "economic and soGlal development, handing over and 
i«eorparation." 1 thus found Hufurudzi more amenable than the other schemes to 
a systematic study and observation of the policy Impaets and responses to 
reBettlement, 



123 

their resources to the politico-religious and military aspects of the 
liberation war during the 1970s. Through the close collaboration of people in 
these areas the African nationalist or guerrilla forces inflicted a lot of 
casualties, sabotage and destruction on European farms and property in the 
region. These acts led to the abandonment or underutilization of many farms. 
As a result some of the early acquisitions of land for resettlement by the 
government occurred in the province. 

Indeed and finally, one of the oldest Model A schemes, Mufurudzi, and the 
very first Model B scheme to be opened in the country, the Simba Youth 
Cooperative, are all located in the Province (see Figure 8-1). 

The decision to use a regional case study approach was also influenced by 
various reasons. Coming into anthropology from geography with a regional 
development background, I found it much more insightful to see cultural 
expressions through spatial perspectives. Moreover, it is common knowledge 
that the no n- randomness of the empirical populations that anthropologists 
often select for study introduces major methodological problems. 

The most serious of these are in the area of validity (Carmines and 
Zeller 1981; Kirk and Mller 1986). A regional approach to the study of 
anthropological problems is one solution that has the potential to mitigate 
some of the confounding validity problems in field research. Indeed, Allen 
Johnson (1979:55) writing about anthropological quantification in research 
design rightly suggests that a "practical solution to this problem [of 
non-randomness] is to include a regional survey as a preliminary part of any 
research project." 

Similarly, a case study methodology also facilitates the effective 
execution of ethnographic or anthropological research particularly in applied, 
needs assessment or policy evaluation settings. This is a point that Casley 



125 

In order to place the case study in context and make it much more 
meaningful than would otherwise be the case, I decided to compare and contrast 
Mufurudzi with the other farming systems in the Province. Thus, in addition to 
the Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, the following sectors were also studied: 
(1) the Model A Accelerated Intensive Resettlement; (2) the Model B Producer 
Cooperative; (3) the Communal Area (Peasant); (4) the Sraall-Scale (African) 
Commercial; and (5) the Large-Scale (European) Commercial. A sample of farmers 
representing various units within each of these six farming systems or sectors 
was therefore selected and interviewed. 

For the Model A Accelerated Schemes two out of a provincial total of 
seven were chosen for their close proximity to Mufurudzi. The two schemes are 
Shamva and Bindura located in the Shamva and Bindura Districts, respectively. 

Of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes in the Province five 
were studied. These are (1) Batsiranayi; (2) Kubudirira; and (3) Simba Youth, 
all in the Shamva District; (4) Chakoma; and (5) Kushingirira both in the 
Mount Darwin District. 

There are three Communal Areas that are adjacent to Mufurudzi. They 
comprise (1) Bushu in the Shamva District; (2) Madziwa in the Madziwa District 
and (3) Kandeya in the Mount Darwin District. Eleven subdivisions were studied 
all drawn from the three Communal Areas. 

Two Sraall-Scale Commercial Areas are also located in the Province and to 
the north of Mufurudzi. These are Karuyana and Chesa within the two respective 
Intensive Cultivation Areas. The survey covered farmers drawn from the two 
areas to represent that sector. Finally, for the study of the Large-Scale 
Commercial farmers the Bindura Intensive Conservation Area (ICA) was chosen 
(see Figure 4-1 and Figure 7-1). 



126 

These case study areas are all spatially distributed within a maximum 
distance of 70 kilometers from our operational base in the Mufurudzi scheme 
where I stayed initially at Chindunduma. For the duration of the interviews, 
the research team, made up of one senior investigator, four assistants and 
myself, lived at Chiruma Secondary School situated in a block of land in the 
northern part of Mufurudzi (see Figure 7-2). In all cases, except for the 
Large-Scale Commercial farmers, the research team commuted from Chiruma 
travelling from one research site to the other and interviewing farmers 
individually in their homes within the villages, or the homestead. On a few 
occasions, towards the end of the survey when farmers started their land 
preparation and planting, some of them were only reached and interviewed in 
their respective farms. 

Data Collection Techniques 

Given the research problem and the evaluative nature of this study it was 
thought appropriate to use survey techniques within our case study 
methodology. This is what Alan Rufus Waters, writing about understanding 
smallholder agriculture, recommends. In his view the "sample survey ... is 
the best available tool for collecting information in rural Africa" (Waters 
1974: 56). 

But in order to be able to use a sample survey effectively to benefit the 
needs and the goals of any research certain guiding principles have to be 
accepted and followed. This is even more so under the "African conditions," as 
Spencer (1972:19-22) elaborates, where special strategies are called for if 
(1) farmer cooperation, (2) enumerators commitment and (3) the ability to 
collect "sensitive" information are to be assured. 



127 

In soliciting for the cooperation of farmers it was found useful to 
emphasise two important points always at the initial or introductory meetings 
with farmers. The first is that I had read about the efforts underway by the 
government of Zimbabwe to distribute lands and improve the country's 
agriculture. I was therefore in the country as a research student to learn 
more about agricultural programs from the perspective of the farmers 
themselves. This was to enable me to write a book which my university required 
as a condition for granting me a doctoral certificate. With the second point, 
I related an old African maxim to the farmers. This is to the effect that 
"since he who is cutting the path through a thicket never turns to observe if 
he is charting a straight line, it is always useful for leaders, such as in 
government, to be informed about the impacts of and the responses to their 
implemented policies." Consequently, the book that I was researching to write 
would be of help to the government in its planning and policy formulation 
about farmers and the rural areas where they live. 

Though some farmers, out of mere curiosity perhaps, often seemed to 
wonder about the wisdom in ray travelling away all the way from home in Ghana 
to ask of them the kinds of simple questions contained in the survey 
instrument, they always appeared pleasantly amazed, proud and elated to be the 
focus of a book, very friendly and extremely helpful. 

Thus, except in the rather surprising case of the Large-Scale Commercial 
or European farmers, the research did not encounter any of the out of the 
ordinary problems of fieldwork. It generally received the maximum cooperation 
from all the respondents, both farmers and government field officers that we 
came into contact with.'^ The major problem experienced in this research 
was logistics, mainly prohibitive expenses with typing, xeroxing, printing 

Q 

and, more seriously, travel and excessive fuel costs. 



128 



Study Variables 

A set of different questionnaires embodying issues that 
characteristically reflect matters of interest to each farming system was 
prepared and administered to the farmers from each system. In the main, the 
questions or study variables broadly covered the following categories of 
research interests: (1) farmers perceptions about on-going developments in the 
areas of resettlement and agriculture; (2) ratings of and attitudes or 
responses towards specific services available to farmers; (3) access to and 
control over particular resources such as production assets and consumption 
items; (4) farm-level needs and farmer constraints; and (5) agricultural 
performance. In addition, each such questionnaire, except in the case of the 
Large-scale Commercial or European farmers, also contained a section which 
addressed socio-demographic and household composition variables. 

The number of study variables that the survey covered ranged from a low 
of 35 in the case of the Large-Scale Commercial farmers to a maximum of 96 for 
both the Model A and the Small-Scale Commercial farmers (see Appendix D, 
Tables D-1 to D-5 ) . 

Sampling Techniques 

The nature of the residence characteristics of the farm households in the 
various farming systems covered by the survey necessitated the application of 
different sampling techniques to select farmers for the interviews. 

Our central case study unit, Mufurudzi Model A Normal Intensive 
Resettlement Scheme, contains a total of 566 resettled families or households. 



129 

These reside in 18 nucleated villages. Being essentially an exploratory and 
baseline study I was prepared to take a complete census by interviewing all 
households in Mufurudzi. But given the time constraint and the limited 
financial resources at my disposal this was obviously not practicable. 
Nevertheless, my objective was to achieve a credible and adequate 
representation by taking a cue from the evaluation recommendation given by 
Fitz-Gibbon and Morris (1984:158-159) to work with a large sample size. 

The villages rather than the list of resettled heads of households formed 
the basis of the sample frame, I calculated a productivity index for all the 
18 villages. This was done using the 1983-84 aggregate output data for maize, 
the most important subsistence and the most widely cultivated cash crop in the 
scheme (Zimbabwe 1984c). 

On the basis of this index all the villages were ranked and assigned to 
three strata. Four villages, namely, Magadzi, Gwetera, Takawira and Nehanda 
with 27 percent of all households in the scheme, were the most productive for 
that particular year recording from 1.6 to 2.0 tons of maize per hectare. The 
majority of households, that is, 65 percent of them spread across eleven 
villages, obtained a range of 1.1 to 1.3 tons per hectare. These are Tongogara 
2, Denda, Mudzinge, Chitepo, Mukwari, Banana, Gatu, Zvomanyanga, Chimburukwa , 
Zvataida and Tongogara 1 (see Figure 7-2). The remaining three villages, 
namely, Mur ingaraombe , Mutoramhepo and Mupedzanhamo with 10 percent of the 
households, each produced less than 1 ton of maize per hectare (Table 4-1). 

The villages are characterized by such spatial and structural variations 
as differential proximity to the main tarred road and differences in 
population size. Given these differences, the variations in productivity and 
the available research resources, a decision was made to cover 12 out of the 
18 villages to provide an adequate sample size for the Mufurudzi survey. 



130 

TABLE 4 - 1 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORtlAL SCHEME: LIST OF VILLAGES, MAIZE 
PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE VILLAGES SELECTED FOR CASE STUDY 



LIST OF MAIZE YIELD VILLAGE 

VILLAGES 1983-84 SELECTED 
(KGS/ HECTARE) FOR STUDY 

STRATUM I 

1. Magadzi 1960.6 Yes 

2. Gwetera 1942.3 Yes 

3. Takawira 1709.2 Yes 

4. Nehanda 1626.9 Yes 
STRATUM II 

5. Tongogara 2 1319.5 No 

6. Denda 1209.8 No 

7. Mudzinge 1183.0 Yes 

8. Chitepo 1173.3 Yes 

9. Mukwari 1157.4 No 

10. Banana 1149.8 Yes 

11. Gatu 1113.4 Yes 

12. Zvoraanyanga 1107.8 Yes 

13. Chimburukwa 1105.5 No 

14. Zvataida 1065.8 Yes 

15. Tongogara 1 1059.8 No 
STRATUM III 

16. Muringamorabe 942.5 Yes 

17. Mutorarahepo 899.4 Yes 

18. Mupedzanhamo 62 3.5 Yes 



131 

The four villages from Stratum I and the three from Stratum III, being the 
extreme cases, were purposely selected for the study. Using a table of random 
numbers, an additional five out of the remaining eleven from stratum II were 
also chosen. 

The distribution and some characteristics of all the villages in 

Mufurudzi, including those which were selected for study, are given in Table 

8-14 in Chapter VIII below. These are Banana, Chitepo, Gatu, Gwetera, fiagadzi , 

Mudzinge, Mupedzanhamo , Muring amombe , Mutoramhepo, Nehanda, Takawira and 

Zvataida (see Figure 7-2). For methodological reasons it was decided, once the 

sample villages were selected, to cover every resettled household head 
9 

present. Of the total of 361 households in the 12 selected villages, 349 
or 96.7 percent were interviewed (Table 4-2). 

Following the same lines one village each was selected among the 
respective total of three each in the Shamva and Bindura Model A Accelerated 
Intensive Schemes. In Shamva, Sanye I was chosen and 22 of the 24 households 
were interviewed. Likewise, for Bindura, 17 out of the 20 households in 
Chidumbwi 1 were interviewed (Figure 7-1). In all, 39 households amongst the 
44 selected for the Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme were reached, thus 
giving an effective coverage rate of 88.6 percent (Table 4-3). 

Five of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes were also selected 
for the case study. These are Batsiranayi , Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira 
and Siraba Youth. All the members, numbering 151, actually present in the 
schemes during the survey period in October 1985 were interviewed. This 
represents 65.9 percent of the members reported to be registered with the 
Cooperatives during that month (see Table 4-4). 



TABLE 4-2 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORtdAL SCHEME: VILLAGES, HOUSEHOLDS, 
AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR CASE STUDY 



132 



VILLAGES 
IN THE 
SCHEME 



TOTAL VILLAGE NUl^BER OF 

NUMBER OF SELECTED HOUSEHOLDS 
HOUSEHOLDS FOR STUDY INTERVIEWED 
(TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS) 



1. Banana 13 

2. Chitepo 30 

3. Chimburukwa 25 

4. Denda 38 

5. Gatu 50 

6. Gwetera 32 

7. Magadzi 51 

8. Mud2inge 33 

9. Mukwari 38 

10. Mupedzanhamo 13 

11. Muringamombe 28 

12. Mutoramhepo 14 

13. Nehanda 39 

14. Takawira 31 

15. Tongogara 1 51 
15. Tongogara 2 14 

17. Zvataida 27 

18. Zvoraanyanga 40 



Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 



12 
30 
0 
0 
48 
32 
49 
50 
0 
13 
28 
14 
38 
29 
0 
0 

26 
0 



566 



(361) 



349 



133 



TABLE 4-3 

SHAMVA-BINDURA MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEMES: VILLAGES, 
HOUSEHOLDS AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR 

CASE STUDY 



VILLAGES TOTAL VILLAGE NUMBER OF 

IN THE NUMBER OF SELECTED HOUSEHOLDS 

SCHEME HOUSEHOLDS FOR STUDY INTERVIEWED 

(TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS) 



SHAMVA 

1. Sanye 1 24 Yes 22 

2. Sanye 2 33 No 0 

3. Sanye 3 28 No 0 
BINDURA 

4. Chidumbwi 1 33 No 0 

5. Chidumbwi 2 20 Yes 17 

6. Chavakadzi 34 No 0 



172 



(44) 



39 



TABLE 4-4 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: REPORTED 
MEMBERSHIP AND THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS/ HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED 



COOP REPORTED SCHEME MEMBERS/ 

SCHEME MEMBERSHIP SELECTED HOUSEHOLDS 

(OCT 1985) FOR STUDY INTERVIEWED 



1. 


Batsiranayi 


69 


Yes 


39 


2. 


Chakoma 


79 


Yes 


47 


3. 


Kubudirira 


26 


Yes 


19 


4. 


Kuenda 


32 


No 


0 


5. 


Kurima Inhaka 


34 


No 


0 


&. 


Kushingirira 


33 


Yes 


27 


7. 


Nyakudya 


88 


No 


0 


8. 


Simba Youth 


22 


Yes 


19 



(383) (229) 151 



Note: Because of the high turnover in many of the Model B 
Schemes there is an apparent discrepancy between the 
membership figures that are reported every mouth to the 
Resettlement Section of DERUDE and the actual members 
present in the particular scheme. The tendency for 
overreporting is significant. In October 1935 the 3 
Schemes selected for the case study in the Mashonaland 
Central Province reported a total membership of 229. 
A complete census that the Research Team carried out 
around the same period showed only 151 members present. 



135 

The sample selection for the three Communal Areas, namely, Shamva, 
Bindura and Kandeya was done in consultation with the officers of AGRITEX in 
Shamva, Bindura and Mount Darwin, respectively. The technique used here was 
cluster or area sampling. First, the subdivisions surveyed were identified on 
airphoto mosaics. 

Given the size and the settlement density of the area I decided on the 
number of farmers to interview. The names of farmers were then provided by the 
Extension Worker in charge of the particular subdivision. Each list supplied 
was already divided equally into three strata corresponding to the "more 
progressive," the "averagely progressive," and the "less progressive" farmers. 
In all, 62 out of a target of 75 households from 11 subdivisions in the three 
Communal Areas were surveyed. These are distributed as follows: (1) 31 from 
Goora, Makubvu, Nyamaropa and Svesve in Madziwa; (2) 16 from the three Bushu 
subdivisions of Chishapa, Gono and Jiti; and (3) the remaining 15 from 
Mandeve, Mashanga, Mungando and Matope/lCapf udza in Kandeya (Table 4-5). (See 
Figure 7-1.) 

The samples from Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Areas were similarly 
drawn with the assistance of the AGRITEX field officers in Mount Darwin. For 
its size Chesa, with 623 farms, is made up of six subdivisions. Nyaj enj e , the 
subdivision closest to Mufurudzi was selected and added to Karuyana for the 
study (see Figure 7-1). I decided to cover a total of only 9 farmers in 
Nyaj enj e and 12 in the more accessible Karuyana. This was because of 
transportation and accessibility problems and the fact that the research team 
had not previously visited to get acquainted with farmers in the two areas as 
it was the case with most of the other research sites. 

Similar to what was done in the case of the Communal Area farmers AGRITEX 
supplied me with the list of the names of the 21 Sraall-Scale Commercial 



136 

TABLE 4-5 
COMMUNAL AREA (PEASANT) SECTOR: AREAS, 
SUBDIVISIONS, HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED 



AREAS SUBDIVISIONS SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 

HOUSEHODS INTERVIEWED 
SELECTED 

1. Madziwa Goora 12 10 

Mukubvu 6 4 

Nyamaropa 6 5 

Svesve 12 12 

2. Bushu Chishapa 6 5 

Gono 6 5 

Jiti 6 6 

3. Kandeya Mandeve 6 4 

Mashanga 3 3 

Mungando 6 4 

Matope/Kapf udza 6 4 



(75) 



62 



137 

farmers divided up equally into the "more progressive," the "averagely 
progressive," and the "less progressive." All the selected farmers except one 
from the more progressive stratum in Karuyana were interviewed (Table 4-6). 

Finally, using the 1934 Telephone Directory of Rural District Councils, 
towns and municipalities and a 1:100,000 land use map supplied to me by the 
AGRITEX office in Bindura, a list of 78 Large-Scale Commercial Farmers was 
prepared for the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area (ICA). Out of this list a 
total of 41 farmers were selected using a table of random numbers. These 
farmers were mailed an introductory letter about the study. This was followed 
by a self-administered questionnaire, complete with a return address and 
stamped envelope. Only 10 of the sample farmers responded, one of them 
requesting to be excused from participation for personal reasons thus leaving 
nine (Table 4-7 ) . 

In all the survey obtained interview responses from a total of 630 
farmers distributed across the six sectors or farming systems. These are as 
follows: (1) 349 farmers in the Model A Normal Intensive Scheme; (2) 39 in the 
Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme; (3) 151 in the Model B Producer 
Cooperative Schemes; (4) 62 in the Communal or Peasant sector; (5) 20 in the 
Sraall-Scale Commercial sector; and (6) 9 in the Large-Scale Commercial sector. 

Data Handling and Analysis 

The post-f ieldwork handling and analysis of the data turned out to be an 
overwhelming chore mainly because of the division of the research into two 
parts, that is, the macro or policy and implementation aspect on one hand and 
the micro or farmers' responses on the other. 



TABLE 4-6 
SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS SECTOR: 
AREAS, HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED 



INTENSIVE TOIAL SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 

CULTIVATION HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED 
AREA SELECTED 



1. Chesa Nyaj enj e 96 15 9 

2. Karuyana 68 15 11 

(164) 30 20 



TABLE 4-7 
LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS SECTOR: 
AREA, FARI-IERS IDENTIFIED, SAMPLED AND SURVEYED 



INTENSIVE FARMERS FARMERS SAMPLED/ FARMERS RESPONDING 
CULTIVATION IDENTIFIED MAILED TO 

AREA QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONNAIRE 



1. Bindura 



73 



41 



9 



139 

Within each part, additional handling problems came up. This was the 
result of the subdivisions into provincial, model type and other geographic 
units which the comparative nature of the study imposed on the data. The 
breadth of the study items also compounded rather than minimized the 
analytical workload. For instance, over 37,300 responses to mostly open-ended 
questions were generated by the 388 Model A resettled farmers alone, not 
mentioning the other remaining 242 farmers. 

Content analysis was applied to study the macro and essentially aggregate 
information collected from the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural 
Development. This necessitated the organization and coordination of the data 
and its indexing into categories of study items and substantive themes. 

The primary survey data, involving the questionnaire in respect of (1) 
the individual resettlement schemes evaluated during the first part of the 
research and (2) the subsequent responses of farmers, required extensive 
scrutiny. First, each specific response to all study item in every individual 
questionnaires was examined carefully and tabulated to derive patterns of 
responses. These were then used in the construction of coding frames and 
instructions. Once this was completed, the answers in each questionnaire were 
coded into appropriate categories of responses. The codes so tabulated were 
put on floppy disks and then analyzed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) computer program at the University of Florida North 
Eastern Regional Data Center. 

Where necessary, simple frequencies of the study items have been 
generated and are presented in various tables. The purpose of this is to 
establish possible patterns of relationships and variations upon which further 
empirical studies can be based and more rigorous statistical analysis derived. 



140 



Notes 



1.) Organization and participation are of major interest to most analysts of 
development be they anthropologists, public choice economists or political 
scientists. Indeed, writers such as Cernea (1983) and Garcia-Zamor (1985) 
discuss this issue in much detail. Bratton (1986) also looks at farmer 
organizations and agricultural production in Zimbabwe. Currently, both 
development aid donors and recipients alike advocate participation of local 
residents in projects as a management technique to increase effectiveness. 

In Zimbabwe the encouragement of grassroots organization of farmers is part 
of the resettlement and rural development policy. In the thinking of the 
government the participation of the povo or the so-called masses in 
decisions is in line with its commitment to socialist ideals. Raising the 
political consciousness of the povo is a responsibility that the ruling 
ZANU-PF party has taken upon itself and is pursuing vigorously. The objective 
is to promote effective and beneficial development and implementation of 
national policy agendas. It is accepted also that by so doing the constituency 
and support base of the party and the government will be enhanced as the 
country moves towards the institutionalization of a one party state. 

In 1984, the Office of the Prime Minister directed that village-level 
organizational structures be set up in all African rural areas. Consequently, 
Resettlement Officers together with their teams of extension, cooperative and 
community development assistants are charged with the responsibility to 
organize farmers in the various schemes. For instance, in Mufurudzi like in 
all the other Model A Schemes farmers are organized into a three-tier system 
as follows: (1) each of the 18 villages constitutes a Village Development 
Committee (VIDCO) under a popularly elected chairman; (2) representatives of 
the nearby VIDCOs are also organized at the next level into the Ward 
Development Committee (WARDCO) of which there are 4 in the scheme; and (3) at 
the highest scheme level of organization is the Area Board of WARDCO 
representatives (see Figure 5-1). The Area Board is under an elected chairman. 
The Board is the farmers' institution which directly laises with the 
"government." The Area Board representatives in Mufurudzi serve on the 
Chaminuka District Council, Madziwa Township, thus linking the scheme with 
the local government system. 

It must be mentioned also that in Mashonaland Central, a Province that is 
claimed to be "100 percent ZANU-PF," the influence of the ruling party in the 
organization of these local-level farmer institutions is quite significant. It 
is customary for every speaker at a musangano or important meeting to 
precede any speech or contribution by first raising a clinched fist and 
reciting important party or national slogans. Some common slogans include, for 
example, Pamberi ne . . . (Prime Minister Comrade Robert Mugabe, /Jongwe/, 
/Minda Mirefu/, /Vuremende/ , /Kuriraa/ , etc). (Forward with . . . the Prime 
Minister, /the Cockerel — the party emblem — /, /the Government/, 
/Resettlement/, /Agriculture/, etc.). All such slogans always end with a 
denounciation of the "enemies,": Pasi ne ... (dissidents, /Muzorewa/ , 
/ZAPU/, /mbava/ , etc). (Down with . . . the dissidents [in Matabeleland] , 
[former Prime Minister of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Bishop] /Muzorewa/, [the 
opposition party] /ZAPU/, /thieves/, etc). 

At the village level the responsibility of the youth in the VIDCOs is to 
constitute a vigilant brigade in charge of security. 



141 



2. ) During the stay of the research team at Chiruraa School and in the course 
of our daily field trips we depended on the nearby retail shops for most of 
our provisions. These shops are located in the Madziwa Mine, the Rural Service 
Center, Chitepo Village, Ponesai Vanhu Institute and Simba Youth Cooperative. 
Three of these are licensed also to operate beer halls. Simba Youth is one 
such hall which serves soft drinks and the locally popular chibuku sorghum 
beer. Indeed, after our interviews of the members of Simba Youth we came to 
know them well. It became a customary routine for us to stop at the 
Cooperative every evening when time permitted to either buy personal needs, 
refresh ourselves, eat sadza or just fraternize with friends. Through this 
close interaction I gained more insights into the backgrounds of most of the 
members and developments within the scheme than were possible otherwise. 

3. ) All the resettlement schemes around the country encounter certain kinds 
of problems. These are reported to DERUDE every month by the Resettlement 
Officers. Nationally the most common of these is "poach grazing." The schemes 
adjoin Communal Areas. Consequently, farmers in those areas lacking adequate 
grazing or pastures allow their cattle and other livestock to stray into the 
schemes. In most cases these farmers steal the barb-wire boundary fencing 
which physically separates the schemes from the Communal Areas. 

In addition to these some of the schemes in the Mashonaland West Province 
had problems which may be termed special. During our tour in 1985 the most 
serious of these problems was the security situation. Bands of so-called 
"South African sponsored ZAPU-PF dissidents," claimed to be operating from 
bases within South Africa, Botswana and the Matabeleland Provinces, were 
reportedly sighted now and then in or near such schemes as Jompani , Muzvezve 
1, Hamilton Hills and Chegutu 6. Other schemes in the Karoi area particularly 
Pote 2 was also plagued by "squatters" or illegal occupants of state land. 

4. ) The problem of illegal occupation of some European farms and state lands 
by so-called squatters is particularly acute in such Provinces as Manicaland 
and Mashonaland West. As of July 1984, it is estimated that there were about 
4,961 squatter family members in the Karoi area, Hurungwe District and about 
1,400 in the Chinoyi District all in Mashonaland West. The problem has 
necessitated the promulgation by the government of guidelines on ways and 
means of controlling it. In every affected area a District Squatter Control 
Committee has been formed with the following organizations represented: (1) 
the District Administrative Officer as the Chairman; (2) Resettlement Officer; 
(3) Resettlement Inspector; (4) the Chairman of the District Council; (5) the 
Natural Resources Board's Lands Inspector; (&) officers of the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police, the Criminal Investigation Department and the Central 
Intelligence Organization; and (7) an official of the ruling ZANU-PF party. 

The work of the Committee is hampered in many places by the politically 
over-sensitive nature of this issue. Even in official circles the squatting is 
viewed with ambivalence. Opinion is divided between some high party officials 
and members of the government on one hand and many in the ZANU-PF on the other 
as to how to effectively resolve the problem. The former group advocates the 
strict adherence to policy. It therefore calls for the forceful removal of 
squatters who refuse to follow government's instructions in respect of how to 
get registered for resettlement. Squatters are believed to be destroying the 
natural resources through their indiscriminate cutting of trees and grass for 
houses and fences. They are also accused of cultivating stream banks, an act 
which is deemed illegal. In the Mashonaland West Province a meeting of the 
squatter committees held in June 21, 1984 at Chinoyi resolved that the 



142 



provincial governor should visit and address squatters in the affected areas 
for "destroying the natural resources, harbouring dissidents, demoralising 
morale of commercial farmers, and not being supportive of the government." 

The principal proponent of the view that the government be hard on squatters 
is the former cabinent member and old-time party leader from the Manicaland 
Province, Edgar Tekere. In some cases this view has prevailed and some 
squatter settlements have been destroyed. This has been on the orders of the 
government often arising from court actions initiated by affected European 
farmers. In almost all cases the squatters return and set up again. This is 
what perhaps prompts opponents of this line of tough action to question in the 
first place how any rational person can say that poor and landless rural 
Zimbabweans are "illegally occupying" their own ancestral lands. They argue 
that the so-called European farms were forcefully taken away and since many 
individuals and families sacrificed themselves in a bloody war to regain the 
lands they have the right now to use them for their subsistence. 

The squatters also have problems which are unique. A significant proportion 
of them are old laborers and aliens who worked on farms that were later 
abandoned or purchased by the government from Europeans. These elderly 
squatters may need more than resettlement, perhaps social welfare 
rehabilitation. For instance, in a survey at the former Kassimure farm within 
Pote 2 a total of 67 of the heads of the squatter households did not 
apparently qualify for resettlement. This is because of old age or physical 
disability. Of this group 22.4 percent were Zimbabweans, 35.8 percent were 
Mozambicans, 23.9 percent were Malawians, 16.4 percent were Zambians and the 
remaining 1.5 percent were South Africans. Their mean age was 62.8 years with 
a mean household size of 4.6 persons. 

5. ) In June 1985, as part of the government's reorganization of the 
Ministries, DERUDE was transferred from the new Ministry of Lands, Agriculture 
and Rural Resettlement to that of Local Government, Rural Development and 
Urban Development. Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region were also 
rescheduled to different schemes and in some cases to different Provinces in 
the Region. The evaluation survey was so timed to enable the officers to 
respond to the questionnaires immediately after their detachment from the 
respective schemes that they previously managed, 

6. ) During the course of the Model B Cooperative management survey I visited 
Batsiranayi on three occasions but never got hold of the Chairman. I left 
written and verbal messages with the Vice Chairman and the Secretary but to no 
avail. I had previously visited the scheme in the company of the 
Zimbabwe-United Kingdom Evaluation Team. I had also met the Chairman and the 
Management Committee on various occasions at DERUDE, Harare. The Chairman was 
quite aware of my research. At one point I realized that he did not want to 
cooperate in the research. I therefore personally interviewed the Committee 
for the management survey in his absence during a scheduled visit to the 
scheme . 

About a month later on November 21 1985, the research team interviewed 
members of the Cooperative for the Model B farmers survey, also during the 
ab sence of the Chairman who had previously been notified of our schedule. The 
following day I passed through Kushingirira Cooperative on my way to Mount 
Darwin. There, the Batsiranayi Chairman who also happened to be visiting 
confronted me in obvious anger warning that I did not have his permission to 
interview his members and that he would have prevented them from answering the 
questionnaire. In his view all researchers were biased against cooperatives 



143 



and that we should leave them alone. I tried, perhaps successfully, to impress 
upon him that I had the permission of the government to do the research and 
since Batsiranayi was a public institution it was perfectly alright to do my 
work without his input or sanction. Later that day the Chairman apologized to 
my senior investigator and subsequently tried to interact more with us on 
occasions when we met him at the Madziwa Mine Club House. 

7. ) Among the Model A resettled farmers there were only three problem 
instances that I can recall. The first occurred during the initial public 
introduction of the research team subsequent to the interviews of individual 
household heads. As it was the case we had visited this particular village the 
previous two days to consult with the VIDCO Chairman and his Vice-Chairman 
about our impending research. On the morning of the public meeting involving 
all the farmers three of them, whom we learned had been brewing and drinking 
the illicit kachasu gin all night, apparently did not understand the need 
for the research. Matters got worse when my senior investigator in reciting 
his slogans mentioned, "Pamberi ne Mushandira Pamwe !" (Forward with the 
cooperatives!). Taking that perhaps to mean we were in the village to promote 
cooperatives obviously did not sit well with them. It took nearly an hour for 
the other farmers to get the situation under control. For the two days that we 
visited and interviewed all the farmers in that village no other problems 
arose . 

The second incident involved a farmer whose questionnaire was incomplete. 
The night after our interviews in one village I detected that a page was 
originally left out in a filled questionnaire. Our schedule did not allow an 
immediate follow up for about a week. Meanwhile, I sent a message to the 
Chairman in the village notifying him that we would be back there to complete 
the missing section with the farmer. We drove into that village one afternoon, 
and in accordance with custom first went to greet the Chairman. Later, we were 
told that the farmer in question had left the village that morning and "gone 
into hiding to avoid" our meeting him. This was because he did not understand 
why he alone of all the people in that village should be interviewed twice. 

The third problem was in respect of one of the farmers who is also an 
important public servant in the area. Indeed, we became friends in the course 
of my visits to the scheme. On two occasions he provided me with 
accommodation. During the interview he took a questionnaire which he decided 
to fill himself. He kept it for a couple of weeks before filling and leaving 
many of the questions unanswered. My senior investigator and I impressed upon 
him the need to obtain complete answers. He steadfastly refused to respond to 
those questions the answers to which he felt were "obvious" and perhaps too 
personal. Among these were those in respect of (1) ownership of household 
items and capital assets and (2) about socio-demographic characteristics. 

8. ) Apart from the major direct expenses such as subsistence and the 
development and printing of questionnaire, field transportation was unbearably 
expensive. The regional nature of the case study involving interviews in 
differently located research sites meant that the team had to move from place 
to place. In many instances, some research sites had to be visited three or 
more times in order to obtain complete coverage. From our base at Chiruma 
school the nearest gas stations were at Mount Darwin 37 kilometers to the 
northwest or Shamva 53 kilometers to the south. 

Depending upon which village in the scheme that the team was working in we 
had to cover distances of at least 50-80 kilometers return trip just to obtain 
gas. We could not purchase and store extra quantities for later use. This is 



144 



because it was illegal to transport gas in any container in a passenger or 
public vehicle and not more than 4 liters in a private vehicle. During the 
course of the research in 1985 one liter of gas in Harare, Bindura, Shamva and 
Mt. Darwin averaged between a low of Z$1.0I to a high of Z$1.07 or around 
Z$3.93 (US$2.45) per gallon. 

9.) I originally planned to cover only randomly selected farmers in the 
survey. In early June 1985, I visited Mufurudzi to pre-test aspects of my 
quetionnaire . I decided to do this in Tongogara 1. I therefore drew a random 
sample of 10 from a list of 50 farmers in the village. On June 6, 1985, I was 
accompanied by the Resettlement Assistant to meet the VIDCO Chairman and 
farmers. Many of them had already been notified of my research. All the same I 
explained it to them and requested to do a pre-test of my questionnaire with 
the selected 10 farmers prior to the main survey which was to begin in about 3 
months. When I arrived the following morning with a research assistant we 
could not obtain farmers' cooperation and participation. Some of the selected 
farmers insisted on the coverage of all their neighbors as a condition for 
their own participation. Many of those not originally selected also questioned 
how "fair" my so-called random sampling was. Though I never understood the 
basis of the "suspicions" I was compelled to change the original strategy. 

Since these resettlement programs started the government has permitted only 
a few field studies in them. The only individuals who have been so lucky all 
did their research from the University of Zimbabwe. These are (1) Bill 
Kinsey's (1982, 1983) controversial work which generated hysteria by 
questioning the wisdom in the government's resettlement policy and (2) 
Mumbegwegwi's (1984b) study of the Model B Cooperative resettlements. 

The other studies are monitoring activities such as the (1) farm management 
studies done by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and 
(2) the routine annual census of farm output conducted by the Resettlement 
Officers on behalf of the Central Statistical Office. The latter covers all 
individual resettled farmers. This fact coupled with the organizational ideals 
of the VIDCOs which encourage the participation of everybody rather than a 
chosen few militates against partial coverage that random selection entails. 
Consequently, I modified the research design to cover selected villages and 
the total households in them. Even then, a few individual farmers in some of 
the nearby villages which were not selected presented themselves to be 
interviewed. Though these were interviewed their questionnaires were never 
analyzed for this study. 

The foregoing problem which necessitated the use of total rather than 
selective coverage of farmers in particular villages is unique to the 
resettlement schemes with their nucleated settlements. In the Communal and the 
Sraall-Scale Commercial Areas with dispersed homesteads no such problems were 
encountered . 



CHAPTER V 
AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 

Introduction 

According to Mayer and Greenwood (1980:17) policy is a decision of intent 
made on behalf of a collective to iafluence the behavior of its members 
through the use of positive and negative sanctions. Since the attainment of 
political independence in 1980 the government of Zimbabwe has formulated an 
elaborate agricultural resettlement policy that is now in various stages of 
its implementation. In this, the government is collaborating with several 
external donor countries, principally the Uaited Kingdom and Kuwait and with 
international aid and lending institutions, such as the African Development 
Bank and the European Economic Community. Other so-called non-governmental 
organizations are also participating in the resettlement program. Among these 
are Africare, Redd Barna , Lutheran World Federation and Christian Care. 

The major responsibility for the resettlement is in the hands of the 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement which, in addition to 
coordinating the participation of the external governments and agencies, also 
actively oversees the involvement of numerous Ministries and Departments in 
various aspects of the planning and implementation of the program. 

The policy dimensions of the entire resettlement program are explicitly 
expressed in official publications and pronouncements. These include the 
speeches of government members, party leaders and policy makers, official 
memoranda ana circulars, development plans, budget statements and estimates of 
expenditures. The policy blueprint is the Intensive Resettlement Policies and 
Procedures (Zimbabwe 1985c). 

145 



At the macro-level this document provides the major source of statements 
of intent concerning the objectives, organization, regulations and procedures 
that relate to the resettlement. This chapter draws extensively from this 
revised document as well as from its previous editions (see Zimbabwe 1931e, 
1983c). Project Reports of some of the individual resettlement schemes 
discussed in this chapter also provide additional insights, particularly in 
terms of the economic and technical dimensions of resettlement policy at the 
micro-level. The reports are important for these vital background information 
against which specific outputs or program performance may be measured. 

Resettlement Policy Objectives 

In 1980, a joint Government of Zimbabwe-Government of the United Kingdom 
three-year agreement proposed to resettle 18,000 farm families on 1.1 million 
hectares of land at the cost of $60 million (Zimbabwe 1981e:l). These 
proposals were revised upward two years later in the Three Year Transitional 
National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85 (Zimbabwe 1982b, 1983a). The 
Zimbabwe government envisaged then to resettle a total of 162,000 families on 
9 million hectares at an estimated cost of $500 million in constant prices 
(Zimbabwe 1985c: 1). 

By January 1983, a total of 32 resettlement schemes had been established. 
These covered 1.2 million hectares and were planned for 22,000 families. Of 
this number, 18,400 were already resettled in the schemes (Zimbabwe 1983c:2). 
At the end of June 1984, a little over 1.8 million hectares had been purchased 
for resettlement at the cost of $50.7 million. As of that time the estimated 
number of families that had been resettled was 30,122 representing some 
255,000 people (Zimbabwe 1985c:3). 



147 

In September 1985, of the revised target population of 162,000 families 
about 35,000 or 22 percent were already resettled. A total of 171 schemes had 
been established for them throughout the country (see Appendix E). Of these, 
56 are Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Projects, 66 are Model A 
Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Projects; 48 are Model B Producer 
Cooperatives and one is a Model C Resettlement Project (see Table 5-1). (See 
below for a description of the Resettlement Scheme Models.) 

Currently, the government has no specific time frame as to when 
resettlement will be completed. Thus, much as it is proceeding in all earnest 
the approach to the program remains flexible. Consequently, all necessary 
modifications in policy as well as in implementation will be incorporated into 
the program if and when new information and experience warrant such changes. 
With the Five Year Development Plan, launched in 1986, a target of 15,000 
households is set to be resettled every year (see Zimbabwe 1986d) . 

The resettlement is meant to achieve eight specific objectives. These are 
(1) to alleviate population pressure in Communal Areas; (2) extend and improve 
the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector; through 
individual households and cooperatives; (3) improve the standard of living of 
the largest and poorest segment of the population; (4) ameliorate the plight 
of people who have been adversely affected by war and to rehabilitate them; 
(5) provide opportunities for people who have no land and who are without 
employment and may therefore be classed as destitute; (6) bring abandoned or 
underutilized land into full production as one facet of implementing an 
equitable policy of land redistribution; (7) expand or improve services and 
infrastructures needed to promote the well-being of people and of economic 
production; and (8) achieve national stability and progress in a country that 
has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war (Zimbabwe 1985c: 4). 



148 



TABLE 5 - 1 

ZIMBABWE: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES, 

SEPTEMBER 1985 







MODEL A 
NORMAL 
INTENSIVE 


MODEL A 
ACCELERATED 
INTENSIVE 


MODEL B 
PRODUCER 
COOP 


MODEL C 


Total 


Mashonal and 


East 


8 


4 


7 


0 


19 


Mashonaland 


Central 2 


7 


9 


0 


18 


Mashonal and 


West 


6 


6 


8 


0 


20 


Midlands 




10 


13 


15 


0 


38 


Manicaland 




14 


6 


7 


1 


28 


Masvingo 




9 


16 


0 


0 


25 


Matabeleland 


North 


2 


2 


0 


0 


4 


Matabeleland 


South 


5 


12 


2 


0 


19 


Total 




56 


66 


48 


1 


171 



Source: Department of Rural Development (DERUDE), Harare. 



Note: Some Schemes, especially in Matabeleland South, are still at the 
planning stages and therefore are not fully operational as at 
this time. The security situation in most of the Matabele Schemes 
are terribly serious because of so-called dissidents who operate 
in the region. For instance, as early as 1982 the government 
admitted that it was compelled to withdraw Development Teams from 
certain schemes in the area because of the disruptive activities 
of armed bandits (see The Herald, May 4, 1982). After this news, 
bandits attacked one resettlement near Plumtree leaving scores of 
families homeless (The Herald, June 17, 1983). DERUDE's Monthly 
Reports for Matabeleland also show that (1) in August 1985 bandits 
attacked a public bus, burned an elementary school and the entire 
Village 4 and part of Village 3 at Hollins Block, Gwanda District, 
(2) on three separate occasions they harassed farmers at Pioneer 
and Spring Blocks, Mbembesi Scheme, (3) one officer based at Shashi 
Irrigation Scheme was murdered in October 1985 and (4) In November 
1987 a group of foreign missionaries and their families were also 
massacred in a mission farm in Matabeleland South for allegedly 
causing the removal of squatters from the farm. 



149 



These objectives express a strong equity bias in policy. This is because 
the overriding aim of the resettlement policy is to use redistribution to 
achieve social justice. In addition, it seeks to create opportunities and to 
establish the necessary conditions for a broader based agricultural growth. 
The government envisages the full participation and the incorporation of the 
hitherto neglected majority African smallholders in the market economy as a 
major goal of its development effort (Zimbabwe 1981a, 1981c, 1982b, 1983a, 
1985c) . 

The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the Governmenfs 
Development Policy 

At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that the essential thrust 
of the agricultural resettlement policy of the government is the 
collectivization of the mode of production and the means of capital 
accumulation. The central place that the government would want cooperatives to 
assume in its development policy is quite apparent. Both in words and in 
action the government's commitment to agrarian socialism based largely on the 
collective system of production is unequivocal. In June 1985 for example, the 
Prime liinister created a special coordination Ministry in his office to 
oversee the development of cooperatives, a task previously performed by the 
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. 

Secondly, the country's development policy statement document, Growth 
With Equity, spells out quite clearly the government's stand about the issue 



150 



of cooperatives. The document makes it clear that 

[The] Government will promote the establishment of communal 
and cooperative farms in agriculture, and provide general 
assistance to ensure their economic viability. ... In this 
area Government will be building upon the traditional 
cooperative approach in Zimbabwean culture in facing up to 
the technological challenges of tomorrow. (Zirababvre 1981a :5) 

In an undated paper titled Rural Land Policies in Zimbabwe prepared by the 
Honorable Moven Mahachi , until January 1988 the Minister of Lands, Agriculture 
and Rural Resettlement, he argues the rationale behind the government's 
commitment to agrarian socialism stating thus: 

It must be stressed that Zimbabwe today has a capitalistically 
organised commercial farming sector and the government faces 
the task of converting it to a socialist system of agriculture. 
It must convert the land ownership and tenure system from 
private ownership and uncontrolled land use, permitting a 
high degree of exploitation of man by man, to either producer 
cooperatives or state farms. 

Elsewhere, at an agricultural field day held on April 15, 1985, at the Kwaedza 
Model B Producer Cooperative, Mashonaland East Province the Deputy Secretary 
of the Ministry read an address on behalf of the Honorable Minister Moven 
!lahachi . He argues in the address: 

Our government has adopted a policy on Cooperatives which aims 
at: Eliminating the exploitation of man by man, ... My 
Ministry and indeed the Government of Zimbabwe see. . .the 
Cooperative movement as the most desirable production system 
that must substitute the individual production enterprise 
pattern that has dominated the agricultural economy of this 
country over the past century or so. While the resettlement 
program in general seeks to extend the land resources to and 
open up new opportunities for the hitherto disadvantaged, 
neglected and landless majority of our African population in 
the rural areas. Agricultural Cooperatives as implemented under 
Model B of the programme specifically represent a move by 
Government to define the mode and direction production should 
take in the agricultural endeavours of our people. 



151 

These statements give ample policy recognition to the cooperatives as the 
means to extend "socialist and popular democratic participation in the 
ownership and management of the nation's resources" (Zimbabwe 1981a:5). 

So far also these Model B Producer Cooperatives have received more 
government funding and voluntary donor assistance per capita than any other 
resettlement model under implementation. Given this background, which is 
discussed fully in Chapter VIII below, it is very difficult to understand how 
some observers of the Zimbabwe scene can dismiss the policy thrust of the 
cooperatives as "only an aspect of government's overall approach" to 
agriculture (Mumbengegwi 1984b:2; 1984a) or as merely rhetorical (see for 
instance Sylvester 1985:35; Astrow 1983). 

The Structure and Organization of Resettlement 

The organizational structure for resettlement is three-tier. At the top 
is the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement which is chaired by the Minister of 
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. At the next level are the various 
implementing and servicing agencies. The third level embraces the recipient or 
resettled farmer units (Figure 5-1). 

All matters relating to policy about resettlement ultimately reside with 
the Cabinet Committee. However, resettlement is more than policy formulation. 
It involves planning, implementation and administration. Thus, in order to 
carry on with these activities and, even more so, to achieve the stated policy 
objectives various Ministries and agencies have been brought together. 

This coordination is at the inter Ministry level where the following are 
represented: The Ministries of (1) Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; 
(2) Natural Resources and Tourism; (3) Energy and Water Resources and 



152 



CABINET COMMITTEE ON RESETTLEMENT 



INTER MINISTRY COMMITTEE FOR RESETTLEMENT 



MIN OF AGRIC 
LANDS & RURAL 
RESETTLEMENT 



PLANNING 
AGRITEX 
VETERINARY 
IRRIGATION 

ARDA 
AFC 
AMA 
CSC 



MIN OF LOCAL GOVT 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
& URBAN DEVELOPME 



PLANNING 
PHYSICAL DEVEL 
RESETTLEMENT/ 
ADMINISTRATION 



OTHER 
MINISTRIES 



HEALTH 

EDUCATION 

HOUSING 

WATER 

COOPS 

NATURAL RE 
COMMUNITY 
DEVEL 

NON-GOVT 
ORGANIZA 



RESETTLEMENT TEAM 



AREA BOARD 



WARDCOs 



VIDCOs 



RESETTLED HOUSEHOLDS 



FIGURE: 5 - 1 
ZIMBABWE: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF RESETTLEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 



153 



Development; (4) Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; (5) Education; 
(6) Transport; (7) Health; (8) Public Construction and National Housing; (9) 
Community Development and Women's Affairs; and (10) Cooperative Development. 
In addition, representatives of donor countries and agencies which fund 
various aspects of the resettlement program participate in the deliberations 
of this Inter Ministry Committee for Resettlement. 

The organizational emphasis at this level is to ensure that the resources 
which otherwise are compartmentalized and controlled by each Ministry are 
coordinated at the highest echelon of national administration. This 
coordination is meant to make these resources readily available for the 
integrated development of both the resettlement areas and their neighboring 
communal, small-scale farming and the large-scale farming areas. 

Specifically, the Inter Ministry Committee is mandated to carry out 
functions which include (1) program projects appraisal and recommendations of 
amendments, (2) recommendation of projects to donors for funding, (3) 
monitoring of program performance and the expenditures incurred on individual 
schemes and (4) recommendations on specific aspects of policy. In performing 
these functions the Committee is assisted by a Technical Sub-Committee which 
undertakes preliminary appraisal of all resettlement projects before 
submission to the Inter Ministry Committee. 

Two major ministries are much more involved with both the macro and micro 
issues of resettlement policy and processes. These are the Jlinistry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and that of Local Government, Rural and 
Urban Development, The specific involvement in the resettlement process of 
each of the two primary ministries, their respective agencies and also of the 
supporting ministries is set out below in detail. 



154 



The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 

The entire resettleraent program is the overall responsibility of this 
Ministry^ in terms of (1) specific policy matters, (2) inter-agency 
coordination, (3) designation and acquisition of land required for 
resettlement, (4) financial control, (5) promotion of appropriate technology 
and (6) monitoring and evaluation of the program. 

Various organs of the Ministry carry out specialized tasks that directly 

relate to different aspects of the program. For instance, the Planning Section 

in conjunction with AGRITFiX and the Land Identification Advisory 
2 

Committee conducts preliminary assessment of land suitability for 
resettlement. It also undertakes technical appraisal of all project reports as 
well as the actual physical planning and layouts of various resettlement 
schemes including their Administrative or Rural Service Centers. In this, the 
Planning Section works closely also with its counterpart in the Ministry of 
Local Government, Rural and Urban Development. 

AGRITEX, the technical and extension arm of the Ministry has 
responsibility in whole or in part for several major aspects of resettlement. 
Specifically, these include the (1) preliminary assessment of the suitability 
of land for resettlement, (2) preparation of resettlement plans upon the 
request of the Ministry, (3) demarcation of village sites, arable, grazing and 
residential plots, (4) pi anning and pegging of conservation works such as 
ridge contors and (5) the provision of group and individual extension service 
to resettled farmers. 

Likewise, the Department of Veterinary Services provides dipping services 
and extension on animal health on the resettlement schemes. The newly created 



155 

Irrigation Section of the Ministry undertakes the technical appraisal and 
participates in the planning of all irrigation projects under the resettlement 
program. 

In addition, there are four parastatals of the Ministry whose statutory 

responsibilities bring them in contact with resettlement. These are the 

Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), the Agricultural Finance 

Corporation (AFC), the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) and the Cold 

Storage Commission (CSC). ARDA is tasked with the provision of accounting 

service, the preparation of monthly financial reports and reimbursement claims 

and the disbursement of the program funds. It is also charged with the direct 

implementation of the resettlement Model D pilot project and the management of 

the resettlement Model C in the case of specialized crops, except in the 
3 

Zunde variant. 

Operating through the Resettlement Credit Scheme the AFC provides both 
short, or seasonal and medium term credit to resettled farmers. It also 
manages the Small Farm Credit Scheme. The scheme covers successful and 
enterprising smallholders in all rural areas including resettlement areas. 
Under its mandate the Corporation has the responsibility to educate farmers in 
resettlement schemes on credit management. 

Two subsidiaries of AMA, namely, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the 
Cotton Marketing Board (Cf-IB), by virtue of their statutory mandates, 
respectively have to purchase all controlled produce harvested by farmers 

except tobacco which is traded by the privately-organized Tobacco Marketing 

4 

Association. Maize and cotton, being the most important crops in 
resettlement schemes, therefore make the two Boards quite important to 
resettled farmers. 



156 

Finally, the Cold Storage Commission which handles livestock products has 
started to expand its activities into the resettlement areas with the 
operation of Grazier Schemes. Under the system resettled farmers are 
encouraged to establish paddocks or enclosures after which they are assisted 
to purchase cattle for fattening and sale to the Commission. As of now the 
system is mostly confined to a few Model B producer cooperatives schemes which 
have the necessary infrastructure for such a venture still intact. 

The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 

The Ministry^ is consulted and it fully participates in the planning, 
approval and implementation of the resettlement program. This is so because 
the resettlement plans have to be incorporated into the overall plans of the 
Rural District Council and the Administrative Province within which the scheme 
is located. The incorporation occurs after a final decison on the 
implementation of a particular scheme has been taken by the Inter Ministry 
Committee on Resettlement. 

As from the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year, the Department of Rural 
Development (DERUDE) became part of this Ministry. DERUDE is 

the implementation arm for the resettlement program. Two of its sections, 
namely, Development and Resettlement, play specific roles that are crucial to 
the establishment and micro-management of the schemes. 

The Development Section either directly or through contracting undertakes 
the provision of the physical infrastructures that serve resettlement schemes. 
These include the demarcation of the scheme boundaries, initial clearing and 
plowing of portions of farmers' arable lands. It constructs and maintains 
cattle dips, access roads, elementary schools, the Rural Service Centers and 



157 

their administrative, residential and other facilities such as the clinic, 
inputs and marketing depots. The budget for these services is also controlled 
by the Ministry. 

The Resettlement Section performs the important task of selection and 
allocation of individual families for resettlement. This is done with the 
participation of the respective District Councils to which the prospective 
families originally apply to be resettled. The day-to-day administration of 
the schemes is in the hands of the Resettlement Section through the resident 
Resettlement Officer and his team of other services personnel. 

Since 1984, in compliance with directives from the Office of the Prime 
Minister, the Ministry has undertaken the formation of Village Development 
Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WARDCOs) in all 
resettlement schemes and rural areas. This is to facilitate the grassroots 
participation of rural dwellers in rural and national issues, particularly in 
the area of development planning and implementation. 

Other Ministries 

The remaining Ministries which deal with various aspects of resettlement 
are charged with the following appropriate responsibilities. The Ministry of 
Energy and Water Resources and Development is responsible for the provision 
and maintenance of domestic water supply to all villages, schools and Rural 
Service Centers in the resettlement schemes. It also provides water for 
livestock and irrigation purposes. 

The Ministry of Education undertakes the construction of secondary 
schools in all schemes, where appropriate and takes care of the staffing and 
payment of salaries of both elementary and secondary school teachers. As it is 

( 



158 

pointed out above the construction of elementary schools is the responsibility 
of the Development Section of DERUDE within the Ministry of Local Government, 
Rural and Urban Development. 

The Ministry of Transport maintains all major or national roads that run 
through resettlement schemes. Maintenance of feeder roads, however, lies with 
the Development Section of DERUDE. The responsibility for the provision of 
health services, the equipping, staffing and operation of clinics lies with 
the Ministry of Health. It also undertakes the training of Village Health 
Workers and offers technical advice on the siting and construction of "Blair 
privies" or latrines in all villages and schools. The maintenance of all 
government housing in resettlement schemes is carried out by the Minstry of 
Public Construction and National Housing. It is also responsible for the 
introduction, promotion and loan financing of improved rural housing for 
resettled farm families. 

The Natural Resources Board of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism educates farmers in all resettlement schemes on matters relating to 
conservation and proper ecological practices. It also encourages them to 
establish woodlots. Resettled farmers are organized and trained to initiate 
and participate in community development activities or self-help projects by 
the Mnistry of Community Development and Women's Affairs. 

Finally, since the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year responsibility 
for the promotion of cooperative enterprises has been vested in a newly 
created Ministry of Cooperative Development. The Department of Cooperatives is 
the operational arm of the Ministry. Its responsibilities include the 
development of cooperative movement among individually resettled farm families 
in the Model A schemes and the training of members of such resettlement 
schemes as the Model B Producer Cooperatives (see Table 5-2). 



159 



TABLE 5-2 

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES IN THE 
AREA OF RESETTLEMENT 



COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/ AGENCY 



SPECIFIC DUTIES 



INTER CABINET COMMITTEE 



Policy formulation and approval of 
recommedations about resettlement 



INTER MINISTRY COMMITTEE 



Project appraisal 

Recommendation of projects for funding 
Monitoring of program performance and 

expenditures 
Resettlement policy recommendations 



TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE 



Assits Inter Ministry Committee 
Undertakes preliminary project 
appraisal 



MIN. OF LANDS, AGRIC. & 
RURAL RESETTLEMENT 



LAND IDENTIFICATION 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 



Policy matters 
Inter Agency coordination 
Acquisition of land 
Financial Control 
Appropriate technology 
Monitoring and evaluation 



Makes initial selection of land on 
block basis and advices on its 
acquisi tion 



PLANNING SECTION 



Preliminary assessment of suitability 

of land for resettlement 
Technical appraisal of all project 

reports 

Planning and appraisal of layout of 
Rural Service Center 



[RRIGATION SECTION 



Technical appraisal and participation 
in planning of all irrigation 
proj ec ts 



TABLE 5 - 2 — continued 

COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/ AGENCY 



SPECIFIC DUTIES 



AGRITEX 

Preliminary assessment of suitability 
of land for resettlement 

Preparation of resettlement plans 

Demarcation of arable lands and 
village sites 

Provision of extension to resettled 
farmers 

Conservation works on resettlement 
schemes 



VETERINARY SERVICES Provision of dipping services 

Ensures animal health 



AGRICULTURAL & RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Provision of accounting services for 

(ARDA) resettlement program 

Disbursement of program funds 
Preparation of monthly financial 

statement on the program 
Preparation of reimbursement claims 
Management of central estates of the 
Model C schemes in the case of 
specialized crops 
Implementation of the Model D pilot 
proj ect 



AGRICULTURAL FINANCE 
CORPORATION (AFC) Operation of the Resettlement Credit 

and the Small Farm Credit Schemes 
Provision of short-term (seasonal) 
and medium- term credit to resettled 
farmers 

Education of resettled farmers on 
credit management. 



MIN, OF LOCAL GOVT, 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT & 

URBAN DEVELOPMENT Participates in the approval, planning 

and implementation of specific 
resettlement schemes 
Administers schemes handed over by the 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and 
Rural Resettlement 



161 



TABLE 5 - 2 — continued 
COMMITTEE/ MINISTRY/AGENCY SPECIFIC DUTIES 



PLANNING SECTION 



Confirms the location of Rural Service 
Centers and approves their layouts 



DEPARTMENT OF RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT (DERUDE) 



DEVELOPMENT SECTION 



RESETTLEMENT SECTION 



Implements resettlement and micro- 
manages individual schemes 

Constructs, implements and maintains 
all physical infrastructure in 
resettlement schemes, eg. 
demarcation, clearing, plowing, 
dips, access roads, elementary 
schools, marketing and supply 
depots, clinics and Rural Service 
Center 

Controls the budget for various 

aspects of the resettlement program 
Selection and allocation of farmers 

for resettlement 
Adminstration and coordination at the 

scheme level 
Enforcement of resettlement permits 
Squatter control 
Promotion of VIDCOs and WARDCOs 
Undertakes the collection of data 

about scheme progress and problems 



MIN. OF ENERGY, WATER 
RESOURCES & DEVELOPMENT. Provision of domestic water to all 

resettlement villages and schools 
Provision, operation and maintenance 
of water supplies at the Rural 
Service Center 
Provision of irrigation water and 
dams in resettlement schemes where 
appropriate 



MIN. OF EDUCATION Holds ultimate responsibility for 

education in resettlement schools 
Provision of secondary schools in 

resettlement schemes 
Staffing and payment of salaries for 
both elementary and secondary 
school teachers 



TABLE 5 - 2 — continued 
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/ AGENCY 



SPECIFIC DUTIES 



MIN. OF HEALTH Responsibility for the provision of 

health services in all schemes 
Responsible for equipping, staffing 

and managing all clinics 
Training of Village Health Workers 
Provision of technical advice on 
the siting and construction of 
"Blair" toilets by resettled 
farmers in the villages and schools 



MIN. OF CONSTRUCTION 

& NATIONAL HOUSING Maintenance of government housing in 

the schemes 
Introduction, promotion and financing 
of improved housing for resettled 
farmers 



Organizing and traiiiiag of farmers in 
schemes in self-help and community 
development activities 

Promotion of pre-cooperative self- 
help economic groups 



Processing and registration of 

cooperative groups for the program 

Identification, selection and 
recommendation of suitable 
registered cooperative societies 
for resettlement 

Provision of orgatiizational aad 
managerial skills necessary for 
effective cooperative performance 

Coordination of the Management 
Advisory Teams that services the 
cooperatives 



MIN. OF TRANSPORT Responsible for the major road works 

in and the maintenance of national 
roads running through resettlement 
schemes 



MIN. OF COMMUNITY DEV. 
& WOMEN'S AFFAIRS 



MIN. OF COOPERATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 



NATURAL RESOURCES 
BOARD 



Education of resettled farmers on 

matters relating to the conservation 
of natural resources 



163 



Land Acquisition and Tenure 

A major wish of many landless and near-landless Zimbabweans is the 
appropr iatioa of the so-called European lands and their distribution to 
Africans. This is particularly so in the Communal Areas now as it was before 
independence. Indeed, the support of the "masses" for the liberation war was 
built on this wish. Many nationalist leaders, either implicitly or explicitly, 
alluded to equitable land reform programs in postindependent Zimbabwe. Most 
European settlers and adversaries of the nationalist cause in the western 
world also entertained the fear that land seizures were going to be the order 
of the day if and when African majority rule was achieved. 

It is no wonder that the end of the war and the period immediately after 
independence in 1980 precipitated the massive and spontaneous squatting or 
occupation of some European and state lands. Such a development should have 
been anticipated because it happened earlier on in the 1960s in the similar 
case of Kenya (see Mbithi and Barnes 1975). The squatter situation is still 
particularly serious in Manicaland and to some extent in Mashonaland West. In 
these Provinces some returning refugees and landless Communal Area residents 
did not wait for official resettlement. The "squatter problem," as this 
development is officially known in Zimbabwe, poses a major dilemma to both the 
government and affected European farmers. 

It was to allay the concern of European land owners over possible forced 
appropriations that the independence constitution, worked out at the Lancaster 
House Conference, stipulated guarantees for the sanctity of privately owned 
lands. It was decided and accepted there and then that any land acquisition by 
the government of Zimbabwe "has to be on the basis of willing seller-willing 
buyer, at the prevailing market prices." 



164 

So far this requirement has been scruplously honored by the government, 
though much to the chagrin and the disappointment of many landless Zimbabweans 
and radical intellectuals alike (see Chapter II above). There is no doubt, 
however, that the government's resettlement effort is frustrated to some 
extent by the operation of this mode of land acquisition. The government 
points out that the system 

has proved unsatisfactory because, on the one hand the 
majority of offers have been of poor quality land and, 
on the other hand such offers have been fragmented and 
scattered across the country. (Zimbabwe 1985c: 11) 

In November 1985, as a consequence of and in response to this 
frustration, the government introduced a new Land Acquisition Bill in the 
National Assembly. The Bill sought to encourage land owners to sell to the 
government first. It also sought to empower the President to acquire land that 
had been declared underutilized or derelict by the Derelict Lands Board. As 
expected the Bill was emotionally debated along racial lines. For instance, 
the acting Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the 
Honorable Herbert Ushewokunze who tabled the Bill charged the European members 
of the Assembly who opposed it to be "digging in their heels against change." 
(The Herald, November 20, 1985:1). 

Also contributing to the debate the ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for 
Mufakose, the Honorable John Zhakata, argued that the Bill was meant to get 
back the lands "which [the whites] grabbed away from us," (The Herald, 
November 27, 1985:8). From the perspective of the European members the 
controversy about the Bill centered on the definition of two crucial words. 
These were "underutilized," and "derelict" as they applied to land. For 
example, the Honorable Mark Patridge, the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe 
member for Mazowe-Mutoko and the Honorable Bill Irvine, an Independent 



165 

representiag Marlborough, persistently requested for a definition of those 
wo rd s . 

The Bill which passed as the Land Acquisition Act (1986) took effect on 
March 1, 1986. It now provides for a system of designation of certain areas, 
in the country, for various public needs purposes such as resettlement and 
state farms. It defines properly utilized land as that which has been 
"substantially and continously used for the past three years." According to 
Linda van Buren (1986:1123), writing on the Economy of Zimbabwe, the passage 
of the Bill is based on the fact that prior to independence the colonial 
administration did not invariably grant European farmers a freehold title to 
commercial land, reserving to itself the right to repossess land for "public 
purposes." 

Under the new system an inter ministry Land Identification Advisory 
Committee has been set up to make the initial selection of blocks of land on 
the basis of such criteria as the availability of water and suitable soils and 
then give advice to the Land Selection Committee. 

Analysts of land tenure systems, particularly in Africa, often cite 
insecurity of tenure as a major constraint on investment in improved 
technologies, management and husbandry of resources (Feder and Noronha 1987). 
An important issue in land tenure is therefore the question of whoever 
controls access to the resources of the land and the benefits accruing from 
its use (Cohen 1980), This becomes even more significant where productive 
resources such as irrigation are involved (Lipton 1985). 

In Zimbabwe the government is yet to come out with the desirable system 
of tenure for resettlement agriculture. As of now resettled farmers operate 
their holdings under temporary leases issued in accordance with Section 6 of 
the Rural Land Act. In the Model A schemes with their individual family 



166 

operated farms, for instance, the conditions of occupancy or tenure held by 
the farmers are in the form of three different permits. These are (1) the 
permit to reside, which covers a 2,500 square meter residential plot within 
the village; (2) the permit to cultivate a net arable land of 5 hectares and 
(3) the permit to destock, covering a right to graze a stated number of 
livestock units in the communal grazing area set aside for each village.^ 
These permits, enforced by the Resettlement Officers of DERUDE, are issued by 
the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on the strict 
conditions that a resettled farmer relinguishes all traditional rights, if 
any, that were held in the Communal Area (see Appendix F; and Appendix G, 
Tables 1 to 3). 

Resettlement Planning 

Each resettlement scheme is planned before the necessary infrastructures 
are constructed or farmers resettled. The scheme's project report embodies the 
plan. The report describes the natural environment, the intended agricultural 
program, staff requirement, the scheme costs and an economic analysis. In the 
planning process physical details and suitable sites for locating proposed 
villages and infrastructures are identified on 1:12,500 air photo mosaics. 
However, final decisions about the location of these development structures 
are made in the field during implementation. 

The total number of farm families to be resettled in each scheme is a 
crucial planning decision. The determination of this is based on the 
agro-ecological resources, the land capability and the livestock carrying 
capacity of the land surveyed for the scheme. The arable potential of the land 
is calculated from a standard land capability classification of the country. 



167 

This classification is derived from detailed stereoscopic analysis of 
1:25,000 blanket airphotographs cross-checked by ground verification and soil 
coding. The livestock carrying capacity or stocking rate of the non-arable 
land is also similarly assessed. 

The scheme's project report is prepared in consultation with the relevant 
District Council which has to approve it. After this the report is submitted 
for the consideration of the Inter Ministry Coramitte for Resettlement and 
approval by the Inter Cabinet Committee. This provides authority for ARDA. to 
open a development expenditure account. Once such an account is set up the 
Development Section of DERUDE begins the construction of various 
infrastructures . 

Resettlement Scheme Models 

Currently, there are 4 Models in use in the planning and Implementation 
of resettlement projects in Zimbabwe. These are Models A, B, C and D. Each of 
these has its own structure and internal dynamics as are described below. So 
far and in terms of land area, number of resettled families and expenditure of 
resources the Model A schemes are the most important (see Table 5-1). However, 
in line with its commitment to socialism the government's intention is "to 
settle a major proportion [of individual farmers and farm families] under 
Model B" schemes (Zimbabwe 1981, 1985c: 14). 

Model A Resettlement Program 

This Model involves the resettlement of individual farm families on 
Individual residential plots within nucleated villages. It also provides 



168 

individual arable holdings demarcated as close as is practicable to the 
village but usually within 3 kilometer radius. Tied to the arable holding is a 
grazing right which varies with the availability of grazing land and the 
ecological imperatives of the prevailing natural region. 

Consequently, in the better arable zones such as Natural Regions I and II 
each resettled family has a permit to keep up to 5 Livestock Units. The 
corresponding maximum unit for Natural Region III is 8; Natural Region IV is 
10; and 20 for Natural Region V which is only suited for grazing. These 
allocations are based on minimum viable herd size, draft requirement and 
cropping reliability worked out for each region. 

The village sites are carefully selected and the layout planned before 
farmers are permitted to build their homes. The ideal size preferred by the 
planners ranges between 25 and 50 families depending upon such factors as 
water supply and distance to the arable plots. In a few situations farmers 
have been resettled in villages with a minimum of 13 families. 

From the start, the government through the resident Resettlement Team and 
Community Development personnel has encouraged the formation of VIDCOs and the 
participation of resettled families in communal and self help activities. 
Indeed, it is the expectation of the government that with time and as the 
communities develop the individual families will start pooling their 
production activities together in line with the traditional Zunde concept 
and ultimately consolidate their resources into group or cooperative 
enterprises . 

There are two variants of the Model A schemes. These are the Normal 
Intensive Resettlement Project (NIRP) and the Accelerated Intensive 
Resettlement Project (AIRP). Throughout this study the former is referred to 
as the Model A Normal and the latter as the Model A Accelerated. The Model A 



169 

Accelerated is a stop gap program which is launched on emergency basis to get 
as many desperately needy people, such as "qualified" squatters, resettled 
with the minimum planning. There is no provision of basic infrastructures such 
as clinics, schools and dip tanks. Domestic water from boreholes, however, are 
provided to the villages. Over the years an Accelerated Project is gradually 
upgraded and turned into a Normal Intensive Resettlement Project. 

Model B Resettlement Program 

The Model B schemes are always set up within the Model A projects where 
two or three farm units with well developed infrastructure still intact are 
planned for them. The kinds of infrastructure on a farm property that is 
usually selected for a Model B scheme include, for instance, irrigation 
systems, storage and workshop facilities and specialized enterprises for crops 
such as coffee or animal production that can be managed as a unit by 
cooperative groups. Thus, the model involves group resettlement with formal 
cooperative organization and management operating as a legal entity registered 
with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies who is the Director of Cooperative 
Development . 

In these schemes all adult residents including wives and dependents 16 
years or older are required to be registered as full members. A typical Model 
B scheme in a cropping resettlement has a target size of between 50 and 200 
members. This is determined by the Planning Section of the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in consultation with relevant agencies such 
as AGRITEX. The size is consequently based upon the physical and 
infrastructural resources available on the scheme. Like their Model A 
counterparts the Model B schemes also have two variants, namely, the Normal 



170 

Intensive Resettlement Project (NIRP) and the Accelerated Intensive 
Resettlement Project (AIRP). 

The day-to-day management, purchasing of inputs, production and marketing 
of output is controlled by committees of the members. The property, resources, 
equipment and livestock on the scheme are held cooperatively. Work 
arrangements and the distribution of earnings are also done according to a 
formula agreed to by the members. The initial production target is 
self-sufficiency, followed by full agricultural production after the build-up 
period of four to five years. 

Given the newness of the producer cooperatives in Zimbabwe and even more 

so because of the special problems that some of the schemes have 
g 

encountered, the government has recently modified a few aspects of the 
policy arrangements governing assets and resource use. Since 1985, individual 
members or families are allowed to own a small proportion of livestock for 
domestic purposes separate from the cooperatively owned and commercially 
oriented stock. Members are now allowed also to cultivate private plots of up 
to 0.5 hectares for subsistence during their own free time. 

The government does not directly manage these Model B schemes. However, 
it arranges and coordinates for them support services in the fields of 
organization, farm management, crop and veterinary extension, credit and 
administration. This is done through such agencies as the Department of 
Cooperative Development (DECODE), DERUDE and AGRITEX. In the case of the 
Normal Intensive Resettlement Projects the government also commits major 
resources to them. These are in the form of Establishment Grant (see Table 6-3 
below) and medium term credit facilities from the AFC. These provisions assist 
in the initial acquisition of capital goods and to cover operating costs. They 
are in addition to existing assets and the acquisition of livestock. 



171 

stock watering facilities and domestic water supplies which the government 
also provides. 

Model C Resettlement Program 

In many respects this Model is built upon a synthesis of both the Models 
A and the B schemes. The rationale for setting up the Model C is to promote 
cooperative effort on a gradual and demonstrable basis. The Model incorporates 
a commercial central core estate which is separate from individually allocated 
and operated arable entities. The core estate is run by either the committee 
of the cooperative with labor provided by cooperative members or hired from 
elsewhere during peak operational periods. Alternatively, it may initially be 
run by ARDA employing its own labor force. 

The cooperative farm or core estate is planned and operated as a single 
production unit with access to all essential equipment and inputs. Acting also 
as a service provider the estate supplies essential services to the individual 
resettled farmers and farm families. These are in the form of mechanical 
draft, bulk transportation of inputs and produce, the production of seedlings 
for specialized crops and the processing and marketing of specialized crops. 
These services are made available to the farmers by the estate at prevailing 
economic rates. Proceeds from the cooperatively-run farm are distributed among 
the members according to their work contribution after deducting all 
investment requirements. In the case of livestock there is individual 
ownership and communal grazing facilities in the Model C scheme as it obtains 
in the Model A program. 



172 



In promoting the Model C resettlement it is the hope of the government 

that 

the small privately-run individual plots would initially serve 
to foster individual effort while the cooperative estate would 
serve to demonstrate the benefits of cooperative effort. . . . 
As the settlers get knowledgeable and gain experience and 
expertise in the major enterprise produced by the scheme's . . . 
central estate they [would] take over the central estate and run 
it collectively. (Zimbabwe 1985c: 17) 

Model D Resettlement Program 

The Model D scheme has been formulated as a special response to the 
particularly fragile ecology of Natural Regions IV and V and the predominant 
I role of livestock production in the socioeconomic life of the rural 
communities in southern Zimbabwe, particularly Matabeleland . However, it is 
not the intention of the government to restrict the application of this Model 
to only the marginal agro-ecological zones. In 1985 the government launched 
the pilot scheme of the Model at Doddieburn-Manyoli in Matabeleland South. 

The essential features of the Model D scheme are the establishment of 
large ranches within which individual farm families paddock or enclose their 
own grazing areas and control their stock numbers. Once every three or four 
years each community is given access to the ranch. During this time period the 
community's own grazing area reverts to fallow to get a chance to rejuvenate. 

An important aspect of the operation of this Model is the expectation 
that communities participating in it will "undertake an internal resettlement 
and reorganization of their arable blocks and villages so that they free as 
much of the land for grazing as is possible" (Zimbabwe 1985c: 18). 



173 



Selection Criteria and Procedures and Allocation 
of Holdings to Farmers: The Case of Model A Schemes 

The responsibility for the selection of individual families for 

resettlement and the allocation of residential and arable holdings to them is 

vested in DERUDE. For an individual to qualify for resettlement he must meet 

any of the following conditions: (1) being effectively landless, that is, he 

has no land or has land which is too little to support himself and his 

dependents; (2) neither he nor the spouse be gainfully employed; (3) being 

poor; (4) married or widowed with dependants; and (5) aged 18 to 55 years and 

physically fit and potentially able to make productive use of the allocated 
9 

holdings . 

Other than these basic requirements Zimbabweans returning home as 
refugees are given special consideration. Widowed and unmarried women with 
dependents are also allocated land in resettlement schemes in their own right. 
Since about 1984, wage employees, experienced farmers and peasants who possess 
"master farmer" certificates of recognition from AGRITEX are also accepted for 
resettlement. Like everybody else, however, their allocation of holdings is 
predicated on the condition that the particular individual gives up all land 
rights in the Communal Area. 

The resettlement procedure is initiated through the filling of 
application form (see Appendix F) at the office of the Rural District Council 
which serves the Communal Area of the applicant. When a particular area is 
designated for resettlement a Resettlement Officer from DERUDE travels through 
the adjoining Communal Areas and holds meetings to explain resettlement policy 
and to assist individuals in filling such forms. A complete application is 
then submitted to the Rural District Council through the applicant's Ward 
Councillor. In the case of farm-laborers on newly acquired European property 



174 

the Resettlement Officer registers them directly for processing. This is also 
true of illegal occupants or squatters provided they have been so prior to 
July 1981. 

Once the resettlement scheme is implemented in the area and it is ready 
for allocation the Resettlement Officer and the Rural District Council 
drawing, on a previously prepared list of qualified applicants compose a final 
list of the farmers to be resettled. In doing so they are required to pay 
regard to drawing equally from different parts of the District or Communal 
Areas and also to consider local problems and land pressures. 

After this is done the Resettlement Officer arranges a meeting of the 
selected farmers in the resettlement scheme. At the meeting the allocation of 
residential and arable holdings is done by a random drawing of numbers. The 
Resettlement Officer then takes each farmer and physically shows him or her 
the (1) village site, (2) residential plot, (3) arable holding and (4) 
communal grazing area. 

Finally, the Resettlement Officer decides a suitable date by which the 
farmer and his or her family of dependents are expected to have moved on to 
their new land to commence resettlement. This time period is supposed to be 
reasonable enough to ensure that the farmers can wind up their affairs in 
their old Communal Areas to enable them to resettle permanently in their new 
homes. During the initial period of resettlement, the Officer is required by 
DERUDE to carry out a thorough check to verify that the resettled farmer is 
actually the very person who originally applied and was selected and that he 
or she in practice meets all the stipulated criteria required for 
rese ttleraent . 



175 



Implementation Structures and Process: The 
Case of a Model A Normal Intensive Scheme 

Once farm households have settled in a Model A Normal Intensive 
R.ese ttleraent Scheme the planned services as well as those for which 
infrastructures have been established already are made operational for their 
benefit. A typical scheme consists of 500 families in about 15 villages all 
linked by maintained feeder roads. 

In addition the following facilities are provided: (1) three or four 
elementary schools and a secondary school, all with teachers housing; (2) 
diptanks , provided on the basis of 800 to 1,000 head of cattle or 
approximately 600 Livestock Units per dip and serving a maximum radius of 6 
kilometers; (3) watering dams for cattle; (4) a centrally located Rural 
Service Center accomodating a Resettlement Officer and staff of one Clerical 
Officer and one Field Orderly; (5) an AGRITEX worker for every 200 families; 
(6) a Cooperative Development Worker; (7) an Animal Health Assistant; and (8) 
a Clinic and Staff to serve between 300 to 600 families (see Ivy 1983:153). 

These service staff are provided with government housing erected at the 
Rural Service Center, where a telephone is installed at the resettlement 
office. Motor-pumped water supply, reservoir and reticulation are also 
provided. Cooperative depots, consisting of a storage shed and office within a 
security fenced yard, are built in the Service Center on the basis of 1 per 
every 500 resettled farmers. 

Under the government's development planning structure, the Rural Service 
Center is envisaged to serve as a mini growth point for the outlying area. 
Provision is made therefore for the controlled establishment of permitted 
businesses such as small general dealers and grinding mills. 



176 

The Resettlement Officer is the primary representative of the government 
in the scheme. He is directly responsible to the Senior Resettlement Officer 
and through him to the Regional Rural Development Officer. The Regional Rural 
Development Officer in turn is accountable to the Director, DERUDE, through 
the Chief Resettlement Officer. 

Apart from the additional responsibility for the routine administration 
of all Model B schemes within the project area, the Resettlement Officer 
performs the following functions: (1) registration and selection of applicants 
for resettlement and the allocation of holdings to them; (2) issue of permits 
to reside, cultivate and destock; (3) enforcement of the conditions of these 
permits; (4) the fostering of community spirit among resettled farmers and the 
promotion of community projects such as the establishment of woodlots, 
erection of scheme and village fencing, cooperatives, literacy clubs and 
schools; (5) ensuring the maintenance of the infrastructure in the 
resettlement scheme; (6) collecting and maintaining of detailed and up-to-date 
socio-economic records covering all resettled farmers in the scheme; (7) 
preparation and submission of reports relating to the scheme as directed by 
the Minister; (8) supervision of such communal activities as grazing; (9) 
laison between resettled farmers and government agencies, particularly the 
District Development Committee and ensuring that these farmers have access to 
whatever advice and services they require; (10) promoting and supervising the 
formation of VIDCOs and WARDCOs ; and (11) ensuring squatter control within the 
scheme area. 

Resettled farmers on moving to a scheme have to rely on the team of 
Resettlement staff for directions and assistance to fully avail themselves of 
the government provided services. One major area, for instance, where such 
facilities are crucial to the survival of these farmers is in production. 



177 

By the time the farmer has completed moving to the village AGRITEX 
workers would have pegged all arable holdings and assisted each farmer with 
the construction of conservation works such as contors to check soil erosion. 
It is normal for the Tillage Team of the Development Section of DERUDE to 
undertake part of the land preparation free of charge for the newly resettled 
farmer. This consists usually of the clearing and plowing of 0.5 hectares of 
the farmer's 5 hectare holding which is done before the onset of first farming 
season. In addition the Resettlement Section of DERUDE supplies each farmer 
with a free crop package of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides for the 0.5 
hectares. This is seen as a gesture to help the farmers to get established in 
their new environment during the initial year of resettlement. 

From the very beginning resettled farmers are obligated to comply fully 
with all provisions in the permits to reside, cultivate and destock. For 
example, it is stipulated in the permit to cultivate that the holder shall 

personally, actively and continously carry on agricultural 
activities on the holding . . . comply in all respects with 
the provisions of, an regulations made under, the Natural 
Resources Act, the Animal Health Act, the Noxious Weeds Act 
and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming 
practices and livestock management .( See Appendix G, Table 
G-2) 

The enforcement of these permits is the responsibility of the Resettlement 
Officer acting on behalf of DERUDE. In situations where a farmer does not 
abide by the stipulations DERUDE can recommend to the i-tLnister of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to revoke permits and consequently evict a 
resettled household from any of the schemes. 

After the initial years of establishment farmers are expected to produce 
enough grain for subsistence, build up crop and livestock surpluses for sale 
and eventually achieve target household incomes of $400 or more. 



178 

Towards the realization of this objective the Resettlement Credit Scheme 
a special unit of the AFC has been formed to assist farmers. The assistance is 
in the form of both short-term or one agricultural season and medium-terra 
loans. The former is available to farmers in their second year of 
resettlement. Uuring the third and subsequent years both medium and short-term 
loans are available to these farmers. The short-term loans pay directly for 
such services as contract plowing by the Tillage Team of DERUDE's Development 
Section. It also provides for the delivery of seeds, fertilizers and pesticide 
inputs through Cooperative suppliers. 

The loan is repayable through a system of stop orders lodged by the AFC 
with the appropriate marketing organization, such as the Grains or Cotton 
Board, against crop delivery at the depot. The medium term loans on the other 
hand cater for the purchase of such items as scotch-carts, draft-oxen, fencing 
and other capital assets or implements. These loans are payable over a maximum 
period of five years. The loans are secured by the government and interest is 
charged at an economic rate. 

Every February-March, about six months before the start of the 
agricultural season. Area Credit Officers of the AFC visit the resettlement 
schemes to hold meetings and explain the loan system to the farmers. From 
about May onwards farmers submit their applications to the AFC. Before the 
season commences the AFC issues buying orders for the items covered by the 
approved loans to registered cooperative suppliers. It then becomes the 
responsibility of the respective suppliers to physically arrange the delivery 

I of those items to the farmers in the villages. 

Another area where resettled farmers do benefit from loan facilities is 
in rural housing. The Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing has 

j instituted a housing scheme in the resettlement areas. This scheme provides 



179 

for loans to build three to four roomed brick houses with steel-frame doors 
and windows and corrugated roofing. The scheme covers qualified farmers who 
have maintained resettlement for at least two years in the Model A schemes. 
The repayment plan is liberal aad the loan is spread over a maximum of 30 
years . 

Conclusion 

This Chapter has described how Zimbabwe is going about its agricultural 
resettlement program. Though the land question is essentially an economic 
issue it is nevertheless so emotional a development agenda that the measures 
being taken by the government to tackle it are rather political. This fact 
notwithstanding the relative smoothness with which the resettlement policy has 
been formulated, the planning executed and the implementation carried out so 
far is a major accomplishment in the African context. 

In magnitude the Zimbabwe program is only surpassed by Tanzania's u j amaa 
or villagization program which is variously estimated to have affected 
anywhere between 5 to 10 million people. However, in terms of accomplishments 
to date the only comparable case might be Kenya in the 1960s. The Kenyan 
experiment was less involved as contrasted with Zimbabwe's. For instance, six 
years after its inception the Kenya program comprised only 123 resettlements 
embracing 31,081 families on 450,076 hectares (von Haugwitz 1972). 

Even more importantly in comparative terms Zimbabwe has been able to 
avoid such costly policy flaws, planning inadequacies, implementation 
deficiencies, the terrible human sufferings and the disappointing results as 
those of Tanzania's uj amaa (see for instance, von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; 
Hartmann 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ergas 1982 ).''"■'■ 



180 



Notes 



1. ) In June 1985, the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development 
was reorganized. It was expanded to incorporate the Ministry of Agriculture 
while its Rural Development section was taken away. It was therefore renamed 
the ilinistry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. However, the 
primary responsibility for resettlement policy and implementation still 
resided in the Ministry. 

2. ) Under the Land Acquisition Bill (1986) the Inter Ministry Land 
Identification Advisory Committee (LIAC) makes the initial selection of 
prospective land for resettlement. This is done on block basis rather than by 
individual farms. LIAC then advises another body, namely, the Inter Ministry 
Land Selection Committee (LSC) about the suitability of the identified land. 
The LSC is not bound by the recommendations of the LIAC. Where it accepts 
LIAC's recommendations the LSC in turn recommends to the Minister of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to approve and accordingly designate such 
land for resettlement purposes. 

Once such a designation is made the Government Valuation Office is 
instructed to negotiate with individual owners of farm properties within the 
block with a view to concluding conditional agreements of sale. When the price 
of a particular farm has been agreed upon and it is acceptable to the Ministry 
it acquires the farm. The status of the farm then changes from a privately 
owned freehold into state land managed by the Rural State Land Office of the 
Ministry. 

Based on specific criteria laid down by the Ministry, AGRITEX evaluates each 
farm and makes recommendations about its suitability for a particular 
resettlement model. For instance, a fair sized farm with some developed 
infrastructure is usually planned for the Model B Producer Cooperative. To 
qualify for Model B such a farm, if it is in Agro-ecological or Natural Region 
II, has to have in addition 50 percent of its land area arable or potentially 
arable. Likewise, In Regions III, IV or V, where the proportion of arable land 
may be less, the farm has to have existing irrigation with water rights for 
about 50 hectares of supplementary irrigated summer crops. Any fair sized farm 
where the arable potential is high but would be very much reduced if developed 
as a Model B is planned into a Model C. This is usually the case where 
plantations such as coffee are involved, or where large irrigation systems for 
200 hectares or more are present. Any farm property which does not meet the 
criteria for either a Model B or a Model C is developed into a Model A. 

When a particular state land is ready for implementation as a resettlement 
scheme the Rural State Land Office instructs DERUDE to commence 
inf rastructural developments on it. 

3.) The Zunde is a traditional concept of production organization based on 
the voluntary cooperation of individual farm households to work specific 
tasks. In Zimbabwe's resettlement it is associated with the Model C scheme. In 
effect, it involves the cooperative management of the "core estate" by the 
would-be outgrowers who farm the scheme. 



4.) Controlled products are agricultural produce so designated by the Grain 
Marketing Act (1966), which is still in force. The Act regulates the sale of 



181 



all such products. Currently, the products include the following: (1) peanuts 
(groundnuts) — shelled or unshelled , green, wet or dry; (2) coffee; (3) maize 
and maize-meal; (4) sorghum and sorghum-meal; (5) soya beans and soya-beans 
meal; (6) sunflower seed and sunflower seed-meal; (7) wheat and wheat-flour; 
(8) mhunga and mhunga -meal and (9) rapoko and rapoko -meal. Green maize 
on the cob for human consumption is not a controlled product. 

Under the Act the country is divided into two classes known as A.rea 'A' and 
Area 'B'. The former comprises nearly all the large-scale commercial farming 
areas and a majority of the small-scale commercial farming areas. Area 'B' 
consists of all the Communal Areas, the Resettlement Schemes and certain 
Small-Scale Commercial Farm Areas which are wholly surrounded by communal 
lands, forest and game or wildlife reserves. Certain Large-Scale Commercial 
Farms in the Matabeleland Provinces which grow little or no maize also fall 
into Area 'B'. 

The marketing of the listed products are controlled in Area 'A' and 
uncontrolled in Area 'B'. What this means in effect is that only the Grain 
Marketing Board or its approved contract buyers may purchase produce and 
transport them from Area 'A'. On the other hand, anybody is permitted to 
acquire, sell or re-sell controlled products in Area 'B' provided that those 
products do not leave the area or, if they do, avoid passing through Area 'A'. 
The only exception to the stipulations in this strictly enforced Act in 
respect of Area 'B' is when registered Cooperatives, Approved Buyers or 
farmers themselves transport the products directly for sale at the Board's 
depot. In this case they are allowed to pass through areas designated as 'A'. 

5.) The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development was so 
constituted in June 1985. Until then it was known as the Ministry of Local 
Government and Town Planning. The Rural Development section of the former 
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was transferred to this 
Ministry. With this reorganization DERUDE became part of Local Government thus 
facilitating the integration of the established resettlement schemes into the 
District Councils. It is the ardent hope of the government that with the 
amalgamation of the schemes into the local government structures two things 
will happen. First, there would be a harmonious and integrated resource use 
between the schemes and the communal areas. Second, problem activities such as 
poach-grazing , indiscriminate tree felling and boundary fence stealing blamed 
on residents of Communal Areas would cease. 



6.) In the Manicaland Province some of the squatter groups are well 
organized. Indeed, they maintain a network of Committees with elected 
officers. They are believed to even weild some influence over various 
political leaders. This was the case in Mutanda scheme. Schemes such as 
Romsley and Rusitu also have sizeable squatter populations. In his monthly 
report for February 1985, the Regional Rural Development Officer of Manicaland 
wrote: "The general squatter situation continues to deteriorate with 
increasing numbers of people reported to be moving onto land, especially, 
Nyamakawara, Odzani, Mpudzi II and Chipinge. ... In the whole Province we 
are thinking in terms of thousands of families " (my emphasis). Eight months 
later, in October 1985, he wrote again: "We can't win here! At the moment 
there is pressure on us from both the pro-squatter and anti-squatter factions 
in the Province." 

There were major problems also in the so-called European lands. Affected 
properties included Nyanga Downs, Eastern Highlands Tea Estates, farms in the 
Nyazura and Tsangwezi areas, Vergnoeg and Daisy Hill Farms in Chipinge and 



182 



Howth Farm in the Chigadora area, all in the llanicaland Province. One of these 
areas Nyanga Downs is the only quarantine area for potatoes within the 
Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) region. Consequently, the 
powerful Commercial Fanners Union (CFU) expressed concern to the government in 
regard to the pests and disease problems that the presence and uncontrolled 
activities of the squatters posed to the industry. In December 1984, these 
squatters were removed only to return in a matter of weeks. In May 1985, 
according to the i"(anicaland monthly report, "Squatters who were illegally 
occupying Nyanga Quarantine Area were [again] physically removed. All huts 
have been destroyed. This was a joint exercise by the Ministries of Home 
Affairs, Local Government. . .and Derude." 

The official explicit thinking of the government about this problem is that 
squatting is an unlawful act liable for prosecution in the civil courts. Land 
owners therefore have the right to institute legal proceedings against illegal 
occupants of their land. It is also the responsibility of the Police to assist 
land owners and court officials to evict squatters ordered removed by the 
courts. In instances in the Manicaland Province farm owners have engaged the 
services of attorneys to get the courts to order the removal of squatters from 
their properties. 

It needs to be mentioned that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement has laid down procedures for resettling "qualified" squatters who 
are willing to go through the process as every applicant does (see Selection 
Criteria above in this Cliapter) . 

7.) AGRITEX calculates Livestock Units (LU) on the following basis: 

1.5 Cattle = 1 LU 5 Goats = 1 LU 

1.5 Donkeys = 1 LU 4 Sheep = 1 LU 

The livestock carrying capacity of 1 LU is equivalent to 5.2 hectares 

3.) Of the problems plaguing the Model B Producer Cooperatives high 
membership turnover is quite prevalent or almost universal. The problem that 
the policy modification tackles, however, relates to parcelization of 
cooperatively owned land and privatization of cultivation. These are against 
the cooperative principles and the Bye-Laws of the Model B Schemes. However, 
before and during 1985 this problem was occuring in such schemes as 
Tabudirira, Kumanhya and Mount Saint Mary in Mashonaland East Province and at 
Nyakudya in the liashonaland Central Province. 

Mount Saint Mary was established as a Model B scheme in 1983. Since then the 
members have parcelled the arable land among themselves setting aside only 
about 25 hectares during the 1985 season as the collectively-cultivated 
property. Each household keeps and maintains its own livestock. When it comes 
to the application for seasonal loans from the AFC, input procurement and the 
marketing of produce then they all come together. This is at variance with 
government policy on Model B resettlement. However, a lot of politics 
permeates this issue and it has not been easy for the bureaucrats in DERUDE 
and the Department of Cooperative Development (DECODE) to enforce the rules. 

Nyakudya is another classic case. In 1982, the Chaona Estate was turned over 
to a group of residents from the nearby Chiweshe Communal Area. About 80 
percent of them used to stay at Benjge Kraal . The farm was registered and 
initially operated as a Model B Producer Cooperative. In 1985, the members set 
aside about 60 hectares as the collective farm and parcelled out the rest 
among themselves. They claim that is exactly the original agreement which they 



183 



and their Sabuku (chief) entered into in 1982 with the government's District 
Administrative Officer, Concession District, Mashonaland Central Province. 

There is an increasing tendency among some of these Model B Schemes to 
operate along Model C lines. Now that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and 
Rural Resettlement has institutionalized a system of regulated individual 
holdings to cater for household subsistence needs it is the belief of the 
government that the problem of large-scale parcell ization of plots and 
privatization of cultivation in some of these Model B Producer Cooperatives 
would cease. 



9. ) The selection criteria for the Model B schemes are different from the 
other schemes where specific qualifications have to be met (see above in this 
Chapter on Selection and Allocation Procedures) . In the Model B Producer 
Cooperative Schemes membership is open. Individuals, married or unmarried, 
have to apply to the Management Committee of the respective cooperative for 
membership. If an applicant agrees to subscribe to the cooperative principles, 
as laid down by the Registrar of Cooperatives and also abide by the existing 
Bye-Laws then he or she is automatically accepted. This acceptance is usually 
probational and it is confirmed or rejected within 60 days by the majority of 
the membership voting at the general assembly. 

10. ) In the initial years of resettlement, particularly in 1982 the Minister 
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was reported on many occasions of 
warning that loafers or lazy farmers will be evicted (see for instance. The 
Herald, October 17, 1982; November 2, 1982; December 2, 1982 and May 25, 1983. 

However, the records both nationally and for the Mashonaland Region hardly 
show any evictions so far. In the drought years of 1982 and 1983, when there 
was widespread hunger in many parts of rural Zimbabwe, a few resettled farmers 
who could not cope with the relatively hard life in their new environment 
abandoned resettlement for the more socially secure and supportive life in the 
Communal Areas, Europe an- owned farms or even the urban areas from where they 
originally moved into resettlement. 

In Mufurudzi, with 563 resettled households, there were only three cases on 
record between 1980 and 1985 to evict farmers who allegedly were not complying 
with the terms of the resettlement permits. 

In the first case involving a farmer in Banana village he was reported in 
1982 of maintaining a permanent home in Harare while employing a laborer to 
take care of his home and farm in the resettlement scheme. Secondly, whenever 
he visited Banana he engaged in fights with everybody because he always 
insisted on using his motorized pump to draw water from the Mufurudzi stream 
to irrigate his crops at a time when water was very scarce because of the 
drought. As a result of these problems he was given the option to leave the 
resettlement program or stay and comply with the conditions in the permits. He 
opted out. 

In the second case of a farmer in Gatu village it was alleged that he 
black-marketed all the inputs that were supplied him in 1982 under the AFC 
credit program. He was also accused by his colleagues in the village of being 
a drunk, lazy person and a bad example of a resettled farmer. Facing possible 
eviction he abandoned the resettlement. 

The final case involved an incident in Chitepo village in 1985 when an 
attempt by the Resettlement Assistant, acting apparently on the orders of the 
Resettlement Officer, visited a farmer and demanded him to surrender his 
permits of resettlement for non-compliance. The father of this farmer was also 
resettled in the same village where they were viewed by the Resettlement Team 



184 



as lazy and problem fanners. They were accused of always organizing against 
the Team and leading their colleagues to oppose community programs. Indeed, 
the two were singled out to be the ring leaders in the Mukwari school 
incident. This was when many of the farmers in Chitepo village withdrew their 
children from Mukwari, one of the four elementary schools administered as part 
of Mufurudzi, and enrolled them at the nearby non-resettlement Chindunduma 
school . 

However, the reason for wanting to evict this farmer was for his being 
effectively single though he always claimed that his wife was joining him. In 
the process of the officer's attempt to physically take the farmer's permits 
the latter assaulted him. The incident was reported to the police and the 
farmer was charged, convicted for assault and fined. 

While DERUDE officials in the liashonaland Regional office agreed that the 
farmer was evictable for non-compliance they chided the Resettlement Assistant 
for his methods which were completely outside the laid-down administrative 
procedures for eviction. The officer was transferred to another resettlement 
scheme and as at December 1985, over five months after the incident, the 
farmer had not been evicted from Chitepo village. 

11.) Nowhere in Africa has any government attempted to resettle so many as in 
Tanzania's ujamaa. That fact perhaps explains the legion of problems and 
failure that almost every reviewer associates with the program. 

Kenya's so-called Mllion Acre Settlement Scheme comprised the high and low 
density and the yeoman resettlements in the IJhite Highlands. It should be 
noted though that the Kenya program did not involve the large-scale provision 
of such basic needs services and facilities ranging from health care centers, 
clean water, schools and better access roads to cattle dipping and veterinary 
services as it is the case in Zimbabwe. 



CHAPTER VI 

CONTINUITY IN CHANGE: THE PRESERVATION OF THE OLD AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FARMING SYSTEMS 

Introduction 

Writing about decision making processes among the so-called commercial 
farmers in Zimbabwe Douglas McClymont characterizes the country as having 

two distinct kinds of farmer. There is the commercial 
farmer who produces the bulk of the saleable agricultural 
produce and the communal farmer, the tribesman, who 
basically farms to grow food for his o\-m and his family's 
subsistence. (McClymont 1984:150) 

Though the structure and organization of agriculture in Zimbabwe is 
essentially dualistic the kind of stereotypic portrait, which McClymont paints 
here, is too simplistic to reflect the realities of the diverse farming 
systems and farmers of a country that is certainly a leader in African 
agriculture. 

Today, as in 1984 when McClymont reported, the farming systems of 
Zimbabwe embrace both the old and the new. The old system comprises Che 
following: (1) Large-Scale Farms; (2) Small-Scale Farms; and (3) Communal Area 
Farms while the new is made up of the Resettlement program Farms and the State 
Farms . 

These old and new farming systems are described below as a prelude to the 
review of the kinds of empirical responses that their respective farmers 
generate to aspects of policy on agricultural resettlement formulated and 
implemented by the government. The State Farms are left out of this review 
because that system does not have "farmers" as such. They are operated as 
firms and they employ farm laborers to produce for the State. ^ 



185 



186 



The Large-scale (European Commercial) Farms Sector 



In official parlance the large-scale farms are known as the Large-Scale 
Commercial Farms. They used to be called the European Commercial Farms and 
they date back to the 1890s (see Hunt 1971; Hodder-Williams 1983). By and 
large the great majority of these farms are still owned by Europeans under a 
system of freehold tenure. Almost invariably all farm owners in this sector 
are members of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), a very powerful political 
and economic force in the country. McClymont presents us with what he calls a 
real picture of the Zimbabwean commercial farmer. According to him 

the farmer tends to be a Caucasian of around 45 years old, 
married, with three to four children. He has worked on a farm 
for most of his life and is either the son or grandson of a 
pioneer farmer or has entered farming because it is a 
profitable and challenging way of life. Typically, he served 
a farming apprenticeship with some well known senior farmer 
before borrowing the money from the 'Land Bank'to start on his 
own. (McClymont 1984:150) 

Having given this background he continues with their work ethics arguing 
further that most of these farmers 



have either had to open up their farms from virgin bush or 
develop established farms for intense commercial production. 
Thus, there is an element of pioneering spirit and basic 
personal motivation among all of them. (McClymont 1984:150) 

The large farms are distributed throughout the country. However, the most 
productive of them in terms of crop output are confined to the better Natural 
Regions I, II and to some extent III. These cover mainly the Mashonaland and 
Manicaland Provinces (see Figure 1-1). In all there are currently about 5,000 
large farms and they occupy nearly 15 million hectares (Billing 1985:20). 



187 

The modal farm size nationally is between 1,500 to 2,000 hectares 
(Whitsun 1983:33). Some farms or ranches in Natural Regions III and IV, mostly 
in the Midlands, Masvingo and Matabeleland Provinces (see Figure 1-1), are 
quite large. For instance, the average size of the 23 holdings Europe an- owned 
farms making up the Limpopo Intensive Conservation Area is 35,800 hectares 
(Kay 1970:105). In fact, as far back as the late 1960s one particular farm, 
Liebigs ranch, in Matabeleland carried some 40,000 cattle on 52,000 hectares 
(Kay 1970:105). 

The three Mashonaland Provinces are the primary cropping region in the 
country. In the region the modal cropped area for maize is about 250 hectares 
per farm and between 100 and 125 hectares per farm for tobacco or cotton or 
0 ther crops . 

There is a lot of regional diversity within Zimbabwe's large farm sector. 
But as it is expected these farms exhibit certain common characteristics, 
including (1) enterprise specialization, (2) intensive reliance on 
capitalization for some activities, (3) the use of scientific inputs and (4) 
dependence on African laborers. According to the Whitsun Foundation the 
cropping standards on these farms are generally high. The average maize yields 
are in the range of 4 - 6 tonnes per hectare and the value of crops produced 
per farm is typically in the range of $125,000 to $250,000 per year (>7hitsun 
1983:34). Indeed, between 1964 and 1982 the volume of output on these large 
farms grew at more than 3.6 percent annually (Hawkins 1984:4). 

The Whitsun Foundation argues that 

The profile which emerges of the large-scale commercial farmer 
in the main cropping regions of the country is one of a 
formidable agricultural entrepreneur. He has a large farm, he 
runs a big operation, and he sells large volumes of produce. 
Although he owns a large holding he is certainly not an idle 
landlord, for he is first and foremost a farmer and a very 
productive one at that. (Whitsun 1984:35) 



188 

The high productivity of the large farm sector generally is not a matter 
which is questioned. The sector is the backbone of the country's economy being 
a source of food self-sufficiency and security, foreign exchange, eraplojiinent 
and raw materials for agro-manufacturing and other businesses. The government 
therefore has even explicitly commited itself to encouraging its survival and 
growth (Zimbabwe 1981d:55). However, the nature and intensity of land 
utilization within the sector is a controversal issue of much interest to many 
protagonists who study the political economy of land and race in Zimbabwe. 

For instance, the \7hitsun Foundation apparently sees a high land use 
intensity on these large farms. It (Whitsun 1983:34) cites a survey conducted 
in 1982 by the Hawkins Associates for the World Bank which states that in five 
of "six selected [Intensive Conservation Areas] in the main cropping regions 
of the country . . . the percentage utilization of arable land was over 75 %." 
Lacking any additional information on the total land availability and the 
proportion of the arable area covered by the ICAs in question it is impossible 
to evaluate the land use intensity index quoted here by Whitsun in any 
meaningful context. 

Figures given by George Kay, though somewhat dated, indicate however that 
nowhere in the large farm areas does cropped land constitute a large 
proportion of the farm land. Taking intensity of land use to be the area under 
crops as a percentage of the total farm land Kay (1970:106-107) comes out with 
the following regional variations: (1) Mashonaland Region 8.0 - 8.6 percent; 
(2) Manicaland Province 3.4 percent; (3) Mdlands Province 1.8 percent; (4) 
Masvingo (formerly Victoria) Province, excluding the high intensity Chiredzi 
District, 0.7 percent; and (5) Matabeleland Region 0.5 percent. 

These are very low by any standards especially given the facts of land 
pressure, ecological degradation and poverty in many of the Communal Areas 



139 

around the country. As it was reviewed in Chapter II above Roger Riddell 
(1978a, 1978b, 1979b, 1980) provides ample evidence to support the thesis that 
the European settlers were not intensively using their available farm lands. 
This pattern of low intensity is reported to still characterize landuse in 
postindependence large-scale Europe an- owned farms in the country. According to 
Weiner et al. 

[A]lthough the average size of the 2,626 large-scale commercial 
farms in Mashonaland was 1,640 hectares, the average area under 
crops during 1981-2 was only 168 hectares for each holding. 
Also, in that year, as many as 468 farms — or 17.8 per cent of 
the total number in Mashonaland — did not grow any crops at all. 
(Weiner et _al^ 1985:257) 

Since independence in 1980 the government has acquired some of the mostly 
inefficient and underutilized farms including many that are apparently managed 
by absentee landlords (Whitsun 1983:35). Consequently, there is about 15 
percent reduction in the number of the large farms throughout the country 
(Hawkins 1984:5). It needs to be borne in mind, however, that of the 1.7 
million hectares of land purchased by the government up to July 1984 for all 
Model A Intensive resettlement schemes 81 percent were in the marginal Natural 
Regions III, IV and V where crop production is constrained (see Weiner _et al . 
1985:259, Table 2). 

The passage of the Lands Acquisition Bill by the government in 1986 to 
facilitate the identification and speedy acquisition of "derelict" lands by 
the state for public use (see Chapter V above) very clearly reflects this 
concern and the frustrations about getting commercial farmers to put their 
lands to intensive use. 

A number of both short and long term constraints confront the large farm 
sector. According to Hawkins (1984:5) there appears to be a "crisis of 
confidence [arising from] shortage of foreign exchange and the profitability 



190 

squeeze linked in turn to escalating input costs." There is no doubt that this 
problem is rather a general one which faces the entire agricultural and other 
economic sectors. Of specific interest, however, is the labor situation in 
most of the large farms. For instance, in 1974 these farms employed at their 
peak about 366,000 workers representing 35 percent of the total employment in 
the formal economy. However, by 1984 this had declined by almost 30 percent to 
about 260,000 workers. 

The Small-Scale (African Commercial) Farms Sector 

In the past the category of Sraall-Scale Commercial Farms were referred to 
as the Native Purchase Areas and, lately, as the African Purchase Areas. 
According to Billing (1985:20) these Areas presently comprise some 1.5 million 
hectares and are occupied by some 9,000 African farmers. These farmers were 
seen as constituting the cream of enterprising "natives," better motivated 
than their "tribal" area cultivators and who had the opportunity to replicate 
some of the high management and productivity "miracles" achieved by the 
country's white farmers. 

Today, the political and other interests of these Sraall-Scale farmers are 
represented by one of the country's three farmers' organizations, namely, the 
Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union. 

Distributed throughout the country the Small-Scale Commercial farming 
system and farmers have been the focus of numerous studies (see Powys-Jones 
1955; Massell and Johnson 1968; Johnson 1970; Bembridge 1974; Cheater 1978, 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984; Mungate 1983). The creation of these Sraall-Scale 
Commercial farms began in 1931 with the passage of the Land Apportionment Act 
(see Chapter II above). 



191 



George Kay states that the establishment of these farms in various areas 
of the country was a 

compensation for the Africans' loss of the right to purchase 
land anywhere in Rhodesia on the same terms as members of 
other races. It was intended that holdings in these areas 
should be owned or leased by individuals and that they should 
be of such size as to be viable and profitable family farms in 
the hands of progressive, well trained Africans. (Kay 1970:93) 

As Kay points out further the demand for these farms exceeded the 
availability of holdings. In 1946 there were over 2,000 outstanding 
applications. Of the Africans allocated farms at that time only 20 percent had 
freehold titles with the remaining farmers leasing their holdings. In 1953 
"all applicants were required to have the Master Farmer's Certificate [issued 
by the Department of Agricultural Extension] , and shortly afterwards they also 
had to have capital assets to the value of at least 300." (Kay 1970:93). Yet, 
in some cases "farms were allocated to ex-civil servants and others in reward 
for long service, and not necessarily in relation to farming ability" (Whitsun 
1978: 13) . 

Inspite of the rather stringent conditions that were introduced to 
restrict access to these farms the waiting list for them continued to exceed 
allocations leading to the termination of applications in 1956. Consequently, 
many residents in the Reserves or Communal Areas never realized their dreams 
to benefit from access to relatively large hectares and other preferential 
facilities such as extension, guaranteed inputs and produce markets which were 
made available to these Sraall-Scale Commercial farmers throughout the country. 

Given all these services at the disposal of these farmers it was thought 
that they would be successful commercial producers and role models for their 
peasant counterparts in the Communal Areas. In fact, that is the thesis that 



192 



the Iftiitsun Foundation presents. In its assessment 

[l]n terms of tenure, in terms of productiveness and market 
orientation, the Purchase Lands represent a successful (if 
relatively small) experiment in the transformation of peasant 
farming. While many problems remain with the . . . farmer, and 
while his needs for extension, credit, marketing and other 
services are as great as that of the tribal farmer, he has 
demonstrated that freehold farming is often a viable option 
for the rural African and that the Purchase Land experiment 
holds important potential as a model for future expansion of 
African commercial farming. (Whitsun 1978: 14, emphasis added) 

Angela Cheater, who perhaps has closely studied the social and political 
economy of these farms in Zimbabwe more than any researcher, agrees with this 
assessment (see Cheater 1984:9-13). 

This rather glorious evaluation, however, is exceptional. Most studies of 
these farms show on the contrary that only a negligible percentage of the 
farmers have successfully made it. George Kay (1970:95-97) concludes that "the 
general picture that emerges of farming in these [African Purchase] areas is 
disappointing." Bembridge (1974:57), in a study of one such area in 
Matabel eland , has a similar view stating: "The original aim of creating 
prosperous middle-class families in the area . . . has not been successful." 
Roger Riddell elaborates these observations as follows: 

The creation of the Purchase Areas has done very little to solve 
the basic problems of the African rural areas. A large proportion 
of the land is not used and the individual tenure system has not 
proved to be an adequate base for promoting agricultural 
development or for making an efficient use of the land within the 
present economic structure. Small farms, low levels of 
capitalisation, the minimal use made of credit facilities and a 
large number of family-dependants have all contributed to the 
maintenance of a subsistence-based system of farming for the 
majority of PA cultivators. ... If one is looking for ways of 
solving the land and population problems of the TTLs through 
constructing a framework for a more efficient use of the land and 
an increase in agricultural production then the PA scheme does 
not provide the answer. (Riddell 1978c:55) 



193 

A more recent estimation by the Whitsun Foundation of these Small-Scale 
Commercial farms apparently reverses Its (Whitsun 1978) earlier position and 
now supports the general observations about their poor performance. It 
(Whitsun 1983:46-47) contrasts the Sraall-Scale Commercial with the Large-Scale 
Commercial farms and sees little specialization in the former according to 
agro-ecological region. In its view the Sraall-Scale Commercial sector or 
"farming system is . . . not intensive or highly productive." Furthermore the 
sizes of the small farms are also much the same throughout the country, 
averaging in 1977 some 125 hectares. The mean area cultivated then was just 11 
hectares and the mean cattle head per farmer was 22. On the average maize 
yields on these farms over the years were 1.5 tonnes per hectare (see I^itsun 
1983:46-47). 

Today, if there have been any change in the situation of these 
Sraall-Scale Commercial farmers it is perhaps in terms of tenancy. The majority 
of them now have freehold titles with only a few still leasing their farm land 
from the government. 

The Communal Area (Peasant) Farms Sector 

Farming in the Communal or the African peasant areas is what has been 
characterized by many observers as tribal, subsistence or quasi-subsistence 
economy. The African rural areas were designated as Communal Areas by a 
Legislat ive Act in 1982. Presently, there are a total of 174 separate Communal 
Areas dotted across the country. In all these cover some 16.4 million 
hectares. In what obviously is an underestimation Billings (1985:20) states 
that these provide homes for 700,000 farming families. 



194 

It needs to be stressed here that the concept of communa.lism in this 
context does not imply any collective living or production arrangements. 
Indeed, these areas are mostly characterized by dispersed homesteads of 
individual households. Households, including even urban residents, maintain 
usufructuary rights to arable plots which are de jure state property. 
Ho wever , these lands in the Communal Areas are under the effective control in 
many cases of respective individual lineage heads, sabuku or headmen and even 
VIDCO chairmen. Households or their individual members who have livestock 
enjoy uninterrupted access to community controlled grazing land. As Jordan 
(1974:71) sums it: "The producer in African areas is the individual farmer 
supported by his immediate family." 

Before these areas became Communal Areas they were variously called the 
Native Reserves or the Tribal Trust Lands (see Chapter II above). But that was 
after the advent of European immigrant-settlers and the consequent forced 
removals of African groups from their original homes into territories created 
for their settlement. 

Available evidence indicates that these idigenous peoples, mostly of 
Shona origin, were cultivators and pastoralists who supplemented their food 
requirements with resources obtained through hunting, gathering and fishing. 
At one point or the other some of them engaged in long-distance commerce as 
well as mining. 

David Beach (1974) in a classic seminar paper about the various branches 
of production within the precapitalist phase of Shona economy reviews the 
primacy of the cropping system upon which these cultures depended. He states 
(Beach 1974:4-5) that the "Shona communities were all basically agricultural, 
in that the most important activity of the greatest number of their people was 
the production of food by growing crops." 



195 

Elaborating this fact further Beach (1974:6) points out that the crops 
available to these farmers were limited initially to rukweza or rapoko 
(finger millet), mhunga (balrush- or pearl-millet), mapfunde (sorghum). 
These were much later expanded to include chibagwe (maize), mupunga (rice), 
nzungu ( ground nuts/ peanut s) , nyimo (bambara nuts) and nyemba (cowpeas). 
Other crops mentioned elsewhere in association with early indigenous farmers 
of Zimbabwe include mwiwa (watermelon), mbambaira (sweet potatoes), ipwa 
(sweet cane) and nhanga (pumpkin) (see Reid 1977:101-102). Today, these 
crops are traditionally grown by African farmers for subsistence. Most of them 
are also cultivated in addition to cotton and, to a minimal extent, tobacco 
for the market. 

Some studies fault peasant agriculture by evaluating its poor performance 
through the myopic perspectives of European farming. For instance, George Kay 
characterizes the agricultural problems of the communal lands rather naively 



as 



[S]imply . . . consist [ ing] , first, of pressure upon the land by 
primitive peoples and their livestock such as to constitute an 
immediate and increasing threat to the natural resources of the 
land in question and of adjacent areas; and, secondly, of the 
dire poverty and limiting ignorance of the tribesmen. 
(Kay 1970:83) 



Given the general ecological degradation and problems of the Communal 
Areas, such as are extensively described in Chapter II above, the farming 
system associated with these areas has persistently been highly unproductive, 
Recent studies by Gobbins and Prankerd (1983:152) in the Mashonaland West 
Province, for example, showed the following variations in yield for maize 
during the 1981-82 season. For these respective Communal Areas, which happen 
to be in the same Natural Region II, the outputs were (1) Zwimba 28 bags 
(2,548 kilograms) per hectare; (2) Chirau 19 bags (1,729 kilograms); 



196 

(3) Magondi 14 bags (1,274 kilograms); and (4) Umfuli 9 bags (819 kilograms) 
per hectare. 

The Whitsun Foundation discusses a joint survey in the Chibi District, 
Masvingo Province, carried out in 1981 by the Department of Land Management, 
University of Zimbabwe and the Department of "Research and Specialist Services 
(R & SS) in the Ilinistry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. 

The Chibi survey essentially replicated findings by other researchers who 
looked at the land and capital assets of communal land farmers around the 
country. On the average these farmers have about 11 hectares of which only 3 
to 4 hectares are arable. The significant paradox of Communal Area farming 
system is the paradox is the simultaneous existence of a general lack of draft 
and other oxen, on the part of majority of farmers, and the devasta tingly high 
stocking rates. 

For example, the survey found the following crucial distinction among the 
Chibi farmers. Those with draft animals cultivated an average area of 3.23 
hectares as compared to 2.40 hectares by those without. The grain harvested by 
the former averaged 25.7 (x 91 kg.) bags in contrast to only 9.4 (x 91 kg.) 
bags produced by the farmers without draft-oxen. Consequently, while the 
draft-constrained farmers made a mean cash income of $105.00 those with draft 
power made $240.00 (lihitsun 1983:39). 

The contradictions which encapsulate the farming system and the farmers 
of the Communal Areas are summarized by the Whitsun Foundation thus 

Tlie picture which emerges is of an ecologically unsustainable 
system of farming and of over-crowded cultivators of whom only 
some 10-15% are productive farmers producing good or very good 
crops. The others are subsistence cultivators who are not 
putting enough into their crops to make them worthwhile, nor 
enough into the soil to maintain its fertility. They therefore 
face even lower crop yields in the future, with the continued 
degradation of the land. (Whitsun 1983:38) 



197 

At any rate, in evaluating the current performance of peasant or communal 
land agriculture one needs to be reminded of its antecedent evolution under 
European settler colonialism and also recognize the presently changed 
situation in the political economy of the country. 

The fact is that these farmers were restrained by past government 
policies from fully participating in commercial production. This situation 
forced many able-bodied persons into wage employment in European agriculture, 
mining and the urban areas. T^hat was left of farmers were mostly the women, 
children and the old. In the circumstance once the vicious cycle of selective 
rural outmigration, increasing household sizes and dependency, overutil ization 
of the limited resources and ecological degradation set in the consequent 
poverty and underdevelopment of Communal A.rea agriculture were inevitable (see 
Chapter II above) . 

Given this rather depressing perspective many rural dwellers appear to be 
taking farming more seriously in postindependent Zimbabwe. This development 
may be in response to the government's policy which ensures high producer 
prices as well as improved access and delivery of agricultural credits, 
services and inputs to this hitherto neglected peasant sector. 

Tlie agricultural wage increases which came into effect in inid-1985, the 
second since independence in 1980, placed a burden on the ability o£ European 
farmers to employ as many African laborers as they may need. Without the 
security of such employment there is virtually no alternative source of income 
for many rural households outside their o\m farm plots. Nevertheless, a number 
of Africans do not also even want to work anymore as laborers on European 
farms. They desire to be resettled by the government (see Chapter VII below). 
A few of them who cannot wait have spontaneously squatted on European and 
state lands (see Chapter V above). 



198 

These trends present a crisis to most people in the Communal Areas. They 
also demand a more serious commitment on the part of these people towards 
farming, a challenge which is being realized. There is mounting and impressive 
evidence which shows that the government's investment in peasant agriculture 
is paying dividends. Many of these so-called subsistence farmers are now 
increasingly producing a surplus for the market (see Chapter II above). 

Felicity Wood, writing about the role of extension in the success story 
of Zimbabwe, alludes to the fact mentioned in Chapter II above that Communal 
Area farmers and their counterparts in the resettlement and the Small-Scale 
Commercial farms have responded remarkably to production incentives. 

Before 1981 there was seldom more than 130,000 tonnes of surplus maize 
for sale from African producers. In 1981 the surplus generated by this sector 
was 324,000 tonnes rising to 400,000 the following year (Wood 1984:11). In 
1985 Zimbabwe produced nearly 2.0 million tonnes of maize. The estimation by 
The Economist (1986:15) that 58 percent of this total production came from the 
African areas contrasts vividly with the situation ten years ago. In 1975-76 
these farmers produced just 26.5 percent of the total of 1.64 million tonnes 
of the maize output (see Zimbabwe 1982c: 40, Table 21). 

It is only a little over a decade now that George Kay (1970:33) described 
Zimbabwean peasants as "primitive and ignorant" and even much later when the 
Wliitsun Foundation (Whitsun 1983:38) asserted that these Communal Area farmers 
were not putting enough into their crops and land. Yet, there is perhaps no 
other country in Africa where smallholder farmers have so quickly and 
successfully turned their output and productivity around as in Zimbabwe today. 
There, smallholders including the newly resettled households which are mostly 
in the Model A Schemes are spearheading a revolution in food self-sufficiency 
and regional subsistence security. 



199 



Resettlement Program Farms 

Farms in this new farming systems category fall into the various models 
described above in Chapter V. The two major ones of interest to this study are 
the Model A Resettlement and the Model B Producer Cooperative schemes. The 
former with its Normal and Accelerated variants consists of individual family 
holdings of 5 hectares arable plots. The latter is made up of 
collectively-organized and managed properties. These are on-going schemes aad 
the oldest among them were set up in the latter part of 1980. 

As was pointed out earlier in Chapter IV to date only a few papers have 
dealt with the resettlement issue and even fewer still have reported what is 
going on specifically in resettlement agriculture (see Kinsey 1982, 1985; Ivy 
1983; AGRITEX 1984; Zimbabwe 1984c; Mumbengegwi 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Munslow 
1985; Weiner _et al. 1985; Geza 1986; Moyo 1986). The unpublished report by 
Mumbengegwi (1984b) on the Model B Producer Cooperatives is perhaps the only 
one of its kind that benefitted from extended survey interviews and therefore 
presents the responses of the farmers concerned. Indeed, virtually nothing 
comprehensive has been done thus far to systematically study the responses of 
the resettled farmers and more so to compare them across schemes and models. 

Farms in the Model A Sector 

Weiner _et al . ( 1985), in their paper on land use and agricultural 
productivity, contrast developments within the resettlement and the alternate 
farming systems in the country. Tliey argue strongly for resettlement and point 
out that peasants can and will respond by producing greater marketed surplus 



200 

with significantly less inputs when conditions are right. In their view 
(Weiner et al. 1985:284) there is a strong evidence that yields from the 
settlement schemes could become comparable to those achieved on Large-Scale 
Commercial Farms. 

The Farm Management Research Section of the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Development also collaborated with the Department of 
Land Management, University of Zimbabwe, during the 1982-83 farming season to 
collate management records kept by some farmers in seven Model A Normal 
Schemes throughout the country. These schemes were (1) Mpudzi and Nyagundi in 
Manicaland Province, (2) Mukorsi , Soti Source and Chizvirizvi in Masvingo, (3) 
Sengezi in Mashonaland East and (4) Mufurudzi in the Mashonaland Central 
Province (Figure 1-1). 

According to the report (Zimbabwe 1984c: 7) "the very serious drought 
experienced during the season adversely affected the economic perfomiance of 
small farm producers in the survey." Thus only Mukorsi showed an overall net 
farm profit. Even then this was well below the annual target income per farmer 
of $400 plus subsistence set by the government for resettled farmers. 

For these resettlement schemes most of the area cropped was for dryland 
maize which achieved very low yields. In fact, except for Mufurudzi and 
Sengezi the average total maize yields were well below households' subsistence 
requirements. This was in spite of the fact that a large proportion of the 
variable farm expenditure in all the schemes also went into maize. The 
expenditure was mainly for fertilizer, seed and land preparation (Zimbabwe 
1984c:ll). 

The report also indicates that all the schemes received credit from the 
AFC. Thus, interest and arrears interest charges formed a large proportion of 
total overhead expenses. These arrears interest charges arose from the 1981-82 



201 



season when most schemes experienced severe drought conditions and farmers 
were unable to to fully redeem their AFC loans. In a summary conclusion the 
report had this to say about the performance and potential of Model A schemes: 

[I]t is obvious that the whole farm economic performance of 
resettlement farms . . . would have been much better in 
conditions of normal rainfall. An increase in livestock 
holdings to optimum levels should also improve the economic 
viability of resettlement farms and counterbalance the risk 
of losses through crop failures by minimizing these in the 
drier parts of the country. (Zimbabwe 1984c: 12) 



Farmers" Characteristics in the Model B Sector 



According to Mumbengegwi (1984b:4) at the official or governmental level 
the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes are regarded not only as instruments 
to promote rural development but as major experiments that will spearhead the 
transformation towards socialist agriculture. His (Mumbengegwi 1934b) research 
conducted during the 1982-83 farming season covered sample farmers drawn from 
(1) Batsiranayi and Simba Youth in I-la sho nal and Central and (2) Kwaedza, 
Shandisal Pfungwa and Mount Saint Mary's in the Mashonaland East Province 
(Figure 8-1). The following summary account of developments within the Model 8 
Schemes draws from his report. 

He indicates that the mean age of these pioneer members of the 
cooperatives was 38 and the modal age 23. There was a predominance of males 
who comprised 64 percent of the membership. In all 78 percent were married and 
the average family size was five. In terms of the membership composition 66 
percent of all members were former Communal Area peasants followed by former 
commercial farm employees 16 percent, former urban unemployed 10 percent and 
demobilized guerrillas or former combatants in the liberation war who numbered 
only 9 percent. The level of education attained by these cooperative members 



202 

was low and that 28 percent did not have any formal schooling at all. 

The areas and levels of skill were low. Although between 57 percent in 
Simba Youth and 100 percent in Mount Saint Mary's considered themselves to 
possess farming experience this was either as farm laborers, landless peasants 
or juvenile dependants of farm households in the Communal Areas. Consequently, 
most of the reported skills were "not central to agricultural production 
activities of the cooperatives" (Mumbengegwi 1984b: 16). 

There was a preponderance of the economic motive in joining the 
cooperative this being the reason offered by 98 percent of the members with 
the remaining 2 percent being motivated by socialist ideological reasons. To 
test the degree of commitment of these farmers to the cooperative endeavor 
they were asked to respond to three questions ralating to the following 
alternative modes of gainful employment: (1) commercial farm laborer at the 
minimum agricultural wage of $50 per month; (2) urban worker at the minimum 
industrial wage of $105; and (3) Model A Normal Scheme or Communal Area farmer 
if enough farm land was provided. From the responses Mumbengegwi arrives at a 
conclusion which states: 

[l]t would be fair to observe that the cooperative members 
degree of commitment to producer cooperatives is somewhat 
ambivalent in the sense that a substantial to a very high 
proportion would leave the cooperative for alternative 
employment at a "sufficient" but low rate of remuneration. 
Given that our suggested alternative modes of emplojmient are 
not highly remunerative, this seems to suggest that members 
expectations of the performance of their cooperatives are 
also very low. (Mumbengegwi 1984b: 29) 

In terms of agricultural resources and productivity the five Model B 
Producer Cooperatives that Mumbengegwi (1984b) studied all lie in the better 
agro-ecologically endowed Natural Region II where, incidentally, many of the 
most productive Large-Scale Commercial farms are located. However, the 



203 

"average land productivity for all the cooperatives combined was 39% and 
labour productivity was 53% of that on the large scale commercial farming 
sector (Mumbengegwi 1984b:50). 

This unimpressive performance coupled with general problems of financial 
mismanagement and embezzlements as well as indebtedness translated into 
generally low average annual incomes received by the cooperative members. This 
ranged from the low of $75 in Simba Youth through $81 in Kwaedza, $118 in 
Shandisai Pfungwa, $154 in Batsiranayi to a maximum of $260 in Mount Saint 
Mary's. All these were well below the target annual income of $400 per year 
set by the government for the resettled households (This issue is pursued in 
much more detail in Chapter VIII below) . 

Conclusion 

The foregoing background notes about the major farming systems from which 
farmers were interviewed (see Chapter IV above) have been provided here to 
give a contextual framework for the presentation of the case study and 
evaluation findings. These are respectively set out below in Chapters VII and 
VIII. 



Note 

1.) In a way the State Farms are not a new farming system as such. In fact, 
the white settler-colonial administration operated state-controlled estates 
for the production of such major crops as cotton, maize, rice, wheat and sugar 
cane throughout the 1960s and 1970s. With independence in 1980 the government 
mandated the newly formed Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) 
to take over the management of these large, heavily mechanized and irrigated 
estates which now number about 18 (For a brief review of the State Farms 
sector see Moyo 1985). 



CHAPTER VII 

CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS: 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE 



Introduction 

This chapter consists of a description of case study findings about the 
characteristics of farmers and their survey responses to various questions 
that relate to (I) current agricultural and resettlement policies and (2) 
farmers' self assessment of agricultural matters that are important to their 
lives, work performance and their community. 

The presentation is organized essentially around the Model A Normal 
Intensive Resettlement program. As it was pointed out in Chapter IV above the 
Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme is the central focus of this study. Many 
aspects of the respective responses from farmers in the various farming 
S37Stems are analyzed and evaluated from the comparative perspective of 
Mufurudzi farmers. The responses are presented in the form of a series of 
tables of frequencies, percentages and means. A rather descriptive analysis of 
these tables covering various study variables (see Appendix D, Table D-1 to 
D-5) is offered. Except where warranted the presentation is done without much 
attempt to give detailed explanations to the observed patterns. However, some 
aspects of the findings which need highlighting are elaborated upon in the 
summary. 

The responses to what are considered to be issues of specific interest to 
particular farming systems are discussed separately as such under the relevant 
system. However, the responses to common questions are presented together as a 
way to draw on the comparative or contrasting patterns within and between the 
systems. The presentation is done under seven themes of as follows: (1) 
responses of commercial and communal farmers to some background issues 

204 



205 



relating to their respective farming systems; (2) social and demographic 
characteristics; (3) evaluation of government policies and programs; (4) 
attitudes and perceptions about life situation; (5) material resources and 
capital assets; (6) farm-level constraints; and (7) household developmental 
cycle, micro-level agricultural characteristics and economic performance. 

Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues 
From the Commercial and Communal Areas' Farmers 



The Large-Scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura Intensive 
Cultivation Area 

For this study a total of nine large-scale commercial farmers, all of 
them Europeans, responded to a questionnaire (see Appendix D, Table D-5) 
mailed to them. These farmers owned lands in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation 
Area (see Figure 7-1). They were all male and ranged in ages from 39 to 63 
years with a mean and median age of 49. The average or typical farmer in the 
area had a college education which he completed in about 1967. The farmer with 
the most years of farming connection to the area had been farming in Bindura 
since 1951 while the one with the least had been there since 1975. About half 
of these farmers took to farming straight from college while a third of them 
worked in agricultural-related jobs prior to their entry into farming. 

All these farmers owned the properties that they farmed on freehold 
tenure basis having purchased them at one time or the other between 1964 and 
1983. Their total farm sizes ranged from a low of 150 hectares to a high of 
1,296 hectares with a mean size of 534. The monetary worth of the farms were 
also valued by the owners to be between $65,000 and $300,000 with a mean of 
$154,167. Only one farmer reported that the size of his farm was inadequate 



KANDEYA COHMUTIAL AREA 




FIGURE 7-1 
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: CASE STUDY AREAS 



207 

for his needs. He would buy more land to expand. The others found their land 
to be adequate and therefore did not contemplate any purchase or expansion. 
Fifty-five percent of the farmers intended to pass the property on to a family 
member eventually, but the rest had "other" unspecified plans towards the 
disposal of their farms. 

Four of these farms shared a common boundary with the Madziwa Communal 
Area (Figure 7-1). Six out of the nine farmers had their farms trespassed upon 
by residents and livestock from the Communal Area. Seven farmers were 
approached before and they offered agricultural advice and other farm-related 
assistance to farmers in the Communal Area. However, only one was ever 
contacted and he gave assistance to a farmer in the government-sponsored 
resettlement scheme. The nearby schemes include Mufurudzi and Mount Darwin 
Model A Normal, the Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated and Model B Producer 
Cooperatives notably Kubudirira, Batsiranayi , and Kushingirira (Figure 7-1). 

When asked about how, in their opinion, the smallholder African farmers 
in the region could become successful farmers the views of these Bindura ICA 
farmers were divided equally. Three of them suggested the increased adoption 
of extension advice by the peasants, three others recommended the proper use 
of credit facilities while the advice of the remaining three was simply to the 
effect that "there was no substitute for hard work." 

The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa Nyajenje and Karuyana 

Chesa and Karuyana are bordered by the Kandeya Communal Area to the north 
and the east. Elsewhere, they respectively share boundaries with Mufurudzi, 
Mount Darwin and Karuyana Model A Normal Schemes (Figure 7-1). 



208 

Farm sizes in this sector ranged from 48 to 108 hectares with a mean of 
74. Land ownership in the case of 95 percent of the farmers was freehold and 
only 5 percent carried a lease. Of the freehold owners 58 percent acquired 
full title to their lands between 1955 and 1965, 16 percent between 1956 and 
1970 and the remaining 25 percent only as recent as 1979 to 1985. The majority 
of the farmers, that is, 58 percent of the original occupants were still 
present while the mode of acquisition on the part of the remaining 42 percent 
was through inheritance. When asked about how farmers intended to dispose of 
these properties eventually when they are unavailable to farm anymore 79 
percent indicated that they planned to will them to their sons and another 16 
percent to their brothers instead. Five percent preferred to sell the farms 
ultimately. Currently, 74 percent of all the farmers found their land sizes 
adequate for their cropping and grazing needs. However, every one in four 
expressed the intention to buy more land in the future. 

Of the 20 farmers studied 16 percent had lands that were adjacent to the 
Communal Area. Like some of the Large-Scale farmers of Bindura, 20 percent of 
these Small-Scale Commercial farmers reported problems of trespassing from the 
Communal Area. Sixty percent of the farmers reported interacting and offering 
advice to their counterparts in the Communal Area. As to if these Sraall-Scale 
Commercial farmers had ever been approached or offered advice on good farming 
to farmers from the Model A Normal and the Accelerated resettlement schemes 30 
percent of them responded to have done so. But this was even less so when it 
came to the Cooperatives. The closest Model B Producer Cooperatives in the 
area were Chakoma, Kushingirira , Kuriraa Inhaka and Nyakudya. Only 15 percent 
of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers stated that thay had interacted with 
farmers from the cooperative sector. 



209 



The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madzlwa and Kandeya 

The 62 farmers who were respectively interviewed in this farming system 
came from (1) Chishapa, Gono and Jiti subdivisions of Bushu, (2) Nyamaropa, 
Svesve, Mukubvu and Goora in Madziwa and (3) Mandeve, Mashanga, Mungando and 
Jfetope/Kapf udza in Kandeya (Figure 7-1). These had all lived in those areas 
from between 3 and 92 years. This meant that some of them might have returned 
home recently to live and farm permanently while others had spent all their 
lives there. 

The number of years that these had been farming in their respective areas 
ranged from 1 to 50 years with a mean of 18. The size of arable lands 
controlled by these farmers also ranged from 0.8 to 6.4 hectares with a mean 
of 2.7 and median of 2.4 hectares. Only about a third of all these farmers 
considered their land size adequate. In all 68 percent felt that their land 
was not sufficient for their farm needs and as many as 82 percent of all 
farmers also stated that the grazing land for livestock in their Communal Area 
was inadequate. 

All the Communal Area farmers had heard about the government's 
resettlement program. Seventy-three percent of them had either already applied 
or intended to apply for resettlement. Of these farmers, numbering 45, an 
overwhelming majority or 93 percent preferred to be resettled in the minda 
miref u or the Model A individual family schemes. This was in contrast to the 
mushandira pamwe or the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes for which only 
7 percent of those opting for resettlement indicated a preference. 



210 



Farmers: Their Social and Demographic Characteristics 

This sub-section deals only briefly with background characteristics of 
the European or Large-Scale Commercial farmers after which aspects of the 
socio-demographic profiles of African farmers in the resettlement schemes, the 
Communal Axea and the Small-Scale Commercial sectors are discussed. For the 
African farmers the major items presented include farmers' home or country of 
origin, province and communal area, age, gender, marital status, number of 
wives and children, level of school completed, no n- agricultural skills, 
household size and developmental cycle type. 

All farmers in the Communal Area, the Small-Scale Commercial sectors as 
well as the greatest majority of those in the remaining farming systems were 
Zimbabweans. However, with the government- introduced resettlement program some 
so-called alien from neighboring countries opted to become farmers in Zimbabwe 
(Table 7-1). Indeed, these aliens took advantage of the government's amnesty 
in early 1985 which offered citizenship to those of them who had lived 
continuously in the country over the previous five years. The majority of 
these resettled farmers of non-Zimbabwean origin were farm laborers on the 
farms which the government purchased for resettlement. They were mostly 
Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians who reported to have worked in European 
farms in Zimbabwe for periods ranging from 14 to 53 years. 

The Zimbabwean-born farmers in the Mashonaland Central Province or the 
study area came from all parts of the country. In terms of provincial 
distribution all the farmers in the Communal as well as 76 percent of those in 
the Model A Normal, 41 percent from the Model A Accelerated and 53 percent 
from the Cooperative sectors hailed from Mashonaland Central. Only 5 percent 
of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers were from that Province. This 



211 



distribution is shown in Table 7-2 which also indicates that 55 percent of the 
African elite farmers who purchased farms in Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale 
Commercial Areas did so as farmers whose home province today is Mashonaland 
East. A similar situation exists now in the Model A Accelerated Schemes of 
Shamva and Bindura where many of the farmers were brought in from the Uzuraba 
Communal Area in the Mashonaland East Province rather than from Mashonaland 
Central where the schemes were located. 

Of all farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 41 percent listed their 
communal area to be in the !'Ia sho nal and Central Province. Of these, every one 
out of four came from the nearby Bushu Communal Area. On the other hand, every 
farmer out of three La the Model A Normal Scheme was from the adjacent Madziwa 
Communal Area while one out of five cooperative or Model B farmers was from 
Kandeya/Dotito Communal Area (Table 7-3). 

The age distribution of the farmers provide interesting contrasts. That 
of the Model A Normal and Accelerated schemes' farmers look similar to that 
from the Communal Area in terms of the mean and median ages which respectively 
were around the raid-40s. In comparison the Cooperative Schemes' farmers were 
younger while the Small-Scale Commercial farmers were much older. An 
examination of Table 7-4 reveals that 55 percent of the farmers in the 
Small-Scale Commercial area were in the 25-60 year age group with 40 percent 
of the remaining being older than 60 years. In the case of the Cooperatives 63 
percent were in the 26-60 year age group with 34 percent of the remaining 
being even younger than 26 years. However, in the Communal Area and in the 
Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes the number of farmers in the 26-60 year 
age group were 82 percent, S3 percent and 89 percent respectively (Table 7-4). 



212 



TABLE 7 - 1 



MASHONALAND 


CENTRAL 


PROVINCE: 


FARMERS' 


HOME COUNTRY 






ZIMBAB 
BWE 


MOZAMB 
I QUE 


MAT AIJT 


7 AMRT A 

/Li fli il> J-rt. 




(N=) 




% 






Model A Normal 


(349) 


96.3 


2.0 


1.4 


0.3 


Model A Accelerated 






7 7 


5.1 


2.6 


Model B Cooperative 


(151) 


83.4 


11.3 


4.6 


0.7 


Communal Area 


(62) 


100.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Small-Scale Commercial 


(20) 


100.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 



TABLE 7-2 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME PROVINCE 

NGN- MASHONALAND MANICA MID MASV MATABELELAND 

ZIMBA EAST CENT WEST LAND LANDS INGO NORTH SOUTH 
BWE RAL 

(N=) % 



Model A 

Norm (348) 3.7 10.4 75.9 2.6 2.0 1.4 4.0 0.0 0,0 

Model A 

Accl (38) 15.4 38.5 41.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 

Model B 

Coop (151) 16.6 15.9 53.0 3.3 4.6 2.6 3.3 0.0 0.7 

Communal 

Area (62) 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 

Small-Sc 

Commer (20) 0.0 55.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 5.0 0.0 



213 

TABLE 7-3 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME COMMUNAL AREA 

NON- MADZI BUSHU CHIWE KANDEYA/ OTHER 

MASHONALAND WA SHE DOTITO MASHONALAND 



CENTRAL CENTRAL 
(N=) % 

Model A Norm (349) 24.0 34.7 13.5 16.0 1.7 10.0 

Model A Accl (39) 59.0 2.6 25.6 2.6 2.6 7.7 

Model B Coop (151) 30.5 5.3 4.6 3.3 21.9 16.6 

Communal Area (62) 0.0 50.0 25.8 0.0 24.2 0.0 

Small-scale C (20) 95.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 



TABLE 7-4 
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' AGE 

AGE COHORTS 

16- 21- 26- 31- 36- 41- 46- 51- 56- 61- 66 OR 

20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 MORE 

(N=) % 



Model A 

Norm (344) 0.3 4.1 10.2 15.4 11.9 13.7 11.6 11.6 9.0 6.7 5.5 

Model A 

Accl (38) 0.0 0.0 7.9 15.8 18.4 10.5 18.4 7.9 10.5 5.3 5.3 

Model B 

Coop (151) 9.9 24.5 13.2 9.3 10.6 9.3 7.3 6.0 7.3 1.3 1.3 

Communal 

Area (61) 0.0 3.3 8.2 8.2 14.8 18.0 8.2 18.0 6.6 6.6 8.2 

Small-Sc 

Commer(20) 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 15.0 15.0 25.0 



The headship of these rural households reflected the expected, that is, 
the predominance of males. This was even more so in the Small-Scale Commercial 
Area. A large proportion of the Cooperative farm families, making up 38 
percent of the total, and about 23 percent of families in the Communal Area 
were female headed (Table 7-5). 

All Small-Scale Commercial farmers were married. In the Communal, Model A 
Normal and Accelerated sectors every 9 of 10 farmers were married. In the 
Cooperative one out of every 4 farmers had never been married. Also within 
this latter sector the proportion of divorcees was higher. There were more 
widowed farmers in the Communal Area and none in the Small-Scale Commercial 
Area (Table 7-6). The norm among all the married men was monogamous unions. 
However, a few farmers had taken additional wives. One out of every 10 married 
men in the Cooperative had a second wife. The corresponding figures were 
higher elsewhere with 1 in 8 in the Model A Accelerated Scheme, 1 in 5 in the 
Small-Scale Commercial, 1 out of 4 in the Model A Normal Scheme as well as 1 
in 3 in the Communal Area (Table 7-7). 

Still among the married male farmers all those in the Small-Scale 
Commercial sector married their wives at one time or another before 1980. But 
that was not so among the others. In the Communal Area 12.5 percent of the 
married men either entered into their first marriage since 1980 or had taken 
another wife between then and 1985. This was true of 15 percent of the 
Cooperative farmers, 16 percent of the Model A Accelerated and 24 percent of 
Model A Normal Schemes' farmers. In the latter group two farmers had each 
married three and four women respectively since being resettled in 1980 (Table 
7-8) . 

All farmers in the Small-Scale Commercial as well as the Communal Areas 
respectively had one or more living children. With a negligible exception this 
was the case also in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. However, in 



TABLE 7-5 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' GENDER 



215 





(N=) 


MALE 


FEMALE 

% 


Model A Normal 


(349) 


87.1 


12.9 


Model A Accelerated 


V, JO ; 




1 5 8 


Model B Cooperative 


(151) 


62.3 


37.7 


Communal Area 


(62) 


77.4 


22.6 


Small-Scale Commercial 


(20) 


95.0 


5.0 



TABLE 7-6 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' MARITAL STATUS 

NEVER MARRIED DIVORCED WIDOWED 
MARRIED 

(N=) X 



Model A Normal (349) 0.3 93.1 1.1 5.4 

Model A Accelerated (38) 0.0 92.1 2.6 5.3 

Model B Cooperative (151) 24.5 66.9 5.3 3.3 

Communal Area (62) 0.0 91.9 0.0 8.1 

Small-scale Commercial (20) 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 



216 



TABLE 7-7 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: MARRIAGE STRUCTURES OF MALE FARMERS 

NEVER MONO POLYGYNOUS 
MARRIED GAMOUS 



(NUMBER OF WIVES 


(N=) 


0 1 


2 


3 

% 


4 


5) 


Model A Normal 


(304) 


0.3 61.8 


25.3 


10.2 


1.3 


1.0 


Model A Accelerated 


(32) 


0.0 84.4 


12.5 


3.1 


0.0 


0.0 


Model B Cooperative 


(94) 


39.4 51.1 


9.6 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Communal Area 


(48) 


0.0 68.8 


29. 


2 2. 1 


0.0 


0.0 


Sraall-Scale Commercial 


(19) 


0.0 78.9 


21. 


1 0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


TABLE 7-8 
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF 
BY MALE FARMERS SINCE 1980 


WIVES MARRIED 




(NUMBER OF WIVES 


0 


1 


2 


3 


4) 




(N=) 






% 






Model A Normal 


(304) 


72.0 


24.0 


3.3 


0.3 


0.3 


Model A Accelerated 


(32) 


84.4 


15.6 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Model B Cooperative 


(94) 


85. 1 


14.9 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Communal Area 


(48) 


87.5 


12.5 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Sraall-Scale Commercial 


(19) 


100.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 



! 
1 



217 

the Cooperative sector 29 percent of all farmers did not have any children. 
Among the farmers with children the minimum was one child throughout except in 
the Small-Scale Commercial Area where it was two. The maximum number of 
children born to these farmers ranged between a low of 15 in the Model A 
Accelerated to 28 in the Model A Normal Schemes (Table 7-9). The mean number 
per farmer was 5 in the Cooperative, 6 each in the Model A Normal and 
Accelerated Schemes and 7 each in the Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial 
Areas, respectively. 

With regards to the number of children born to farmers between 1980 and 
1985 the Model A Normal Scheme recorded the highest figures with 57 percent of 
all farmers getting two or more children. Correspondingly, within the five 
year period 39 percent of the Communal Area and the Model A Accelerated 
farmers, 32 percent of the Cooperative and 30 percent of the Small-Scale 
Commercial farmers respectively had two or more children. Infact, within the 
Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area around 3 percent of the farmers 
respectively had 5 or more children during the period (Table 7-10). 

In relation to the level of education completed 95 percent of all 
Small-Scale Commercial farmers had being to school. In contrast, as high as 
43.7 percent of the Cooperative farmers had never been to school (Table 7-11). 
In respect of non-agricultural skills the majority of Small-Scale Commercial 
farmers had an advantage in that 80 percent of them were skilled. Artisans 
such as bricklayers and carpenters as well as driver/mechanics formed the 
majority of the professionals in these farm communities (Table 7-12). 

Household sizes ranged from single-constituted households, which numbered 
39.3 percent in the Cooperatives, to multiple ones. The latter type was the 
norm throughout the remaining sectors. The largest households, two of them 
each with 21 or more people, were confined to the Model A Normal Scheme and 
the Communal Area, respectively. In both cases the households were male-headed 



218 



TABLE 7-9 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN OF FARMERS 



(NUMBER OF CHILDREN 


0 


1-5 


6-10 


11-15 


16-20 


21 OR 




















(N=) 








fa 






Model A Normal 


(348) 


1.1 


44.8 


39.1 


11.4 


2.7 


0.9 


Model A Accelerated 


(38) 


2.6 


55.2 


23.7 


18.5 


0.0 


0.0 


Model B Cooperative 


(150) 


29.3 


49.3 


19.4 


1.3 


0.7 


0.0 


Communal Area 


(61) 


0.0 


36.1 


50.8 


8.2 


3.3 


1.6 


Small-Scale Commercial 


(19) 


0.0 


35.0 


45.0 


15.0 


5.0 


0.0 



TABLE 7-10 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO FARMERS 

IN 1980 - 1985 

(NUMBER OF CHILDREN 0 1 2 3 4 5 OR 

MORE) 

(N=) % 



Model A Normal 


(349) 


22.3 


20.9 


33.0 


15. 


5 


5.4 


2.9 


Model A Accelerated 


(39) 


38.5 


23. 1 


30.8 


5. 


1 


2.6 


0.0 


Model B Cooperative 


(151) 


51.0 


16.6 


29.1 


3. 


3 


0.0 


0.0 


Communal Area 


(62) 


43.5 


17.7 


22.6 


11. 


3 


1.6 


3.2 


Small-Scale Commercial 


(20) 


45.0 


25.0 


15.0 


15. 


0 


0.0 


0.0 



MASHONALAND CENTRAL 


TABLE 
PROVINCE : 


7-11 
FARMERS' 


LEVEL 


OF SCHOOL 


COMPLETED 




NONE 

E 


SOME 

T F 


COMPLETED 
M F N T 


POST 
A R Y 




(N=) 










Model A Normal 


(348) 


21.6 


46.3 


14.7 


17.5 


Model A Accelerated 


(38) 


28.9 


39.5 


10.5 


21.1 


Model B Cooperative 


(151) 


43.7 


25.2 


12.6 


18.5 


Conmunal Area 


(62) 


11.3 


67.7 


14.5 


6.5 


Small-Scale Commercial 


(20) 


5.0 


55.0 


5.0 


35.0 



TABLE 7-12 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' NON- AGRICULTURAL SKILLS 

NONE ARTISAN DRIVER/ SALES TAILOR/ OTHER 
MECHANIC DRESS 
MAKER 

(N=) % 



Model A Normal (348) 51.0 24.1 10.3 1.4 3.7 9.2 

Model A Accelerated (38) 53.8 15.4 10.3 5.1 5.1 7.7 

Model B Cooperative (151) 57.0 10.6 7.9 7.9 6.6 9.9 

Communal Area (62) 50.0 19.4 11.3 3.2 8.1 8.1 

Small-scale Commercial (18)- 20.0 15.0 20.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 



220 

and highly polygynous. Apart from the Cooperatives, where the large number of 
single households depressed the mean household size to 4 persons, the average 
size everywhere was around 7 persons (Table 7-13). 

In order to assign the 621 African households interviewed for this case 
study I examined the respective ages, gender and conjugal situation of the _de 
facto household head as well as other structural forms including the age 
characteristics of all household members in the light of the Household 
Developmental Cycle Typology that I formulated for this work (see Appendix A). 

Very early in the analysis it became quite clear that the complex 
organizational and household structures in the Model B Producer Cooperative 
Schemes were not amenable to the kinds of analytical concerns such as the 
socioeconomic performance of the farm households for which the typology was 
designed. Consequently, the 151 cooperative farmers were dropped leaving 470. 
Of these 458 or 97.4 percent representing the four respective farming systems 
possessed the complete and necessary data for them to be fit into the cycle. 

The farmers were categorized into the following nine broad types of 
developmental cycle: (1) male-headed monogamous household in establishment 
phase, (2) male-headed monogamous household in expansion phase, (3) 
female-headed household in expansion phase with the spouse temporary away, (4) 
male-headed polygynous household in expansion phase, (5) male-headed 
monogamous household in consolidation phase, (6) female-headed household in 
consolidation phase with spouse temporary away, (7) female-headed household in 
consolidation phase without a spouse, (8) male-headed polygynous household in 
consolidation phase and (9) household in a decline phase (Table 7-14).^ 

The agricultural chracteristics and performance of each developmental 
type for the various farming systems are described below in this Chapter. 



221 



TABLE 7-13 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOUSEHOLD SIZE 

SING COUP 3 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 15 16 - 20 21 OR 

LE LE MORE 
(NO DEPENDANTS) 

(N=) 



Model A Nonna(342) 


0.3 


2.9 


25.4 


52.6 


17.0 


1.5 


0.3 


Model A Accel (38) 


0.0 


5.3 


34.2 


42. 1 


13.2 


5.3 


0.0 


Model B Coop (117) 


39.3 


4.3 


26.5 


29.1 


0.8 


0.0 


0.0 


Communal Area (62) 


1.6 


8.1 


25.8 


48.4 


14.5 


0.0 


1.6 


Small-scale C (20) 


0.0 


0.0 


40.0 


60.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 



TABLE 7-14 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD 
DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 



TOTAL 
NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 



D 



H 



Model A Noma 11 123 13 86 49 9 20 26 2 
Model A Accel 1 14 1 4 11 2 3 1 0 
Model B Coop - -- -- -- -- 

Communal Area 214 5 916 5 4 5 1 
Small-scale C070281020 



340 
37 

61 
20 



Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase 
B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase 
C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase 
D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase 
E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase 
F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase 
G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase 
H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase 
I = Household in Decline Phase 



The Model Bs have been left out of this presentation. 



Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation of the 



Government's Resettlement Policies and Programs 



223 



Some of the questions that farmers responded to in their evaluation of 
the resettlement and agricultural policies and programs of the government were 
specific to their respective farming systems. This was especially the case 
with farmers in the resettlement schemes, namely, the Model A Normal and 
Accelerated as well as the Model B Producer Cooperative sectors. Other general 
questions common to these farmers were also asked of their counterparts in the 
Large and Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Areas respectively. The 
specific issues are presented first. 

The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and the Shamva-Bindura 
Model A Accelerated Schemes 

These farmers first heard about the resettlement program through various 
sources (Table 7-15). The most common of these was the ruling ZANU-PF party. 
Its leaders and oficials made the land redistribution issue an important one 
in the chimurenga or liberation war years and followed up on it after the 
attainment of independence in 1980. The majority of these farmers gave poor or 
inadequate lands as their reason for resettlement. This category was followed 
by those who were either landless or wanted a place to build a home and raise 
families and those who just desired to improve their lives (Table 7-16). 

Among these farmers the response to resettlement was overwhelmingly 
positive. Infact 99 percent of the 388 Model A resettled farmers said that 
they were glad to be part of the program. Comments explaining this response 
Included that of a farmer who was thrilled to be having, in his own words, 
"for the first time in my 'difficult life' such things as my own minda 
(farmland), musha (a home) for my family to live in, abundance of food, 
government services and, above all, a peace of mind." Another farmer 



224 

TABLE 7-15 
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST SOURCE OF 
INFORMATION ABOUT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 



SOURCE 


FREQUENCY 


% 

— 


ZANU (PF) Comrades 


125 


32.2 


District Councillors 


86 


22.2 


Government Officers 


46 


11.9 


News Media 


44 


11.3 


1? e» 1 a ^ 1 VP Q 

i\C X a C X V C 3 


23 


5.9 


Friends 


23 


5.9 


Chief /Headman/ Farm Master 


15 


3.9 


Other 


24 


6.2 


Not Applicable 


2 


0.5 




388 


100.0 


TABLE 7-16 
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' REASONS 


FOR RESETTLEMENT 


REASON 


FREQUENCY 


% 


Inadequate/Poor Land 


215 


55.4 


Landless 


98 


25.3 


Wanted Own Home 


42 


10.8 


To Improve Life Situation 


22 


5.7 


Unemployed 


5 


1.3 


Other 


4 


i.Q 


Inherited Property 


2 


0.5 



388 



100.0 



225 

emphatically boasted that resettlement had freed him from the serfdom 
conditions under which he lived as a laborer in the colonial days sojourning 
from one European-owned farm to another. 

The farmers were also unanimous in voicing out that the government should 
continue with resettlement. Most farmers rather impatiently recommended the 
taking over of so-called "European farms" for resettlement (see Table 7-27 
below) and the financing of the program from external donor sources. The 
majority of farmers, that is 60 percent of all of them, were willing to pay a 
resettlement tax, if at all necessary. Some of the remaining 40 percent argued 
that they were not yet firmly settled or financially secure enough to be 
burdened with such a tax, A few farmers held the opinion that as agricultural 
producers they were already taxed enough by the government. Yet another group 
just abhored aay form of taxation implying that it was a relic of the colonial 
past from which they were now permanently liberated. 

The farmers complimented highly the assistance and the performance of the 
Resettlement Team of scheme-level government staff. They recommended that the 
officers found ways and means of solving and providing feedback on farmers' 
problems and also visiting them in the fields and villages more regularly 
(Table 7-17). 

The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira 
and Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes 

The questions and responses relating to background issues about the 
cooperatives dealt mostly with (1) membership and (2) members' attitudes and 
self-evaluation of organizational problems which were unique to this 
particular farming system. 

Nearly 32 percent of the farmers originally worked as farm laborers on 
European or Large-Scale Commercial Farms. In fact, almost all of these 



TABLE 7-17 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' RECOMMENDATION TO IMPROVE 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESETTLEMENT TEAM (GOVT. OFFICERS) 



RECOMMENDATION FREQUENCY % 



Solve Farmers' Problems 


133 


34.3 


Provide Feedback on Complaints 


ICQ 


25.8 


Visit Farmers More Regularly- 


75 


19.3 


Other 


28 


7.2 


Don't Know 


10 


2.6 


Nothing/officers Doing Fine 


42 


10.8 



388 



100.0 



227 

former-laborers stayed on after the government purchased the respective farms 
and they were absorbed into the Model B program. The other major category of 
farmers in the cooperative were peasants, most of them formerly landless 
Communal Area residents (Table 7-18). One Model B Scheme Chakoma was 
originally formed by about 50 families from the Dotito sub-division of the 
Kandeya Communal Area (see Figure 7-1). These families teamed up and 
approached the government which assigned the 1,264 hectare Ruia Ranch located 
in Natural Region II in the Mount Darwin area to them in 1981. 

Apart from the Communal Area and the commercial farms a number of these 
farmers previously lived in the towns working or unemployed. A few others were 
also either students or former combatants and war refugees in neighboring 
countries (Table 7-19). 

As to how these farmers got to know about their cooperatives and became 
resettled in them a large proportion said that they were co-founders or 
original members. This group made up 48 percent of the members while 14 
percent were recruited by friends or through political party and government 
channels (Table 7-20). 

On why they decided to join the cooperatives and be resettled 60 percent 
of these farmers said they wanted a better life. The ideological factor, 
namely, the promotion of state policy of socialism was what also influenced 16 
percent of the other farmers. Another 15 percent said that as farm laborers, 
ostensibly from outside Zimbabwe, they had "nowhere else to go other than 
staying on" these farms which had become their homes (Table 7-21). 

Of the married members, who numbered 103 and constituted 62.8 percent of 
the total interviewed the overwhelming majority, that is, 88 percent also had 
their spouses as members of their cooperative. Fifty-nine percent of all the 
members also did not have any relative or kinsman as a cooperative member. In 
the opinion of 80 percent of the members everyone in their cooperative 



228 

TABLE 7-18 



MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS 
PRIOR TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE 


UOLUrAl iUNb 


OCCUPATION 


FREQUENCY 


% 


Laborer in European/ Commercial Farm 


48 


31.8 


Peasant in Communal Area 


33 


21.9 


Ex-Combatant/ Refugee 


5 


3.3 


M"f TIP XJnTVtfST" 


i 


2.0 


Unemployed 


11 


7.3 


Domestic Servant 


9 


6.0 


Other 


17 


11.3 


Student 


25 


16.6 




151 


100.0 


TABLE 8-19 
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' 
TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE 


RESIDENCE PRIOR 


PLACE 


FREQUENCY 


% 


Communal Area 


50 


33. 1 


Other European/Commercial Farm 


33 


21.9 


This Cooperative/Ex-Commerial Farm 


16 


10.6 


Harare City- 


14 


9.3 


Other Urban Area 


14 


9.3 


Youth Training/ School 


13 


8.6 


Outside Zimbabwe/Refugee Camp 


4 


2.6 


Other 


3 


2.0 



151 



100.0 



TABLE 7-20 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE COOPERATIVE 



SOURCE 


FREQUENCY 


% 


Founding/Initial Member 


72 


47.7 


Friends 


21 


13.9 


ZANU-PF/Government Officials 


15 


9.9 


Relatives /Kinsmen/ Af fines 


13 


8.6 


News Media 


8 


5.3 


Other 


21 


13.9 




151 


100.0 



TABLE 7-21 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS' REASONS 
FOR JOINING THE COOPERATIVE 



REASON 


FREQUENCY 


% 


To obtain better life 


90 


59.6 


To promote socialism (state ideology) 


25 


16.6 


Lived on this farm/Nowhere to go 


23 


15.2 


Other 


13 


8.6 



151 100.0 



230 

considered himself or herself as belonging to "one family." Even a greater 
portion of the members, that is, 87 percent of them asserted that they "got on 
well" with each other. Almost everybody joined the cooperative with no capital 
assets or agricultural equipment (Table 7-22). 

On organizational issues though almost everyone of them had not been a 
cooperative member prior to joining these Model B resettlements as much as 48 
percent claimed they knew the principles and objectives of the cooperative 
movement. A great majority of these farmers claimed also to be satisfied with 
the administration of the current Management Committee. The majority did not 
favor the idea of paying mambership levy or annual fee to help to run their 
schemes. The majority also believed that their respective cooperatives had 
adequate membership to undertake the expected production activities and that 
everybody was working hard enough. (Table 7-22). 

As much as 71 percent of these cooperative farmers preferred the existing 
collective tenure and work arrangement while 29 percent favored individual 
farms (Table 7-22). The latter or minority group argued that individual would 
promote harder work, end the exploitation of the "powerless majority by the 
privileged minority" and reward personal initiative. The majority who argued 
against parcel ization of the collective property were of the opinion that such 
action would be inimical to socialism, reduce productivity and that it was 
even against the byelaws under which the Model B Schemes were registered. 

This fact notwithstanding 69 percent of the members favored individual 
cooking and eating arrangements over collective ones (Table 7-22). They cited 
personal hygeine, different preferences and taste as justification. Their 
minority opponents on the other hand believed that individual arrangements 
were anti-collective and in principle and spirit contrary to cooperative 
living and work. Both protagonists of individual and communal cooking, to some 
extent, also mustered the same reasons to back their arguments .These were 



TABLE 7-22 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: SOME GENERAL RESPONSES TO 
RESETTLEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO THEIR COOPERATIVE 



QUESTION 


RESPONSE 


T? T? TTA T T 17 AT V 

r Kii(^Ut.iNL I 


% 


Were you a member of another 






3 


2.0 


CoODerStivP Hp'Fri'rp nnirrfno" 










this one? 




NO 


1 A« 
1 H-o 


y 0 . (J 


Were you familiar with Coop- 




YES 


73 


48.3 


erative objectives and 










principles? 




NO 


78 


51.7 


Is your spouse a member of 




YES 


91 


60.3 


this Cooperative? 












NU 


12 


7.9 




NO 


b JrUU oCj 




31.8 


Is any other relative (kinsman/ 




62 


41.1 


affine) of yours a member of 








this Cooperative? 






SQ 

oy 


DO . 9 


Did you bring in any capital 




YES 


3 


2.0 


assets/farm implements when 










you joined this Cooperative? 




NU 


148 


98.0 


Are you satisfied with the 




YES 


118 


78.1 


administration of the Manage- 










ment Committee of this 




NO 


30 


19.9 


Cooperative? 










NO 


RESPONSE 


3 


2.0 


Are you willing to pay an 




YES 


121 


80.1 


annual levy/tax towards the 








running of this Cooperative's 




NO 


28 


18.5 


programs? 










NO 


RESPONSE 


2 


1.3 



TABLE 7 - 22— continued 
QUESTION 



RESPONSE FREQUENCY 



% 



Does this Cooperative have YES 94 62.3 

adequate membership/workforce 

to carry out its programs? NO 57 37.8 



Are members of this Cooperat- YES 128 84.7 
ive working hard enough to 

ensure its success? NO 17 11.2 

DON'T KNOW i 4.0 



Do other members of this Coop- YES 133 88.1 

erative appreciate the effort 

you put into your work assign- NO 11 7.3 

ment ? 

DON'T KNOW 7 4.6 



Do you get on well with the YES 128 84.8 
other members of this 

Cooperative? NO 6 4.0 

SOME/NOT ALL 13 8.8 

DON'T KNOW 4 2.6 



Do members of this Cooperative YES 121 80.1 
regard themselves as one 

family? NO 16 10.6 

DON'T KNOW 14 9.3 



What cooking/eating arrange- INDIVIDUAL 104 68.9 

ment would you recommend for 

this Cooperative? COLLECTIVE 47 31.2 



What production arrangement COLLECTIVE FARM 107 70.9 
do you prefer in this Coop- 
erative? INDIVIDUAL FARMS 43 28.5 

BOTH 1 0.7 



233 

efficiency, cost-effectiveness, avoiding waste and being convenient. 

Of all these cooperative farmers 38 percent had been in the scheme for 
between 4 and 5 years, 28 percent for as much as 2 to 3 years while 34 percent 
had been members for only a year or less (Table 7-23). 

Finally, these Model B Producer Cooperative farmers were questioned about 
how much remuneration they thought they deserved for their respective work 
effort at the end of the 1984-85 agricultural season. About 20 percent said 
they expected nothing apparently because their cooperative did not generate 
any income. Nearly 9 percent also did not know how much they deserved to be 
paid (Table 7-24). 

Communal Area Farmers^ Responses 

Two major questions about resettlement were asked of only the Communal 
Area farmers. These are the people closer to the practical issues and 
developments relating to the land question both in the past and now. They are 
also the immediate and direct beneficiaries of the resettlement program. 

The first question was whether or not in their judgement the government's 
resettlement program was the solution to the land problem, meaning the 
racially segregated pattern of ownership, the denudation and overutilization 
of the communal resources and the landlessness . The response offered by 82 
percent of these farmers was that resettlement was a solution. Those 
disagreeing made up 8 percent with the remaining 10 percent not knowing 
whether or not resettlement was the answer to the land hunger (Table 7-25). 

These Communal Area farmers were then asked to choose between two 
options. These were either (1) leaving these traditional homes and being 
resettled in a new environment by the government as it was currently occurring 
or (2) staying and having access to adjacent new lands to be purchased by the 



TABLE 7-23 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS' DURATION 
OF STAY IN THEIR COOPERATIVES 



NUMBER OF YEARS 


FREQUENCY 


% 


1 or Less 


51 


33.8 


Over 1 to 3 


42 


27.8 


Over 3 to 5 


58 


38.4 




51 


100.0 


TABLE 7 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE 
INCOMES FOR WORK DONE 


- 24 

SCHEMES: MEMBERS' 
IN 1984-85 SEASON 


EXPECTED 


AMOUNT EXPECTED 
($) 


FREQUENCY 


X 


Nothing/Coop. Made no Profit 


30 


1 Q Q 


Less than 100 


4 


2.6 


Between ICQ and 200 


17 


11.3 


Between 200 and 300 


30 


19.9 


Between 300 and 1,000 


29 


19.2 


Above 1,000 


28 


18.5 


Don't Know 


13 


8.6 



151 100.0 



235 

government and added to expand the Communal Areas. Every three in four of 
these respondents preferred the second alternative of remaining to farm in an 
expanded Communal Area (Table 7-25). 

Almost all the 75 percent opting for the expansion of the Communal Areas 
were of the opinion that such a development, compared to resettlement 
elsewhere, would be less socially disruptive and also ensure continuity of 
traditional communal life as well as links with their ancestors. In the case 
of the remaining 25 percent whose first preference was for resettlement they 
were attracted by the different nature of the program especially ownership of 
a new farm and home and being provided with all kinds of government 
facilities. Most of them appeared suspicious and doubted that these privileges 
would ever be part of any policy program that expanded Communal Areas (Table 
7-25) . 

Finally, the farmers were questioned about one controversial issue 
germane to the country's communal lands policy which was been debated and 
formulated by the government. This had to do with traditional land rights in 
these areas held by urban residents and workers. In the view of 73 percent of 
these Communal Area farmers Africans now residing in the cities and towns 
should continue to enjoy access to lands in their respective Communal Areas. 
The remaining 27 percent disagreed (Table 7-25). 

The argument put up by the majority of those who would want their kinsmen 
and others working in the urban areas to be allowed to maintain rights was 
that those people were sojourners and therefore had to have a "home to return 
to." Others pointed out that many urban residents maintained and supported 
their respective immediate and extended families in the Communal Areas. Thus 
their links by way of land rights were of mutual benefit and crucial to the 
prosperity of these Areas especially. The three main misgivings about the 
situation offered by the opposing school were (1) the problem of communal 



TABLE 7-25 

COMMUNAL AREA: FARMER'S RESPONSES TO ISSUES RELATING TO 
THE COMMUNAL LAND PROBLEM AOT RESETTLEMENT 

QUESTION RESPONSE FREQUENCY % 



Is the Government's resettlement YES 51 82.3 
program the solution to the 

problem of land hunger here? NO 5 8.1 

DON'T KNOW 6 9.7 



Would you prefer the Government RESETTLEMENT 16 24.6 
(1) to resettle more people from 

here or (2) to add more new land EXPANSION 46 75.4 

to this Communal Area? 



Should urban residents continue 
to enjoy traditional rights in 
lands in the Communal Areas? 



YES 45 
NO , 17 



72.6 
27.4 



237 



landlessness , (2) land underutilization by "absentee fanners" who only came in 
during the planting and harvesting periods and (3) the inequities entailed in 
the "townsmen" enjoying the best of both worlds. 

General Responses to Resettlement 

In order to get a perspective about the wider dimensions of the impacts 
of the on-going resettlement program farmers were asked if any of their 
relatives or kinsmen had benefited from it and, specifically, under which 
model. Table 7-26 sums up the responses which indicate that while some farmers 
in all the five farming systems had kinsmen resettled the major beneficiaries 
were those related to farmers in the Model A. Normal and Accelerated Schemes as 
well as in the Communal Area. Of those beneficiaries the majority selected the 
minda miref u or Model A individual family farm rather than the mushandlra 
pamwe or Model B Producer Cooperative. 

The criticisms voiced so far by farmers about the wisdom of resettlement 
as an agricultural development policy had come from only the so-called 
commercial sector. These farmers were therefore asked to rate the performance 
of the government on a subjective tricho tomized scale from low to high in 
regard to an array of policy issues. 

The responses are presented in Table 7-27. Among the majority of the 
Sraall-Scale Commercial Farmers the government got high marks in areas of (1) 
national food self-sufficiency, (2) support for large-scale farm sector, (3) 
support for small-scale farm sector, (4) support for communal lands 
agriculture and (5) progress with the resettlement program. In terms of 
economic growth, resource conservation and the idea of socialist type of 
agriculture for Zimbabwe the majority ratings were only average. 



TABLE 7-26 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' IF RELATIVES 
HAVE BEEN RESETTLED AND IN WHICH MODEL 



MODEL A MODEL B 

(Minda Mirefu) (Mushandira Pamwe) 





Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 


(N=) 


% 








Model A Norm (349) 


80.2 


19.8 


12.3 


87.7 


Model A Accel (39) 


71.8 


28.2 


17.9 


82. 1 


Model B Coop (151) 


32.5 


67.5 


37.1 


62.9 


Communal Area (62) 


78.7 


21.3 


19.1 


80.9 


Small-scale C (20) 


45.0 


55.0 


25.0 


75.0 



239 

The majority of the Large-Scale Commercial Fanners highly applauded the i 
government only for promoting and maintaining self-sufficiency in food. The 
majority also rated the policy impacts in the following areas as average (1) 

economic growth, (2) promotion of large-scale farm sector and (3) support for j 

i 

the small-scale farm sector. However, for (1) resource conservation, (2) | 
progress on the resettlement front and (3) plans for socialist agriculture the 
majority responses were low or non-complimentary of the government (Table 
7-27). 

These farmers were asked if in their respective opinions and in the 
context of the country's agriculture the government's resettlement policy was , 
realistic. Every four in five of the farmers in the Small-Scale sector said it 
was. The remaining 20 percent were divided equally between a "no" and "don't 
know" responses. On the other hand 78 percent of the Large-Scale Commercial | 
Farmers thought the policy was not realistic. The remaining 22 percent were ; 
also divided equally between a "yes" and "don't know" answers (see Table ! 
7-28). 

Farmers from the Model A Schemes and the Sraall-Scale Commercial Area were 

asked if the government should continue with the resettlement of more people. | 

f 

The response was overwhelmingly positive with 100 percent of the farmers In ! 

both the Model A Normal and the Accelerated Schemes saying yes. The j 

i 

corresponding percentage was 95 for the Small-Scale Commercial sector. ; 

On the issue of where to obtain land for further resettlement the I 
majority of these farmers suggested European-owned lands and the state lands 
such as wild game reserves as the possible areas for the government to look 
(Table 7-29). In an apparent response to that suggestion 44.4 percent of the 

Large-Scale Commercial Farmers said that there were no lands available in that . 

sector for government's purchase for resettlement while 33.3 percent thought j 

there were (Table 7-28). ^ 

!' 
I 



TABLE 7-27 

MASHONALMD CENTRAL PROVINCE: COMMERCIAL FARMERS' RATINGS OF 
ISSUES ABOUT GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL AND RESETTLEMENT POLICIES 



SMALL-SCALE FARMERS 
(N = 20) 

LOW AVERAGE HIGH 
% 



Food Self-sufficiency 5.0 25.0 70.0 

Economic Growth 15.0 45.0 40.0 

Large-scale Farm Sector 10.0 30.0 60.0 

Small-Scale Farm Sector 15.0 30.0 55.0 

Communal Area Sector 25.0 30.0 45.0 

Resource Conservation 15.0 45.0 40.0 

Resettlement Progress 0.0 45.0 55.0 



LARGE-SCALE FARMERS 
(N = 9) 

LOW AVERAGE HIGH 
% 



11.1 
33.3 
11.1 
11.1 

44.4 
44.4 



22.2 
44.4 
77.8 
55.6 

44.4 
33.3 



66.7 
22.2 
11.1 
33.3 

11.1 
22.2 



TABLE 7-28 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: COMMERCIAL FARMERS' RESPONSES 
TO OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 

SMALL-SCALE LARGE-SCALE 
(N=20) FARMERS (N=9) 



QUESTION 



RESPONSE FREQUENCY % FREQUENCY % 



Are the government's 
resettlement policy and 
programs realistic? 



YES 
NO 

DON'T KNOW 



16 80.0 
2 10.0 

2 10.0 



1 11.1 
7 77.8 
1 11.1 



Are Large-scale YES 
(European-QxTOed) Farms 
available for purchase NO 
and resettlement? 

DON'T KNOW 



3 33.3 

4 44.4 
2 22.2 



241 



TABLE 7-29 

RESETTLEMENT AND SMALL SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS RESPONSES 
AS TO WHERE LANDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR RESETTLEMENT 

MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED SMALL-SCALE 
SCHEME SCHEME COMMERCIAL 



(N = 345) 



(N = 39) 



(N = 20) 



European (Large-Scale) 

Conunercial Farms 61.2 

Safari/State Lands 16.2 

Government Knows Where 6.7 

Other Areas/Lands 5.2 

Don't Know Where 10.7 



66.7 

10.3 

5.2 

17.9 



60.0 
10.0 
20.0 
5.0 
5.0 



242 

About relations with Communal Area residents the resettled farmers were almost 
unanimous in their disagreement that the former have a right to graze their 
livestock or even to enjoy access to the exploitation of such "collective" 
resources as housing poles, firewood and thatching grass from the resettlement 
areas. Consequently, they agreed with the government's policy of erecting and 
maintaining a wired boundary fence to physically divide the two geographic 
entities (Table 7-30). 

The reasons offered by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers in 
support of their view to keep away "trespassers" were that the resettlement 
schemes were private property which resources were for the exclusive benefit 
of the resettled members and their households. Some of them also labelled such 
Communal Area residents as "poachers" and accused them of often stealing from 
the Cooperatives. Given the fact that almost all these resettled farmers not 
long ago were Communal Area residents their new attitude towards their kinsmen 
and former colleagues in the area of the use of state-controlled resources is 
interesting . 

While over 60 percent majority of the farmers in the Communal Area also 
accepted that they did not have rights as such in the resources of the 
resettlement areas 47 percent felt that a physical boundary erected to 
separate the two areas and thus communities was not justified (Table 7-30). 
This minority opinion argued that (1) both communities were made up of the 
same people, (2) such a measure was anti-socialism and (3) smacked of the old 
colonial policy of segregated development against which many of them fought in 
the liberation struggle. To most of the 53 percent who favored the boundary 
the feeling was that it would minimize any social conflicts between 
communities in the two different areas and also facilitate resource 
conservation in the new resettlements. 



243 

TABLE 7-30 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: RESETTLEMENT AND COMMUNAL AREA 
FARMERS' RESPONSES TOWARDS COMMON ACCESS TO RESETTLEMENT RESOURCES 

MODEL A MODEL A MODEL B COMMUNAL 

NORMAL ACCELERATED COOPERATIVE AREA 

SCHEME SCHEME SCHEME 

(N=349) (N=39) (N=151) (N=62) 



Do Conmunal Area residents YES 4.3 5.1 0.7 32.3 

have the right to graze 

livestock in resettlement NO 95.7 94.9 99.3 67.7 
lands? 



Do Communal Area residents YES 2.3 2.6 - 33.9 

have the right to use common 

resources (poles, grass, NO 97.7 97.4 - 66.1 

etc. in resettlement lands? 



Is the Government justified YES 95.4 97.4 - 53.2 

in erecting a boundary fence 

between the resettlement NO 4.6 2.6 - 46.8 

lands and the Communal Areas? 



244 

Finally, the responses of all the farmers about two pertinent issues were 
requested. The first was on the government's pronouncement to "socialize the 
country's agriculture" as a means of ending exploitation and to ensure equity. 
The second asked the farmers to suggest a recommendation to the government as 
Co how a better agriculture can be fostered in Zimbabwe. 

Except in the Small-Scale Commercial Sector the majority of farmers in 
the four farming systems who were questioned about socialist agriculture gave 
it a low rating. Infact all the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farmers 
were against the idea (Table 7-31), 

The recommendations presented here in Table 7-32 reflected some of the 
major and diverse concerns within and between farmers in the different systems 
(see for instance farm-level constraints below in this Chapter). Thus while 
the most importaat interest expressed by the majority of African farmers was 
for the provision of more credits, inputs and equipment their European 
counterparts in the Large-Scale Commercial sector were bothered by the need to 
ensure efficient marketing and pricing policies as well as the promotion of 
private or individual farm enterprises. This concern for private farms was an 
apparent response to the pronouncements about socialist agriculture in 
Zimbabwe . 

Except in the Small-Scale Commercial Sector the majority of farmers in 
the four farming systems who were questioned about socialist agriculture gave 
it a low rating. Infact all the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farmers 
were against the idea (Table 7-31). 

The recommendations presented here in Table 7-32 reflected some of the 
major and diverse concerns within and between farmers in the different systems 
(see for instance farm-level constraints below in this Chapter). Thus while 
the most important interest expressed by the majority of African farmers was 



TABLE 7-31 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' RATING OF GOVERNMENT'S 
POLICY TO SOCIALIZE THE COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURE 



(N=) 



LOW AVERAGE HIGH 

7, 



Model A Norm (349) 63.3 28.4 8.3 

Model A Accel (39) 53.8 25.6 20.5 

Model B Coop ( — ) - - - 

Communal Area ( — ) - - - 

Small-Scale C (20) 45.0 50.0 5.0 

Large-scale C (9) 100.0 0.0 0.0 



TABLE 7-32 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS RECOMMENDATION 
FOR BETTER AGRICULTURE FOR THE COUNTRY 



NONE CREDIT/ MARKET EXTEN RESETT PRIVATE OTHER 
INPUTS/ ING/ SION LEMENT FARMS 
IMPLEM PRICES 
ENTS 



(N=) 



% 



Model A Norm (347) 0.9 49.3 2.6 14.7 13.3 11.8 7.5 

Model A Accel (38) 0.0 63.2 0.0 13.2 2.6 10.5 10.6 

Communal Area (62) 1.6 43.5 32.3 0.0 21.0 0.0 1.6 

Small-Scale C (20) 5.0 50.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 15.0 

Large-scale C (9) 0.0 0.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 37.5 25.0 



246 

for the provision of more credits, inputs and equipment their European 
counterparts in the Large-Scale Commercial sector were bothered by the need to 
ensure efficient marketing and pricing policies as well as the promotion of 
private or individual farm enterprises. This concern for private farms was an 
apparent response to the pronouncements about socialist agriculture in 
Zimbabwe . 

Farmers; Their Attitudes and Perceptions About Life Situation 

Farmers were asked general and specific questions seeking to elicit 
responses that reflected their perceptions and attitudes towards matters 
relating to the special circumstances of their lives. 

For instance, to the African farmers in the resettlement schemes and 
other rural areas the government's development agenda was meaningless if it 
was not targeted to the attainment of what everybody talked about as the "good 
life" (upenyu hwakanaka) . The farmers were therefore asked to define what each 
considered to be the major attribute of this so-called good life. Other 
questions relating to this very important concept were also put to the 
farmers. Their responses are presented below. 

Farmers' conception of what constituted development can be inferred 
from their perceptions of what a "good life" was. Zimbabwe African farmers 
mentioned various major attributes of a satisfying and desirable life. The six 
major attributes mentioned were the ownership of the following: (1) musha , 
(home) a concept embracing a physical dwelling, residential plot and wives and 
children; (2) minda , (farm) which is also agricultural land and all the 
essential implements to make it productive; (3) mombe , (cattle) which 
symbolically and in all other respects shows a man's worth; (4) mari , 
(money); (5) off-farm business or non-agricultural source of income; and (6) 



247 

access to social infrastructure or modern facilities such as schools. These 
attributes defined what, in the Shona worldview, ensured upenyu hwakanaka 
that is sought by every person for himself and his family (mhuri) . 

In ranking these attributes of a good life the majority of farmers 
selected minda or having a farm as the most important. The only exception was 
the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers who, instead, chose money. The second 
most mentioned attribute was a home. However, it was ranked third by Model A 
Normal Scheme farmers who valued cattle as a second choice (Table 7-33). 

The farmers were asked as to whether or not the good life they mentioned 
was attainable in the areas or farming systems that they currently farmed. 
Almost all Model A Normal and Accelerated Scheme farmers responded in the 
affirmative. However, this was not the case among the other farmers 15 percent 
of whom respectively said that their systems could not assure them of a good 
life (Table 7-34). \'n:ien the farmers were asked a similar question about their 
children the majority still believed that it was possible in the long run for 
them to enjoy a good life at where the parents were farming now. Every two in 
five Communal Area farmers indicated otherwise (Table 7-34). 

A hypothetical question was asked of farmers as to where they would 
rather work if wage eraployTnent was their only option to achieve a good life. 
Four places were suggested to them, namely, (1) Harare or other towns, (2) 
Small-Scale ( Af rican) Commercial Farms, (3) Large— Scale (European) Commercial 
Farms and (4) Mining Areas. Nevertheless, the majority of farmers everywhere 
insisted that they would prefer to do nothing at all rather than be employed 
in any of the four suggested situations. Of those willing to accomodate that 
option more of the Model A Normal Scheme farmers were prepared for an urban 
eraplo3nnent and the Model A Accelerated Scheme farmers for work on the 
Small-Scale Commercial Farms. The Communal Area farmers were divided between 
working in Harare or other towns and working in the Small-Scale Commercial 



TABLE 7-33 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CONCEPTION OF 
ATTRIBUTES OF A "GOOD LIFE" (UPENYU HWAKANAKA) 







FARM/ 
CAPITAL 
ASSETS 


CATTLE 


HOME/ 
MATERIAL 
ITEMS 


MONEY 


OFF-FARM 
BUSINESS 


ACCESS 
TO SOCIAL 
INFRAST 


OTHER 




(N=) 








% 








Model 
Norm 


A 

(349) 


34. 1 


30. 1 


24.9 


4.9 


2.9 


1.7 


1.4 


Model 
Accel 


A 

(39) 


41.0 


20.5 


23. 1 


1.1 


5.1 


0.0 


2.6 


Model 
Coop 


B 

(151) 


26.5 


11.3 


27.2 


28.5 


2.0 


3.3 


1.3 


Communal 
Area (62) 


41.9 


14.5 


25.8 


11.3 


1.6 


3.2 


1.6 


Small- 
Commer 


Sc 

(20) 


50.0 


10.0 


20.0 


0.0 


0.0 


20.0 


0.0 



TABLE 7-34 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' RESPONSES AS TO WHETHER 
OR NOT GOOD LIFE IS POSSIBLE IN THIS AREA/FARMING SYSTEM FOR FARMER 

AND CHILDREN 



FARMER FARMER'S CHILDREN 

(SHORT/MEDIUM TERM) (LONG-TERM) 



(N=) 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 
1 


Don't 
Know 


Model A Norm (349) 


98.9 


1.1 


65.0 


22,1 


12.8 


Model A Accel (39) 


100.0 


0.0 


82. 1 


12.8 


5.1 


Model B Coop (151) 


84.8 


15.4 


76.2 


9.3 


14.6 


Commumal Area (62) 


85.5 


14.5 


53.2 


40.3 


6.5 


Small-scale C (20) 


85.0 


15.0 


70.0 


25.0 


5.0 



249 

Farms. Most of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers who were willing to engage 
in wage labor chose the Large-Scale Commercial Farms which, incidentally, was 
the least preferred by Communal Area farmers. For all the other farmers 
working in the Mines was an option that hardly anybody cared for (Table 7-35). 

The responses to another similar hypothetical question showed very 
interesting pattern. The farmers were asked if their only option to attain a 
good life was remaining in agriculture the under which of the four farming 
systems associated with African agriculture would they choose. Every 7 in 10 
farmers in the Model A Schemes preferred remaining in the resettlement program 
while a third opted for the Small-Scale Commercial sector where they would 
have access to more land and other resources. Nearly 60 percent of the Model B 
Producer Cooperative farmers liked the cooperatives and nearly 40 percent of 
the Communal Area farmers also chose to farm in the Communal Area. All the 
Small-Scale Commercial farmers also preferred their own farming system and did 
not consider any of the other systems as a viable option (Table 7-36). 

The responses in Table 7-36 are striking for the fact that (1) every 6 in 
10 Communal Area farmers wanted an upgrade into the Model A resettlement 
program or better still into the Small-Scale Commercial farming, (2) over 36 
percent of the farmers in the Model B Schemes similarly wanted such an upgrade 
away from the cooperatives and (3) almost nobody outside the Communal Area or 
the Model B Producer Cooperative thought a good life was achievable for them 
if they were in any of the two respective farming systems. 

The final hypothetical question to the farmers related to what they would 
invest in were they to be given $1,000 each. The majority of all Model B 
Producer Cooperative farmers chose to use that to provide a home and other 
household essentials for themselves and/or their families. Elsewhere, other 
farmers would rather invest the money in their farms especially by purchasing 
capital or productive assets. Varying percentages of the farmers ranging from 



250 



TABLE 7-35 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL: FARMERS' PREFERENCE FOR JOB i 
LOCATION IF WAGE EMPLOYMENT IS THE ONLY OPTION I 

FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A GOOD LIFE ! 

I 

I 





HARARE/ 
OTHER 
TOWNS 


SMALL- SC 
COMMER 
FARM 


LARGE-SC 
COMMER 
FARM 


MINES 


NO 
PLACE 


(N=) 






% 






Model A Norm (348) 


10.0 


8.0 


4.3 


1.4 


76.2 


Model A Accel (39) 


2.6 


12.8 


5.1 


2.6 


76.9 


Model B Coop (151) 


13.2 


23.2 


4.6 


2.6 


56.3 


Communal Area (62) 


14.5 


14.5 


3.2 


6.5 


61.3 


Small-Scale C (20) 


5.0 


0.0 


20.0 


0.0 


75.0 



TABLE 7-36 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' PREFERENCE FOR 
FARMING SYSTEM IF AGRICULTURE IS THE ONLY OPTION 
FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A GOOD LIFE 

COMMUNAL MODEL B MODEL A SMALL- 
AREA (Mushandira (Minda SCALE 

Pamwe) Mirefu) COMMERCIAL 

(N=) 

I 



Model A Norm 


(348) 


0.6 


0.3 


72.1 


27.0 


Model A Accel 


(39) 


0.0 


0.0 


74.4 


25.6 


Model B Coop 


(151) 


3.3 


58.9 


29.8 


7.9 


Communal Area 


(62) 


38.7 


0.0 


35.5 


25.8 


Sraall-Scale C 


(20) 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


100.0 



251 

20 in the Small-Scale Commercial Area to 33 percent in the Model A Normal 
Scheme would buy cattle (Table 7-37). 

Still dealing with good life farmers were requested to list the one 
profession that they would prefer for their children who completed school. 
Those mentioned were put into eight major professional categories as follows: 
(1) farming, (2) engineering, (3) teaching, (4) nursing, (5) medicine, (6) 
driving (7) clerk or office work and (8) the army/police forces. More farmers 
in the Model A Accelerated Schemes chose Nursing followed by teaching. For 
farmers in the remaining farming systems teaching was the most cited choice 
(Table 7-38). 

Since almost all the major preferences entailed additional training it is 
likely that these farmers were prepared to invest more of their resources in 
the post-elementary education of their children. A rather interesting 
observation from the data relates to the comparative perspective offered by a 
sample of farmers' children about their own job preferences. Like their 
parents most of the students also chose teaching followed by nursing (see 
Table 7-38). 

Finally, all the farmers both African and European were respectively 
asked about their life situation for the period before independence in 1980, 
currently in 1985 and as they perceive it would be like five years hence in 
1990. Apart from the Europeans each farmer was shown a chart depicting a Good 
Life-Difficult Life Continuum simply as three levels on a stairway (Figure 
7-2). These farmers were each requested to indicate where he or she stood on 
the steps during the three separate periods. 

Around 9 in 10 resettled farmers in both the Model A Normal and 
Accelerated Schemes as well as the Model B Producer Cooperatives reported as 
having experienced hard or difficult life (upenyu hwakaoma) prior to 1980. In 
the Communal Area nearly 7 in every 10 also responded likewise. For both the 





MASHONALAND 


TABLE 
CENTRAL PROVINCE: 
ITEMS IN WHICH TO 


7-37 
FARMERS' 
INVEST $1 


CHOICE 
,000 


OF LIKELY 








INVEST 
IN FARM/ 
CAPITAL 
ASSETS 


BUY 
CATTLE 


PROVIDE 

HOME/ 
MATERIAL 

ITEMS 


SAVE 
IN BANK 


INVEST IN 
OFF-FARM 
BUSINESS 


OTHEI 




(N=) 






% 








Model 


A Norma (347) 


41.8 


32.6 


8.9 


8.4 


4.0 


4.3 


Model 


A Accel (38) 


33.3 


30.8 


12.8 


10.3 


5.1 


7.7 


Model 


B Coop (150) 


8.7 


23.3 


34.7 


13.3 


5.3 


14.7 


Communal Area (62) 


37.1 


29.0 


12.9 


9.7 


6.5 


4.8 


Small- 


-Scale C (20) 


65.0 


20.0 


15.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 








TABLE 


7-38 









MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CHOICE OF POST-SCHOOL 
PROFESSION FOR THEIR CHILDREN COMPARED WITH SELF-CHOICE BY GRADUATING 
STUDENTS FROM MUFURUDZI MODEL A SCHEME ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 



(N=) 


FARM 
ING 


ENGI 
NEER 
ING 


TEACH 
ING 


NURS 
ING 


MED I 
CINE 

% 


DRIV 
ING 


CLERK/ 
OFFICE 
WORK 


ARMY/ 
POLICE 


OTHEI 


Model A NorTna(325) 


9.8 


8.0 


30.2 


18.8 


8.3 


3.7 


12.6 


0.9 


7.7 


Model A Accel (36) 


5.6 


8.3 


19.4 


25.0 


5.6 


8.3 


5.6 


5.6 


16.7 


Model B Coop (90) 


12.2 


4.4 


33.3 


17.8 


7.8 


6.7 


12.2 


0.0 


5.6 


Connnunal Area (54) 


7.4 


9.3 


20.4 


13.0 


11.1 


5.6 


6.7 


7.4 


9.3 


Small-Scale C(16) 


12.5 


18.8 


25.0 


12.5 


18.8 


6,3 


0.0 


0.0 


6.3 


Muf urudzi 
Students (71) 


5.6 


15.5 


28.2 


23.9 


8.5 


5.6 


0.0 


7.0 


5.6 



Note: The 71 students represented the total population of graduating 
students in October 1985 and they were from the four elementary 
schools sponsored by the Mufurudzi Model A resettlement scheme. 
They were distributed as follows: (i) Magadzi (26), (ii) Mudzinge 
(20), (iii) Mukwari (15) and (iv) Muringamombe (10). 



253 



5 Years From Now (1990) 
(Makore mashanu ari kuuya) 




These Days (1985) 
(Mazuva ano) 




5 Years Before Now (1980) 
(Makore mashanu apfuura) 




Note: 1 — Hard Life; 2 — Some Progress; 3 — Good Life. 



FIGURE 7-2 
GOOD LIFE-DIFFICULT LIFE CONTINUUM 
(Upenyu hwakanaka-Upenyu hwakaoma/Madanho okubudirira) 



254 

Sraall-Scale and the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers the responses were quite 
familiar. A third of them reported that they went through a hard life during 
the period up to 1980 (Table 7-39). 

The majority of all farmers in the various farming systems said they were 
either making progress or enjoying a good life five years after independence 
in 1985. They also perceived that they were likely to enjoy a good life 
(upenyu hwakanaka) by 1990. A close examination of the Small-Scale Commercial 
farmers reveals that as much as a fifth of them reported to be going through 
hard times in 1985 and, worse still, a third believed that life was going to 
be a hard one for them in 1990. This pattern reflected the trend among the 
Large-scale Commercial farmers also. Of these a little over 44 percent 
perceived difficult times ahead (Table 7-39). 

Farmers: Their Material Resources and Capital Assets 

The study sought information about aspects of the quality of life that 
these farmers were experiencing in their respective rural communities. 
Specifically, responses were elicited to infer if the changed socio-political 
and econoraic scenario brought about by independence in 1980 was altering their 
access to various selected household items as well as to farm capital. 

The household or material items asked about were watches, radios, beds, 
sewing machines and bicycles. Such items might be seen as status symbols, 
items of comfort or necessities. Nevertheless, each of them ensured a kind of 
convenience to rural living that was not easily measurable in economic terms. 

These items were regarded in this study as sources or indices of social 
differentiation. The most striking observation from the responses indicating 
the distribution of these items across the various farming systems was the 
fact that in all cases the greater majority of the Cooperative sector farmers 



TABLE 7-39 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' PERCEPTIONS 
OF LIFE SITUATIONS 







1 


9 8 0 




1 9 


8 5 




1 9 


9 0 








HARD 


SOME 


GOOD 


HARD 


SOME 


GOOD 


HARD 


SOME 


GOOD 






LIFE 


PROG 


LIFE 


LIFE 


PROG 


LIFE 


LIFE 


PROG 


LIFE 




(N=) 










% 










Model A Norm 


(348) 


92.0 


7.5 


0.6 


5.5 


92.0 


2.6 


0.3 


4.3 


95.4 


Model A Accel 


(38) 


89.5 


10.5 


0.0 


5.3 


92.1 


2.6 


0.0 


5.3 


94.7 


Model -B Coop 


(148) 


87.8 


6.1 


6.1 


10.2 


79.6 


10.2 


4.1 


27.2 


68.7 


Communal Area 


(61) 


68.9 


31.1 


0.0 


6.6 


88.5 


4.9 


0.0 


13.1 


86.9 


Small-Scale C 


(20) 


33.3 


22.2 


44.4 


22.2 


44.4 


33.3 


33.3 


22.2 


44.4 


Large-scale C 


(9) 


44.4 


22.2 


33.3 


33.3 


44.4 


22.2 


44.4 


22.2 


33.3 



256 

did not own them. Watches were a common item that most farmers had. In all 
more Sraall-Scale Commercial farmers enjoyed the comfort or prestige of owning 
these household items than their counterparts in the other farming systems 
(Table 7-40). 

The majority of all farmers with watches obtained them after 1980 while 
the more durable items, such as sewing machines and bicycles were acquired 
before 1980. The majority of the newer or resettlement area farmers had since 
1980, that is, after they became resettled acquired in addition to watches 
such other items as radios and beds (Table 7-41). Infact, two farmers in Gatu 
village owned cars and another two in Magadzi also had acquired lorries. 

In response to the question if farmers bought items of clothing for 
themselves, their spouses and children during 1985 most farmers said they did. 
The exceptional case was still the Cooperative farmers. Among them only 1 of 
every 3 managed to afford this "luxury" or to fulfil what might be deemed an 
important social obligation in rural Africa (Table 7-42). 

Among African farmers in Zimbabwe the productive or capital assets that 
are important include scotch-carts, ox-plows, sprayers, wheelbarrows, 
cultivators, planters and tractors. In addition to these livestock ownership, 
especially mombe or cattle, is very important to these farmers not only for 
agricultural purposes but even more so for religious and other social reasons. 
,\gain the Cooperative farmers as individuals did not possess any of these 
assets. The majority of farmers from all the farming systems also did not own 
Scotch-Carts (Table 7-43). 

All farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes as well as every 3 out of 
4 in the Model A Normal Scheme who had scotch-carts acquired them since being 
resettled in 19S0. The same pattern holds across the board for items such as 
sprayers, wheelbarrows, tractors and tractor implements (Table 7-44). 



257 



TABLE 7-40 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF 

HOUSEHOLD ITEMS 

WATCH/CLOCK RADIO BED/MATRESS SEWING BICYCLE 

MACHINE 







Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 




(N=) 


% 






I 




% 




% 




% 


Model 
Norm 


A 

(348) 


57.5 


42.5 


32.5 


67.5 


48.0 


52.0 


10.9 


89.1 


30.2 


69.8 


Model 
Accel 


A 

(39) 


64.1 


35.9 


30.8 


69.2 


48.7 


51.3 


10.3 


89.7 


17.9 


82.1 


Model 
Coop 


B 

(151) 


23.8 


76.2 


11.3 


88.7 


11.9 


88.1 


4.6 


95.4 


3.3 


96.7 


Communal 
Area (62) 


55.7 


44.3 


31.5 


68.5 


55.7 


44.3 


21.9 


78.1 


38.7 


61.3 


Small- 
Commer 


■Sc 

(20) 


75.0 


25.0 


60.0 


40.0 


80.0 


20.0 


15.0 


85.0 


60.0 


40.0 



TABLE 7-41 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN HOUSEHOLD MATERIAL 

ITEMS ACQUIRED 



WATCH/ CLOCK 



RADIO 



Before After Before After 

1980 1980 



BED/MATRESS 

Before After 
1980 





(N=) 




% 


(N=) 




I 


(N=) 


% 




Model A 
Norm 


(200) 


5.0 


95.0 


(113) 


35.4 


64.6 


(167) 


48.5 


51.5 


Model A 
Accel 


(25) 


4.0 


96.0 


(12) 


50.0 


50.0 


(19) 


42.1 


57.9 


Model B 
Coop 


(36) 


5.6 


94.4 


(17) 


17.6 


82.4 


(18) 


38.9 


61.1 


Commmunal 
Area 


(34) 


11.8 


88.2 


(19) 


52.6 


47.4 


(34) 


70.6 


29.4 


Small-Scale 
Commmerc (15) 


40.0 


60.0 


(12) 


66.7 


33.3 


(16) 


68.8 


31.2 



SEWING MACHINE 

Before After 
1980 



BICYCLE 

Before After 
1980 



(N=) 



(N=) 



Model A Norm (38) 68.4 31.6 

Model A Accel (4) 75.0 25.0 

Model B Coop (7) 57.1 42.9 

Conraiunal Area (13) 53.8 46.2 

Small-scale C (3) 66.7 33.3 



(101) 56.4 42.6 

(7) 57.1 42.9 

(5) 60.0 40.0 

(24) 66.7 33.3 

(12) 58.3 il.7 



259 



TABLE 7-42 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHETHER FARMERS' PURCHASED 
CLOTHING ITEMS IN 1985 

MEN'S CLOTHES WOMEN'S CLOTHES CHILDREN'S 

CLOTHES 

Yes No Yes No Yes No 

(N=) 

% 



Model A Norm (348) 91.1 8.9 95.4 4.6 95.7 4.3 

Model A Accel (39) 82.1 17.9 94.9 5.1 100.0 0.0 

Model B Coop (151) 35.1 64.9 31.1 68.9 35.1 64.9 

Communal Area (62) 80.6 19.4 91.9 8.1 85.5 14.5 

Small-scale C (20) 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 



TABLE 7-43 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF 
PRODUCTION/CAPITAL ASSETS 



SCOTCH-CART 
Yes No 
(N=) % 



Model A Norma (348) 39.4 60.6 

Model A Accel (39) 20.5 79.5 
Model B Coop (151) 

Comnunal Area (62) 40.3 59.7 

Small-Scale C (20) 75.0 25.0 



OX-PLOW 
Yes No 
% 



84.8 15.2 

71.8 28.2 

79.0 21.0 

90.0 10.0 



SPRAYER WHEEL-BARROW 
Yes No Yes No 
% % 



81.3 18.7 

69.2 30.8 

37.1 62.9 

80.0 20.0 



24.9 75.1 

20.5 79.5 

29.0 71.0 

65.0 35.0 



CULTIVATOR PLANTER TRACTOR TRACTOR 

IMPLEMENTS 





(N=) 


Yes 


No 

% 


Yes 

% 


No 


Yes 

I 


No 


Yes 

t 


No 


Model A Norma 


(348) 


49.7 


50.3 


3.2 


96.8 


7.8 


92.2 


7.5 


92.5 


Model A Accel 


(39) 


30.8 


69.2 


2.6 


97.4 


7.7 


92.3 


7.7 


92.3 


Model B Coop 


(151) 


















Communal Area 


(62) 


50.0 


50.0 


8.1 


91.9 


0.0 


100.0 


0.0 


100.0 


Small-Scale C 


(20) 


80.0 


20.0 


55.0 


45.0 


45.0 


55.0 


45.0 


55.0 



261 



TABLE 7-44 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN PRODUCTION/ CAPITAL 

ASSETS ACQUIRED 

SCOTCH-CART OX-PLOW SPRAYER WHEEL BARROW 



Before After Before After Before After Before After 
1980 1980 1980 1980 



(N=) 




% 


(N=) 




% 


(N=) 




% 


(N=) 




% 




Model A 


























Norm (137) 


25.5 


74.5 


(295) 


31.9 


68.1 


(283) 


7.8 


92.2 


(84) 


29. 


8 


70.2 


Model A 


























Accel (8) 


0.0 


100.0 


(28) 


25.0 


75.0 


(27) 


3.7 


96.3 


(8) 


12. 


5 


87.5 


Communal 


























Area (25) 


40.0 


60.0 


(49) 


71.4 


28.6 


(23) 


30.4 


69.6 


(18) 


33. 


3 


66.7 


Small-Scale 
























Com (15) 


80.0 


20.0 


(18) 


66.7 


33.3 


(16) 


43.7 


56.3 


(13) 


38. 


5 


61.5 



CULTIVATOR PLANTER TRACTOR TRACTOR 

IMPLEMENTS 

Before After Before After Before After Before After 
1980 1980 1980 1980 



(N=) 

% 






(N=) 


% 




(N=) 


? 


1 


(N=) 


t 






Model A 

Norm (173) 42.8 


57. 


2 


(11) 


36.4 


63.6 


(27) 


3.7 


96.3 


(27) 


3.7 


96. 


3 


Model A 

Accel (12) 16.7 


83. 


3 


(1) 


100.0 


0.0 


(3) 


0.0 


100.0 


(3) 


0.0 


100. 


0 


Communal 
Area (31) 64.5 


35. 


5 


(5) 


40.0 


60.0 


(0) 


0.0 


0.0 


(0) 


0.0 


0. 


0 


Small-scale 
Com (16) 68.7 


31. 


3 


(11) 


90. 1 


0.9 


(9) 


45.5 


55.5 


(9) 


45.5 


55. 


5 



262 

Since independence the AFC has introduced medium and long-term loan 

programs to assist African farmers to acquire these items. These days farmers 

in the resettlement villages are being encouraged to team up and obtain 

tractor and equipment loans from the AFC for their collective use. In 1985, 

there were cases of such successful groups in Gwetera and Chitepo villages in 
2 

Muf urudzi . 

In terms of livestock ownership it is only in the Communal Area that 
every farmer had at least one head of cattle. This, however, did not mean that 
he or she owned draft-oxen which are an important asset for land preparation 
and for farm and household haulage purposes. Unlike all other farmers none of 
those in the Communal Area had more than 10 cattle. Among the Small-Scale 
Commercial farmers 95 percent were cattle-owners. In this group every nine in 
ten farmers had between 11 to 21 or more head of cattle. This contrasted with 
the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 46 percent of whom did not have 
any cattle at all (Table 7-45). The modal number of cattle owned by farmers in 
the Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area was 3 head. 

These days donkeys are becoming an important draft and haulage animals in 

rural Zimbabwe. There is an acute problem of trypanosomiasis-carrying 

tsetsefly glossina sp., which infests most of the northern portions of the 

3 

entire Mashonaland Region. Given this problem donkeys, which are not 
bothered by tsetse, can be of distinct advantage to farmers in the region. 
However, none in the Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Area and only an 
insignificant percentage of farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated 
Schemes possessed any donkeys (Table 7-46). This may be explained in turn by 
the obvious utilities that cattle have over donkeys in respect of farmers' 
subsistence, cash flow and ceremonial or social needs. 

Small ruminants, particularly goats and sheep are also important for 
meeting some of the more mundane needs of farmers such as ready cash and also 



263 



TABLE 7-45 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF CATTLE OWNED BY FARMERS 





(N=) 


NONE 


1 


2-4 


5-10 


11-15 


16-20 


21 OR 
MORE 


Model A Norm 


(349) 


19.8 


8.6 


35.5 


26.9 


7.8 


0.9 


0.6 


Model A Accel 


(39) 


46.2 


5.0 


23.0 


20.6 


2.6 


2.6 


0.0 


Model B Coop 


(151) 
















Communal Area 


(62) 


0.0 


3.2 


69.3 


27.4 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Small-scale C 


(20) 


5.0 


0.0 


5.0 


0.0 


35.0 


20.0 


35.0 



TABLE 7-46 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF DONKEYS OWNED BY FARMERS 

* 





(N=) 


NONE 


1 

% 


2-5 


6 OR 
MORE 


Model A Norm 


(349) 


96.6 


0.9 


2.5 


0.0 


Model A Accel 


(39) 


97.4 


0.0 


0.0 


2.6 


Model B Coop 


(151) 










Communal Area 


(62) 


100.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Small-Scale C 


(20) 


100.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 



264 

food. Surprisingly, however, the majority of fanners did not have either goats 

(Table 7-47) or sheep (Table 7-48). This pattern was conspicuously more so in 

the resettlement schemes. There, unlike the dispersed settlements of the 

Communal and the Sraall-Scale Commercial Areas, the nucleated village system is 

not particularly conducive to the free ranging habits that both cattle and the 

small ruminants maintain. 

Indeed, the very few in Mufurudzi were already a nuisance both in the 

homes and to the farms closest to the villages. Thus, the socioeconomic 

advantages of goats and sheep ownership were increasingly being overshadowed 

by the fact that as free rangers they had become a source of social conflicts 

4 

among some of the farmers and their neighbors. 

Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints and Scheme Needs 

Model A Scheme Farmers 

Farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes were asked to 
identify what they saw as the problems and the needs associated with their 
resettlement. In addition, they were also requested to give what they 
perceived to be the cause of each such problem. Specifically, the farmers 
responded to three sets of questions relating to (1) the major constraint that 
faced them during the initial years of resettlement, (2) the one which was 
facing them in the 1985-86 farming season and (3) what they would describe as 
being the nature of the major problem encountered in their experiences dealing 
with the three parastatal agricultural service agencies. These agencies were 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) , the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB). 



TABLE 7-47 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF GOATS OWNED BY FARMERS 



(N=) 



NONE 1-4 5-10 11-15 16-20 21 OR 

MORE 



Model A Norm (349) 84.0 8.9 6.3 0.0 0.6 0.3 

Model A Accel (39) 82.1 15.4 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 

Model B Coop (151) - 

Communal Area (62) 53.2 45.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 

Small-scale C '(20) 55.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 5.0 0.0 



265 



TABLE 7-48 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF SHEEP OWNED BY FARMERS 

NONE 1-4 5-10 11-15 16-20 21 OR 

MORE 

(N=) 



Model A Norm (349) 

Model A Accel (39) 

Model B Coop (151) 

Communal Area (62) 

Small-Scale C (20) 



91.4 4.3 3.2 

100.0 0.0 0.0 

87.1 12.9 0.0 

80.0 10.0 5.0 



0.3 0.6 0.3 

0.0 0.0 0.0 

0.0 0.0 0.0 

5.0 0.0 0.0 



TABLE 7-49 

"°?SY%frrfS^^^'''' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS 
THEY FACED IH THE INITIAL YEARS OF RESETTLEMENT 

MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=346) (N=39) 



Environmental 

Resettleioent Inf rast 

Greet it/ Inptits/ lapi em 

laiaage/Crop Transport 
S Marketing 

Servlee laslnesses 
Other 

No Problem 



% 



52.6 
15.3 
16.8 

7.2 
6.1 
1.2 

9 



I 



Si. 3 
30.8 
10.3 

2,6 

2.6 

2.6 



266 

In the second, third and fourth years of resettlement in Mufurudzi, that 
" is, between 1981 and 1984 Zimbabwe experienced what was conceived by many 
farmers as the worst drought, shangwe , in living memory. Crop production was 
adversely affected, livestock died and most farmers at one point or another 
subsisted on food rations from the government and non-governmental 
organizations which they supplemented with items gathered from the wild. In 
some schemes a few households gave up, abandoned resettlement and left their 
new homes for the traditional security of the old Communal Areas. 

Many who stayed on and continued to farm were even two years later still 
/'■ indebted to the AFC for the loans contracted in the drought years. Thus 52 
percent of all the resettled farmers cited this environmental or climatic 
constraint. Among the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Scheme the lack of 
resettlement infrastructure was also seen as a major problem (Table 7-49). 

The interviews were done over a period when the farmers were supposed to 
be in the final phases of preparing to begin the cropping programs. Yet, the 
greatest majority of them had not plowed their lands because the Tillage Team, 
then just transferred from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement to the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development, 
had QOt arrived in the schemes to tractor plow the lands. This delay, perhaps 
caused by the ministerial transfer and reorganization, was a matter of great 
concern throughout the resettlement schemes and the Communal Areas in the 
i-lashonaland Central Province as well as other parts of the country. It 
appeared also that most farmers having gotten "used" to mechanical tillage 
were either complacent or not prepared to get their draft-oxen ready for the 
task. 

The apparent crisis which faced these Model A Normal and Accelerated 
Schemes was made worse by the non-arrival of the season's input packages 
consisting of seed maize, cotton and peanut and the top dressing and other 



268 

fertilizers. The delay was reported to be due to transportation problems that 
faced the Bindura-Mount Darwin Cooperative Society which had been commissioned 
as the exclusive input delivery agency to Mufurudzi and other nearby farmers 
under the AFC's small farmer credit program.^ 

For the 1985-86 season the problems mentioned most by the farmers related 
to delayed land preparation, cited by 53 percent of them all, and delayed 
supply of inputs- which was mentioned by another 40 percent (Table 7-50). 

The delay in the delivery of these essential pre-season services by the 
agencies were variously blamed in most instances on the A.FC, the Ministry of 
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR) or the government, the 
cooperative supplier and even the Resettlement Team (Table 7-51). Talking to 
many farmers one could detect an apparent confusion in their minds in 
perceiving these rather distinct institutions as being the same establishment 
in terms of their respective abilities to solve the problems of delayed 
plowing and inputs delivery. 

However, when the farmers were questioned specifically about the AFC 13 
percent stated that they had not experienced any problems with the 
Corporation. Nevertheless, 52 percent of all the farmers complained bitterly 
about its insensitivity to their plight. Other complaints mentioned included 
its bad loan repayment and bad credit processing systems (Table 7-52).^ 

The greater majority of farmers did not complain about the respective 
dealings of the Grain and Cotton Marketing Boards with them. Those who had any 
problems cited either (1) the delay that they encountered in receiving checks 
for payments of produce sold or (2) the lack of haulage vehicles and the long 
distances that they had to cover in order to transport produce to the buying 
centers or storage depots in Shamva or Mount Darwin (Table 7-53 and Table 
7-54). 



TABLE 7-50 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS 
THEY FACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1985-86 SEASON 



MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=339) (N=39) 
% % 



Delayed Land Preparation 52.2 
Delayed Farm Inputs 38.1 



AFC Rejected Loan/ 
No Cash 

Other 

No Problem 



3.8 

2.7 
3.2 



46.2 
46.2 

2.6 
2.6 
2.6 



TABLE 7-51 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF 
PROBLEMS THEY FACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1985-86 SEASON 



MODEL A NORMAL 
(N=328) 



Agric. Finance Corp (AFC) 36.0 
Govt. /Ministry of Lands 16.8 
Environmental/ Climatic 



Cooperative (Input) 
Supplier 

Resettlement Team 

Other 

Don't Know 



16.8 

7.0 
2.4 

14.0 
7.0 



MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=39) 

% 



30.8 
7.7 
7.7 

20.5 

17.9 
15.4 



TABLE 7-52 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS 
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION 

MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED 

(N=348) (N=39) 

% % 

Insensitivity " to Fanners' 



Plight (resulting from 



drought) 


50.9 


64.1 


Bad Credit Processing 


21.6 


2.6 


Bad Pajonent (Stop Order) 


13.2 


12.8 


Other 


2.0 




No Problem 


12.4 


20.5 



TABLE 7-53 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS 
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE GRAIN MARKETING BOARD 



MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=348) (N=39) 



% 



Delayed Issue of Checks 



26.4 



Poor Marketing/Depot Too Far/ 
Transportation 14.9 



Other 

No Problem 



0.6 
58.0 



% 



20.5 



7.7 



71.8 



TABLE 7-54 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS 
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE COTTON MARKETING BOARD 



MODEL A NORMAL 
(N=348) 
% 



MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=39) 



Delayed Issue of Checks 



23.0 



Poor Marketing/Depot Too Far/ 
Transportation 18.9 



No Problem 



58.0 



30.8 

12.8 
56.4 



272 

Finally these farmers identified the majority need of the schemes to be 
resettlement infrastructure particularly a health clinic (Table 7-55). ^ 
In the medium to long-term projection of the planners these resettlement 
schemes were to develop or attract service businesses and industries as they 
matured and as their service centers evolved as growth points (see Zimbabwe 
1983d) . 

The slow development of these essential services was a matter of great 
frustration for most farmers. In particular, local transportation was a 
problem. Some farmers, for instance, walk 17 kilometers one way from say Gatu 
to Chindunduma on the main Shamva-Mount Darwin road to wait for hours to catch 
a bus. One out of every three farmers in Mufurudzi therefore mentioned this 
transport, grinding mills for maize-meal and other grain, grocery stores and 
butcheries as their urgent needs. 

As to who should be responsible for the provision of these needs 42 
percent looked up to the government or the Mnistry of Lands, Agriculture and 
Rural Resettlement to do so. Another 34 percent suggested a joint effort of 
the government or the Ministry and the farmers (Table 7-56). 

The Model B and Communal Area Farmers 

The constraints mentioned by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers are 
treated separately below in Chapter VIII where the general problems that were 
identified with these Schemes are reviewed. 

For the Communal Area farmers each was asked to indicate what major 
concern faced him or her. The three major responses that were given comprised 
(1) lack of agricultural implements and services such as credit and inputs, 
which was the problem of 29 percent of the farmers, (2) poor or inadequate 
land and (3) lack of water (Table 7-57). 



TABLE 7-55 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF THEIR 
RESETTLEMENT SCHEME NEEDS 



MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=348) (N=39) 



Health Clinic 34.5 

Other Resettlement 

Infrastructure 10.6 

Service Businesses 29.3 

Livestock Service (for 

Tsetsefly Eradication 12.1 

Produce Depot/Transport 7.8 

Other 5.2 

Not Sure/Don't Know 0.6 



% 



25.6 

61.5 
5.1 



5.1 
2.6 



TABLE 7-56 

MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF WHO TO 
PROVIDE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME NEEDS 



MODEL A NORMAL 
(N=347) 
7, 



Govt. /Ministry of Lands 43.2 

Government & The Farmers 32.0 

NGOs (Foreign Donors) 6.9 

The Farmers Themselves 5.8 

Other 6.6 

Not Sure/ Don't Know 5.4 



MODEL A ACCELERATED 
(N=37) 
% 



29.7 
56.8 
2.7 
2.7 

8.1 



274 

TABLE 7-57 

COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING 
THEIR AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE 



PROBLEM 


FREQUENCY 


% 


Credit /Inputs /Implements 


18 


29.0 


Poor/Inadequate Land 


16 


25.8 


Water / EnviTnnTnpnfAl 

U >vV>-^/ LULL W LL LI L- U -1. 




Z ^ . D 


Transport /Marketing 


4 


6.5 


Clinic/Social Infrastructure 


3 


4.8 


Other 


3 


4.8 


No Problem 


4 


6,5 



! 



! 



276 

TABLE 7-58 

COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS 
AFf ICXIte THEIR AGRICULTMAIi WilORMANCE 

QUESTION RESPONSE FREQUENCY % 



What should the Government 
do to solve farmers' 
problems in this Area? 



What should farmers in 
this Area do to solve 
their agricultural 
problems? 



Provide more credit/ 
inputs/ implements 

Provide more social 
infrastructure and 
services 

Resettle more people 
Other 



27 

20 
13 
2 



32,3 
21.0 
3.2 



Utilize AGRITEX advice 

and services more fully 29 46,8 

Work harder 20 32.3 

Obtain more credit/ 

input/implements 8 12,9 

Other 3 4,3 



Nothing/Situation is 

hopeless 2 3.2 



275 

Having been asked to identify their problems these farmers were requested 
to propose solutions that they wanted the government to implement as well as 
those that they felt they themselves should carry out to improve the situation 
of Communal Area agriculture. Almost 44 percent of the farmers called upon the 
government to make available to them more credit, inputs and farm implements. 
This was followed by the provision of inf rastr uc tural services and more lands 
or resettlement (Table 7-58). On their part these Communal Area farmers 
thought that they would perform better if they utilized more extension advice 
and also worked harder (Table 7-58). 

Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle, Micro-Level 
Agricultural Characteristics and Economic Performance 

The respective phases which characterize the developmental cycle of 

various households in the different farming systems (see Table 7-14 above in 

this Chapter) operating in the Mashonaland Central Province exhibit 

9 

interesting associational patterns. A few of these discussed below are 
the respective producer and consumer units, the head of cattle owned, area of 
land cultivated, quantity of maize retained for household use and finally the 
net farm cash flow from maize and cotton sales. 

Units which are capable and available for production were calculated for 
each individual household . ^'^ For all the 458 farmers covered in this 
analysis these mean units ranged from a low of 1.5 to a high of 7.9. The 
household with the lowest mean unit belonged to one in a decline phase within 
the Model A Normal Scheme. The households with the most mean units were 
male-headed, polygynous and in expansion phase within the Model A Accelerated 
Scheme. However, for the Model A Normal Scheme, the Communal and the 
Sraall-Scale Commercial Areas it was rather the male-headed, polygynous 
households in the consolidation phase which commanded most producer units. 



277 

Generally, the households with the most units were all male-headed and 
polygynous. Those with the least were either in decline or were female-headed 
or monogamous households headed by young men who were just beginning to 
establish themselves (Table 7-59). 

Similarly, consumer units were calculated for all households ^ The 
pattern in many ways replicates that of the producer units in that the 
male-headed polygynous households also had more mouths to feed. It is 
interesting to note in this regard that the polygynous households in the 
consolidation phase in the old farming systems, namely, the Communal and 
Small-Scale Commercial Areas, had the most consumer units. In the new farming 
systems or the Model A Schemes, however, the polygynous ones in the expansion 
phase had the most units (Table 7-60). (The significance of the relationship 

! 

between the producer and consumer units for household performance is examined 
below in this Chapter) . 
j If mombe or cattle owned was taken to be the tangible measure of 

! socioeconomic status or the symbolic worth of the household then the evidence 

I 

indicates that the male-headed polygynous households in the consolidation 
phase constituted the model class in rural Zimbabwe. Among our farmers the 
I mean head of cattle owned ranged from the low of one beast for each of the 

male-headed monogamous households in the expansion phase within the Model A 
Accelerated Scheme to a high of 26 for the polygynists in the Model A Normal 

i 

Schemes (Table 7-61). It may be mentioned in passing that the transfer of 
cattle plays the most crucial role of completing and legalizing traditional 
marriages in Zimbabwe. Polygynous households especially with more favorable 
ratio of married daughters to sons are in a better position to accumulate more 
cattle from in-laws. 

\ihen it comes to the size of area cultivated male-headed polygynous 
households in the expansion phase had more hectares. In the Communal Area 



TABLE 7-59 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD PRODUCER UNITS 



B C D E F G H 



(N=) 



278 



Model A Norma(340) 2.2 3.7 2.5 6.0 4.1 3.1 3.6 6.5 1.5 

Model A Accel (37) 2.0 3.6 2.0 7.9 3.9 3.0 2.1 7.5 

Communal Area (61) 2.0 3.9 4.2 5.8 3.8 2.8 2.6 6.3 3.0 

Small-scale C (20) - 3.8 - 4.8 4.4 2.0 - 5.3 



TABLE 7-60 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD CONSUMER UNITS 



CN=) 


A 


B 


C 


D 


E 


F 


G 


H I 


Model A Norma (340) 


2.6 


4.8 


3.2 


7.8 


4.9 


3.8 


4.8 


7.3 1.5 


Model A Accel (37) 


2.5 


4.1 


3.0 


11.0 


4.5 


2.0 


2.7 


9.0 


Communal Area (61) 


2.3 


5.3 


5.1 


6.9 


4.4 


3.4 


3.4 


7.8 3.0 


Small-Scale C (20) 




5.2 




5.8 


4.4 


2.0 




6.5 



Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase 
B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase 
C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase 
D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase 
E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase 
F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase 
G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase 
H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase 
I = Household in Decline Phase 
- = Phase not represented 



279 

their counterparts in the consolidation phase rather cultivated more hectares. 
In the isolated case of the Small-Scale Commercial Area a consolidated 
female-headed household with the spouse away from the farm had the largest 
mean farm size of 18.4 hectares (Table 7-62). This particular farmer had a 26 
year old son who assisted her to manage the farm and probably with her spouse 
earning off-farm income from another source she was able to put more land into 
cultivation. Within this farming system the individual household with the most 
area cultivated, that is, 24 hectares was male-headed, monogamous and 
expanding . 

In terms of maize retained for household use the sole female-headed 
household in the Sraall-Scale Commercial Area was also the leader by keeping 76 
X 91 kilograms of maize. The fact that this was far in excess of the 
households subsistence needs suggested that the spouse might be engaged in 
some piggery or poultry project elsewhere or most probably in a maize-meal 
milling project in the nearby Mount Darwin urban center (see Figure 7-1). 
Within the remaining farming systems the polygynous households on the whole 
retained more maize than other households did (Table 7-63). 

In order to assess the economic performance of farm households in 
different phases of the developmental cycle it would have been ideal to use 
various costs and returns data that are traditionally generated by farm 
management studies. These rely on enterprise or whole farm records kept by 
farmers or enumerators over periods covering the agricultural season to 
calculate various measures of farm economic performance. 

Costs are treated as variable or overhead expenditure. Variable 
expenditure is the costs that specifically relate to a particular crop or 
livestock enterprise. It may include, for instance, such purchased input items 
as seed, fertilizer and pesticide, hired labor for various farm activities, 
plowing and land preparation, produce packing, storage, transportation and 



280 



TABLE 7-61 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD HEAD OF CATTLE OWNED 

ABCDEFGHI 

(N=) 

Model A Norma(340) 7.9 17.3 13.2 25.1 17.1 12.6 17.8 25.5 4.0 
Model A Accel (37) - 1.4 5.0 3.0 4.8 1.5 0.7 5.0 
Communal Area (61) 3.0 6.0 5.6 5.2 10.6 7.2 1.5 13.2 10.0 
Small-scale C (20) - 16.6 - 14.5 20.3 11.0 - 24.5 



TABLE 7-62 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD HECTARES CULTIVATED 



(N=) 


A 


B 


C 


D 


E 


F 


G 


H 


I 


Model A Norma (340) 


3.5 


3.1 


3.0 


3.7 


3.1 


3.1 


3.3 


3.4 


1.4 


Model A Accel (37) 


2.0 


2.4 


2.0 


3.7 


2.6 


2.6 


2.7 


3.6 




Communal Area (61) 


1.6 


2.1 


1.8 


1.6 


2.0 


1.8 


1.1 


2.2 


1.6 


Small-scale C (20) 




11.3 




6.6 


9.4 


18.4 




12.2 





Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase 
B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase 
C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase 
D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase 
E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase 
F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase 
G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase 
H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase 
I = Household in Decline Phase 
- = Phase not represented 



281 

marketing. Overhead expenses, on the other hand, are treated on whole farm 
basis as they refer to costs that cannot be directly assigned to a particular 
cropping or livestock enterprise. 

Based on yields and commodity prices obtained by the farmer it is 
possible to calculate, Cor example, (1) gross income or income received from 
produce sale and in the case of cash-cum-subsistence crops the sales in 
addition to the value of retentions, (2) gross marg ins , that is, the gross 
income minus total variable cost, (3) net farm profit which is the whole farm 
gross margin less whole farm overhead expenditure and (4) return per dollar of 
variable cost which is obtained by dividing the gross income for each 
enterprise by the total variable expenditure for that enterprise. Similarly, 
the total variable cost per unit of area cultivated can be divided by a crop's 
gross income per unit of production to obtain the break even yield. This is a 
useful measure of a crop's yield that is required to cover total variable 
expenses. Other pertinent indices include farm cash surplus for household use 
which gives an idea about the working capital or the self-sustaining capacity 
of the farm; gross farm income which measures productivity of the resources 
used as an indication of the intensity of the farm operations and the 
household net cash income. The latter is the cash available to the household 
for non-farm payments. It is a partial but important index of the welfare of 
the household in terms of whether it is poor or successful (see Dillon and 
Hardaker 1980; Kay 1981). 

Given the limited field resources and the broad regional nature of this 
study it was not possible to mount the necessary data collection activity to 
derive these rather useful farm management measures. The farmers' net cash 
incomes, which were calculated and are presented below as an index of their 
economic performance, was done by (1) relying on recall of their respective 
cotton and maize sales as well as maize retentions, which were cross-checked 



282 

with the Central Statistical Office (CSO) data collected by the Resettlement 
Team and AGRITEX, (2) using the prevailing Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) expenditure parameters set for these smallholder farmers and (3) the 
government producer prices for the 1984/85 season. 

Maize and cotton are the chief crops in the African or smallholder farms 
throughout Mashonaland Central Province and, indeed, around other parts of the 
country where agro-ecological factors permit commercial agriculture by these 
smallholders . 

In Mufurudzi for example, which is the central focus of this analysis, 
78.2 percent of the total variable expenditure of $850.10 incurred by the 
resettled farmers in 1982-83 season went into maize, 20.9 percent into cotton 
and the remaining 0.9 into livestock. Of the mean hectares cropped per sample 
household which was 3.99 the percentage devoted to maize was 81.5. In terms of 
the total gross income of $479.62 maize contributed 46.4 percent, cotton 48.9 
and livestock only 4.7 percent. There was no off-farm income (Zimbabwe 
1984c:14, Tables 5 to 8).^'^ 

Consequently, for our measure of economic performance the farmers' net 

cash incomes were calculated exclusively from costs and returns to these two 

dominant crops, that is, maize and cotton. The production of these crops were 

13 

financed with loans from the AFC. The produce was also sold to the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cotton Marketing Board ( CMB) respectively at 
government stipulated prices. ^'^ All the 349 farmers in the Model A Normal 
and the 39 in the Model A Accelerated Schemes, the 62 in the Communal Area and 
the 20 in the Small-Scale Commercial sector grew maize in 1984-85 agricultural 
season. A total of 337 in the Model A Normal, the 39 in the Model A 
Accelerated, 50 in the Communal and 17 in the Sraall-Scale Commercial Areas 
also grew cotton in addition. 



283 

This cash income must not be misinterpreted to be the farm profit because 
if does include interest and arrears charges on loans that most of these 
farmers owe to the APC. These costs are deducted at source by a stop order 
honored in its behalf by the marketing boards. In our case also income from 
livestock was not taken into account. 

Table 7-64 indicates that in the resettlement Model A Schemes the 
male-headed polygjmous households in the expansion phase commanded the highest 
net farm income grossing a mean of $2,443 from maize and cotton sales with 
respect to the Model A Normal Schemes and $1,810 in the case of the Model A 
Accelerated Scheme. For the Communal Area it was the male-headed polygynous 
households in the consolidation and then the expansion phases respectively 
which obtained the highest net cash incomes. The monogamous male-headed 
households which were also in the consolidation phase constituted the top net 
cash flow earner in the Small-Scale Commercial sector with a mean of $3,204 
(Table 7-64). 

Generally, the households which did poorly in this regard were those in 
(1) the decline phase, (2) the male-headed monogamous ones which are trying to 
get established in both the Communal and the Model A Accelerated Scheme and 
(3) the female-headed households without supporting spouses anywhere. 

In fact, households in the resettlement or new farming systems did 
remarkably better than those in the old Communal and Small-Scale Commercial 
sectors. In the latter only the male-headed households in the consolidation 
and the expansion phases respectively managed to record positive net cash 
flows (Table 7-64). At any rate one can conclude from this preliminary 
analysis that the resettlement Model A farms generate more cash. Consequently, 
their debt servicing capacities are much better than the Communal farms and 
surprisingly even more so than the so-called Small-Scale Commercial farms. 



284 



TABLE 7-63 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD (91 KILOGRAMS) BAGS OF MAIZE RETAINED FOR 

CONSUMPTION 



B C D E F G H 



(N=) 



Model A Norma(340) 8 17 13 26 17 13 18 26 8 

Model A Accel (37) 5 12 14 20 16 9 6 10 - 

Communal Area (61) 13 12 13 19 13 10 10 24 15 

Small-scale C (20) - 51 - 60 23 76 - 37 - 



TABLE 7-64 

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES 
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD NET FARM CASH FLOW (MAIZE AND COTTON) 



(N=) 


A 


B 


C 


D 


E 

$ 


F 


G 


H 


I 


Model A Norma (340) 


1,609 


1,315 


1,623 


2,443 


726 


1,198 


862 


1,912 


0 


Model A Accel (37) 


546 


698 


307 


1,810 


1,282 


1,113 


373 


1,360 




Communal Area (61) 


462 


253 


330 


505 


442 


300 


-72 


515 


261 


Small-Scale C (20) 




770 




-322 


3,204 


-2,095 




-496 





Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase 
B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase 
C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase 
D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase 
E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase 
F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase 
G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase 
H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase 
I = Household in Decline Phase 
- = Phase not represented 



285 



Conclusion 

Anthropologists interested in rural economies have tried to make a very- 
important conceptual and anlaytical contribution to development studies in the 
area of the application of households' producer and consamer structures to an 
understanding of productivity patterns. This is where Chayanov's rule (see 
Thorner _et al . 1966) comes in. 

Marshall Sahlins (1974:89) in his interpretation of the Russian economist 
Chayanov is of the view that households with relatively less producers to 
consumers would have to work more and those with more producers would work 
less to ensure domestic well being. In his (Sahlins 1974:102) view, therefore, 
the "intensity of labor ... to provide an acceptable per capita output" is a 
function of the ratio of household producers to consumers. Diana Hunt 
(1979:265) similarly interpretes Chayanov to be saying that "households with 
many producers would achieve higher outputs per producer, due to exploitation 
of economies of scale in allocating labour time." 

Both Hunt and Sahlins mention output which therefore may be taken as a 
valid measure of work. In the context of the realities of rural Africa 
particularly in regard to our case study at least two levels of output 
measures are appropriate. The first is the area cultivated which, given the 
prevailing extensive rather than the intensive land use system, primarily 
determines the volume of output harvested. The second is marketed value which 
is now accepted without question to be an important consideration in the 
decision making process of smallholder farmers. 

Hunt's and Sahlins' interpretations of Chayanov's rule were examined in 
the "controlled" conditions of the resettlement Model A Schemes, where all 
respective households have access to equal amounts of cultivable land and to 
government credit, inputs, extension, marketing and other facilities. The 



286 

evidence generated in Table 7-65 shows that in the Zimbabwe situation 
households with more mouths to feed cultivated more hectares of land on the 
average, that is, between 3.4 and 3.7 hectares. Correspondingly, they obtained 
higher mean net cash flow from maize and cotton. They thus validate Sahlins 
(1974:89) interpretation that increasing consumer to producer ratios are 
associated with increased cultivated area and output. However, the evidence 
appears on the surface to disconfirm Cnayanov's view of "more producers more 
output ," 

Infact, further analysis this time using the producer units instead of 
the producer/consumer ratios does not yield any consistent pattern to prove or 
disprove the validity of the assertion that higher per capita outputs are 
achived by households with many producers (Table 7-66). In the Model A. Normal 
Scheme there were 21 types of producer units. The highest per capita mean net 
cash income of $719 was achieved by the second ranking household which had 
11.0 units of producers. However, the household which ranked second in income 
ranked 19 in producer units with only 2.0. The same basic pattern also holds 
for the Model A Accelerated Scheme. In effect therefore merely having more 
producers in a household does not necessarily translate into more output and 
vice versa. 



TABLE 7-65 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: PRODUCER AND CONSUMER UNITS 
RATIO, MEAN HECTARES CULTIVATED AND MEAN NET FARM CASH 
FLOW (MAIZE AND COTTON) 

PRODUCER UNIT/ MEAN MEAN NET 

CONSUMER UNIT (N=) HECTARES RANKING FARM CASH RANKING 

CULTIVATED INCOMES 

( $ ) 



: 1.00 




28 


2.9 


7 


1,077 


7 


: 1.01 


- 1.10 


19 


3.0 


6 


1,399 


6 


: 1.11 


-1.20 


78 


3.3 


4 


1,901 


4 


: 1.21 


-1.30 


83 


3.3 


4 


1,765 


5 


: 1.31 


-1.40 


78 


3.4 


2 


2,029 


3 


: 1.41 


-1.50 


35 


3.7 


1 


2,547 


1 


: 1.51 


- more 


16 


3.4 


2 


2,128 


2 



Note: Analysis of the comparative data from 37 households in the 
Model A Accelerated Scheme yielded similar results. There 
13 households with the largest ratios (i.e l:1.31-more) 
cultivated more mean hectares (i.e 2.9) and obtained the 
highest mean net margin from sales (i.e $1,476). In contrast 
3 households with the least ratio (i.e 1:1) cultivated the 
smallest mean hectares (i.e 2.1) and even more so made the 
minimum net margin of a mere $139. 



288 



TABLE 7-66 

MODEL A SCHEMES: PRODUCER UNITS AND MEAN PER CAPITA 
NET CASH INCOME (MAIZE AND COTTON) 



MODEL A NORMAL 



MODEL A ACCELERATED 



PROD- RANK (N=) MEAN NET RANK PROD- RANK (N=) MEAN NET RANK 

UCER CASH FLOW UCER CASH FLOW 

UNIT PER CAPITA UNIT PER CAPITA 

$ $ 



1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.5 
6.0 
6.5 
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
9.0 
9.5 
10.0 
11.0 
11.5 



21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 



' 2 
3 
36 
37 
29 
34 
20 
45 
24 
31 
21 
11 
13 
15 
5 
3 
5 
2 
2 
1 
1 



18 
-29 
612 

486 
462 
393 
379 
253 
227 
220 
328 
421 
390 
360 
345 
177 
377 
135 
324 
719 
274 



20 
21 
2 
3 
4 
6 
8 
15 
17 
16 
12 
5 
7 
10 
11 
18 
9 
19 
13 
1 

14 



1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 



6.0 
6.5 

7.5 



9.0 
9.5 



12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 



1 
5 
4 
9 
3 
4 
2 



5 2 
4 4 

3 1 



314 
204 
328 
268 
197 
194 
442 



272 
230 

181 



167 

250 



3 
8 
2 
5 
9 
10 
1 



4 
7 

11 



12 
6 



289 



Notes 

1. ) These nine major categories can be subdivided or elaborated further by 
incorporating two other criteria specified in Appendix A. These are (1) the 
presence or absence of extended kin( s) /af f ine( s) and (2) the state of fission 
of the household structure. These additional categories would have been 
necessary if a much larger sample than this study covered was involved. 

2. ) With independence in 1980 the expansion in the coverage of the peasant 
farm sector by the Agricultural Finance Corporation has been extraordinary. 
From a mere trickle of $0.6 million given to 2,500 farmers in 1979 the AFC 
provided a total of $37.0 million short term or seasonal loans in 1984 to 
91,000 Communal Area and Resettlement Scheme farmers (see AFC Annual Reports, 
Harare) . 

In the case of Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme the situation in 1985 with 
the AFC was as follows. Of the total 563 resettled farmers 546 or 97 percent 
applied for short term or seasonal loans. Nineteen or 3.5 percent of these 
applicants were refused. Of the 527 or 93.6 percent of the farmers who were 
approved a total of $349,104 were granted. The mean per capita credit received 
by these farmers was therefore $662.44. The total loan granted was distributed 
as follows: (1) $223,590 for 870 hectares of cotton, (2) $83,850 for 430 
hectares of maize, (3) $14,448 for 24 hectares of burley tobacco and (4) 
$27,216 for the contract plowing of 432 hectares. 

In terms of medium term loans 165 such loans in the total amount of $21,800 
were given to Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme farmers in 1985. These were to 
be spent on draft-oxen, scotch-carts, cultivators, plows, harrows, a planter 
and a rifle. 

3. ) During 1985 the European Economic Community (EEC) in conjunction with 
SADCC and the respective governments of Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe was 
carrying out pilot surveys to devise effective means of combating the tsetse 
flies and eradicating trypanosomiasis from the entire region through both 
ground and aerial spraying. 

In the specific case of the Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme a team of 
inspectors from the Department of Veterinary Services had by February 1985 
inspected 1,916 heads of cattle in the scheme. Of this a total of 395 or 21 
percent were smeared. Ninety-two heads tested positive of trypanosomiasis 
infection. In October 1985 there were 15 teams of inspectors camping in the 
Scheme scouting the movements and studying the ecology and breeding habits of 
the flies. 

In the nearby Mount Darwin Model A Normal Scheme similar teams were also at 
work. As at the end of January 1985 the inspectors had trapped 100 flies which 
indicates a fairly high concentration within an area the size of the Scheme. 

4. ) According to the records the combined total of goats and sheep in the 12 
surveyed villages in Mufurudzi rose from 191 heads in 1982-83 to 275 in 
1983-84. In 1985 the 349 farmers interviewed reported 439 such small livestock 
among themselves . 

Though the trend in increasing numbers is commendable many women in the 
villages complained that the ruminants were a problem. These women were being 
encouraged by Women and Community Development officers to get involved in 
backyard and cooperative vegetable gardens to supplement household nutrition 



290 



and earn extra cash. However, based on their respective experiences many felt 
that the gardens were not worth the trouble of additional fencing expenses and 
the time required to constantly police them to ward off goats and sheep (see 
also Chapter VIII fn4 ii below) . 

5. ) As Billings (1985:29-30) points out Zimbabwe generally has a good and 
accessible supply of most farming inputs. Major companies such as the Seed 
Coop Company of Zimbabwe, Farm Seeds Limited and Farmers' Coop Limited have 
contracts with various commercial seed growers to produce a number of hybrid 
maize varieties and other agricultural seeds. These seeds, particularly hybrid 
maize SR52, R200 and R201 are almost universally distributed throughout the 
country in a range of convenient package sizes. 

Fertlizers are likewise produced in large quantities in the country by two 
major companies including Windmill (Pvt) Limited. These rely on local deposits 
of ammonia and phosphate. Zimbabwe also has an advanced agricultural 
manufacturing sector which caters for all basic farm implements needs of most 
farmers . 

Inspite of these many farmers in the Resettlement Schemes and the Communal 
Areas experience serious problems in receiving their inputs on time. Given the 
fact that these respective farming systems are now heavily supported by the 
government in the form of guaranteed credits these problems may be attributed 
to the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and Cooperative input 
deliverers. According to Billings (1985:24-25) about 85 percent of the over 
400 registered cooperative movements in Zimbabwe are in the Communal Areas as 
agricultural marketing and input supply cooperatives. These Cooperatives have 
the responsibility to procure and deliver inputs for the Resettlement Schemes 
and the Communal Areas. They operate a network of about 300 input delivery 
centers most of which have been built with aid from Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) . 

Under the AFC operated Small Farms Credit and the Resettlement Credit 
Schemes all inputs approved for these smallholder farmers have to be 
channelled through a designated input delivery Cooperative. At the grassroots 
level such as Mufurudzi the Cooperatives have major delivery bottlenecks. 
These are mainly the result of their inability to procure haulage vehicles at 
the right time and also the poor state of some rural access roads. 

6. ) The phenomenal expansion of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
into peasant agriculture through its Resettlement and the Small Farms Credit 
Schemes is perhaps the determinant factor in the accumulative revolution that 
is occurring within rural Zimbabwe today. 

Notwithstanding this fact, however, the grassroots evaluation by most 
farmers of AFC's service delivery is quite abysmal. There are four main 
concerns expressed by these farmers, namely, (1) late deliveries or 
non-delivery of some input items it approves on farmers' buying orders, (2) 
subsequent invoicing and charges to farmers' accounts of such inputs not 
delivered, (3) the delivery of inputs at locations more convenient to the 
Cooperative agents but less so to the farmers and (4) the "seemingly" 
arbitrary procedures used by AFC field officers to reduce the sizes or even 
refuse farmers credit applications. 

.Anybody who understands the operation of the AFC's input credit package 
would blame the first 3 complaints on the Cooperatives. The fact that farmers 
hold the AFC accountable accusing it of insensi tivity to their plight shows 
that the Corporation has serious public relations deficiencies in its dealings 
at the basic level of the peasant. The following illustrative case is quite 



291 



common. On May 30, 1985, the Commission Delegate of the European 
Communities in Zimbabwe after visiting the Jondale-Bumbe Model A Nonnal 
Scheme (see Figure 8-1 below) and hearing some of the above complaints 
from the resettled farmers conveyed them to the AFC. The General Manager 
of the AFC in his letter of June 21, 1985, explained in response that: 

Our staff have stressed that farmers should take the initiative 
to demand delivery of goods or services from the Co-op officials 
concerned and not to leave this to the AFC. ... On the issue of 
collection points distance, we advise clients to discuss the issue 
with Co-op officials who hire the transporters especially so 
because AFC provides money for the transport services. On granting, 
criteria programme viability, and credit worthiness which is mainly 
a reflection of the farmers' loan payment performance is taken into 
consideration. Poor payment record equals smaller loans in future 
and good record equals bigger loans on a gradual basis (sic.) 

The Cooperatives in turn shift some of the blame to the AFC arguing that 
its delay in giving them all the approved buying orders in time does not 
facilitate effective procurement and delivery of farmers inputs. For 
instance, as late as October 10, 1984, exactly 35 days before farmers in 
Mufurudzi experienced 40 percent probability of planting rains AFCs 
regional office in Bindura had not released the full list of farmers who 
qualified or did not qualify for what amounts of loan. As the Resettlement 
Officer's letter to DERUDE , Harare, indicated the Cooperative had a valid 
point. The memo explained: 

Bindura-Mt. Darwin Coops, would like to deliver the inputs for 
the few farmers whose buying orders were processed but they feel 
it would be uneconomical as they may have to do several trips 
with small loads because further bits of inputs would still be 
gradually released by AFC. . . . AFC has so far approved 245.5 ha 
to be contract ploughed in Mufurudzi which is equavalent to 102 
farmers. . . . AFC promised to release more contract ploughing 
forms later. We now have 7 tractors to do contract ploughing for 
farmers in Mufurudzi. They arrived on Monday 8 October '84 and 
started ploughing at Gatu Village the following day. We wish AFC 
could release all the names of farmers accepted for contract 
ploughing before the tillage team moves off. 

All these developments should be placed against the technical or 
ecological perspective in Zimbabwe. Because of the short rainy season 
early planting is required to ensure maximum yield. The fact is that for 
every one week delay in planting date there is on the average a 5 percent 
reduction in yield for major crops such as maize (Billings 1985:122). 

Finally, the farmers also have a problem with the delay in receiving 
their checks for produce sold. As of the end of November 1985, over 3 
months after many farmers sold their crops, most farmers in Mufurudzi had 
not been served with their payment notices. This is due to the complicated 
nature of the "stop order" system under which the Grain and the Cotton 
Marketing Boards have to monitor individual farmers' sales and deduct 
AFCs loan principal, arrears and interest charges before sending a check 
for whatever amount is left to the farmer's credit. 



292 



7. ) The selection of a health clinic as the major need is quite 
interesting in that a total amount of $24,000 was allocated for the 
erection of such a clinic in Mufurudzi. Infact, as at the end of July 1985 
$19,815 out of the total allocation had been spent (see Chapter VIII Table 
8-15 below) in putting up the clinic which is located at the Rural Service 
Center (Figure 3-2). The physical construction of the clinic was completed 
in June 1983. Yet, two years after its completion Mufurudzi households did 
not still have access to this vital medical facility and had to travel to 
Shamva or Madziwa Township for treatment. 

The problem was that when DERUDE formally notified the Ministry of 
Health to arrange to take over the building and operate the clinic as 
required under the resettlement policy (see Chapter V) the Mashonaland 
Central Provincial Medical Officer responded with complaints that (1) the 
location of the clinic was not central to the population it was built to 
serve, (2) the facility lacked such furniture as cupboards, (3) the Type B 
(government) accomodations constructed for the medical staff would not 
attract qualified personnel to live in Mufurudzi and that the Ministry of 
Health was not consulted in the planning of the clinic. 

This apparent bureaucratic wrangling between the Ministry and DERUDE 
over these clinics was not peculiar to Mufurudzi. Indeed, the problem was 
universal and hardly any clinic built in the Model A Normal Schemes were 
operational at the beginning of 1985. In November 1985 certain 
modifications recommended by the Ministry were being carried out in 
preparation for the opening of the clinic. These included the erection of 
two "blair" toilets for use by outpatients. 

8. ) The relative isolation of most of the resettlement villages makes the 
unavailability of service industries such as grocery stores and grinding 
mills a seriously felt problem. In May 1985 a store was licensed to open 
at the Mufurudzi Rural Service Center (see Figure 8-2). The fact that this 
is some distance from all the villages except Zvomanyanga makes the 
utility of this store very limited. 

Under the resettlement policy and planning service industries in these 
Schemes are controlled. For example, any individual wishing to establish a 
small business there can only do so by first applying formally through the 
Resettlement Officer to lease a trading site or business stand at the 
Rural Service Center. The Resettlement Officer in conjunction with the 
Area Board (see Chapter V Figure 5-1) reviews the application. If it is 
approved then a recommendation is forwarded to the State Land Officer who 
issues the lease accordingly (see Zimbabwe 1983d). 

In considering such application for a lease preference is given to the 
small enterpreneur from the adjoining Communal Areas or urban center. In 
theory resettled farmers who have sufficient capital and have consolidated 
their land allocations into successful productive units also qualify. 

As of 1985 there were plans to permit traders already well established 
in the Rural Service Centers to expand by opening grocery kiosks in some 
villages . 

9. ) These patterns between developmental cycle type and for instance the 
number of cattle owned, area of land cultivated, quantity of maize 
produced, retained and sold and net cash flows of farmers also exist with 
such variables as households ownership of items and capital assets and 
perceptions and attitudes about life situations. Given the limited scope 
of this study it has not been expedient for any correlational or 



293 



multivariate analysis to be carried out at this point to explore any 
causal relationships that may exist. 

10. ) The household producer units were calculated by assigning 1 point in 
weight to all household members above age 14 and working full time in the 
farm. A.11 other members 5 years or older not defined by the household head 
as full time farmers but who contribute labor in some way (such as scaring 
birds, helping to pick cotton or baby sitting on the farm while adults are 
weeding the crop) were assigned a weight of 0.5. 

11. ) The household consumer units were similarly calculated by assigning 
household members age 15 or above I point and those below 15 years 0.5 
points . 

12. ) Certain resettled farmers, numbering about 10 in all, are gainfully 
employed either within or outside the Scheme which is against their 
permits of resettlement. For the greatest majority of farmers, however, 
there are no viable sources of off-farm employment within the Scheme. 

In the circumstaace a successful livestock enterprise can facilitate the 
cash flow needs of farmers. This is especially so for small ruminants such 
as goats and sheep (see fn4 above). However, the calving and mortality 
rates of livestock in these resettlement schemes are generally poor. In 
1982-83 the records indicate that for the 12 Mufurudzi villages cattle 
births were 248 against 36 deaths. In 1983-84 while births increased to 
312 deaths also jumped significantly to 122. The statistics below show 
that (1) cattle sales, (2) out-transfers usually for social purposes and 
(3) household slaughter for consumption are rather few. 



Purchases Births In-Tran 

sf er 



Sales Deaths Slaughter Out- 
Transfer 



1982- 83 

1983- 84 



13 

253 



248 
312 



20 

108 




A major problem with livestock accumulation in these Schemes is the fact 
that some farmers are going against the stipulations in their resettlement 
permits by exceeding the legal or assigned Livestock Units (see for 
instance. Chapter VIII fn 5 iii below). There was a large increase of 
"in-transfer" which in 1983-84 numbererd 108 heads or 16 percent of all 
additions to Mufurudzi cattle herd. If this trend continues it may suggest 
that some resettled farmers are perhaps taking advantage of the better 
pastures that the resettlement areas provide by informally bringing in 
livestock owned by kin and friends in the land-hungry Communal Areas. 

13.) For the 1984-35 season the AFC's estimation of variable costs for 
Mufurudzi Model A Scheme and nearby smallholder farmers were (1) Maize: 
$195 plus $63 for every hectare of contract plowing, (2) Cotton: $257 plus 
$63 for every hectare of contract plowing and (3) Tobacco: $602 plus $63 
for every hectare of contract plowing. 



14.) For the 1984-85 season the government approved producer prices 



offered by the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) were (1) Maize; 
$16.36 per 91 kilogram bag and (2) Cotton: $99.00 per 180 kilogram bale 
Tobacco is sold by auction and prices per kilogram fluctuate on the 
floors . 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT 

Evaluating Change and Development 

The evaluation of development policy programs entails major 
responsibilities. These include (1) measuring attainment of process objectives 
or ends-goals, (2) determining achievement of means-goals and (3) describing 
program implementation (Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 1984a:7 fnl). However, 
evaluation goes beyond the mere quantification of observable indices. It is 
concerned with the critical assessment of the part that programs or projects 
play in generating particular outcomes. 

Many analysts point out that research to measure ends-goals or 
means-goals is better conducted by studying policy inputs and program outputs 
and the establishment of a relation between them (Coleman 1975:36; Morris and 
Fitz-Gibbon 1983, 1984a, 1984b; Fitz-Gibbon and Morris 1984; Henerson et_ al . 
1934). 

Such a task demands that the development process be conceptualized as a 
set of linked hypotheses Chat embodies the concept of causality. The 
attainment of development goals then is attributed to the prior achievement of 
policy objectives or project purposes which in turn derives from an earlier 
production of outputs that is also caused initially by the provision of inputs 
(USAID 1980:52-53). 

Evaluation therefore is nothing more or less than the systematic study of 
innovation and change. It calls for the analysis of variations that are 
observed to be occurring in the same units at different points In time and 
space and the relationship of such variations to interventions (Tuchfeld 
1979: 104). 

295 



296 



The recent upsurge in policy evaluation studies within the field of 
anthropology as well as in the other social sciences is confounded by 
persistent measurement dilemmas that characterize the analysis of change (see 
Bereiter 1963; Barth 1967; Cronbach and Furby 1970). Casley and Lury (1982:7) 
indicate that the most difficult problem in evaluation is the establishment of 
causality between project inputs and their effects and impacts. A widely 
shared solution to this methodological problem among policy analysts is the 
"movement away from inductive statistics toward more building of deductive 
models whereby one can deduce policy effects from empirically validated 
premises" (Nagel 1975:10). 

Michael Patton, however, criticizes the dominance of evaluation research 
by this 

largely unquestioned, natural science paradigm of 
hypothetico-deductive methodology [which] assumes 
quantitative measurement, experimental design and 
multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to 
be the epitome of "good" science. (Patton 1983:19) 

In his view this approach which comes from the tradition of experimentation in 
agriculture is no longer so ominous. Patton instead proposes an alternative 
paradigm that he derives from the tradition of anthropological field studies. 
This ethnographic approach uses 

the techniques of in-depth, openended interviewing 
and personal observation . . . qualitative data, 
holistic analysis, and detailed description derived 
from close contact with the targets of study [and it] 
aims at understanding of social phenomena. 
(Patton 1983:19) 

A similar view was suggested much earlier by Fredrik Barth. Barth 
(1967:661) is of the opinion that in the endeavor to understand change 
processes the contribution of anthropologists lies in two areas. These are 
(1) in providing such primary materials as concepts that allow for the 



297 



observation and description of the events of change and (2) in the 
researchers' powers of observation out there where change is happening. Barth 
is convinced that anthropology that primarily seeks to produce secondary data 
by deduction and extrapolation does not facilitate a better understanding of 
the dynamics of change. 

Given the multifaceted dimensions and the nature of the questions that 
evaluation addresses no one method can ever be analytically adequate. For 
example, in any specific case of policy-induced developments evaluators are 
confronted by at least four basic issues. 

The first is program effectiveness. Here the objectives are (1) to 
determine the substantive effects of a given policy by questioning whether or 
not implementation is delivering services according to design and (2), if it 
is doing so, whether the services are reaching the planned target clients or 
not (Levine 1967; Weiss 1972). The second facet of programs relates to 
efficiency. This involves the assessment of costs against policy effects, 
benefits and utility (Haveman and Margolis 1970; Merewitz and Sosnick 1971; 
Levin 1983a, 1983b). Feasibility is the third aspect that is of interest to 
program evaluation. It usually deals with political costs in terms of the 
constituency whose support is deemed necessary for the successful 
implementation and achievement of policy objectives (Lowi 1972). Finally, 
program ethics are an important consideration in evaluation research. Rather 
than emphasising outcomes program ethics concentrate more on policy goals and 
objectives in respect of the explicit normative values of the policy-making 
system or society (MacRae 1971). 

In the circumstance, only a broad set of evaluation questions which are 
probed through a variety of approaches can yield detailed insights into these 
aspects of development programs. Different evaluation situations and research 
concerns will therefore demand different and appropriate methods. Any such 



298 

method, however, has to be tailored to fit a specific need or program concern. 
To be able to maximize the available options the evaluator must utilize a 
holistic methodological perspective. This is what Fatten (1983:20) refers to 
as "a paradigm of choices." 

The paradigm used in this Chapter is a combination of approaches that 
looks at the inputs that go into resettlement, the costs of these inputs, 
their projected benefits and effects vis-a-vis the observable trends in the 
socioeconomic developments occurring in selected schemes. 

Macro-Level Costs, Development Inputs and 
Economic Projections 

Project Budgets and Costs 

In policy evaluation it is very common to use levels of expeaditure and 
expenditures per capita as proxy indices of development output (Parks 
1975:198). Resettlement as a development program has its fiscal costs. The 
direct and indirect costs incurred in respect of the resettlement in Zimbabwe 
comprise expenditures on (1) land acquisition and (2) general development. The 
latter item includes planning, implementation and physical contigencies . 

These costs are allocated against the bureaucratic or administrative 
machinery that services the program. Primarily, this is the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement which, until mid-1985, was known as the 
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (see Chapter V above). 
The details of these direct and indirect costs are elaborated upon further 
below. Table 8-1, for instance, provides an indication of the overall 
expenditures that go into resettlement as well as the specific areas for which 
these costs are expended. 



299 



TABLE 8 - 1 

I: 

ZIMBABWE: MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL 



uCj V jjijUrrrcjiN i 


BUDGET EXPENDITURE 
($ MILLION) 


1 Qfl 1 —ft 9 
XyO I o Z 


/ 1 QQ S- 

/ Lyo J 


o o 




1981-82 


1982-83 


1983-84 


1984-85 


1985-86 


xiamX LITcLLXun 

& General 












Land Acquisition 


14.0 


25.1 


6.5 


3.0 


6.3 


Resettl. Grants 


10.1 


12.8 


11.0 


10.2 


4.0 


Other 


X u . o 


1 n 4 


11.4 


19.3 


13.3 


Surveyor General 


1.8 


1.8 


2.2 


2.2 


2.3 


Rural Development 


0.0 


10.3 


10.2 


10.3 


11.3 


Coop Development 


1.3 


2.1 


2.0 


2.9 


3. 1 


Total 


44.0 


62.5 


43.3 


47.9 


40.3 


Total as % 
of National 
Budget 


2.1 


2.2 


1.4 


1.3 


1.1 



Source: Based on Estimates of Expenditure issued by the 
government for the respective financial years 
(see Zimbabwe 1982e, 1983b, 1984b, 1985b, 1986b). 



300 



In 1981-82 financial year, resettlement accounted for 2.1 percent of the 
national budget of $2,122.0 million. This share increased to 2.2 percent in 
1982-83. From then to the fiscal year 1985-86 the relative share was on the 
decline. It dropped to 1.4 percent in 1983-34, then to 1.3 percent in 1984-85. 
By 1985-86, when the national budget was $3,568.0 million, the proportion 
going into resettlement was down to 1.1 percent. In absolute terms also 
1982-83 was the best year for the Ministry when it received $62.5 million for 
its activities. In 1985-86 it operated with budgetary cuts that reduced its 
expenditure allocation to $40.3 million, only 64.5 percent of what it received 
three years earlier. 

The expenditures incurred by the Ministry are allocated into four 
specific areas or item headings. These are: (1) the development of 
cooperatives; (2) rural development, which essentially is the inf rastruc tural 
development of the Model A Intensive Resettlement Schemes; (3) the Department 
of the Surveyor General; and (4) Administration and General. The major share 
of all the monies allocated to the Ministry is accounted for by the latter 
item heading, though it is declining slightly relative to the other three. 

Under Administration and General are a number of sub-items many of which 
are categorised here into "others." These include salaries as well as the 
special grants administered by the parastatal Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA). ARDA, in addition to its statutory functions, 
undertakes the management of farms purchased by the government. It also 
disburses funds used by the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) for the 
inf rastructural development of the purchased farms pending the resettlement of 
farmers (see Table 5-2 above and Table 8-4 below). 

In 1981-82, an estimated $10.1 million in grant money in respect of 
resettlement was allocated to ARDA. The amount increased to $12.8 million the 
following year decreasing to an estimated $11.0 million in 1983-84. In 



301 



1984-85, there was a further cut to $10.2 million which was drastically 
reduced to $4,0 million in 1985-85. 

The expenditure for Land Acquisition is controlled directly by the 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (see Table 5-2 above and 
Table 8-4 below). Such expenditure is accounted for by the purchase of farms 
and compensation for other properties acquired for resettlement. Land 
Acquisition used to be the most significant sub-item under Adminstration and 
General. In 1981-82, this sub-item covered 31.8 percent of the total budget of 
the Ministry. The following year the proportion of the land acquisition 
expenditure was raised to 40.2 percent. In 1984-85, however, land purchases 
accounted for only 6.3 percent of the total expenditures. It appeared to be 
picking up though as the government approved 15.6 percent of the Ministry's 
allocation in 1985-86 for land acquisition alone These fluctuating trends in 
the budgetary allocations going into land acquisition as well as into the 
grants used by ARDA to administer the purchased lands reflect the ups and 
downs in the resettlement process over the years (see Table 8-1). 

In Table 8-2, the differential funding, costs and returns characteristics 
of 17 selected schemes representing a cross-section of the Model A individual 
family resettlements in the country are presented. Similarly, Table 8-3 shows 
corresponding features relating to a selection of 13 Model B cooperatives or 
collective resettlements. 

A review of the tables shows that there are variations in funding, 
project costs, resettlement costs per individual households, the economic 
internal rates of return and in other areas. These peculiarities tend to make 
each of the over one hundred and seventy schemes distributed around the 
country somewhat unique by itself. Even at this rather macro or aggregate 
level of review the problems and implications that this fact of uniqueness 
holds for the systematic and comparative evaluation of schemes' performances 



TABLE 8-2 

ZIMBABWE: SOURCE OF FUNDING, COSTS, AND RATES OF RETURN 
SELECTED MODEL A NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES 



SCHEME 


PROVINCE 


FUNDING 
SOURCE 


TOTAL 
COSTS 

($000) 


AVERAGE 
COST PER 
FAMILY 

($) 


EIRR 
% 


Hoyuyu 


Masho. East 


Kuwai t 


4,656 


2,162 


22.0 


Nyadire 


Masho. East 


Kuwai t 


1,619 


2,196 


25.8 


Sengezi 


Masho. East 


Zim/UK 


534 


1,846 


14.0 


Muf urudzi 


Masho. Central 


Zim/UK 


1,316 


2,337 


15.0 


Mt. Darwin 


Masho. Central 


Zim/UK 


1,635 


3, 162 


19.0 


Muzvezve 


Masho. West 


Zim/UK 


5,179 


4,574 


11.8 


Tokwe 


Midlands 


Zim/UK 


2,754 


2,521 


9.0 


Copper Queen 


Midlands 


Kuwai t 


4,930 


3,296 


10.4 


Sessombi West 


Midlands 


Zim/UK 


1,611 


2,945 


12.0 


Chinyika 


Manicaland 


Zim/ADB 


23,600 


3,469 


21.0 


Mayo 


Manicaland 


Zim/UK 


3,673 


2,652 


8.0 


Nyajezi 


Manicaland 


Zim/UK 


468 


2,449 


11.0 


Soti Sourrp 


q \7 1 n crn 


7 1 m / ]JV 


1 (^71 
1 , o ^ / 




1 Zl i 


Mukosi 


Masvingo 


Zim/UK 


1 ,361 


2,254 


7.0 


Chizvirizvi 


Masvingo 


Zim/UK 


548 


1,957 


15.0 


Mguza 


Matabele North 


Zim/UK 


780 


3,084 


2.9 


Dombodema 


Matabele South 


Zim/NE 


2,028 


2,898 


11.4 



Sources: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 

Evaluation and Monitoring Section; DERUDE; ARDA; AGRITEX, 
Harare . 

Note: EIRR — Economic Internal Rate of Return; Zim — Government 

of Zimbabwe; UK — Government of the United Kingdom; ADB — 
African Development Bank; NE — Netherlands Government; 
Masho — Mashonaland ; Matabele — Matabeleland . 



303 



TABLE 8-3 

ZIMBABWE: SOURCES OF FUNDING, COSTS, AND RATES OF RETURN 
FOR SELECTED MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES 

SCHEME PROVINCE FUNDING TOTAL AVERAGE EIRR 

SOURCE COST COST PER 

FAMILY 
($) ($) % 



Kwaedza 


Mas ho. 


East 


Zim/UK 


176,930 


1,769 


16.3 


Tabudirira 


Masho. 


East 


Zim 


380,626 


1,903 


9.0 


Kumhanya 


Masho. 


East 


Zim 


214,679 


3,253 


29.0 


Simba Youth 


Masho. 


Central 


Zim 


161,097 


1,790 


32.0 


Batsiranayi 


Masho .. 


Centra 


Zim 


153,955 


770 


19.4 


Kurima Inhaka 


Masho. 


Central 


Zim 


208,879 


5,022 


32.7 


Mukuwapasi 


Masho. 


West 


Zim 


1 n o O "7 

182,03/ 


1 o o n 




Gowe 


Masho. 


West 


Zim 


265,552 


4,918 


26.8 


Nyamakate 


Masho. 


West 


Zim 


224,462 


2,040 


38.9 


Gutsaruzhinj i 


Midlands 


Zim 


250,601 


2, 141 


27.8 


Ruponeso 


Manicaland 


Zim 


243,830 


3,997 


13.3 


Bethel 


Manicaland 


Zim 


326,986 


3,269 


24.3 


Magurabatanai 


Manicaland 


Zim 


201,234 


2,613 


33.0 



Source: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 

Evaluation and Monitoring Section; ARDA; DERUDE; AGRITEX 
Harare. 



Note: EIRR — Economic Internal Rate of Return; Zim — Government 
of Zimbabwe; UK — Government of the United Kingdom; 
Masho-Mashonaland, In 1985 there were no Model B schemes 
in the poorer agro-ecological provinces, namely, 
Matabeleland North and South and also in Masvingo. 



304 



are quite enormous. The variations give each scheme its own dynamism. 
Sources of Project Funding 

The initial funding for the resettlement program was made available 
jointly by the governments of Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom. This joint 
source continues to provide funding for the great majority of schemes 
throughout the country. However, in terms of the volume of funding, the 
African Development Bank and Arab sources, particularly Kuwait, have become 
important partners of Zimbabwe in securing aid monies for resettlement. 

For instance, in 1982 the government of Zimbabwe teamed up with the 
African Development Bank to finance the $23.6 million Chinyinka Scheme. The 
scheme which is located in the Makoni District, Manicaland Province, is 
certainly the biggest single resettlement in the country. It has an area of 
112,600 hectares distributed across Natural Regions II, III and IV. There are 
a total of 3,841 farm families in Chinyika and they are resettled in 108 
villages . 

Project Development Inputs 

It is important to observe that expenditure levels or per capita costs 
per se do not provide all the insights about development inputs. The 
specifics of expenditure commitments such as they are presented in Table 8-4 
make available to the evaluator a picture of what development monies are spent 
on. In this case a detailed summary of the various items budgeted for and 
progressively expended upon for the five year period covered between 1980-81 
and 1985-86 is shown. It must be mentioned that these expenditures are only 
for the Normal Intensive Model A and Model B schemes. They do not include the 



TABLE 8-4 

ZIMBABWE: BUDGET ALLOCATION, SUMMARY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
AND BALANCE FOR MODEL A AND MODEL B NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES AS 

AT JULY 31, 1985 



ITEM/ SUB-ITEM 


BUDGETED 
COST 


PROGRESSIVE 
EXPENDITURE 

(S 000") 


BALANCE 


.ndirecC Costs (Ministry 


of Lands, 


Resettl. & Rural Dev. 


) 


Land Acquisition 


35,385 


31 , 193 


4,192 


Development Team 


62 


58 


4 


Suspense Account 


5,142 


5, 148 


0 


Development Costs (Agricultural & 


Rural Dev. Authority) 




Demarcation and Survey 


1,699 


910 


789 


Land Preparation 


3,390 


2,279 


1,112 


Road s 


4,449 


1,503 


2,945 


Roads Maintenance 


400 


31 


369 


Water Supplies 


9,722 


4,305 


5,417 


Fencing 


4,563 


555 


4,008 


Dips 


1,568 


891 


677 


Staff Housing & Offices 


4,897 


1,541 


3,356 


Schools 


15,658 


9, 109 


6,549 


Clinics 


2,640 


712 


1,928 


Other Buildings 


1,338 


106 


1,233 


Rural Service Centers 


3,336 


1,394 


1,943 


Telephones 


98 


0 


98 


Pit Latrines 


13 


0 


13 


Crop Packs 


1,360 


934 


427 


Transport 


156 


2 


154 



TABLE 8 - 4 — continued 



ITEM/ SUB-ITEM BUDGET 


EXPENDITURE 
I''; 000"^ 


BALANCE 


TiJ(~\ (~i H T G 
WU UU. uU L b 


900 


6 


194 


Ecjui pmen t 




1 


244 


LdUXXb Uincll L or dll L riUCl. C X D 








Housing 5t Fann Buildings 


J i u 


47 


463 


iraccors a cjquipnienc 


7 S 


89 


695 


ULner cjquipnienL 


i ZD 


4 


121 


rlcillu. XUUl.b lL\jL l^XULUcib 


34 


28 


6 


Wn T" V C3 l"i n n Tn n 1 q 


17 


8 


9 


V ^ ^ L> 4^ ^ \_J CI JL ^-1 ^ 11 X ^ O 


7 


4 


3 


V-* 1. C d k-- tXO 




376 


142 


pn 


V i. 


27 


34 


UA odL L b 




2 


10 


\J ^ X Ul J. >3 lU C Lt 1.^ O 


25 


6 


19 


i L dll b po L L 


1 90 
i ^ u 


13 


108 


Vehicles & Cycles 


225 


55 


170 


Tobacco Demonstration Unit 


201 


97 


104 


British Dril ling Team 


20 


17 


3 


Planning & Implementation 4, 


880 


1,346 


3,534 


Contigencies 7 , 


292 


0 


7,292 


Recurrent Cost 1, 


564 


359 


1,206 


Total 112, 


727 


63, 156 


49,571 



Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), 
Harare . 



307 



Accelerated schemes (see Chapter V above for a description of the Resettlement 
Models) . 

As it is explained above the expenditure items range from indirect costs 
such as land acquisition to direct ones which include both primary and 
secondary development infrastructures like schools, crop packages for newly 
resettled Model A families and farm equipment for cooperative groups in the 
Model B schemes "(Table 8-4). The funds which are accounted for in this 
expenditure summary are respectively managed by the Mnistry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in the case of land purchases and by ARDA 
in the area of development items. 

The expenditure on land acquisition is the single most important cost 
item in resettlement. The total budgetary allocation for land acquisition for 
the period 1980-81 to 1985-86 amounts to a little over $35.0 million. Of this 
about 89 percent or $31.2 million was spent during the period under review. 
The funds for land purchase represent a third of the total amount of $110.8 
million allocated for the establishment and development of the schemes. 
However, in terms of the actual expenditure so far the commitment to the 
acquisition of lands makes up almost 50 percent. 

Apart from land acquisition there are two major areas of development 
expenditure or indirect costs which are significant. Tliese are expenditures on 
schools and water supplies construction respectively. 

Within the five year period a total of over $9.1 million were used for schools 
while over $4.3 million went into the provision of water supplies (Table 8-4). 

Project Economic Returns/Benefits 

The costs and benefits associated with development, as Gittinger (1972:4) 
points out, are a useful measure of the wealth creating capacity of a project. 



308 

The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) is one such method among others 
used in investment analysis (see Kay 1981:230-245; Livingstone and Ord 
1984:141-152). The EIRR uses discounted cash flow to measure a project's worth 
or the average earning power of the money expended over its life span 
(Gittinger 1972:71). 

In Zimbabwe the calculated rates range widely between different 
resettlement schemes and models. In the Model A schemes, for instance, it 
varies from a low of 2.9 percent for Mguza in the Matabeleland North Province 
to a high of 25.8 percent for Nyadire in Mashonaland East (see Table 8-2). 
Likewise, for the Model B schemes Tabudirira Cooperative located in the 
Mashonaland East Province has the lowest rate of return amounting to 9 
percent. The highest is for Nyamakate Cooperative in the Mashonaland West 
Province with a 39 percent EIRR (see Table 8-3). 

It needs to be noted, however, as Gittinger argues that 

Although the Internal Rates of Return of different projects 
will vary, projects cannot with confidence be ranked on the 
basis of the Internal Rate of Return. Only in a very general 
way will the Internal Rate of Return tell us that one project 
is better than another, in the sense that it contributes more 
to national income relative to the resources used. (Gittinger 
1982:331) 

Given the projections of the respective rates of return in the case of an 
overwhelming majority of the schemes the planners and policy makers are 
apparently optimistic generally that resettlement is economically viable. At 
the micro or grassroots level of the farmer viability of resettlement is, 
however, going to be determined by the ability of the resettled household to 
achieve adequate subsistence output and to produce enough crop and livestock 
surpluses for the market to realize a target cash income of $400 or more per 
year (see Chapter V above). 



309 



A comparison of the mean resettlement costs per family and the rates of 
economic returns is quite illuminative in that the relatively expensive 
schemes such as Muzvezve or Mguza are not necessarily the potentially 
productive ones and vice versa (Table 8-2). This is also true of the Model B 
Producer Cooperative Schemes (see Table 8-3). The fact of this matter 
underlies the ideological or political importance in terms of feasibility that 
governments' attach to such economic or rural development programs as 
resettlement . 

Assessing the Soclo-Economic and Political 
Performance of Resettlement Schemes 

An important evaluation issue arises from the foregoing macro-level 
information about costs and expected returns. The issue has to do with whether 
or not the expended budget generates the expected responses. This crucial 
concern is brought out so vividly by Casley and Lury. They argue (Casley and 
Lury 1983:9) that many projects assume certain beneficiary responses which do 
not materialize due to a lack of insight into the attitudes and constraints 
affecting the likely beneficiaries. 

In development programs the kinds of radical or even conservative 
responses that are expected of the affected or would-be-beneficiaries tend to 
be projected in the form of positive social, political and economic 
orientations. Nevertheless, the unanticipated responses or consequences of 
development, particularly the negative ones, are more often the most serious 
which also get reported. Evaluation therefore has to be concerned with 
identifying both the good and the bad that any implemented policy generates. 

In order to follow up on various dimensions of this issue in respect of 
the performance of the resettlement schemes two sets of case studies are 
presented here. The first deals with the evaluation of aspects of development 



TABLE 8-5 

MASHONALAND REGION: LIST OF RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES 

DBCMBM 1985 



mmmm 


MODEL A 
NORMAL 


MODEL A 
ACCELERATED 


MODEL B 
COOPERATIVE 


mashonalasd 

EAST 


1 Acton Reynold 


9 Matoniera 


12 Kwaedza 




3 Sengezi 2 

■T AtSM ** JF *-i »' 

5 Hojmyu 1 

6 Hoyuyu 2 

7 Nyamuzlzi 

8 Nyadire 


11 Wheleerdale 


14 Shandisai 

PfUng«ra 

15 Tamuka 

16 Ktoilianya 

17 laro^ra 

18 Tabudlrira 


MASHONALAND 
CENTRAL 


19 Mufurudzl 


22 Shajava 


28 Nyakudya 

KUcQua 




21 Karuyana 


24 Alfa 

27 Rrpmlin 
Heights 


30 Gbatoma 

^9 Vunh-incrir-ira 
£r.xiu.s#a xiiui>fi 
KuDuuXxxxa 

35 Batsiranayi 


MASHONALAND 
WEST 


36 Nyafflia 

37 Mttsengezi 


42 Chegutu 6 

43 Hamilton Wlls 


48 Sanyangu 

49 Sowe 




38 Jompani 


44 Pote 2 


50 Tashinga 




39 Muzvezve 1 


45 ToransHga 


51 Mukuwapasi 




40 Muzvezve 2 


46 Vuti A & 1 


52 Maaya 




41 Jondale/Bumbe 


47 Ngezi 


53 Nyamak^tt 



310 

achievements and problems within all the 53 resettlement schemes which are 
distributed between the three Models in operation in the Mashonaland Region 
(see Table 8-5 and Figure 3-1). This regional evaluation is based on the 
assessment of Resettlement Officers. The second consists of two detailed case 
studies which examine the dynamics of program performance using contrasting 
resettlement schemes and models. The Mufurudzi Model A Scheme and its 
immediate Model B neighbor the Simba Youth Cooperative Scheme are purposively 
chosen for this illustrative case study (see Figure 8-2). 

Both schemes are in the Shamva District, Mashonaland Central Province. 
They have similar agro-ecological features and were established at about the 
same time in 1980 as the premier resettlement projects in the country. A 
general background to each scheme is provided as well as its costs, economic 
projections, aspects of its development problems and agricultural performance. 

Resettlement Officers"" Assessment of Model A Schemes 

Attitudinal, Participation and Activity Profiles of Farmers 

In 1985, there were a total of 18 Resettlement Officers and their support 
staff In charge of the 16 Model A Normal Intensive and the 16 Model A 
Accelerated Intensive schemes in the Mashonaland Region comprising the three 
Provinces (see Table 8-5 and Figure 8-1). A major responsibility of these 
Officers is the close monitoring of the day-to-day developments within the 
schemes (see Chapter V above). 

/' For this evaluation the Officers were asked to assess their respective 
schemes and rate the resettled farmers from low to high on various items 
grouped into four profiles as follows: (1) Attitude — (i) social harmony and 
(11) motivation; (2) Participation — (i) VIDCO/WARDCO affairs, (11) self help 



312 




FIGURE 8 - 1 
MASHONALAND REGION: DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES 



313 

activities, (iil) youth affairs, (iv) women's affairs and (v) Area Board 
leadership; (3) Performance — (i) agriculture, (ii) loan repayment and (4) 
Activity — (i) cooperation with resettlement team, (ii) compliance with 
resettlement policy and (iii) long-term prospects for scheme success (see 
Appendix B, Tables 1 to 3 for the list of study variables). 

In the evaluation of the Resettlement Officers the two variants of Model 
A schemes were generally doing quite well in all areas examined. Indeed, the 
Accelerated schemes, which do not enjoy some of the infrastructures and 
services provided the Normal schemes, were even rated highly on most items. 
All Model A Normal schemes rated average or high on all items. In particular, 
the long-term prospects for the success of 91.7 percent of these schemes were 
high, the agricultural performance of farmers in 91.6 percent of them was also 
high likewise the motivation, cooperation with the Resettlement Team and 
participation in VIDCO/WARDCO affairs (Table 8-6). 

The organization and participation in resettlement matters and 
development among the youth in the Accelerated schemes are an item which was 
rated low. However, in other areas such as cooperation of the farmers with the 
Resettlement Team, agricultural performance, long-term prospects, motivation, 
participation in VIDCO/WARDCO issues, Area Board leadership, self help and 
social harmony among the resettled families these schemes rated consistently 
high (Table 8-6) . 

Performance of Service and Implementation Agencies 

At the scheme level the Resettlement Officers coordinate the work of 
various service organizations and personnel to facilitate their utilization by 
resettled farmers and their households. These range from 



TABLE 8-6 

MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF 
ATTITUDINAL AND ACTIVITY PROFILES IN MODEL A SCHEMES 



314 



NORMAL 
SCHEMES 



ACCELERATED 
SCHEMES 







(N=16) 




(N= 


16) 






LOW 


AVER 
AGE 


HIGH 


LOW 

i 


AVER 
AGE 


HIGH 


Social Harmony 


0,0 


50.0 


50.0 


0.0 


26.3 


73.7 


Motivation 


0.0 


16.7 


83.4 


0.0 


15.8 


84.2 


Agricultural 
Performance 


0.0 


8.3 


91.6 


5.3 


5.3 


89.5 


AFC Loan Repayment 


0,0 


50.0 


50.0 


6.3 


37.5 


56.3 


Political 
Participation 


0.0 


25.0 


75.0 


0.0 


21.1 


78.9 


Self Help 


8.3 


50.0 


41.6 


0.0 


21. 1 


78.9 


Youth Activities 


8.3 


41.7 


50.0 


10.5 


47.4 


42.1 


Women's Affairs 


16.7 


25.0 


58.3 


5.3 


52.6 


42.1 


Area Board's 

T,p a H p T"<?}ti n 


n n 

u. u 


Zl 1 7 


JO • J 


u . u 


1 J • O 




Cooperation With 
Resettlement Team 


0.0 


16.7 


83.3 


0.0 


0.0 


100.0 


Compliance With 
Resettlement Policy 


8.3 


33.3 


58.4 


0.0 


36.9 


63.1 


Long Term Prospects 
for Scheme's Success 


0.0 


8.3 


91.7 


0.0 


15.8 


84.3 



Note: The ratings cover all the 16 Model A Normal and the 16 Model 
A Accelerated Schemes in the Region. The Normal Schemes are 
distributed as follows: Mashonaland East 8; Mashonaland 
Central 2 and Mashonaland West 6. The Accelerated Schemes are 
also distributed as follows: Mashonaland East 3; Mashonaland 
Central 7 and Mashonaland West 6 (see Table 8-5 and Figure 
8-1). The evalution of these 32 schemes was done respectively 
by a total of 18 Resettlement Officers who manage them. 



315 



extension through the services of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
input delivery and produce marketing facilities. 

The assistance given to farmers and the services provided by the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation to all the 16 Model A Normal Intensive 
Schemes were rated highly by the Officers. The services of the village health 
workers, the school principals and AGRITEX in most schemes were also 
commended. In over half the schemes, the work of adult literacy personnel and 
the services of input deliverers receive only average rating. 

The relations between residents of Communal Areas and Resettlement 
Schemes which adjoin each other are crucial to the success of the latter. In 
the past, boundary fence stealing, "poach-grazing" and other acts of 
trespassing on resettlement land posed serious social problems. It is no 
surprise therefore that the nature of the cooperation of the residents of 
Communal Areas bordering a third of the schemes were rated low by the Officers 
(Table 8-7). 



Officers' Identification of Schemes" Problems 



From the perspective of the Officers the following are the problems that 
they encountered in the administration of the Model A Normal Schemes: (1) 
interference in their management duties by local-level ZANU-PF politicians 
which was cited for three of the schemes; (2) DERUDE's monthly kilometers 
allowed for the Officers' travel within the schemes which were considered to 
be inadequate and a limitation to close monitoring of the problems and the 
concerns of the resettled farmers; (3) problems of trespassing by Communal 
Area residents and their indiscriminate exploitation of the resources in the 
resettlement schemes; and (4) the tendency among some of the resettled farmers 
to ignore various conditions contained in the resettlement permits. 



316 

TABLE 8-7 

MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT OFFICERS EVALUATION OF 
IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES AND RELATED SERVICES IN MODEL A 
NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES 



NUMBER OF 
SCHEMES WHERE 
SERVICE PRESENT 


LOW 


AVERAGE 
% 


HIGH 


AGRITEX 


12 


8.3 


8.3 


83.3 


Veterinary 


9 


11.1 


11.1 


77.8 


Cooperative Development 


9 


22.2 


44.4 


33.3 


Water Development 


9 


0.0 


22.2 


50.0 


Medical/Cl inic 


8 


12.5 


37.5 


50.0 


School Principals 


12 


0.0 


16.7 


83.4 


Housing Development 


7 


0.0 


42.9 


57.2 


Village Health workers 


12 


8.3 


0.0 


91.6 


Community Development 


11 


0.0 


45.5 


54.6 


Adult Literacy Workers 


12 


0.0 


58.3 


41.7 


Non-Governmental Org's 


6 


16.7 


16.7 


66.7 


Tillage/Plow Team 


11 


9.1 


18.2 


72.8 


Road Development 


11 


9.1 


27.3 


63.7 


Agricultural Finanace 
Corporation 


12 


0.0 


0.0 


100.0 


Input Delivery 


12 


16.6 


50.0 


31.3 


Marketing Boards 


12 


0.0 


41.6 


58.3 


Communal Area Neighbors 


12 


33.3 


41.7 


25.0 



Note: The ratings cover only 12 Model A Normal Intensive Schemes. 



317 



For the Model A Accelerated Schemes the Officers reported problems which 
emanated from the very nature of those schemes. The most mentioned constraint 
was the lack of resettlement infrastructure such as schools, clinics and good 
access roads which were available to the Normal Schemes. The problems of 
squatters, lack of farmer self-help organization and some farmers' lack of 
draft oxen were also cited. 

Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B Cooperative Schemes 

Attitudinal and Activity Profiles in the Cooperative Schemes 

In all, eight of the 18 Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region 
additionally supervise aspects of the activities of the 21 Model B Producer 
Cooperatives. These Officers were asked to rate each scheme in terms of the 
cooperative members (1) Attitudes — (i) cooperative spirit and (ii) motivation; 
(2) Performance — (i) agriculture, (ii) membership stability and (iii) 
management committee leadership and (3) Activity — (i) progress in achieving 
objectives and (ii) long-term prospects for the success of the scheme (see 
Appendix B Table 2 for the list of the study items). 

The pattern which emerged from the evaluation is rather mixed. For 
example, over half of the schemes rated only average for the spirit of 
cooperativeness among the members and a third came out low. A third of the 
schemes were low in motivation. In agriculture only 42.8 percent of them rated 
high for their performance. The Management Committees in a third of the 
schemes were performing lowly. 

Given the current prevailing circumstances and in terms of their long-run 
prospects ten cooperative schemes or 47.6 percent were given a high chance to 
succeed. These are Kumhanya, Shandisai Pfungwa and Tamuka in Mashonaland 



318 



East, Batsiranayi and Kurlma Inhaka in ^lashonaland Central and Gowe , Mauya, 
Mukuwapasi , Nyamakate and Tashinga in Mashonaland West. Eight other schemes 
were believed to face a bleak future. These are Kwaedza in Mashonaland East, 
Chakoina, Kubudirira, Kuenda, Kushingirira , Nyakudya and Simba Youth in 
Mashonaland Central and Ganyungu in Mashonaland West. Finally, the remaining 
three, namely, Marowa , Mount Saint Mary's and Tabudirira all in the 
I'lashonaland East Province (see Figure 8-1) were seen as having an average 
prospect (Table 8-8). 

Problems of the Model B Producer Cooperative 
Schemes: An Identification 

The Officers were asked to list the major constraint that confronts each 
of the 21 Model B schemes. The following problems were cited. In eight of the 
schemes the Officers mentioned lack of funds and implements at the disposal of 
the cooperatives. In four schemes the problem was identified to be inadequate 
membership. Similarly, another four schemes were perceived to be plagued by 
lack of cohesion and motivation or little interest in the philosophy of 
collective production. Poor management by the elected officers of the 
cooperatives was seen as the problem in the case of three schemes. Finally, 
lack of cooperative education and of agricultural knowhow, respectively, was 
cited for the remaining two. 

Two other studies were carried out which among other things probed more 
into the problems of the Model B Producer Cooperatives. One study sought the 
perspectives of the respective Management Committees of a sample of 14 of the 
21 schemes around the Mashonaland Region and the other among 151 individual 
members of 5 of these cooperatives in the Mashonaland Central Province (see 
Appendix C and Appendix D, Table D-2 , respectively, for the list of the study 
items) . 



TABLE 8-8 

MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT OFFICERS EVALUATION OF 
ATTITUDINAL AND ACTIVITY PROFILES IN MODEL B SCHEMES 





LOW 


AVERAGE 
% 


HIGH 


Cooperative Spirit 


33.3 


52.4 


14.3 


Motivation 


33.3 


28.6 


38.1 


Agricultural Performance 


28.6 


28.6 


42.8 


Stability 


29.1 


38.1 


32.8 


Progress With Resettlement 
Obj ective 


28.6 


33.3 


38.1 


Management Committee 
Leadership 


33.4 


38.1 


28.6 


Long-Term Prospects 
For Success 


38.1 


14.3 


47.6 



Note: There are 21 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes in 

the Region distributed as follows: Mashonaland East 7, 
Mashonaland Central 8 and Mashonaland West 6. (See 
Table 8-5 and Figure 8-1). The 21 schemes were 
evaluated by 8 Resettlement Officers who respectively 
supervise aspects of the administration of these 21 
schemes . 



Four of the questions that specifically related to the problems of the 
Model B Cooperatives as well as solutions to them as seen by the Management 
Committees are summarized below (Table 8-9). The first asked the Committee to 
identify the major problem(s) of its cooperative. Of the total of 30 problems 
identified the source of only 8 were internally generated. These were where 
the cooperatives blamed their lack of skills and cohesion or the cooperative 
spirit, poor management and low membership for their low performance. The 
majority of the cooperatives mention also the lack of farming implements and 
equipment, tractors in particular as being the constraint. Other problems 
listed include lack of transport and markets for their produce, apparently 
vegetables or poultry. 

The second question sought to find out what members of these Model B 
schemes might do to solve the identified problems. In all 18 responses were 
provided. Though the majority of these alluded to the need for self reliance 
it is significant to observe the strong belief among some of them that the 
solution to their problems was not themselves but rather some other source 
from elsewhere (Table 8-9), In the respective responses to the questions of 
what they expect the government and also the non-governmental agencies (NGOs) 
to do to solve the problems the overwhelming views favor more grants or 
increased aid and to the lesser extent training of the members (Table 8-9). 

Finally, the individual members of the cooperatives provided the 
following responses when they were asked to list the major problem facing the 
schemes to which they respectively belonged (see Appendix D, Table D-2). Lack 
of farm equipments and implements were mentioned by 43.0 percent of the 151 
farmers. This was followed by non-availability of cash income and of basic 
personal needs such as toilet soap and the like which was cited by 23.8 
percent of them. Financial indebtedness was indicated in 12.6 percent of the 
cases followed by charges of mismanagement on the part of the respective 



TABLE 8-9 

MASHONALAND REGION: MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES' 
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AND THEIR SUGGESTED 

SOLUTIONS 



Q. What are the main problems facing this Cooperative? 

RESPONSES FREQUENCY % 

Lack of Farming Implements (especially Tractors) 9 30.0 

Management /Membership Problems 8 26.7 

Lack, of Finance 6 20.0 

Marketing/Transportation Problems 4 13.3 

Accomodation/Subsistence Problems 3 10.0 

Q. What Must Members Of This Cooperative Do To Solve These Problems? 

RESPONSES FREQUENCY % 

Work Hard/Increase Productivity II 61.1 

Seek Donor Assistance/AFC Loan 5 27.8 

Nothing/Have Done All We Can 2 11.1 
Q. What Must The Government Do To Solve These Problems? 

RESPONSES FREQUENCY % 

Provide More Grants/Assistance 12 75.0 

Provide More Training/Education 4 25.0 

Q. What Must NGOs (Donor Agencies) Do To Solve These Problems? 

RESPONSES FREQUENCY % 

Provide More Aid 13 76.5 

Provide More Training/Education 4 23.5 



322 



Management Committees which accounted for 6.6 percent of the problems. Then, 
social conflicts among the individual members and households 3.3 percent, lack 
of transport and markets 2.6 percent and other miscellaneous problems which 
took up the remaining 7.9 percent. 

Schemes" Problems: A Discussion 

The lack of funds and implements that was given as a major constraint to 
the performance of the Model B schemes by the Officers and also by the 
Cooperatives' Management as well as the majority of the individual members is 
an opinion which is shared by some observers of postlndependence development 
efforts of Zimbabwe. For instance, Christine Sylvester (1985:35) argues that 
collective cooperatives in the country are constrained by the start-up costs 
of large-scale farming and that public policy, so far, has been clearly 
supportive of private producers and silent on socialist producers. 

This view is not supported by any evidence. Infact, every available 
statistics indicate that the government had and continues to back its 
commitment to producer cooperatives by the infusion of large amounts of grants 
and public resources towards their running. These are in addition to all kinds 
of assistance that various non-governmental organizations now operating in 
Zimbabwe offer these Model B Producer Cooperatives. 

As Table 8-10 shows the government's budget allocation from 1980 to 
mid-1985 for 18 of the 21 cooperative schemes in the Mashonaland Region alone 
amounted to nearly $4.6 million. By the end of July 1985 about 47 percent of 
this grant had been expended on these cooperatives. This was in addition to 
various forms of both short and medium-term loans advanced by the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC) as well as the assistance and donations in cash and 
kind that most of them receive from the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 



TABLE 8-10 

MASHONALAND REGION: GOVERNMENT'S GRANTS, EXPENDITURES AND BALANCE 
ON MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES FROM 1980 TO JULY 31, 

1985 



YEAR OF 
ESTABLISHMENT 


BUDGET 


EXPENDITURE 
($) 


BALANCE 


Kumhanya 


1982 


200,414 


67,813 


132,601 


Kwaedza 


1981 


194,930 


124,667 


70,263 


Mt. St. Mary's 


1981 


188,323 


95,390 


92,933 


Shandisai Pfungwa 


1982 


543,192 


262,961 


280,231 


Tabudirira 


1982 


394,004 


296,475 


97,529 


Batsiranayi 


1981 


154,695 


105,580 


49,115 


Chakoma 


1981 


312,820 


144,157 


168,663 


Kubudirira 


1981 


323,761 


70,422 


253,339 


Kuenda 


1982 


304,227 


96,084 


208,143 


Kurima Inhaka 


1982 


275,365 


113,368 


161,997 


Kushingirira 


1982 


352,007 


185,339 


166,668 


Nyakudya 


1982 


281,983 


114,701 


167,282 


Simba Youth 


1980 


161 097 


i U J , D / (3 


J J , 4 1 9 


Gowe 


1983 


265,552 


116,327 


149,225 


Mauya 


1982 


224,462 


64, 191 


160,271 


Mukuwapasi 


1982 


186,537 


87,019 


99,518 


Nyamakate 


1983 


218,997 


97,757 


121,240 


Total 


4, 


582,366 


2,147,929 


2,434,437 



Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, Harare. 



Note : 



As of 1985 Marowa, Tamuka, Ganyungu and Tashinga were Model B 
Accelerated Schemes with no Establishment Grants or government 
subsidies . 



324 

In the case of the AFC loans most of them consist of monies granted for the 
purchase of tractors and related equipment (Table 8-11). 

In 1984, DERUDE reported a national survey (Zimbabwe 1984d) into the 
achievements and problems of all resettlement schemes. According to its report 
at the time of the survey the various NGOs had donated amounts to the tune of 
$535,363.80 to individual Model B schemes. In addition to such aid some of the 
cooperatives were also given farm equipments. For example, Ruponeso in the 
l-lanicaland Province received 3 tractors valued at about $75,000. Batsiranayi 
and Simba Youth both in the Mashonaland Central Province also received 
donations of tractors and tractor implements as well as irrigation equipment. 
A Swedish NGO even provided $38,000 to Batsiranayi to construct an elementary 
school to cater for the children of its members. Table 8-12, based on figures 
extracted from the monthly reports of these schemes, shows some of the sources 
and the nature of the donations which had gone to assist particular 
cooperatives in the Mashonaland Region. 

The significant lesson to be drawn from these forms of assistance coming 
from both the government as well as the NGOs is the "dependency syndrome" that 
they tend to foster. A very forceful summary of this impression is provided in 
the report of the survey conducted by the Evaluation and Monitoring Section of 
DERUDE. The unpublished report argues that 

It is now the habit of almost all the (Model B) groups to 
depend on handouts so much that without them, they would 
not survive. . . . There is hardly any group that purchased 
assets or carried out any development project out of the 
funds generated from their agricultural activities. There 
has been a lot of input into these groups without significant 
output if any at all. (Zimbabwe 1984d:18) 

The foregoing facts indicate unequivocally that the Model B Producer 
Cooperatives had so far benefited from all kinds of assistance. If their 
problems was one of lack of equipment and finance these grants and aid should 



TABLE 8-11 

MASHONALAND REGION: AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION (AFC) 
LOANS TO SELECTED MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES 

YEAR AMOUNT PURPOSE OF LOAN 

OF LOAN OF LOAN 
$ 



Shandisai PEungwa 


1983 


17,000 


Tractor and Implements 


Tabudlrira 


1983 
1985 


65,000 
6,000 


Tractor and agricultural inputs 
Tractor trailer 


Kwaed za 


1983 
1984 


( ? ) 
26,302 


Tractor, implements and fuel 
Electricity, fuel and repair 
bills and children's school fee 


Marowa 


1984 
1984 
1985 


21,830 
22,000 
3,000 


Tractor and implements 
Agricultural inputs 
Sunflower cultivation 


Mt . St. Mary's 


1984 


2,000 


Fuel 


Kumhanya 


1984 


( ? ) 


Tractor 


^wLlo 1 L L ilg, Jul XL a 


Lyo J 


( '? \ 
\ ■ ) 


L L aL, LU L 


Simba Youth 


1983 


54,000 


Tractor, implements and inputs 


Kubudirira 


1984 


22,717 


( t ) 


Kurima Inhaka 


1984 
1985 


10,500 
2,256 


Tractor and implements 
Electricity bills 


Nyakudya 


1934 


35,973 


Tractor, implements and fuel 


Nyamakate 


1984 


13,000 


Plowing and agricultural inputs 


Mukuwapasi 


1985 


( ? ) 


Tractor and Implements 


Ganyxingu 


1985 


( ? ) 


Tractor and implements 



Source : 
Note : 



Monthly and Quarterly Reports, DERUDE , 
( ? ) Information not available. 



Harare . 



326 



TABLE 8-12 

MASHONALAND REGION: NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) AID AND 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SELECTED MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES 

YEAR NGO NATURE /AMOUNT 

OF AID 



MASHONALAND EAST 

Shandisai Pfungwa 1983 ZIMFEB 

($50,000) 

Planned to set up Industrial Development 
/Training Center for bakery, tanning, 
vegetable oil processing, welding and 
building construction. Supplied irrigation 
equipment and agricultural inputs 



1983 OCCZIM 

Supplied the follwing inputs for 1984-85 
season : 

100 X 10 kg bags seed maize 

100 X 10 kg bags peanut seed 

10 X 100 kg bags sunflower seed 

120 X 50 kg bags Compound D 

100 X 50 kg bags Ammonium Nitrate 

50 X 50 kg bags Gypsum 



1983 ZIMBABWE PROJECT 

$29,000 

Hired a tractor to construct irrigation 
layout. Provided irrigation pipes 

1984 Paid bills, provided material aid and 
personnel as follows: 

Irrigation $19,500 
Poultry feed l , 500 

Electricity bills 4,500 
Food aid 5,000 
Pesticides 2,000 
Wheat seed 500 
Sprayers & Vegetable seed 1,000 
Agricultural Advicer/ Coordinator 
(from 3/82 to 10/82) $1,200 



1984 ZIMFEB 

Built a health clinic. Sponsored adult 
literacy course 



TABLE 8 - 12— continued . 

YEAR NGO 



NATURE /AMOUNT 
OF AID 



327 



MASHONALAND EAST 



Kwaedza 



1983 



1983 



1985 



OCIM 

Donated 1,000 kgs seed maize 



CHRISTIAN CARE 

Supplied asbestos roofing sheets 

Provided funds for electricity extension 
to the homestead and paid children's 
school fees 



1984 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 
Donated $900 



Tabudirira 1983 WORLD VISION 

A five year agreement to undertake various 
projects. Donated $12,139 to purchase 61 
head of cattle 

1984 Provided approximately $3,000 a month 

towards running costs and $18,510 to 
purchase 63 head of cattle 



1984 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 

Supplied 100 day-old chicks for poultry 
project. Sponsored 7 members in a skills 
training course 



1984 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Supplied 20 bags of maize-meal per month 
for subsistence 



1984 OXFAM (AMERICA) 

Donated $17,000 towards wheat production 



Tamuka 



1984 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Plowed 25 hectares and supplied 
agricultural inputs for them 



328 



TABLE 8 - 12— continued 



YEAR 



NGO 



NATURE /AMOUNT 
OF AID 



MASHONALAND EAST 



Marowa 



1985 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 

Provided diesel engine for water supplies 



Mt. St. Mary^^s 1983 ZIMBABWE FREEDOM FROM HUNGER CAMPAIGN 

Provided inputs (Kohwa Pakura) crop 
package for 100 hectares of maize 



MASHONALAND CENTRAL 
Batsiranayi 1984 

1984 



ZIMBABWE PROJECT 

Donated 150 bags of maize-meal 



EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 

Donated 40 bags beans and provided 
assistance to the elementary school 



1984 LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION 

Provided a resident Agricultural Advicer/ 
Coordinator 



1984 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Provided agricultural inputs for two 
farming seasons 



Kurima Inhaka 



1984 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 

Paid electricity bills and sponsored the 
chairman to attend a 3 weeks course on 
cotton production 



1984 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Plowed 20 hectares, donated food aid and 
provided 140 x 50 bags Compound D fertilizer 

1985 Undertook to pay off outstanding loan owed 
to the AFC and to pay the monthly running 
costs 



TABLE 8 - 12— continued 

YEAR NGO NATURE /AMOUNT 

OF AID 



MASHONALAND CENTRAL 

Kurima Inhaka 1985 REDD BARNA 

Sponsored chairman to attend a course 
in administration/management 



1985 WORLD VISION 

Donated $4,005.81 and farm implements 
worth $994.19 including 2 Cultivators 
and 3 Ox-plows 



• Kushingirira 1982 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Supplied the following inputs and aid: 
355 bags maize seed 
38 X 50 kg bags maize-meal 

3 X 25 kg bags beans 
30 Blankets 



1983 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 

Supplied the following items and food aid: 
600 day-old chicks and poultry feed 
20 X 50 kg bag maize-meal 
3 X 20 liters cooking oil 
1 X 50 kg bag salt 



1984 CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES SERVICE ORGANIZATION 
Donated the following items: 
1 Tractor 

Irrigation equipment for 10 hectares 
1 Grinding mill 
4 Sewing machines 



Chakoma 1981 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Donated $26, 653 for borehole to supply 
clean drinking water 



1982 ZIMBABWE PROJECT 

Donated $13,762 



1983 



OCCZIM 

Donated $ 3,011 



TABLE 8-12— continued 



330 



YEAR 



NGO 



NATURE/ A^IOUNT 
OF AID 



MSHONALAND CENTRAL 



Chakoma 



1983 A Jewish woman donated $20,000 



1983 WORLD VISION 

Donated $52,458 



1985 COOPERBAL 

Donated a tractor. 



Kubudirir a 



1984 OXFAM 

Donated a tractor and implements 



1984 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 
Donated $5,318 



1984 



1984 



(NETHERLANDS ? ) 
Donated $1,369 



CHRISTIAN CARE 
Donated $137 



Kuenda 



1984 OCCZIM 

Donated $109 



1982 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Provided food aid, garden tools and 1,400 
bags of fertilizer 



1982 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 

Paid children's school fees and telephone 
bills 



1983 REDD BARNA 

Financial sponsorship. Payment of all 
bills and other running costs. 
Donated agricultural implements 



331 



TABLE 8 - 12 — continued 



YEAR 



NGO 



NATURE/ AMOUNT 
OF AID 



MASHONALAND CENTRAL 



Kuenda 



1984 REDD BARNA 

Pa3niient of monthly running costs 

1985 Provided resident Agricultural Advicer 
/Coordinator and a new 4 wheel-drive 
vehicle . 

Donated $5,000 towards all running costs 
incurred by the cooperative 



1 Nyakudya 1983 CHRISTIAN CARE 

i Provided food aid. 

I 1 

I 1983 ZIMBABWE PROJECTS 

( Supplied 200 day-old chicks. i 

I 



Simba Youth 1983 NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATION 

Sponsored a poultry project 



1983 LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION 

Provided resident Agricultural Advicer/ 
Coordinator 

1984 Loaned $30,000 for the purchase of 
agricultural inputs and fuel 

1985 Payment of monthly running costs and 
provision of tractor/plowing service 



MASHONALAND WEST 

' Mauya 1983 CHRISTIAN CARE 

^ Plowed 20 hectares 

i 



1983 NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATION 
Plowed 10 hectares 



TABLE 8 - 12 — continued 



YEAR NGO NATURE/ AtlOUNT 

OF AID 



MASHONALAND WEST 

Mauya 1984 NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATION 

Donated a tractor and $11,867 as follows: 



Transportation 


$ 30 


2 Sewing machines 


399 


Sewing materials 


160 


Blankets (148) 


1,043 


Petrol 


36 


Agricultural implement 


1, 116 


School books 


295 


Refresher course 


309 


Plowing (10 hectares) 


700 


Discing (100 hectares) 


6, 146 


Fertil izer/ seed maize 


1,634 



1985 Donated a tractor and a grinding mill 

Paid electricity bills 



1984 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Donated $14,436 as follows: 
Plowing (12 hectares) 
Fertil izer 
Seed maize/cotton 
Sprayers (5) and 
pesticides 



Mukuwapasi 1983 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Plowed 28 hectares. 

1984 Provided 2 Agricultural Advicers/ 

Coordinators 



$ 775 
3,982 
137 

4,543 



TABLE 8 - 12 — continued 



YEAR NGO NATURE/ AMOUNT 

OF AID 



MASHONALAND WEST 

Nyamakate 1983 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Plowed 30 hectares and supplied the 
following food aid and agricultural 
inputs all valued at $4,996: 
30 bags maize-meal 
8 X 50 kg bags beans 
4 X 20 liters cooking oil 

90 X 50 kg bags Compound D 

99 X 50 kg bags Ammonium Nitrate 

60 X 50 kg bags Compound D 

10 X 50 kg bags seed maize 



Tashinga 1984 CHRISTIAN CARE 

Donated $9,000 

1985 Donated the following cash amount and 

material s : 

$2,400 towards the purchase of 
cattle 
Scotch-cart 

Electric grinding mill 

Maize sheller 

Petrol (10 liters) 

Compound D fertilizer (120 bags) 

Empty sacks/bags (400) 

Miscellaneous tools 

Gowe 1983 REDD BARNA (Sponsor) 



Source: Compiled from the Monthly and Quarterly Reports, DERUDE , Harare. 



334 



have by now made a lot of difference in their respective performances. 

This study found that the inability of these cooperatives to live up to 
the performance and the production targets projected by the policy makers and 
the planners has very little to do with lack of equipment or funding. In many 
of the individual cases one or the other or a combination of some of the 
following problems are to blame. These are (1) lack of the technical skills to 
run and maintain such equipment as tractors, (2) wanton sabotage of 
collectively-owned property usually arising from petty personal and factional 
conflicts among members and the management, (3) stealing and embezzlement, (4) 
reckless misuse of property and (5) general mismanagement. 

These are problems which apparently were not anticipated by policy makers 
and the development planners in organizing and implementing the Model B 
variants of the resettlement program. Their solutions lie in continuous 
education over the long-term in both the areas of technical knowhow, 
cooperative principles and socialist ideology as well as inter-personal 
relations and organizational behavior rather than the infusion of more funds 
and other capital items such as tractors. 

T-Thile these management and social organizational problems are the 
Achilles' heels of the Model B Producer Cooperatives in Zimbabwe the more 
fundamental and immediate constraint to their successful agricultural 
performance is one of membership. The greater majority of these schemes are 
underutilizing their resources because of the grossly inadequate membership 
that is far below their respective projected targets. 

For instance, as at September 1985 the 21 cooperatives in the Mashonaland 
Region, comprising the three Provinces, were together operating with only 40 
percent of the target or ideal membership capacity. In Mashonaland West the 7 
schemes had achieved 50 percent of their full membership. In Mashonaland 
Central only 41 percent of the target had been met while in the Mashonaland 



335 



East Province also only 34 percent of the number of workers or members needed 
to ensure full and productive performance were present. In fact, individual 
schemes such as Tabudirira, Batsiranayi and Kushingirira (see Figure 8-1), all 
of which are among the older cooperatives, are yet to achieve even 25 percent 
of their respective targets in membership (Table 8-13). The seriousness of 
this matter is underscored by the fact that the reported membership of these 
Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes was often times inflated and do not 
therefore reflect the actual membership present. 

Another dimension of the membership problem is the high turnover in some 
of the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes. For example, between December 
1983 and June 1985 the eight schemes in the Mashonaland Central Province lost 
a total of 150 members. That represented a cumulative loss of 30 percent in 
membership over the period. 

The DERUDE survey (Zimbabwe 1984d) cited above also found serious 
underutilization of the farm lands occupied by the cooperatives. For instance, 
the land put under crops by the cooperatives during that agricultural season 
as a percentage of the total land cleared by the former European owners of the 
farms was as follows: (1) Mashonaland East 11.0 percent; (2) Mashonaland 
Central 14.5 percent; (3) Mashonaland West 20.6 percent; (4) Midlands 2.5 
percent; and (5) Manicaland 5.2 perecent. Worse still the land under crops as 
a percentage of the total potential arable land was also as follows: (1) 
Mashonaland East 9.5 percent; (2) Mashonaland Central 10.4; (3) Mashonaland 
West 6.4 percent; (4) Midlands 2.5 percent; and (5) Manicaland 3.3 percent. 
The survey reported (Zimbabwe 1984d:16) that the "under-utilisation of land is 
related to the issue of failure by the cooperators to recruit more members to 
achieve the optimum membership requirements." 

The seriousness of this problem of land underutilization by the 
cooperatives is emphasized by the paradox of the location of most of the 



336 



TABLE 8-13 

MASHONAIAND REGION: TARGET MEMBERSHIP AND TRENDS IN MODEL B 
PRODUCER COOPERATIVES 1983 - 1985 





(TARGET) 


1983 

SEPT 


1984 

MARCH 


SEPT 


1985 

MARCH 


bhrl 


MASHONAIAND EAST 














Kwaedza 


(100) 


58 


45 






50 


Mt. St. Mary 


(150) 


108 


1 07 


iU/ 


1 07 

1 V / 


107 


Shandisai Pfungwa (330) 


84 






78 


79 


Tabudirira 


(200) 


75 


75 


1 L 
1 1 


(ST 


40 


Marowa 


(64) 






TO 


29 


25 


Tamuka 


(50) 






A u 


27 


26 




(960) 






("^67") 


(354) 


(327) 


MASHONALAND CENTRAL 












Batsiranayi 


(300) 


85 


on 
oU 


AQ 


73 


69 


Simba Youth 


(90) 


40 


31 


Q 1 
Ji 




29 


Chakoma 


(130) 


119 


o c 
OD 


Ot 


8T 


79 


Kushingirira 


(150) 


48 


36 








Kuenda 


(89) 


35 


45 


48 


10 


32 


Kubudirira 


(60) 


25 


29 


15 


17 


26 


Nyakudya 


(100) 


110 


90 


92 


80 


88 


Kurima Inhaka 


(40) 


38 


35 


35 


33 


34 




(959) 


(500) 


(432) 


(421) 


(361) 


(390 



TABLE 8 - 13— continued. 



1983 1984 1985 





(TARGET) 


SEPT 


MARCH 


SEPT 


MARCH 


SEPT 


MASHONALAND WF'^T 














Ma uya 








jU 


53 


54 


Nyamakate 


(200) 








/i A 


45 


Mukuwapasi 


(56) 


53 


52 


48 


51 


49 


Go we 


(108) 






108 


108 


97 


Ganyangu 


(91) 






32 


33 


36 


Tashinga 


(57) 






29 


29 


29 




(622) 






(301) 


(318) 


(311) 


Total All 
Schemes 


2,541 






1,089 


1,033 


1,028 



Source: Compiled from the Monthly Reports submitted by Resettlement 
Officers to DERUDE, Harare. 



338 



Schemes in the better agro- ecological zones. As Weiner et al . point out 



[T]hese so-called model B programmes have generally been 
allocated good land, primarily since the Mnistry concerned 
was anxious for them to maintain viable large-scale holdings. 
Because of their ability to utilise sophisticated machinery, 
the co-operative farms are better suited for natural region 
II, where the employment of tractors can open up large tracts 
of potentially arable land that small-scale producers might 
otherwise have used for grazing livestock. 
(Weiner et al. 1985:258) 



In their calculation (Weiner _et al. 1985:259 Table 2) as of August 1983 
the Model B Producer Cooperatives had been allocated 66,775 hectares. Of this 
area 70.6 percent were located in Natural Regions I and II where conditions 
were optimal for a variety of agricultural activities (see also Mumbengegwi 
1984b: 5). In contrast, the Model A schemes had 1,669,233 hectares of which 
only 18.9 percent were in such favored agro-ecological regions. Given this 
fact and the foregoing evidence about loans and other forms of assistance 
provided the cooperatives by the AFC, the government as well as the numerous 
non-governmental donor agencies one would expect the Model B schemes 
individually and collectively to perform well and achieve the production 
levels and economic returns envisaged in their respective project reports. 

Mufurudzi Scheme as an Illustrative Case 
of Model A Resettlement Program 

Mufurudzi: Background 

The Mufurudzi Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Scheme is located 120 
kilometers north of Harare, on the Shamva-Mount Darwin road. It is bordered on 
the south by the Mufurudzi river and the Bushu Communal Area. In the east is 
the Mufurudzi Safari or Wildlife Reserve Area. To the north of the Scheme is 
the Chesa Small-Scale Commercial Farming Area as well as the Kandeya Communal 



339 

Area. The western boundary of Mufurudzi separates it from the Madziwa Communal 
Area (see Figure 8-2). 

Originally planned in 1980 to cover 54,712 hectares of the Shamva 
Intensive Conservation Area the Scheme is a consolidation of 22 former 
Large-Seal e European Commercial Farm blocks. These farms measured 35,823 
hectares in area. To these were added 18,889 hectares of vacant State Lands. 
So far about 80 percent of the total land area is deemed suitable for 
resettlement. This has been demarcated, planned and developed into cultivation 
and grazing areas centered around 18 nucleated villages. Table 8-14 
provides a summary of some aspects of the general features of the villages 
which make up the resettlement Scheme. 

Of the opened-up area, 14,658 hectares or 32 percent lie in the better 
agro- ecological zone to the west of the Scheme which is covered by Natural 
Region II. The remaining 31,176 hectares under Natural Region III constitute 
the middle and eastern portions of the Scheme. Only about 13.6 percent of the 
land covering the Scheme are suitable for cropping, while about 63.6 percent 
are good for grazing purposes. The rest which is made up of 22.8 percent of 
the land are considered marginal for current resettlement purposes. The 
marginal zone consists of blocks of steep and broken country one section of 
which lies north of Chirume and Gwetera and the other between Mukwari, Gatu 
and Zvataida (see Figure 8-2). 

Precipitation and other related physiographical characteristics are 
important for successful agriculture in the area occupied by Mufurudzi as in 
all parts of Zimbabwe. The mean annual rainfall for the Scheme is around 700 
millimeters with a 20 year mean of 784 millimeters and a 25 percent 
coefficiency of variation. Severe dry spells are possible and mid-season dry 
spells are common. Whenever these occur, as it happened between 1981 and 1984, 
crop yields are seriously affected. The Scheme experiences a mean annual 



340 

TABLE 8-14 
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: 



NUMBER 


OF HOUSEHOLDS, 


ARABLE AND 


LIVESTOCK CAPACITIES 


FORMER 
FARM 


RESETTLEMENT 
VILLAGE 


NUMBER 
OF 

HSEHOLDS 


TOTAL GROSS 
AREA ARABLE 
(HECTARES) 


i_i-L vejO i.Uvjr\. 
UNITS 


Gwatera 


Gwetera 


32 


3,100 


325 


520 


Puck Ridge 


Tongogara 1 


51 


2,290 


680 


344 


Lions Lodge 


Zvomanyanga 


40 


1,960 


655 


290 


Mgadzi 


Magadzi 


51 


2,830 


680 


340 


Gatu 


Gatu 


50 


2,438 


580 


401 


Septera 


Mukwari 


38 


1,850 


265 


234 


Glendry 


Chitepo 


30 


2,160 


640 


228 


Kemphaven West Tongogara 2 


14 


701 


153 


110 


Denda 


Denda 


38 


2,027 


380 


276 


Odenferra 


Ne hand a 


39 


1,727 


210 


9 /i T 


Darien 


Mudzinge 


33 


2,250 


331 


Z D i 


Forest Down 


Takawira 


31 






Z J 7 


Drumossie 


Chimburukwa 


25 


1,421 


265 


1 Q/i 
1 04 


Well away & 
Persephone 


Muring amombe 


28 


1,397 


395 


207 


Aberfoil 


Mutoramhepo 


14 


698 


237 


107 


Polycrops 


Mupedzanhamo 


13 


600 


221 


100 


Thyrza 


Banana 


14 


678 


206 


108 


Rataplan 


Zvataida 


27 


3,067 


280 


367 



Sources: Based on Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX, 

(January 1981) and the Quarterly Reports prepared by 
DERUDE, Harare. 



KANDEYA COMML^'AL AREA 



Mandeve'l 




Rural Service Cancer 
Ponesai Vanhu lascicuca 
Magadzi School 
Mukwari School 
Mudzinge School 
MS4 Muringatnorabe Scnool 
GD Gwecera Diocank 
MD Magadzi Dipcank 
CD Chicapo Dipcank 
TD Takawira Dipcank 

MM Madziva Mine 

L-3CF Large-Scale Commercial 

S-SCF Small-Scala Conimerciai 



■ arms 
"arms 



FIGURE 8-2 
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: 
RESETTLEMENT VILLAGES AND ADJOINING FARMING SYSTEMS 



temperature of 20°C, with a range fluctuating from 1°C to 32°C. 

Frost rarely occurs and when it does it is confined to the low lying areas. 

It is important to place these climatic imperatives in the context of the 
specific constraints that they pose to farmers. In Zimbabwe, like many other 
regions of Africa, farmers depend solely on nature for precipitation to 
facilitate crop growth. Farmers therefore have to time their plowing, land 
preparation, seeding and related activities closely to the rainfall regime. 
This is a critical demand on farming. Consequently, AGRITEX has published 
climatic data for various areas in the country. These charts show monthly 
rainfall in excess of 15 millimeters occuring within a pentad contrasted with 
the probability of a dry spell in excess of twenty days. The charts for 
Mount Darwin and Bindura meteorological stations respectively to the north and 
south of Mufurudzi are shown in Figure 8-3. According to AGRITEX the 
probability of planting rains for the Scheme area is (1) 40 percent between 
November 15 and 20; (2) increasing to 60 percent by November 25 and (3) 80 
percent from November 30 to December 5. 

In terms of altitude the area lies between 325 meters and 1,500 meters 
above sea-level. The geological base is made up mainly of gneissic granites 
with dolerite intrusions which have given rise to fersiallitic soils that 
generally consist of moderately deep to moderately shallow sands. The 
resultant vegetation is predominantly brachystegia boehmii , locally known as 
"mfuti," with some julbernadla globiflora , or "munondo," in th woodland 
areas. The most common grasses found in the area belong to the andropogon 
and the pogonarthria species. In terms of topography the terrain Is roughly 
rolling. This has created narrow ridges of arable land that falls away steeply 
to the waterways. Some large blocks of a more flat terrain are scattered 
throughout the Scheme. There are two drainage systems; one in the north formed 
by the Gwetera river and the other in the south formed by the Mufurudzi river. 



OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. 



MT. DARWIN - 15 mm 



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Sa 62 66 70 I 5 9 13 I7 21 
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OCT. NOV. DEC, JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. 



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5 60 
o 

§ 40 



36 



20 
0 



















\ 






























— ^ 














\ 


-.-.J 


^/ — 


1 1 ' 





58 62 66 70 I 5 9 13 17 21 
PEiNTAOS 



FIGURE 8-3 



MOUNT DARWIN AND BINDURA: PROBABILITY OF 
RAINFALL IN EXCESS OF 15 MILLIMETERS OCCURING WITHIN 
A PENTAD VERSUS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DRY SPELL IN 
EXCESS OF TWENTY DAYS 



Source: AGRITEX 1982 



344 

At the time of the purchase of the 22 farms in 1980 there were homesteads 
and various building structures on 17 of them. Most of these were generally in 
adequate condition but needed urgent maintenance to prevent further 
deterioration which had set in as a result of abandonment during the 
liberation war. There were 13 dams with various storage capacities also 
distributed throughout the farms. Although most of the dams are still intact 
and a few need rehabilitative work, they are generally too small in capacities 
to supply sufficient water for cropping purposes. The irrigation potential in 
the Scheme is therefore limited to the farms in the riparian villages along 
the Mufurudzi river. The villages are Muring amombe , Mutoramhepo, Mupedzanhamo 
and Banana (see Figure 8-2). The river is fed by the Eben Dam from which 
rights for the supply of irrigation water downstream may be negotiated with 
the Ministry of Energy and Water Development. 

The Madziwa Mne , located within the Scheme, is connected to the national 
electricity grid. Power lines from the grid, which served the homesteads, are 
still intact and can be made available to the resettlement villages should the 
need arise. Similarly, a network of telephone lines that used to link the 
homesteads can be restored to service. The perimeter and the internal paddock 
fencing on many of the farms were in place in early 1980. However, the entire 
section of the boundary with the Madziwa Communal Area and portions of other 
places had been stolen at the time of the establishment of the Scheme in 
October 1980. 

Mufurudzi is served by a network consisting of a 30 kilometer section of 
tarred national road which originates from Harare passing through Shamva and 
then the Scheme. From there the road continues to Goora in the Madziwa 
Communal Area where it joins the Harare-Bind ura-Mount Darwin road. In addition 
there are about 100 kilometers of feeder roads which were built to access the 
farms by the former European Rural Council that served the area (Figure 8-1). 



345 



The nearest major shopping center, hospital as well as the railhead are 
all located 60 kilometers from the southern boundary of the Scheme in Bindura, 
the provincial capital of Mashonaland Central. The District Administrative 
Office, Police, GMB and CMB depots are also at Shamva 23 kilometers away to 
the south from the southern edge of the Scheme. 

For the villages in the northern half of the Scheme Mount Darwin, 38 
kilometers from Tongogara 1 and 2 villages, is the closest service center. 
Madziwa Township about 13 kilometers west is a rural growth center where the 
Charainuka District Council and a few other services such as a butchery shop, 
market and auto mechanic garages are opening. 

The Madziwa Mine also provides services such as retail shops, occasional 
entertainment and a beer hall. The latter is heavily patronized by many 
resettled farmers from all the nearby villages in the Scheme. This is 
especially so of farmers from Mudztnge and Zvataida. 

The Chindunduma elementary and Chirume secondary boarding schools are 
additional educational institutions located in the Scheme. These two were 
established at the time of independence by the ZANU-PF party but they are now 
managed by the Ministry of Education. Initially, Chindunduma catered for 
orphaned refugee children and other school-age "comrades" returning from 
Mozambique as well as the displaced from the near-by and war-torn communal 
lands. Though these schools do not form part of the Scheme's infrastructure 
their facilities and services are nevertheless available to resettled families 
in Mufurudzi. Finally, the Ponesai Vanhu vocational institute, sponsored by 
"People to People" a German non-governmental organization also operates from a 
piece of land within the Scheme. 



346 



Mufurudzi: Scheme Costs 

The total project cost of Mufurudzi is a little over $1.3 million which 
works out to nearly $2,337 per every resettled farm family. Of the project 
cost approximately 39 percent are taken up by the acquisition of the 22 farm 
properties which comprise the major portion of the Scheme area. The single 
most important items in the expenditure of the Scheme, respectively, are those 
covering the planning and implementation, accomodation for government staff or 
the resettlement team, facilities and services for the education of farmers 
children and good drinking water. Up until the end of July 1985 the total 
expenditure incurred in the development of Mufurudzi stood at $1.1 million or 
31.5 percent of the project cost (see Table 8-15). 

Mufurudzi: Farm-Level Agricultural Projections 

Dry-land cropping and livestock are the enterprise mix available to 
resettled farmers in Mufurudzi. There is adequate grazing for 4,579 Livestock 
Units, equivalent to an estimated carrying capacity of 6,868 head of mixed 
cattle. Supplementary feeding is also anticipated. The livestock enterprise, 
recommended by the AGRITEX for the Scheme, is based on the breeding and 
production of slaughter cattle and draft or trek oxen. 

The AGRITEX cropping recommendation consists of short season maize 
varieties and cotton with peanuts and ration beans as subsidiary crops. 
Flue-cured tobacco is another crop that is suited to the soils in the area. 
Each resettled family has access to 5 hectares of arable land all of which can 
be cropped in a given farming season if the farmer so disires. AGRITEX, 
however, does not recommend a full utilization of all the land. For good crop 
husbandry, it suggests crop rotation and the utilization of 3 hectares at a 



347 

TABLE 8-15 
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: PROJECT COSTS, 
EXPENDITURE AND BALANCE AS AT JULY 31 1985 

ITEM/SUB-ITEM BUDGET COST PROGRESSIVE BALANCE 

EXPENDITURE 



($) 



Land Acquisition 


426,650 


424,085 


2,565 


Development ■ 








Demarcation & Survey 


16,890 


12,369 


4,521 


Land Preparation/Tillage 


18,841 


18,841 


0 


Roads (100 Kms) 


28,000 


5,266 


22,734 


Telephones 


100 


0 


100 


Diptanks (7) 


35,000 


26,165 


8,835 


Fencing (244 Kms) 


37,600 


26,786 


10,814 


Village Water Supplies 

(18 Boreholes") 
School Water Supplies 


60,000 


\ 
; 

73,966 } 


40,034 


Storage Shed 


10,000 


0 


10,000 




J J J UUU 


q '3 TOO 

53 , 193 


1,80/ 


Staff Housing 


94,000 


79,051 


14,949 


School (4) & Teacher Housing 


313, 100 


302,966 


10, 134 


Clinic 


24,000 


19,815 


4, 185 


Planning/Imp/ & Consultancy 


101,380 


29,376 


72,004 


Contigencies 


41,059 


0 


41,059 


Total Cost 1 


,315,620 


1,071,879 


243,741 


Cost Per Family 


2,337 







Sources: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981) 

and the Summary of Capital Expenditure, ARDA (July 1985), 
Harare . 



348 

time. At the inception of the Scheme AGRITEX anticipated a three year build up 
to the full crop program. The assumption has been that the farmers will 
initially cultivate 2 hectares of maize, adding 0.5 hectares of cotton in the 
second year. In the third year they may either cultivate 0.5 hectares of a 
subsidiary crop in addition to the previous year's cropping program or they 
may expand the cotton enterprise from half to a full hectare (see Table 8-15). 

The livestock budget assumes the farmer's ownership of 5 head of cattle 
in the first year and a 50 percent calving rate. This head is expected to 
build up through natural increase of 2 calves per year for nine years to 
realize the optimal herd composition of 11 head of cattle. Servicing of the 
cows is to be done by a communally owned or a hired bull. Every year two head 
of cattle is to be sold. The only exception is during the third year when, 
with the anticipated stock loss, one instead of two is to be sold (see Table 
8-17). 

Table 8-18 is a summary of the whole farm budget as it builds up to the 
target income level. Essentially, a mixed farming system is recommended for 
Mufurudzi. However, nearly two-thirds of farmers' incomes are projected to be 
derived from the arable or cropping enterprise. The achievement of the target 
income level of $400 per annum for the resettled households is expected to 
occur within 3 to 5 years. The assumption is that the average family would 
make a total income of $302 in the first year, progressively exceeding the 
target income and doubling the initial income within a ten year period. 



Mufurudzi: The Foundations of a Successful Agricultural 

Resettlement Scheme 



Most of the resettled farm households in Mufurudzi appear to be ha 
on the path of success and achievement of their development objectives. 
1985-86 fiscal year the Scheme entered what may be conceived as the 



ppy 

In 



and 
the 



TABLE 8-16 
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: CROP BUILD-UP 
TO TARGET INCOME LEVELS 

YEAR CROP AREA YIELD MAIZE VALUE VARIABLE NET' VALUE 



PLANTED RETAINED OF COST CROP 

YIELD SALE 

(HECTARES) (TONNES) (KILOS) ($) ($) ($) 

1 Maize 2.0 3.0 80 260 90 170 

260 90 170 

2 Maize 2.0 3.0 80 260 90 170 

Cotton 0.5 0.4 140 48 92 

400 138 262 

3 Maize 2.0 3.0 80 260 90 170 
Cotton 1.0 0.7 280 96 184 

540 186 354 



Source: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981), 
Harare . 



350 



YEAR 



TABLE 8-17 
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: LIVESTOCK 
BUILD-UP TO TARGET INCOME LEVELS 



NUMBER OF 
CATTLE 



VALUE OF 
SALES 
(?) 



VARIABLE 
COSTS 
($) 



NET 
VALUE 
($) 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 



5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
8 
8 
9 
10 
11 



0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

183 
0 
0 

268 



20 
20 
24 
24 
28 
32 
35 
36 
40 
48 



-20 
-20 
-24 
-24 
-28 
-32 
148 
-36 
-40 
220 



Source: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981), 
Harare , 



TABLE 8-18 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: SU>MARY OF CROP 
AND LIVESTOCK BUILD-UP TO TARGET INCOME LEVELS 

YEAR CROP CATTLE LESS NET CASH VALUE OF VALUE OF TOTAL 
INCOME OVER INCOME RETENTION LIVESTOCK INCOME 

HEADS ($) ($) ($) ($) 



1 

2 
3 

10 



170 
262 
354 

354 



-20 
-20 
-24 
220 



28 
62 
62 
62 



122 
180 
268 
512 



94 
94 
94 
94 



86 
86 



302 
360 
448 
606 



Source: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981), 



351 

consolidation phase of its implementation. Major aspects of its administrative 
structures and facilities such as schools were formally transferred from the 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to the Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural and Urban Development. This put Mufurudzi under the 
administrative ambit of the Chaminuka District Council, Madziwa. 

In May 1985 at the time of this incorporation Mufurudzi had the following 
primary developments in place. Of the total of 22 hand-pumped boreholes 
planned to supply water to all villages in the Scheme 20 had been constructed 
and were operational. Only two villages, namely, Mukwari and Nehanda did not 
have access to good water. Four elementary schools and a secondary school were 
also built as part of the project. These are in addition to the Chindunduma 
and the Batsiranayi Model 3 Producer Cooperative primary schools and the 
Chiruraa and Madziwa Mine high or secondary schools which are also located 
within the Scheme. 

The Mufurudzi secondary school in 1985 had only forms one and two. 
Located at the rural service center the school had a student population of 120 
and 5 teachers on the staff. The four Mufurudzi elementary schools are 
distributed in a pattern to cater for children from groups of neighboring 
villages within an 3 kilometer radius (see Figure 8-2). The schools are (1) 
Mur ingamombe with 7 teachers and 291 students from Ghimburukwa , Mutoramhepo, 
Mupedzanharao , Banana and Mur ingaraombe , (2) Mudzinge which had 10 teachers and 
419 students from Mudzinge, Takawira, Nehanda, Denda and the Simba Youth Model 
B Producer Cooperative, (3) Mukwari with 5 teachers and 197 students from 
Zvataida, Mukwari, Chitepo and Zvomanyanga and (4) Magadzi school where there 
were 11 teachers and 447 students. The latter serves students drawn from 
Magadzi 1 and 2, Gatu 1 and 2 and Gwetera villages. 

In October 1985, there were a total 33 teachers in the four elementary 
schools of whom 15 percent were certified or professionals. The student 



352 

population was 1,354. Of this 48.4 percent were male and the remaining 51.6 
percent female. The student population resident in the Scheme is higher in 
that all children in the two Tongogara villages as well as others from Chitepo 
attend Chindunduma school, which has boarding facilities but mainly for 
students from elsewhere outside the Scheme. 

The Mufurudzi Scheme has a total of 4,579 Livestock Units the equivalent 
of a carrying capacity of 6,868 head of cattle. Originally, seven diptanks 
were planned of which 5 have been built. In May 1985 four of the five dips 
were in use. These were located as follows: (1) Gwetera which served 329 from 
Gwetera and Zvomanyanga, (2) Magadzi, 588 from Magadzi 1 and 2 and Gatu 1 and 
2, (3) Chitepo which serviced a total 766 from Chitepo, Tongogara 1 and 2, 
Mukwari, Denda and the Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative and (4) 
Takawira where 942 head of cattle were dipped from Takawira, Mudzinge, 
Zvataida, Muring amombe , Mupedzanhamo , Mutoramhepo, Banana and Chimburukwa (see 
Figure 8-2). The 4 dips therefore served a total of 2,625 head of cattle. 

In June 1985, Mufurudzi was evaluated with a standard questionnaire. This 
was part of the survey of Resettlement Officers' assessment of the 
attitudinal, performance and activity profiles of farmers in the 12 Model A 
Normal Intensive Schemes in the three Mashonaland Provinces (see Appendix B 
Table 1). In the evaluation of the Resettlement Officer who managed the Scheme 
during the previous five years Mufurudzi scored consistently high in the 
various items rated. These were in social harmony, motivation, agricultural 
performance, AFC loan repayment, political participation, self help, youth 
activities, women's affairs. Area Board leadership, cooperation with the 
Resettlement Team, compliance with resettlement policy and long-term prospects 
for the success of the Scheme. 

The rating also commended highly the various agencies and services such 
as the AFC, school principals and Rural Housing that served Mufurudzi. In the 



353 

view of the Officer the majority of the farmers in the following villages were 
"more progressive" in that they were making serious efforts and performing 
well agriculturally. These were Denda, Gatu 1 and 2, Gwetera, Magadzi 1 and 2, 
Mudzinge, Tongogara 1 and 2, Zvataida and Zvomanyanga. Farmers in Banana, 
Chimburukwa, Chitepo, Mukwari, Mur ingamombe , Mupedzanhamo and Mutoramhepo 
(Figure 8-2) were perceived to be only "averagely progressive" in making some 
but not the maximum effort to succeed. None of the villages was branded "less 
progressive" where farmers are not making enough attempts at realizing the 
goals of resettlement. 

As it was pointed out in Chapter III above Mufurudzi is now in the final 
or resettlement phase of what Thayer Scudder (1984:19) calls the stage of 
"Handing Over and Incorporation." It needs to be said, however, that 
Mufurudzi's transition from the stage of "Social and Economic Development" 
into "Handing Over" was characterized less by the "development of nonfarm 
activities and hiring of laborers for an increasing number of agricultural 
tasks," as Scudder' s (1984:18-19) model shows. Instead, the socio-economic 
development of the resettled families are manifesting itself, among others, in 
at least seven recognizable areas. These are reflected in their attitudes 
towards farm production as well as in their acquisition of material or 
consumption items and productive assets. 

In the first place these households are becomingly increasingly 
risk-averse.. In 1984-85 a total of 26 farmers in the 12 villages covered in 
the Mufurudzi case study diversified their enterprise mix by adding the 
agriculturally demanding and higher priced tobacco crop to the cultivation of 
the "traditional" crops, namely, maize and cotton. This number showed a 
declining trend among tobacco growers who in 1982-83 were 36 and then 51 in 

1983- 84. However, given the serious droughts of the three years preceding 

1984- 85, which wiped out most crops, there was not much expectation that any 



farmer would take the risk of getting into tobacco again so soon. 

There was also an increasing tendency among Mufurudzi farmers to fully 
utilize their arable lands by expanding the areas cultivated. For instance, 
the mean hectares cultivated by each household increased by 35 percent between 
1982-83 and 1983-84, that is, from 2.3 to 3.1. Consequently, the mean area 
that every household left under fallow decreased by 0.8 hectares between 
1982-83 and 1984-85 when the hectares cultivated apparently stabilized at 3.1 
per household. If this stabilization is maintained it would be in conformity 
with the recommendations made in the Project Report by AGRITEX requiring that 
for agronomic and good husbandary reasons these smallholders only cultivate 60 
percent of their total arable land each year (Table 8-19). 

In 1984-85 slightly more land was devoted to cotton than to maize (Table 
8-20). This appears to be the beginnings of a movement away from putting more 
resources into maize which is the staple source of subsistence. If this 
becomes the trend it would make much economic sense because of the higher 
returns to cotton. Infact, for 1984-85 the per hectare costs for maize and 
cotton as estimated in AFC figures for creditors in Mufurudzi were $258 and 
$320 respectively. At the 1984-85 market prices of $179.78 for a tonne of 
maize and $550.00 for cotton the break-even yield for maize was 1.44 tonnes 
and 0.58 tonnes for cotton. Given Mufurudzi' s mean yield per hectare of 3.48 
tonnes for maize and 1.89 tonnes for cotton in 1984-85 the net returns or 
incomes were $367.65 for a hectare of maize and $719.40 for a hectare of 
cotton. 

The mean kilograms per hectare achieved on Europe an- man aged or the 
Large-Scale Commercial Farms in agro-ecological zone II is reported by AGRITEX 
to be 4,000. This means that the average productivity for maize on Mufurudzi 
farms, about 70 percent of which lie in the poorer Natural Region III, was 
generally very commendable. This is even more so given the fact that the 



TABLE 8-19 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLDS 
LAND USE INTENSITY, 1982-83 / 1984-85 





1982 


-83 


1983 


-84 


1984 


-85 




LAND 
CULTIV 
ATION 


UNDER 

FALLOW 


LAND 
CULTIV 
ATION 


UNDER 
FALLOW 


LAND 
CULTIV 
ATION 


UNDER 
FALLOW 








(MEAN HECTARES) 






Banana 


3.0 


2.0 


2.5 


2.5 


3.3 


1.7 


Chitepo 


2.5 


2.5 


3.7 


1.3 


3.5 


1.5 


Gatu 


3.7 


1.3 


3.3 


1.7 


2.9 


2.1 


Gwetera 


1.3 


3.7 


2.6 


2.4 


3.4 


1.6 


Magadzi 


2.6 


2.4 


3.1 


1.9 


3.5 


1.5 


Mudzinge 


1.7 


3.3 


2.5 


2.5 


3.0 


2.0 


Mupedza 
nhamo 


2.7 


2.3 


3.6 


1.4 


2.2 


2.8 


Muringa 
mombe 


1.8 


3.2 


2.8 


2.2 


2.4 


2.6 


Mutora 
mhepo 


2.0 


3.0 


3.2 


1.8 


3.3 


1.7 


Nehanda 


1 . 5 


3.5 


2.5 


2.5 


2.9 


2. 1 


Takawira 


3.1 


1.9 


3.8 


1.2 


3.0 


2.0 


Zvataida 


2.2 


2.8 


3.7 


1.3 


3.3 


1.7 


All 

Villages 


2.3 


2.7 


3.1 


1.9 


3.1 


1.9 



Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural 
census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by 
DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (C30), Harare. 



TABLE 8-20 
MUFURUDZI MODEL A SCHEME: HOUSEHOLDS LAND USE 
CHARACTERISTICS, 1984-85 SEASON 

NUMBER TOTAL AREA CULTIVATED AREA FOR MEAN AREA MEAN 
OF CULTIVATED MAIZE COTTON TOBACCO CULTIVATED HSEHOLD 
HSEHOLDS IN VILLAGE PER HSEHOLD SIZE 







(. HECTARES ; 


/i 


A 


% 


(HECTARES) 




Banana 


12 


39.2 


41.8 


56.1 


2.0 


3.3 


7.2 


(-.riitepo 




104.8 


45.4 


54.6 


0.0 


3.5 


7.1 


Gatu 


48 


142.8 


43.1 


56.9 


0.0 


3.0 


9.4 


Gwetera 


32 


108.0 


46.7 


53.3 


0.0 


3.4 


7.0 


Magadzi 




1/0.0 


45.4 


53.9 


0.7 


3.5 


7.7 


Mudzinge 


JU 


90.8 


34. 4 


65.6 


0.0 


3.0 


6.9 


Mupedza 
nhamo 


13 


28.0 


53.0 


47.0 


0.0 


2.2 


7.9 


Muringa 
mombe 


28 


67.6 


49.7 


46.7 


3.6 


2.4 


7.9 


Mutora 
mhepo 


14 


46.0 


47.8 


50.4 


1.7 


3.3 


8.9 


Nehanda 


38 


124.8 


53.1 


45.1 


1.8 


3.3 


7.6 


Takawira 


29 


88.0 


59.5 


35.0 


5.5 


3.0 


6.4 


Zvataida 


26 


85.6 


44.4 


55.6 


0.0 


3.3 


7.1 


All 

Villages 


349 


1,095.6 


47.0 


51.7 


1.3 


3.1 


7.6 



Mufurudzi farms are smallholdings with no economies of scale and the kinds of 
management expertise, capitalization and other facilities that are available 
to the commercial farmers. Infact, households in Gatu, Magadzi and Gwetera 
villages easily exceeded the target per hectare outputs for maize of 
commercial farms (Table 8-21). If for example 1982-83 is taken as a base year 
maize productivity in Mufurudzi increased by 167 percent in 1983-84 and by as 
much as 582 percent in 1984-85. In absolute terms, for the twelve villages 
studied, output rose from 277,550 kilograms in 1982-83 to 1,893,164 kilograms 
in 1984-85 (see Table 8-23) 

The same productivity story for maize is replicated in the case of cotton 
the other major crop grown by Mufurudzi farmers (Table 8-22). For cotton the 
mean per hectare yield in 1984-85 was 412 percent over and above the 1982-83 
yield. In 1984-85, the average farmer in Mufurudzi did not only achieve the 
target productivity of 1,370 kilograms per hectare for commercial farms in the 
area but even exceeded it by 38 percent. If these outputs are evaluated in 
terms of the targets projected by the planners as given in Table 8-15 above 
then the productivity of these Model A. Normal Scheme farmers are even more 
impressive. For instance, it was envisaged that at year three and thereafter 
their mean yield for maize was going to be 1,500 kilograms per hectare and 
cotton 700 kilograms per hectare. For 1984-35 these targets were more than 
doubled in all but only 3 of the 12 villages (see Table 8-21 and Table 8-22) 

The trends in maize productivity per household and the respective 
proportions either retained for domestic use or marketed also attest to the 
fact that many farmers are becoming more confident in resettlement and feeling 
more secure in their new environment. The data for 1983-84 indicates that 
farmers were retaining relatively less of their total output and selling more 
of the grain which constitutes the main staple. Thus, whereas Mufurudzi 
marketed only 14 percent of its maize output in 1982-83 the story was 



TABLE 8-21 
MUTURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN 
HOUSEHOLDS MAIZE PRODUCTIVITY 

1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 

(MEAN KILOGRAMS HARVESTED PER HECTARE) 



Banana 

Chitepo 

Gatu 

Gwetera 

Magadzi 

Mudzinge 

Mupedza 
nhamo 

Muring a 
mombe 

Mutora 
mhepo 

Nehanda 

Takawira 

Zvataida 



All 

Villages 



128 
9 18 
276 
163 
172 
167 

143 

64 

307 
867 
754 
1,517 



456 



1,150 
1,106 
1,113 
1,972 
1,961 
1,183 

624 

943 

899 
1,627 
1,709 
1,066 



1,279 



3,041 
2,829 
5,176 
4,749 
5,136 
• 2,768 

3,044 

1,893 

3,073 
3,433 
3,517 
3,113 



3,481 



Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from 
agricultural census figures for the resettlement 
schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO), Harare. 



TABLE 8-22 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLDS 
COTTON PRODUCTIVITY 

1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 

(MEAN KILOGRAMS HARVESTED PER HECTARE) 



Banana 

Chitepo 

Gatu 

Gwetera 

Magadzi 

Mudzinge 

Mupedza 
nhamo 

Muringa 
mombe 

Mutora 
mhepo 

Nehanda 

Takawira 

Zvataida 



156 
359 
313 
581 
280 
296 

290 

85 

762 
770 
246 
285 



1,265 
699 
1,700 
1,430 
1,416 
1,289 

1,075 

465 

1,546 
1,159 
758 
1,164 



1,293 
1,501 
3,762 
2,041 
2,619 
1,694 

2,659 

775 

1 ,978 
1,504 
1,140 
1,720 



All 

Villages 



369 



1,164 



1,891 



Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is derived from agricultural 
census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by 
DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare. 



360 

different in 1984-85 during which 61.6 percent of all the maize produced were 
sold. Indeed, households in all the twelve villages in this study produced 
maize for the market in 1984-85. In contrast only five villages did so in 
1982-83 selling just 13.7 percent of the total harvest and nine in 1983-84 
which sold only 18.1 percent (Table 8-23). 

The significant fact about the increasing commercial disposal of 
Mufurudzi maize is that it has not occured at the expense of household 
subsistence. These households, infact, had more grain for consumption at a 
time when the proportion sold was more. In 1982-83, each household was only 
able to retain 591 kilograms on the average. However, in 1984-85 each retained 
over three times that much with a mean of 1,775 kilograms (Table S-24). 

In the latter half of 1985 the 349 farmers surveyed in 12 of the 18 
villages reported possessing a total head of 1,454 cattle. While this was a 
modest increase over the 1982-83 stock figures it showed a 16 percent decline 
against the total head count for 1983-84 when the 12 villages reported 1,737 
head of cattle (Table 8-25). This decline may not be explained so much by 
sales or slaughter for consumption or even by other out-transfers such as for 
roora or marriage transactions. The field evidence indicates the most propable 
explanation to be predators and pests. If not because of especially the 
widespread prevalence of the trypanosomiasis-carrying tsetsefly, Glossina sp . , 
which was first spotted in the Scheme in 1983, most farmers would have 
successfully built-up their livestock heads.-" 

In terms of income for instance, the average household net cash flow from 
cotton and maize sales in 1985 was $1,332 (Table 8-26). This represents an 
excess of 233 percent over the minimum target of $400 per annum envisaged for 
these resettled households in the government policy. An assessment of the 
gross incomes in 1985 from crops, that is, the output retained and the surplus 
marketed shows a much higher average returns of $2,128.26 per household. 



361 



TABLE 8-23 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN MAIZE PRODUCTION, 
HOUSEHOLD RETENTION AND SALE 

1982 - 83 1983 - 84 1984 - 85 

TOTAL MAIZE TOTAL MAIZE TOTAL MAIZE 

MAIZE RETA SOLD MAIZE RETA SOLD MAIZE RETA SOLD 

YIELD INED YIELD INED YIELD INED 



(N=) TONNES % (N=) TONNES % (N=) TONNES % 



Banana 


1 /. 
14 


3.6 


100.0 


0.0 


14 


17.0 


100.0 


0.0 


12 


49.9 


49.8 


50.2 


Chitepo 


30 


50.9 


64.4 


35.6 


30 


53.5 


74.8 


25.2 


30 


134.7 


29.9 


70.1 


Gatu 


50 


29.3 


74.8 


25.2 


46 


65.2 


94.7 


5.3 


48 


308.5 


33.9 


66.1 


Gwetera 


31 


4.1 


100.0 


0.0 


31 


76.2 


79.3 


20.7 


32 


239.3 


20.9 


79.1 


i ICl^ CtU. ^ X 


J X 


i J » 0 


1 nn n 


U . (J 


/. Q 


142 . 1 


78 . 0 


22.0 


49 


396. 5 


28.0 


72.0 


Mudzmge 


33 


6.8 


100.0 


0.0 


33 


37.9 


94.0 


6.0 


30 


86.4 


56.1 


43.9 


Ml th p rl ^ a 


























nhamo 


13 


4.1 


77.8 


22.2 


12 


13.5 


94.6 


5.4 


13 


45.0 


54.5 


45.5 


Muringa 


























mombe 


24 


2.4 


100.0 


0.0 


28 


29.0 


100.0 


0.0 


28 


63.6 


60.8 


39.2 


Mutora 


























mhepo 


14 


4.5 


100.0 


0.0 


14 


15.4 


100.0 


0.0 


14 


67.6 


36.6 


63.4 


Nehanda 


39 


36.8 


59,9 


40.1 


37 


111.9 


57.6 


42.4 


38 


199.1 


29.3 


70.7 


Takawira 


31 


57.8 


59.4 


40.6 


31 


120.7 


39.0 


61.0 


29 


184.3 


27.4 


72.6 


Zvataida 


27 


63.7 


100.0 


0.0 


26 


58.5 


70.5 


29.5 


26 


118.3 


34.5 


66.5 


All 


























Villages 




277.6 


86.3 


13.7 




740.9 


81.9 


18.1 


1,893.2 


38.4 


61.6 



Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural 

census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE 
for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare. 



362 



TABLE 8-24 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEME: TRENDS IN MEAN 
HOUSEHOLD MAIZE RETENTIONS FOR DOMESTIC USE 





1982 


- 83 


1983 


- 84 


1984 


- 85 




MEAN 
HSEHOLD 
SIZE 


MAIZE 
RETAINED 

(KGS/ 
HSEHOLD) 


MEAN 
HSEHOLD 
SIZE 


MAIZE 
RETAINED 

(KGS/ 
HSEHOLD) 


MEAN 
HSEHOLD 
SIZE 


MAIZE 
RETAINED 

(KGS/ 
HSEHOLD) 


Banana 


7.1 


260 


7.0 


1,216 


7.2 


2,258 


Chitepo 


7.6 


1,092 


5.2 


1,335 


7.1 


1,344 


Gatu 


9.4 


439 


9.7 


1,343 


9.4 


2,176 


Gwetera 


7.4 


132 


5.4 


1,949 


7.0 


1,561 


Magadzi 


7.8 


266 


6.2 


2,264 


7.7 


2,269 


Mudzinge 


7.4 


207 


7.7 


1,078 


6.9 


1,614 


Mupedza 
nhamo 


6.7 


245 


6.3 


1,062 


7.9 


1,890 


Muringa 
mombe 


7.6 


99 


6.7 


1,037 


7.9 


1,432 


Mutora 
mhepo 


9.7 


325 


6.2 


1,183 


8.9 


1,768 


Nehanda 


8.0 


565 


6.0 


1,741 


7,6 


1,533 


Takawira 


7.2 


1,107 


4.3 


1,518 


6.4 


1 ,742 


Zvataida 


6.9 


2,359 


5.6 


1,586 


7.1 


1 ,568 


All 

Villages 


7.7 


591 


5.8 


1,443 


7.6 


1,763 


Source : 


Data for 


1982-83 and 


1983-84 is 


calculated from agricultural 



census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE 



for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare. | 

1 

I 
I 

I 

I 



TABLE 8-25 

MUFURUDZI SCHEME: TRENDS IN THE BUILD-UP OF CATTLE HEADS 





1982 


-83 


1983 


-84 


1984 


-85 




HOUSE 
HOLDS 


CATTLE 
HEAD 


HOUSE 
HOLDS 


CATTLE 
HEAD 


HOUSE 
HOLDS 


CATTLE 
HEAD 


Banana 


14 


46 


14 


53 


12 


45 


Chitepo 


30 


161 


30 


207 


30 


174 


Gatu 


50 


179 


46 


245 


48 


170 


Gwetera 


31 


94 


31 


127 


32 


86 


Magadzi 


51 


185 


49 


290 


49 


197 


Mud z Inge 


33 


67 


33 


139 


30 


110 


Mupedza 
nhamo 


13 


43 


12 


24 


13 


32 


Muring a 
mombe 


24 


74 


28 


96 


28 


69 


Mutora 
mhepo 


14 


83 


13 


113 


14 


93 


iN c nariQ a 




104 


37 


159 


38 


185 


Takawira 


31 


106 


31 


143 


29 


152 


Zvatalda 


27 


87 


26 


141 


26 


141 


All 

Villages 


357 


1,229 


350 


1,737 


349 


1,454 



Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 ar calculated from agricultural 
census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by 
DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare. 



364 

TABLE 8-26 

MUFURUDZI MODEL A SCHEME: CROP COSTS AND RETURNS, 
1984-85 SEASON (MAIZE & COTTON) 



NUMBER 
OF 

HSEHOLDS 


VARIABLE 
COST 

($) 


GROSS 
RETURNS 

($) 


NET CASH 
INCOME 

($) 




MEAN HSEHOLD 
NET CASH 
FLOW 
($) 


Banana 


12 


11,271.20 


24,607.28 


8,869. 


80 


739. 15 


Chitepo 


30 


31 ,736.80 


71,435.80 


32,451. 


52 


1 ,081.72 


Gatu 


48 


54,193.60 


218,513.40 


145,519.96 


3,031.67 


Gwetera 


32 


32,364.00 


107,673.80 


66,324. 


96 


2,072.66 


Magadzi 


49 


53,614.40 


203,247.52 


129,641. 


20 


2,645.74 


Mudzinge 


30 


27,121.60 


71,064.64 


35,239. 


52 


1,174.65 


Mupedza 
nhamo 


13 


9,194.40 


27,403.20 


13,791. 


60 


1,060.89 


Muringa 
mombe 


28 


18,780.80 


24,899.64 


-834. 


16 


-29.79 


Mutora 
mhepo 


14 


13,100.00 


37,400.48 


19,319. 


56 


1,379.97 


Nehanda 


38 


30,708.00 


76,484.68 


35,306. 


28 


929. 11 


Takawira 


29 


20,585.80 


52,434.00 


17,191. 


60 


592.81 


Zvataida 


26 


25,036.00 


66,313.00 


33,947. 


72 


1 ,305.68 


All 

Villages 


349 


327,706.60 


981,477.44 


536,769. 


56 


1,332.02 



Note: A total of 27 farmers from Banana, Magadzi, Muringamombe , Mutora- ! 
mhepo, Nehanda and Takawira cultivated tobacco in addition to the 
maize and cotton. These represented 8 percent of all farmers. 
However, just 1.3 percent of the total area of 1,096 hectares 
cropped was devoted to tobacco. For this reason and because of 
the complicated nature of tobacco marketing which is by auction 
and thus is not subject to government's producer prices I decided 
to drop the crop from these calculations. The costs, value and 
returns therefore relate only to mai^e and cotton. Consequently, 
these figures may not reflect the actual costs, returns and mean i 
net agricultural cash flows in the six villages. I 

I' 



365 

Since being resettled more farmers have purchased for the first time such 
household items as watches and radios (see Table 7-40 and Table 7-41, Chapter 

VII above) and such capital assets as Scotch-carts and ox-drawn implements to 

■ 

facilitate higher productivity (see Tables 7-43 and Table 7-44, Chapter VII 
above). In 1985, a total of 221 households or 64 percent of all farmers 
covered in the twelve villages studied in Mufurudzi had applied for and 
j received government loans to construct new and permanent homes. Of this number 

! the greater majority made up of 171 households had even completed and were 

I residing in these houses. 

I The move away from traditional wattle and daub and grass thatched houses 

into permanent, well ventilated ones made with sandcrete, steel frames and 
wooden doors and windows, corrugated roofing sheets and cement floors and 

i plastering is certainly an improvement. Increased farm productivity is also a 

commendable achievement so are increased incomes and consumption. The 
foundations for these have been the provision by the government of 
resettlement land, wide ranging opportunities and integrated developmental 
facilities such as roads, schools, water, extension, credit and marketing. 

i 

! There is every indication that these farm households are making the fullest 

use of available services and in the process improving their respective 
qualities of life."^ 



Simba Youth Scheme as an Illustrative Case 
of Model B Resettlement 



Simba Youth; Background 



The Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative was established at the 
beginning of the 1980-81 farming season by a group of volunteers who mostly 
then comprised ex-guerrilla combatants. They were allocated the block of land 

I 



366 



that used to be the Paridon Farm measuring a total of 1,955 hectares. The land 
located in the western end of the Mufurudzi Scheme is in a better 
agro-ecological zone of Natural Region II. In terms of the topography, 
vegetation, soils and general climate Simba Youth shares similar 
characteristics with Mufurudzi. It also has the added advantage of being 
transcended by the tarred national road which originates in Harare, passing 
through Bindura the provincial capital and Shamva the district center, all in 
the south, northwards to Mount Darwin which is another district center (Figure 
7-1). 

At the time of the establishment of the cooperative the following 

developments and facilities were present on the property: (1) an old homestead 

3 3 

which needed renovation; (2) a dam with 295 x 10 m capacity, which 
leaked badly and held no water; (3) water pump; (4) electricity connection to 
the national grid; (5) a tractor with plow, planter and trailer; (6) poultry 
unit and (7) old barns. 

Of the total area 24 percent or 460 hectares is considered arable. About 
71 percent of the farm consist of Class VI land an outcropped area which 
provides good grazing. The remaining 5 percent is hilly and contain rough 
grazing . 

Simba Youth: Scheme Costs and Farm-Level Economic Projections 

The government acquired the Paridon Farm at a cost of $44,000. The 
development costs also totalled $117,097. In all then, the entire Scheme cost 
$161,097. At the projected target membership of 90 farmers the cost per member 
was calculated to be $1,790 (Table 8-27). Based on this ideal membership 
figure and the high agro-potential of the area to produce dryland maize and 
cotton crops with integrated cattle and poultry enterprises Simba Youth was 



TABLE 8-27 

SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEME: 
BUDGET ALLOCATION, SUMMARY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND BALANCE 

AS AT JULY 31, 1985 

ITEM/ SUB-ITEM BUDGETED PROGRESSIVE BALANCE 

COST EXPENDITURE 

($ 000) 



Indirect Costs: (Ministry of Lands, Resettl. & Rural Dev.) 

Land Acquisition 44,000 44,000 Q 

Development Costs: (Agricultural & Rural Dev. Authority) 

Demarcation and Survey 400 0 400 

Land Preparation 15,000 10,240 4,760 

Roads 250 0 250 

Water Supplies 20,000 3,824 16,176 

Fencing 3,840 3,520 320 

Dip 3,700 3,643 57 

Establishment Grant: 
Housing & Farm 

Buildings 20,500 20,458 42 

Transport 4,420 4,420 0 

Tractors & Equipment 25,000 5,007 19,993 

Vehicles & Cycles 6,000 6,000 0 
Hand Tools & 

Prof Clothes 1,825 1,825 0 

Workshop Tools 500 0 500 

Vegetable Garden Tools 100 0 100 

Oxen 2,500 0 2,500 

Ox-Carts 480 0 480 



TABLE 8 - 27 — continued 



ITEM/ SUB-ITEM 


BUDGETED 
COST 


PROGRESSIVE 
EXPENDITURE 

($ 000) 


BALANCE 


Ox-Implements 


1,000 


0 


1,000 


Planning & Implementation 5,498 


9 7/i 1 
Z , / H i 


9 757 


Contigencies 


6,084 


0 


6,084 


Total 


161,097 


105,678 


55,419 


Cost Per Member 


1,790 







Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (July 1985), 
Harare . 



369 

projected to yield at its full capacity an Internal Financial Rate of Return 
amounting to 32 percent per annum. According to the project assessment report 
issued by AGRITEX this figure would even increase if the cooperators produce 
high-price crops such as groundnuts (peanuts) and tobacco all of which are 
suited to the sandy soils of the area coupled with its favored agro-ecology. 

AGRITEX recommended that an average of 155 hectares of maize and 35 
hectares of cotton be grown each year in 50 percent rotation. The rotation 
proposed was as follows: Maize/Cotton/Maize followed by a 3 year pasture. 
The ideal cropping program upon which the planners based their projections 
recommended that in the initial year of the Scheme 140 hectares of maize and 
20 hectares of cotton were to be grown. This was to be followed in year two by 
155 hectares of maize and 30 of cotton. In year three and thereafter the 
cooperators were to cultivate a total of 190 hectares 82 percent of which were 
to be devoted to maize and the remaining 35 hectares or 18 percent to cotton 
(Table 8-28). As Table 8-28 further indicates if the Simba Youth kept to this 
cropping viability projection the total gross margins were going to be $42,980 
for 1980-81, $49,345 for 1981-82 and $50,465 for 1982-83 and subsequent years. 

Conceived as an integrated or mixed agricultural system the potential for 
livestock production in Simba Youth is quite promising. Infact, the farm has 
an estimated carrying capacity of 318 Livestock Units, the equivalent of 398 
head of cattle. On full herd development, which usually is expected to take 
about 10 years, the livestock holding is projected to generate approximately 
$8,000 gross margin per year. 

Dealing with the cropping program it is very important to state here that 
all these projections are premised on the explicit policy assumption made by 
the planners to the effect that the membership of Simba Youth will increase 
from its 55 in 1981-82 to 90 by 1983-84. The project report states that by 
year four "the Co-operative must increase to 90 persons to handle this crop" 



TABLE 8-28 

SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEME: 
CROPPING BUDGET 

1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 

& AFTER 



MAIZE 

Area (Hectares) 140 155 155 

Total Variable Cost ($) 27,580 30,535 30,535 

Total Income ($) 66,080 73,160 73,160 

Total Gross Margin ($) 38,500 42,625 42,625 

COTTON 

Area (Hectares) 20 30 35 

Total Variable Cost ($) 4,620 6,930 8,085 

Total Income ($) 9,100 13,650 15,925 

Total Gross Margin ($) 4,480 6,720 7,840 

(TOTAL) 

Area (Hectares) 160 185 190 

Total Variable Cost ($) 32,200 37,465 38,620 

Total Income ($) 75,180 86,810 89,085 

Total Gross Margin ($) 42,980 49,345 50,465 



Source: Simba Youth Cooperative (Paridon Farm) Project Report 
(Revised November 1981), AGRITEX, Harare. 



371 



of 155 hectares maize and 35 hectares cotton. 

Farming in Zimbabwe is highly rigid in terms of the demands on labor that 
is needed to perform specific operations at the right time. This is because of 
the agro-ecological constraints in the form of soils, precipitation and 
climate that nature imposes on farm production (see Chapter II above). For 
instance, it was the recommendation of the AGRITEX planners that Simba Youth 
dry-plants maize seed between the 15 and 25 of November to 43,000 plants per 
hectare to obtain an average yield of 4,000 kilograms per hectare. Likewise, 
cotton seed was also to be dry-planted during the same period to 53,320 plants 
per hectare to obtain average yield of 1,370 kilograms of gin-cotton per 
hectare . 

The reality about the AGRITEX recommendation is that for dry-land 
agriculture under such a restrictive ecology any of the following constraints 
would definitely make the achievement of the projected yields unlikely. Tliese 
are (1) a significant delay in the arrival of the rains, (2) a shortfall in 
the total amount of the rainfall received, (3) non-compliance with the 
planting time, (4) inability to follow the recommended planting density and 
(5) failure to ensure proper crop husbandary. Consequently, while appreciating 
the determinant role of nature for success in such a farming system the 
crucial place of labor especially its adequacy throughout the critical phases 
of land preparation, planting, weeding and harvesting can not be 
overemphasized . 

According to the AGRITEX estimates 2.5 workers per hectare or a total of 
88 workers are needed to pick 35 hectares of cotton during the 12 to 16 weeks 
harvesting period starting from about the month of May. Similarly, 
hand-harvesting of maize requires 3.25 worker-days per 1,000 kilograms. Thus 
for the expected yield of 4,000 kilograms per hectare the needs of Simba Youth 
are a workforce of 90 members to be able to harvest 155 hectares within 22 



372 



days. Thus the achievement and maintenance of the target membership throughout 
the entire farming season are crucially important for the cooperatives to 
realize the projected outputs and incomes. 

For instance, in its third year of establishment, that is, at the 
beginning of the farming season in 1983 the total membership of Simba Youth 
was 40. The cooperative had planned to cultivate 80 hectares cotton and 40 
hectares maize. It needs to be observed that this cropping program was 
unrealistic and contrary to the recommendations made by AGRITEX in Simba 
Youth's project report. Nevertheless, the cooperative managed to plant 54 
hectares cotton and 63 hectares maize. In December 1983, two members of the 
cooperative were expelled while four resigned reducing membership to only 34. 
In the monthly report for December submitted to DERUDE , Harare, by the 
Resettlement Officer it was reported that the cooperative's "crops are very 
good but they are struggling with the weeds." In March 1984, at the peak of 
the farming season, the Officer's report again indicated: 

Membership dropped from 34 to 31 this month. One of 
the most senior members Comrade [. . .] left. The 
remaining members alleged that members were leaving 
the cooperative because there was no income . . . 
They threatened to abandon the [cooperative] society 
if there will be no compromise on their $54,000 AFC 
[ indebted ness] ... Of 57 ha cotton 30 ha were well 
weeded about 20 ha were weeded once and now don't 
look clean enough to give them the expected yield. 

Other dimensions of this problem excerpted from various monthly reports are 
shown in Table 8-29. Such problems continue to plague Simba Youth and indeed 
the greater majority of the other Model B Schemes throughout the country. 



373 



! TABLE 8-29 

I SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B COOPERATIVE SCHEME: MEMBERSHIP AND 

CROPPING MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS, 1984-85 SEASON 



September 1984: 


Current Membership 31 






Cooperative has no financier for seasonal 
inputs. AFC declined its loan application 
because of outstanding debt [of nearly 
$60,000]. Coop negotiating with the 
Lutheran World Federation for sponsorship 


October 


1984: 


Current Membership 27 

Two members were expelled for misconduct. 
Another refused punishment for stealing 
eggs and instead left the coop with his 
wife. The Lutheran World Federation is 
willing to loan $30,000 to finance 35 
hectares maize and 45 hectares cotton. 
Telephone disconnected for non-payment 
of bills. 


November 


1984: 


Current Membership 30 

The Lutheran World Federation granted 
$30,000 loan to enable coop to purchase 
inputs. 72 hectares already plowed. 


December 


1984: 


Current Membership 30 

The members think they will meet a target 
of 35 hectares maize and 45 hectares cotton 
this year. They would like more equipment, 
eg. another tractor for their fields. 


January 


1985: 


Current Membership 28 

Two members failed to return after the 
Christmas holidays. Of the original 
cropping target of 80 hectares [only] 30 
hectares cotton and 20 hectares maize have 
been planted. 


February 


1985: 


Current Membership 30 

Of the cotton crop 12 hectares not yet 
weeded. Maize crop was late and only 16 
hectares planted. 



1 



374 



TABLE 8 - 29--continued 

March 1985: Current Membership 30 

Cooperative is hiring school children to 
provide supplementary labour to weed the 
fields. The cooperators change their 
figures from month to month. This month 
they said they have 31 hectares cotton 
and 16 hectares maize, while last month 
they gave 32 hectares for cotton. They 
say they did not weed the 1 hectare so 
they no more count it. 

April 1985: Current Membership 30 

Maize crop needs weeding. But cooperators 
say they are too busy in cotton fields to 
have time for maize. 

May 1985: Current Membership 30 

Cotton picking is on. Cooperators expecting 
about 400 bales. 

June 1985: Current Membership 29 

A member was expelled for misconduct. He 
stole an overall (work clothe) and also 
fought with another member. 

July 1985: Current Membership 29 

32 bales of cotton picked. 25 sent to the 
CMB. More still to be picked in the field. 

August 1985: Current Membership 29 

Cotton picking still in progress. 

September 1985: Current Membership 22 

A total of 103 bales of cotton picked and 
sent to the CMB. Total maize harvested was 
250 (x 91 kg) bags. 



Source: Monthly Reports, Simba Youth Model B Scheme, DERUDE , 
Harare . 



375 



Simba Youth: Economic Performance and the Genesis 
of a Problematic Agricultural Resettlement 

At the end of the fifth year of Simba Youth's existence none of the 
economic viability projections made by the planners had come to pass. At the 
beginning of the 1985-86 financial year 66 percent of the project costs of the 
Scheme had already been expended. Yet the basic requirement of a workforce of 
90 members had not been achieved. Indeed, from a membership of 55 in November 
1981 the cooperative was down to only 22 members four years later in November 
1985 (Figure 3-4). 

Simba Youth was rated lowly by its Resettlement Officer for cooperative 
spirit, motivation, agricultural performance, stability and progress with the 
resettlement objectives. Its major problems were identified then as (1) low 
membership, (2) laziness and lack of seriousness with work, (3) indebtedness 
to the tune of nearly $62,000 owed to the AFC and (4) lack of a tractor. In 
terms of its performance to date, the nature of its problems and its long-term 
prospects the Scheme, however, was not significantly different from the 
majority of Zimbabwe's producer cooperatives. It did not match the performance 
of apparently successful Schemes such as Gowe in the Mashonaland West Province 
neither did it exhibit the imminent near collapse atmosphere which 
characterized others such as Nyakudya or Kubudirira in Mashonaland Central 
Province. 

Because of its low, unstable and decreasing membership the resources at 
the disposal of Simba Youth were woefully underutilized. The members appeared 
content and hopeful though. The paradox of this fact is that like the greater 
majority of the members of the five Model B Producer Cooperatives covered in 
the case study these resettled farmers were exposed to increasing material 
deprivation and poverty as compared to many of their counterparts in 
Mufurudzi. The cooperative members were even worse off than farmers in the 



Membership 
90 
85 
80 
75 
70 
65 
60 
55 
50 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 

5 

0 



oooooooo 



xo 



XXX 
XX X 



Nov May Nov May Nov May Nov May Nov 
Feb Aug Feb Aug Feb Aug Feb Aug 



1981 1982 1983- 



-1984- 



■1985 



Note: Projected membership o o; Actual membership x x 

FIGURE: 8-4 
SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE: PROJECTED 
BUILD-UP TO TARGET MEMBERSHIP COMPARED WITH TRENDS IN ACTUAL 
MEMBERSHIP, 1981 - 1985 



377 

Communal Areas in terras of accumulation of assets and access to basic comforts 
of life (see Table 7-37, Table 7-39 and Table 7-40, Chapter VII above). 

At the end of the season in August 1985, Simba Youth harvested and sold a 
total of 103 bales of cotton to the Cotton Marketing Soard. This fetched 
$10,197. The cooperative also harvested 250 bags of maize all of which were 
retained for subsistence. Thus, the income from sales grossed by the 
cooperative was only a third of the cost of $30,000 loaned to Simba Youth in 
November 1984 by the non-governmental organization for its cropping program 
(see Table 8-29). In the circumstance none of the members received any cash 
renumeration for their work effort in 1984-85, as was the case in previous 
years, though they were projected by the development planners to be capable of 
generating target incomes of $400 per member. 

In terms of productivity the 103 bales of cotton, equivalent to 18,540 
kilograms from the 30 hectares cultivated, worked out to only 618 kilograms 
per hectare. That represented just 45 percent of the average yield of 1,370 
kilograms estimated for commercial producers in the area by AGRITEX. Similarly 
for maize, only 16 hectares were cultivated which was just 10.3 percent of the 
area that the planners expected the cooperative to put under maize in 1984-85. 
Tlie yield of 250 bags or 22,750 kilograms also gave a per hectare productivity 
of just 1,422 kilograms. That also was only 36 percent of the estimated 
average commercial yield of 4,000 kilograms which the cooperative was deemed 
capable of producing. 

With regards to livestock the herd development at Simba Youth was 
projected to reach at least half of the carrying capacity of the cooperative, 
which is 199 head of cattle, by 1985-86. However, as of March 1935 it had only 
26, a reduction by 7 head since January 1984 when there was a total of 33 head 
of cattle.^ xn October 1985, the government released an amount of $2,415 
out of the outstanding budget of $2,500 against oxen from the Establishment 



378 

Grant (see Table 8-25) to the cooperative. This enabled Simba Youth to 
purchase 10 more head of cattle from Shiloh Development, a private Large-Scale 
Commercial farm in the area. 

With the kind of performance that has characterized Simba Youth from its 
very establishment in 1980 until now there is no way that the cooperative can 
make it without increased and dedicated membership. Equally, there is no way 
that the economically sound projections that justified the government's 
commitment to invest public funds in that particular producer cooperative, as 
well as many others, can be realized in the present circumstance. As at the 
end of July 1985 an amount of $105,678 had been spent by the government on the 
Scheme. That represented 66 percent of the total project cost (see Table 
8-24). The fact is that two-thirds of all the project money had gone into the 
resettlement of less than one-fourth of the target membership. In effect, by 
the raid-19S5 the actual project cost per member stood at $3,774.21 rather than 
the $1,790 (see Table 8-3) originally projected by the planners in the Scheme 
report which obviously is no more tenable. 

Any further expenditures without corresponding increase in membership, or 
worse still with declining membership, will translate into increasing cost per 
member. Thus serious policy efforts need to be directed at breaking the 
vicious cycle of low membership, underutll iza tion of resources, low 
productivity and no surplus output for the market, indebtedness and lack of 
personal income and rewards to labour which in turn precipitates high turnover 
and also keeps membership low. 

Conclusion 

The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the government of 
Zimbabwe as well as other foreign governments and donor agencies have been 



379 

very supportive in providing for the basic needs, essential services and the 
facilitative inputs for the success of the resettlement program. All the 
Schemes which are being implemented under the program appear to have at least 
the necessary economic resources to enable them to achieve the target 
productivities and generate the expected incomes projected for them in their 
respective planning reports. Various evaluations indicate variations in the 
actual performance within and between the Schemes. The human factor, 
essentially household initiative, capability and organization seems to be 
playing the determinant role in bringing about change and progress to some of 
the resettled and inertia and lack of progress to others. 

Generally, the variations in the performance of the two major 
Resettlement Models in operation are striking. While the Model A Schemes 
appear to be building a sound foundation for the success of the greater 
majority of its farmers the Model B Schemes on the other hand are constrained 
by major human and other organizational problems which are serious enough to 
make them an eventual failure. 

Specific implications of these developments substantively for Zimbabwe 
and also for the theory and practice of rural development are explored below 
in Chapter IX along with a set of recommendations. 



380 



Notes 



1. ) The actual number of separate villages in Mufurudzi is 20. These are 
distributed over 18 blocks of land. Gatu and Magadzi each has two villages 
which are combined here for purposes of analysis. This is also the case in the 
official records where the two units of each of the two respective villages 
are treated together. That, however, is not the case with Tongogara I and 2 
which are considered as two distinct villages. 

2. ) A dry spell- is a period of between eleven and twenty days without 
significant rain. According to AGRITEX (1982b; Section on Climatic Data:l) for 
a general usage, 15 millimeters of rain appears to be a suitable criterion for 
significant rainfall on light textured soils; enough to germinate Che seed. 
Once germinated little further rainfall is required to emergence. At this 
stage plants are quite hardy and can take moderate stress without affecting 
the subsequent yield. In Zimbabwe farming circles a period of three weeks is 
generally accepted as being the maximum a farmer can go without replanting. If 
there are more than four pendats (see Chapter II above, fn2) after the 
previous significant rainfall the season is considered to have a false start. 
The growing season is then started at the next significant rainfall with the 
same conditions. 

3. ) As of May 1985 there were 2,625 head of cattle, 424 goats, 120 sheep and 
54 donkeys in Mufurudzi. This represented 1,899 Livestock Units or only 41.5 
percent of the total carrying capacity of the scheme. 

During the survey in November 1985 a little over 80 percent of the Mufurudzi 
sample farm households had cattle. Possession of livestock, especially cattle, 
was cited by 30 percent of all the farmers as the important attribute of a 
"good life" (upenyTi hwakanaka) while 32 percent of all the farmers would, if 
they were to be given $1,000 in cash, rather invest such an amount in 
acquiring cattle (see Chapter VII above). 

There are two major problems which face livestock production in Mufurudzi 
Model A Normal Scheme. The first problem has to do with the proximity of the 
Scheme to the Mufurudzi Safari (Wildlife) Area (Figure 8-2). The game reserve 
which is adjacent to the eastern half of the Scheme exposes the livestock not 
only to such predators as lions from the game reserve but also tsetse which 
thrive well in these reserves. 

In February 1984 four cows and a goat were killed by lions in Magadzi, 
Gwetera and Zvomanyanga villages respectively. In May another 7 heads of 
cattle and a sheep were killed in the three villages. During the first week in 
June 1984 the lions attacked and killed 4 heads in Mukwarl, 2 each in Chitepo 
and Zvataida and 1 each in Nehanda and Gwetera. 

Perhaps, the main contraint to the successful build-up of cattle heads in 
Mufurudzi, like most other localities in the northern half of Zimbabwe, is 
trypanosomiasis. During the survey many farmers reported deaths among their 
stocks the symptoms of which were confirmed to be those of trypanosomiasis 
(see also Chapter VII fn3 above). 

4. ) It may require a lot of financial outlay and physical developments such 
as paddocking and watering points to enable Simba Youth to qualify for the 
grazier scheme under which the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) provides for 
cattle fattening projects on some Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes. Until 



381 



then efforts at increasing the stock numbers at Simba Youth may not yield the 
projected economic benefits. For instance, in February 1985 when there were 
only 30 members, that is, a third of the target membership the cooperators 
slaughtered a cow and 2 pigs from their stock for consumption. In September 
the same year another cow, which they claimed had fallen into a well, was also 
eaten by the 22 members remaining in the cooperative who constituted only 
one-fourth of the target membership. Without any serious and successful 
attempts at building-up the cattle heads an offtake of two beasts in a period 
of six months for subsistence may not be economically justified. 

During ray first visit to the Simba Youth in March 1985 they had a piggery 
with 13 animals, a rabbit project with 49 animals, a poultry project, a 
grocery shop and- a beer hall which generated income for the day-to-day 
subsistence expenses of members. Only the grocery and beer shop were 
functioning at the time of my extended tour of the area with the research team 
during the last quarter of 1985. 

5.) This seemingly rosy picture of the Model A Schemes does not mean that all 
of them are uniforaly successful or none of them have any problems or even the 
respective households within them are all equally doing well. The variations 
in household social and agricultural characteristics as well as performance in 
Mufurudzi, for instance, were examined in Chapter VII above. For the Mufurudzi 
Model A Normal Scheme as a whole various problems involving both the resettled 
farmers, their non-resettlement neighbors as well as the officers have at one 
time or another been reported to DERUDE. The following four cases selected 
purposefully from the records for the first half of 1985 are illustrative: 

(i) In March 1985 1,600 meters of boundary fencing materials erected between 
Tongogara 1 resettlement village and the Goora sub-division of the Madziwa 
Communal Area (see Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2) were vandalized and stolen. Such 
is the contradictions in the nature of the relationships between the better 
resource-endowed resettlement areas and the adjacent ecologically-degraded 
communal lands. 

(ii) In April 1985 a very nasty confrontation occured between the farmers of 
Mudzinge resettlement village and their otherwise very cordial neighbors from 
the adjoining Madziwa Itine (Africa) compound. The Mine which is located within 
the Mufurudzi Scheme just across from Mudzinge (see Figure 3-2) is more of a 
social and economic center for many of the resettled households particularly 
in Mudzinge, Zvataida, Mutoramhepo, Mupedzanharao and Takawira villages. These 
farmers sell vegetables there and buy groceries and meat from the Mine shops. 
More significantly, the beer hall is heavily patronized by these farmers. 

The incident which precipitated the demonstration of the farmers on the Mine 
premises was the death of an Mudzinge ox on the compound apparently from 
poisioning and stab wounds. This was allegedly perpetrated by a disgruntled 
Mine worker whose vegetable garden had been eaten by the ox. In this case also 
the boundary fence between the resettlement area and the Mine compound had 
previously been stolen. DERUDE had asked the Mine authorities to provide 
another fence but the Mine Manager in a letter dated March 28, 1985 responded 
that "management is of the opinion that it is the Resettlement cattle straying 
into Mine property and therefore should be the responsibility of the 
Resettlement area to erect a fence." 

(iii) The general issues of concern reported by the Resettlement Team to 
DERUDE in May 1985 included the following: (1) increasing tendency among the 
"Mapostori" (Apostolic Faith) members particularly in Gato village to indulge 
"in under-age marriages which had affected our school enrolment" for example 
in Magadzi elementary school; (2) withdrawal of non-Mukwari village students, 



382 



that is, those of Chitepo and Zvataida by their parents due to inter-village 
misunderstandings and lack of good drinking water at Mukwari elementary 
school; (3) illegal and secretly operated grocery shops managed by some 
resettled farmers in Tongogara 1, Chitepo and Gatu villages; (4) a government 
staff on the Mufurudzi Resettlement Team illegally operating a grocery shop 
and also assigning an arable plot to himself and cultivating crops; (5) the 
general uncleaniness of some residential plots in Tongogara 1 and Zvoraanyanga 
villages; (6) overstocking beyond the assigned Livestock Units by some farmers 
in Zvoraanyanga, Takawira, Gwetera, Tongogara 1, Magadzi 2, Chitepo, Zvataida, 
Mudzinge and Nehanda villages respectively; and (7) illegal extension of the 
alloted 5 hectare arable plots up, in some instances, to 10 hectares by some 
farmers in Gato, Gwetera, Zvoraanyanga, Magadzi 1 and 2, Tongogara 1 and 2, 
Chitepo and Mukwari villages (see Figure 8-2). (In the case of one of these 
villages a highly placed district-level dignatary of the ruling ZANU-PF party 
who was also a resettled farmer was reported to be cultivating up to 12 
hectares thus "stretching his arable into the coraraunal grazing area.") 

(iv) Finally, in May 1985 a delegation made up of the Mufurudzi Area Board 
Chairman and the Chaminuka District Chairman of the ruling ZANU-PF party 
visited DERUDE's Mashonaland Regional Office in Harare and filed complaints 
against the Scheme's Resettlement Team. They alleged that: (1) the 
Resettlement officials did not show any respect in their dealings with the 
resettled farmers; (2) these officers were fond of threatening farmers with 
evictions thus "prohibiting settlers from making progress;" (3) there were 
cases of misuse of the government vehicle assigned to the Team; and (4) that 
the farmers no longer wanted those particular officers to be in-charge of the 
Scheme . 

These allegations were duely investigated by DERUDE and found to be 
basically without foundation. However, changes were made by transferring one 
officer who had definately incurred the displeasure of some of the farmers. 
The Resettlement Officer, who had been with the Mufurudzi Scheme since its 
inception, was also replaced and moved to another Province to head a newly 
opened Model A Scheme as part of a routine regional reshuffle of personnel. 



CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 

Introduction 

This dissertation has traced the evolution of the land question in 
colonial Zimbabwe. It emphasized how sensitive the problem is to the emotions 
of most Zimbabwean Africans and Europeans alike, be they peasants or the 
povo > bourgeoisie, academics, politicians and technocrats. It has also 
analyzed and described the central role of resettlement in the agricultural 
policy and the implementation of rural development programs in 
postindependence Zimbabwe. All these have been placed against the contextual 
background of both the theoretical and substantive issues which relate to the 
broader paradigms of the developmental problems and prospects for Africa. Thi 
final Chapter recapitulates the thrust of the preceding analysis and findings 
to bring into focus the few recommendations which are offered below. 

Summary of Findings 

After a decade of a bloody and protracted liberation V7ar Zimbabwe 
attained political independence under a majority African rule in 1980. This 
ended a century of European settler colonialism in what was then known as 
Southern Rhodesia and later Rhodesia. The colonial history of the country was 
characterized by segregated land apportionment and separate development along 
racial lines. By the mid-1920s when Britain granted the colony a 
self-governing status the political economy of Rhodesia had crystallized 
essentially into a dualism. 

The dominant sector was European-owned and managed. It depended upon 
extensive African labor force particularly in such critical areas of the 

383 



384 

economy as export agriculture. The marginal or peripheral African sector, on 
the other hand, was predominantly peasant-managed and largely 
subsistence-oriented. While the European sector flourished and accumulated 
wealth through State patronage the African sector was less able to do so 
because of State paternalism and other inhibitive policies. 

In Zimbabwe the best agricultural lands are very limited and they are 
confined to what are designated agro-ecologically as the Natural Regions I and 
II. It so happened that in the course of European immigration and settlement 
they identified and mapped out these favorable areas which they assigned to 
their exclusive use. This development involved the forceful removal of most 
African communities from these lands and their relocation in so-called Native 
Reserves mainly in the poor Natural Regions III, IV and V. 

The net effects of decades of neglect of the development of these 
Reserves were excessive human and livestock pressure on the very limited 
resources available. At independence the Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands, now 
renamed Communal Areas, were characterized by massive ecological degradation 
and underdevelopment of the human capital. This situation was exacerbated by 
the war. 

In 1980 the government launched its massive agricultural resettlement 
program which originally projected to resettle a target of 162,000 farm 
households by 1985. The program is being financed with domestic resources as 
well as international aid. The government set up the objectives of the program 
to include, among others, the rehabilitation of the rural poor and the 
destitute, the reduction of excessive population pressure in the Communal 
Areas, the productive utilization of abandoned and underutilized 
European-owned lands and the eventual intergration of the dichotomized 
European and African sub-sectors of the national economy. 



385 

The policy goal in this on-going resettlement program is to assist the 
resettled farm households to realize domestic food self-sufficiency and also 
generate a surplus market income of at least $400 per year. This assistance is 
in the form of free land, the provision of a wide range of basic human needs, 
liberal credit facilities and extension. Both the public sector and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) , mainly foreign donor agencies, are 
actively involved in the funding of these forms of assistance. 

The resettlement program is planned along various models the two most 
important of which are the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes on the one 
hand and the Model B Schemes on the other. In the former individual households 
are resettled in nucleated villages where they are assigned 5 hectare plots of 
arable lands and access to communal grazing fields. In the latter the mode of 
organization and production follows cooperative or collective lines. 

The Model A Schemes dominate the resettlement scene in terms of the 
numbers resettled, area covered and the total expenditure to date. However, it 
is the explicit intention of the government to eventually transform 
resettlement and indeed the country's agriculture into cooperative 
enterprises. This is in keeping with the socialist ideals of the country's 
only political party the ZANU-PF. 

The resettlement program has now entered its eight year. As of now an 
estimated total of 50,000 households have been resettled. Up until 1986 when a 
new Lands Acquisition Bill was promulagated the government was legally bound 
to acquire resettlement land from European owners on a "willing seller-willing 
buyer" basis = This was part of the Lancaster House agreement which was 
internationnaly negotiated in London in 1979 between Zimbabwe-Rhodesia African 
and European leaders to end the liberation war and usher the country into 
independence. Now the government is at liberty to declare derelict lands as 



386 

needed for public use, purchase them and develop them into resettlement 
schemes. Consequently, the government envisages to resettle at least 15,000 
families every year as lands become available.^ 

Certain concerns have been raised by critics of the resettlement program. 
Of specific interest to this analysis are three issues articulated by them. 
These are that resettlement (1) as envisaged will be harmful to commercial 
agriculture, (2) adversely affect economic growth and (3) will lead to the 
creation of a more serious kind of class antagonism within the African 
communities which will be worse than what had existed between Africans and 
Europeans . 

Some of the literature reviewed in various parts of this study have 
attempted to address the economic criticisms levelled by the adversaries of 
resettlement. This dissertation collected a wide range of empirical data both 
regionally and at the level of farm households from both official and 
non-official sources as well as case study interviews of a cross section of 
farmers in six major farming systems in Zimbabwe. The information gained have 
been analyzed and used to explicate various dimensions of the resettlement 
problem. This analysis has covered some of the issues at the national or 
macro-level and then focused on the micro or grassroots level. The 
presentation below deals with the specific findings from the relevant Chapters 
above as they relate to the impacts of resettlement. 

Macro-Level Impacts of Resettlement 

It is quite obvious from the information presented in Chapters II and VI 
above, in relation to the agricultural boom in Zimbabwe, that the fears 
expressed by critics such as Bill Kinsey (1982) that the implementation of 



387 

resettlement cause the collapse of the Large-Scale Commercial Farm sector was 
unnecessarily alarmist. It was not based on sound empirical projections. 

Economic growth has also not suffered as a result of resettlement. If 
anything at all smallholder producers have responded remarkably to policy 
incentives which are part of the integrated agricultural resettlement and 
rural development program. The phenomenal contribution made by these farmers 
to the so-called "success story" in Zimbabwe's agricultural revolution is 
universally acknowledged (see van Buren 1986). Again Kinsey's (1982) concerns 
have not proved to be based on a correct judgement of what the potential 
impacts of resettlement were at the time of his prediction. 

At the national level resettlement has at least consoled and assured the 
povo or the masses that the government is interested in promoting their 
welfare. This has cushioned off the government from any organized or 
spontaneous agitations and possible coup d'etats which are the hallmark of 
the instability plaguing many African states. The pragmatic way by which the 
government has implemented resettlement so far has not adversely impacted on 
the organization and performance of the country's European farmers also. This 
does not mean that they fully support resettlement, or consider its 
projections to be realistic or even rate the government's progress on it any 
highly. 

Equally, the government has not antagonized its African constituency by 
promising resettlement and failing to carry it out. The criticism in this 
regard has come only from the left among a section of the radical 
intellectuals who expect the government to do more than it is practicable in 
the current situation. The majority Communal Area residents who need 
resettlement are waiting, though anxiously, and they appear to understand the 
constraints that have not made it possible for most of them to benefit from 



388 

resettlement. The greatest majority of those who have been resettled are 
content and appear to be starting off well as the evidence from Mufurudzi 
shows (see Chapters VII and VIII above). 

In terras of the government's own objectives it can be said that there are 
pluses as well as minuses in policy and in implemetation. In reference to the 
positives the following may be mentioned. 

So far over two million hectares of underutilized land have been 
negotiated for and bought for the resettlement of over 300,000 people. It is 
to be admitted that most of these lands are in the poorer agricultural regions 
of the country (see Figure 5-1). But barring the conf istication of the rich 
European-owned lands, which the government refrained from doing, there was no 
legal and democratic way outside the "willing seller-willing buyer" framework 
for acquiring these lands. More significantly, these rather marginal lands, 
which otherwise were not being used effectively, are now being farmed to 
produce food for household needs and also export crops. That certainly is a 
contribution to the national economy. 

If conventional definition of development means anything like changes in 
structure and capacity as well as output (Baster 1972:1) or reducing poverty 
and inequality (Seers 1969:3) then at a general level the government has lived 
up to its developmental objectives. There is no question that the on-going 
resettlement, however modest it is, is (1) extending and improving the base 
for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector, (2) providing, at 
the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who had no land and (3) 
expanding and improving the infrastructure and services that are needed to 
promote the well-being of people and of agricultural production. 

On the problem side the expectation of resettlement in alleviating 
population pressure in the Commmunal Areas, which is a major policy objective. 



389 

has not been realized. Clever Mumbengegwi (1985:212) see the impact of 
resettlement in that regard as marginal. He is right but only to the extent 
that given the high annual birth rate of around 3.5 percent in these Communal 
Areas (Zimbabwe 1982a) there is no way that resettlement of any magnitude can 
possibly solve the problem of overpopulation in the country. This fact should 
have dawned on the policy makers and planners. However, one cannot downplay 
the fact that if the 50,000 households resettled so far were still resident in 
these Communal Areas the already high levels of pressure and consequent crunch 
on the overused resources would have been exceesively exacerbated than they 
are now. 

A major area where the policy of the government on resettlement is not 
working at all as projected relates to the Model B Schemes. These production 
collectives are bewildered by problems which are not easily resolved. One such 
problem is inadequate membership and high turnover of members. The economic 
performance and success of these Model B Producer Cooperatives are predicated 
on the achievement of target membership of hardworking and dedicated 
cooperators . 

The largest proportion of these Schemes, however, have not realized even 
50 percent of their respective targets. Given the existing situation of 
increased impoverishment of the members of these Cooperatives it is not likely 
that they would be able to attract the right kinds of members and be able to 
turn themselves around. The continued governmental sponsorship of these 
apparent waste conduits is a major policy flaw in the area of resettlement. 

Ibbo Mandaza (1985:17) criticizes the government's policies to the extent 
that there "is more continuity than change." That observation is essentially 
valid. However, it must be argued in defence of the government that this is 
the first time in the history of the country that policy guidelines have been 



390 

formulated, funded and are being implemented to equalize opportunity and 
access to existing socioeconomic and political systems. It is the impacts of 
and the projected repercussions of such a development at the grassroots level 
of the resettled farmers which are now examined. 

Micro-Level Impacts of Resettlement 

The case study revealed that as a group the resettled farmers in the 
Model A Normal Scheme are generally doing much better in agricultural 
performance, cash flow and accumulation of assets than farmers in the 
alternative farming systems. This includes the elite Sraall-Scale Commercial 
farmers who are not as productive as the average farmer in the Model A. Normal 
Scheme such as Mufurudzi. On the opposite side of the scale the Model B 
Producer Cooperative farmers are worse off even more so than their 
counterparts in the overcrowded Communal Area farm sector. 

Within the Model A Schemes, like anywhere else, success has not been 
uniform. In Mufurudzi for instance, farmers in such villages as Magadzi, Gatu 
and Gwetera are better performers on the average than their colleagues in 
Muring amombe (Figure 3-2). 

Similarly, within the village level variations are also observed in the 
socio-demographic characteristics of households which reflect in their 
respective phases of the developmental cycle. These phases in turn show that 
different households have different levels of resource accumulation, exhibit 
different capabilities for agricultural performance and are consequently 
responding differently to resettlement. 

It is quite obvious from the analysis that the micro-level impacts of 
resettlement that are expressed in such variables as the amounts of maize 



391 

retained for household consumption, the number of cattle owned, the cash value 
of marketed output and others follow a pattern. For example, (1) the 
male-headed polygynous households in expansion phase are the leaders in 
output, (2) households in the decline phase, as expected, are unable to make 
it, (3) male-headed households are in a better position to benefit from 
resettlement than female-headed households, and (4) even within the latter 
group females who head households because of the "temporary" absence of their 
spouses are responding better and benefitting more from resettlement than 
those who do not have any spouses at all, namely, divorcees and the widowed. 

These variations in social formation have major implications for one of 
the government's policy concerns and also raise the third issue mentioned by 
Bill Kinsey (1982) to the fore. Is this index of increasing social 
differentiation an inevitable concomitant of rural development and social 
change as the literature suggests?. Is such differentiation inherently evil as 
equity advocates say? Is this differentiation likely to be inimical to 
relations among rural Africans in Zimbabwe as Kinsey (1982) predicts? The 
substantive evidence about class in traditional and contemporary Africa may 
provide an inkling into the resolution of some of these issues. 

Ronald Cohen (1985) views the evolution of traditional social formations 
as a process which follows greater "income and wealth." He argues that 

[I]n traditional Africa greater income or wealth requires 
a concurrent increase in the number of dependants, which 
results in more prestige and feelings of achievement for 
the individual concerned. (Cohen 1985:137) 

Cohen's (1985:143) further elaboration of this thesis that "power, 
success, labor, and status stem traditionally from large successful 
households," is a point that Angela Cheater argued earlier in her work among 
Small-Scale Commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. She (Cheater 1984 :xv) found that 



392 

the elements of what she calls "the traditional idiom of accumulation" 
included "polygyny, large families and households, and labour co-operation 
among farmers." 

Recent archival as well as field research in various rural settings in 
Zimbabwe conducted by Ian Phimister (1986) and Davis and Dopcke (1987) have 
all explored dimensions of the sources and relations which underly class 
formation. Similar works have also shed light about comparable experiences 
among the Buganda of Uganda (Mafeje 1973) and in places such as Zambia (Cliffe 
1978) and Tanzania (Raikes 1978). 

What all these studies show is that social differentiation has always 
characterized African societies. It is not development or modernization or 
culture change which fosters class formation. These merely alter or introduce 
additional sources of differentiation. For instance, as Garbett's (1967) 
seminal study among the Shona of valley Korekore chiefdom indicates prestige, 
status and power derived from a large following: 

Traditionally, a man of renown ( munhu mukuru: a 'big' person) 
was one who had control over a large following, who had 
qualities of leadership, who could entertain lavishly, and who 
could put others under obligation to him by distributing gifts 
of grain and beer among them. (Garbett 1967:308). 

While this traditional prerequisite still holds today, as Cheater (1984) 
and. Cohen (1985) confirm, "the introduction of cattle, the acquisition of 
property, and the Involvement in cash farming" (Garbett 1967:321) have 
resulted in important modifications to the norms. That is what changing 
commodity relations did in altering the sources of social formation in the 
Zimbabwean countryside during 1398-1920 (Phimister 1986). That is what the 
rise of the State in colonial Zimbabwe between 1900 and 1939 and the conflict 
between the "established" and the "separatist" churches did in the Gutu 



393 

District (Davis and Dopcke 1987). That is what happened in the case of the 
Small-scale Commercial or the African Purchase Areas with the introduction of 
formalized or monetized land transactions, freehold tenure, extension and farm 
husbandary (Cheater 1984). Across the northwestern border in neighboring 
Zambia that is what male labor migration to the mines and urban centers did 
leaving women to assume new and additional roles in relation to property- 
rights (Cliffe 1978). 

Given these responses about social formation in rural Africa it is 
predictable that resettlement is going to reinforce existing traditonal idoms 
of accumulation and differentiation. The significant fact, though, is that 
nowhere in the literature is it alluded that rural social differentiation is a 
source of mass societal confrontations. Any social conflicts that may arise in 
such situations often consist of domestic or kinship squabbles such as 
relating to witchcraft accusations or realignments in power structures. 

Finally, the establishment of the prestigious and relatively large 
Purchase Area lands for the African farm elites in the colonial days did not 
precipitate any bloody conflicts among so-called "tribal" Africans. Given all 
these developments it is very hard to understand the basis, if any, of 
Kinsey's (1982) concern that the resettlement of the landless on 5 hectare 
plots in postindependence Zimbabwe will create classes which will be 
deleterious to relations among Africans. Such a conjecture is not informed by 
any serious analysis of the traditional and contemporary evidence both in 
Zimbabwe and elsewhere in other parts of Africa, 



394 



Policy Implications for Development 

Resettlement in Zimbabwe is both an equity and an economic issue. 
Normatively, the question comes up as to what economic and other rights and 
benefits individuals or groups are entitled in their own States. As Charles 
Beitz (1981:321) puts it in his general paper about distributive justice: What 
is the distributive share to which everyone is entitled, regardless of the 
opportunity cost in future growth of output? 

So far the discussions about Zimbabwe's agricultural resettlement policy, 
implementation and performance have thrown very little light on the dynamics 
of the program and the empirical responses of those individual households 
which are directly affected by it. Weiner _et al (1985:284) have commented 
succintly that "Much of th[is] agrarian debate has been conducted more at the 
level of ideology than from a reasoned assessment of the available data." 
Elsewhere, Barry Munslow (1985:48) also asserts that "The debate has 
undoubtedly been clouded by much exxageration of the negative economic impact 
of resettlement nationally." 

It was Main de Janvry ( 1983:233) who pointed out that there is no 
science without ideology. A response to Beitz (1981:321) question and for that 
matter any evaluation such as this study is necessarily a statement which 
reflects the ideological orientation of the evaluator. The test, however, is 
whether or not the evaluator's ideology is flexible enough to allow him or her 
to review all the available credible information about the issue of concern. 
The conceptual and methodological problems that this raises are matters with 
which all the social sciences have been grappling over the years (see Schutz 
1954) . 



395 

In this regard there is perhaps no single area of disciplinary research 
where there is so much confusion and disagreements as in the field of social 
change and development. The problems of conceptualizing development and 
identifying and measuring its indicators are immense (Drewnoski 1972). The 
semantics of development concepts and indicators (McGranahan 1972) are not 
value free. Indeed, Magubane's (1971) classic critique of the "received" 
indices that are used to study social change in Africa shows that how 
development is conceived and measured can be culturally biased. 

Jean Due's (1980) studies on rural economic development ia Kenya and also 
among rural women in Zambia (Due 1983) provide clear evidence that what 
constitutes development to most rural peoples in an African context are 
invariably different from "official" definitions with which policy makers and 
their development planners operate. 

To illustrate this point the official definition of development in the 
Zimbabwe case with resettlement policy is rural household food 
self-sufficiency plus the achievement of an annual target income of $400. This 
case study, however, found that resettled households as well as farmers in the 
other farming systems had their own definition of what development is all 
about. These farmers conceived of upenyu hwakanaka or the "good life" that 
they were striving for in terms of productive farm enterprise, more cattle and 
a contented family and home. These are broader interests which subsume target 
cash incomes or food self-sufficiency. 

In pursuit of these interests these farm households were prepared to 
postpone short terra concerns such as cash incomes and immediate gratification 
for increased accumulation of capital assets and investment in their 
children's education. 



396 

At least two messages come out clearly from this section of the analysis. 
The first is that in rural Zimbabwe the poor, the unemployed, the landless and 
the destitute who were resettled are now no more different from anybody else 
in terms of socio-demographic and other characteristics. Like farmers 
elsewhere, they now form households which range along various phases of the 
developmental cycle. These households are not a homogeneous or an 
undifferentiated entity. Consequently, their capabilities, expectations and 
needs for credit, for instance, may vary according to observed differences. 

The second point is that these rural households know pretty well enough 
about what is good for them. It is imperative and necessary that they should 
be partners of whoever is in charge of the formulation of policies that are 
likely to concern them. The specifics of this are elaborated below in the 
closing discussion and recommendation. 

The direction and focus of research efforts at a better understanding and 
explication of these seemingly or "officially" unimportant issues could 
immensely benefit development planning in Africa. The discussion and 
recommendations which are offered below to conclude this study are done in the 
light of the above challenge. Only four of the many areas of concern in the 
resettlement equation are selected for this illustrative presentation. These 
concerns are in respect of the (1) Model A Schemes, (2) Model B Schemes, (3) 
Non-Governmental Organizations and (4) Agricultural Finance Corporation. The 
problems relating to each of the above areas are serious enough to merit the 
immediate and considered attention of the government of Zimbabwe as well as 
its friends through whose mutual interests and joint contributions the rural 
equity, growth and development issues of the country are being addressed. 



397 



Recommendations and a Discussion 

The Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes 

Most of the farmers in these Schemes are responding very well to 
resettlement. The government does not have many problems on its hands in this 
area of development. However, some pressing issues need to be tackled before 
they get out of hand. These relate to (1) enforcement of resettlement permits 
and (2) the need to encourage effective growth of farmers' own grassroots 
institutions, their unrestricted participation in the development process and 
their ultimate self-reliance. 

In Mufurudzi a few settlers are openly doing things which, while not 
appearing to be widespread now, might ultimately degenerate into serious 
problems. The inaction of the government to strictly enforce the letter of the 
permits is likely to encourage or even compell other households to follow the 
breaches. There are cases where some settlers are now (1) in gainful or wage 
employment both within and outside the Scheme leaving their farms in the care 
of wives and other kin, (2) extending their arable holdings beyond their 5 
hectares allocation and cultivating the common property which is reserved for 
communal grazing of livestock and (3) exceeding the numbers of livestock head 
that they are permitted to have in the Scheme. 

These are the harbingers of the social contradictions which cumulatively 
destroyed the ecology and, consequently, the human resources of the former 
Native Reserves during the colonial days. The ecology of Zimbabwe, like other 
areas of Africa, is quite fragile. Keeping and grazing too many livestock 
beyond the carrying capacity of a given piece of land or cultivating an area 
which is designated as only suitable for grazing are a sure invitation for 



398 

ecological disaster both within the short and medium term. In many Communal 
Areas today the ecological base is so degraded through past uncontrolled 
overexploitatlon that the experts predict a permanent damage. If the new lands 
of the resettlement Schemes are to be saved the fate of the Communal Areas 
then action is required on this issue of concern. 

The government must not deceive itself that it can singlehandedly police 
and check these problems of resource conservation. Neither is it even 
necessary for scarce public resources to be expended on such issues which 
accompany change and development. What is needed is creating the necessary 
conditions for the flourishing of traditional community institutions which are 
still deemed relevant and useful by the resettled households. In such a 
situation peer pressure and communally sanctioned norms become very powerful 
instruments of control than, for instance, threats of evictions. 

The security consciousness in rural Zimbabwe is quite high and the 
alertness of the village youth brigades, whose responsibility it is to monitor 
and respond to any threats to communal security, is surprisingly well 
developed. If something like this, based on voluntary consent for the 
protection of mutual interest is proving workable then other such less 
expensive and participatory sources of community self-reliance need to be 
developed. In this regard the VIDCOs, WARDCOs and Area Board Committee have 
important responsibilities to guard. The government must emphasize these and 
utilize these institutions much more than it is doing at present for rural 
self-help and development. 

The final area of recommendation for consideration is socio-economic 
and has to do with maize retention for household use. It appears that most 
households, no matter the number of consumer units within them, retain far in 
excess of what their reasonable subsistence needs are. This reduces their net 



399 

cash flow considerably. It can be hypothesized that these farmers retain large 
volumes of the stable food as an insurance against drought which is a 
persistent problem in Zimbabwe. 

It is plausible to suggest also that such action is a response to the 
"stop order" system by which the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), 
through the Grain Marketing Board, deducts farmers loans and credit charges at 
source during sales (see below under AFC). By keeping more grain the household 
is at least assured of food for the year even if no payments are obtained from 
produce sale due to indebtedness to the AFC. Alternatively, if the farmer can 
manage to get any side-market buyer then he or she takes the risk and 
illegally dispose of the excess grain in exchange for cash. 

^■Thatever the reason is the poor nature of traditional household storage 
facilities, which result in losses, and the fact that these farmers are 
locking up a potential income demand that the issue be looked into seriously. 
This problem needs immediate rectification before farmers' are directly or 
indirectly "pushed" into side-marketing. 

The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes 

If the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes are allowed to flourish in 
their current parasitic state and left to operate as they are doing they will 
soon become a canker and eventually bleed the national economy to 
incapacitation. 

As a group their overall economic performance is negligible and they 
waste more public and donor funds than they contribute by way of agricultural 
output. Their organization is characterized by inertia, mismanagement, lack of 
purpose, petty stealing and internal squabbles, dependancy syndrome and a 



400 

cycle of low membership, underutilized and misused resources, failure to 
generate income and hence inability to attract serious, hardworking and 
skilled farm personnel. Mumbengegwi ( 1984c: 18) aptly sums up the overall 
picture of these Producer Cooperatives by saying that the agricultural skills 
base of their farmers is very thin and inappropriate to the design of the 
Model B Schemes as large scale farming enterprises. 

The government has two clear options to confront this problem. The less 
politically expedient but economically wise action would be to disband these 
Model B Schemes all together. Given the socialist leanings of the government 
this recommendation would smack of capitulation. It may thus be ruled out as 
unrealistic and unacceptable. The more ideologically palatable solution 
therefore would be to continue to sponsor them. 

In the circumstance it is imperative that the government focuses its 
concerns more on ways and means of ensuring efficiency and productivity. The 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or donor agencies which prop these Model 
B Schemes with financial and material assistance have a role to play in 
formulating a workable strategy in this regard. As it is now these 
Cooperatives are administratively autonomous of public control which in itself 
is not a bad idea. Internal and participatory management of members should be 
preferred to State controls and coercion. 

The anomaly, however, is that these Cooperatives are using or misusing a 
public resource in the form of some of the best agricultural lands in the 
country which are intact with all the existing and potentially productive 
assets. The worse part of this problem is that the abysmal economic 
performance, social disorganization and imminent failures of these Producer 
Cooperative Schemes are being financed heavily and exclusively with tax monies 
and scarce donor assistance. 



401 

One way that the government can keep these Cooperatives while 
transforming them into efficient and productive enterprises is to turn them 
over to selected groups of apparently successful farm households drawn from 
the Model A Schemes. Many such households now find their 5 hectares arable 
allocations and the 5 to 8 Livestock Units assigned to them under the 
resettlement permits grossly inadequate. They yearn for more land to prove 
their productive capabilities. Many would opt out of resettlement for the 
Small-scale Commercial Farm system if any such farms were still available. 
Very soon the government would have a problem on its hands in the resettlement 
schemes if the aspirations of this group of hardworking households are not 
addressed . 

Evidence from the Mufurudzi case study and many other Model A Schemes 
points to the existence of many such small groups of households in various 
villages. These have voluntarily and harmonously come together to raise medium 
term loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to accumulate or 
acquire assets, share and use resources without in any way jeopardizing their 
respective self interests as autonomous individual families. Both in theory 
and in practice that is what nhimbe or traditional work parties have always 
been all about. 

The government can take advantage of such an opportunity by identifying 

and recruiting these households, maximizing and utilizing their agricultural 

potential, skills and assets. The Model B Schemes can be turned over to these 

households with their production obligations and rewards negotiated 

accordingly. Whatever the case is there should be less State patronage and 

paternalism so that more resources can be released to monitor and control any 

2 

likely abuses that the new arrangements may generate. 



402 

The current trends in agrarian socialism in China, parts of Eastern 
Europe and to some extent the Soviet Union is the responsibility system. This 
encourages collectivism in the pooling and use of resources. More importantly, 
it is based on the reward of individual initiative or ingenuity and effort. 

If Zimbabwe wants to retain the Model B Schemes as the bedrock of 
socialist agriculture then it has to do more than merely providing access and 
opportunity to the poor. Its own record with the Cooperatives now validates 
what the literature and experiences elsewhere have shown, namely, that the 
Cooperatives per se do not ensure equity. Indeed, they are as open to 
"exploitation of man by man" perhaps even more so than the individually-owned 
or capitalistic farm systems. 

The Non-Governmental Organizations 

Tliere are numerous donor agencies now operating in Zimbabwe. These have 
very important roles to play in the country's rural development efforts 
particularly in areas where the government lacks appropriate and effective 
resources. Hitherto most of them have not gone beyond their original implicit 
or de facto mandates as relief agencies. 

Almost all these organizations registered to operate in Zimbabwe after 
independence in 1980. The task then was the rehabilitation of a war-torn 
country, particularly a demoralized people and a devastated countryside. 
During the second year of independence and into the fourth year a serious and 
persistent drought set in. The NGOs responded commendably by supplying the 
minimal basic needs of the people especially food and clothing. 

Very supportive of the government's rural development programs these NGOs 
aided the implementation of many aspects of the resettlement program. In 



403 

particular, they supplemented government's grants by way of direct financial 
sponsorship of respective Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes throughout the 
country. At one time or another they supplied some of these Cooperatives with 
subsistence needs such as salt or cooking oil, offered services such as the 
payment of phone and electricity bills and provided such capital assets as 
tractors and grinding mills. 

Given the relief orientation of these forms of assistance and 
particularly the lack, of any monitoring controls instituted by the NGOs over 
impacts of their aid they have helped to create the kind of dependancy 
syndromes in the Model B Producer Cooperative sector that is inimical to 
self-help and sustained development. 

The problem with these NGOs is that they lack any inter-agency 
coordination and they appear to be overcompe ting with each other in terras of 
what they can do for the respective Schemes. With the possible exception of a 
few Schemes such as Gowe , Mashonaland West Province (Figure 8-1), which has 
consistently been sponsored by only one agency the Redd Barna , there is too 
much duplication of aid by different agencies within the same Schemes. 

There is the urgent need therefore for self monitoring on the part of 
these NGOs in terras of the nature of assistance that they provide and the 
likely consequences that such assistance would impact on the initiative, 
self-help and the sustained productivity of the Cooperatives. In terms of the 
specifics these Schemes would benefit more from training in agricultural and 
related skills, human relations, equipment servicing and maintainance and 
simple management and accounting skills. Such skills are initial preconditions 
for development. 

Just supplying these Model 3 Producer Cooperatives with tractors, as it 
has been the case on many occasions, has not facilitated their economic 



404 

performance and productivty. In some documented instances the availability of 

these tractors and expensive farm equipment has rather encouraged a 

3 

free-for-all mentality leading to widespread abuse and misuse. 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation 

Institutional credit financing of smallholder agriculture is a new 
phenomenon in Zimbabwe. Currently it is only the AFC which provides such an 
essential service to resettled farmers under the Resettlement Credit Scheme. 
This Scheme, established under Statutory Instrument 685 of 1982, replaced the 
Resettlement Loan Fund which was operational during 1981. 

Under the Resettlement Credit Scheme all resettled farmers are eligible 
for credit from their second year for a period of three years. Beginning from 
their fifth year such farmers cease to be "automatically eligible." However, 
they qualify for loans under the the Small Farm Credit Scheme just like 
Communal Area and Small-Scale Commercial farmers on the basis of their track 
records . 

Much as the extension of credit to resettled farmers by the AFC has 
facilitated their accumulation process there is every indication that all is 
not well with the operations of the Credit Schemes from the perspectives of 
both the AFC and the resettled farmers. 

In May 1984 the General Manager of the AFC reviewed the progress of the 
Resettlement Credit Scheme. For the 1981-82 farming season 1,224 farmers were 
granted a total of $420,000 in loans out of which $305,000 was actually 
disbursed. The following year 4,170 Model A farmers throughout the country and 
3 Model B Producer Cooperatives, namely, Simba Youth, Mount Saint Mary's and 
Kwaedza were together approved for $1,916,800 of which $1,451,000 was 



405 

disbursed. In 1983-84 Model A Scheme farmers numbering 17,010 together with 17 

Model B Producer Cooperatives were granted a total of $8,149,000. The recovery 

rates for these loans for the respective years were 42 percent for the 1981-82 

4 

credits, only 5 percent for 1982-83 and 30 percent for 1983-84. 

Complaining about the possibility of a cumulative loss of up to $7.2 
million excluding the interest receivable the AFC blamed this development 
mainly on the following "controllable factors:" (1) lack of selection process 
and criterion by the Corporation; (2) automatic right to credit facilities 
breeding an attitude which eroded discipline and self-management towards debt 
obligations; (3) financing maize production in ecologically unsuitable 
areas — in which most of the Resettlement Schemes were located; and (4) 
instability of some resettled farmers who once granted a loan to procure 
inputs sold those inputs for cash and deserted resettlement without 
trace . ^ 

DERUDE's response to AFC's complaints was very critical of its operations 
and the attitude of its officials towards smallholder African farmers. It 
accused the Corporation of hypocrisy. It questioned how the AFC could bemoan 
the potential loss of $7 million, advanced farmers who were in their initial 
years of resettlement in a completely new environment, while being silent 
about "a staggering amount of approximately $200 million" owed by experienced 
and established large-scale farmers. Finally, DERUDE charged that the 

AFC has forgotten, or wants to ignore the socio-political 
context in which it is supposed to administer credit to the 
[resettled farmers]. Agricultural credit ... is politically 
determined and is not primarily a function of economic factors. 
Thus AFC is not being requested to grant credit ... as a means 
to achieve explicit short and long term objectives of Government. 
Credit is being extended to [the resettled] to correct the socio- 
economic injustices of the past and as a way of making the peasant 
farmer more productive whilst reducing the country's structural 
dependence for food and industrial crops on the white farmers. 



406 

DERUDE took the opportunity also to mention many concerns which implied 
that the AFC had not changed its" settler-colonial structures and mentality to 
respond to the changed socio-political imperatives of a new Zimbabwe." 
Specifically, the following deficiencies were brought up: (1) while the 
Large-Scale (European) Commercial Farmer received a living allowance with his 
credit as an insurance against crops failure such facility was unavailable to 
the resettled farmer; (2) rather than canvassing the impression that the 
nonpajmients had all been the fault of the resettled farmers the AFC should 
have recognized the failure on the part of service Ministries and Departments 
which had been charged with the responsibility to coordinate the credit 
package for the farmers; (3) the AFC had always delayed in processing the 
applications of resettled farmers in time for them to take advantage of early 
delivery input rebates; (4) resettled farmers more often than not received 
their inputs well into the growing season; (5) these farmers in Mashonaland 
East never received their peanut seed in 1983-84 and others elsewhere also did 
not receive their insecticides or sprayers for cotton or were given the wrong 
seed varieties or got inadequate quantities of certain inputs though they were 
billed; and (&) that the AFC was yet to design appropriate credit policies to 
cater for the specific needs of resettled farmers the greater majority of whom 
were in the poorer agro-ecological regions. 

Elsewhere, the AFC had previously admitted that various reasons accounted 
for farmers non-payment. For instance, reporting upon the progress with the 
Small Farm Credit Scheme the AFC Advisory Committee in its meeting of June 10, 
1 982 , minuted : 

Investigations had shown that the main reasons for defaulting 
on repayment of last season's loans were transport and marketing 
delays, administrative and accounting errors and a degree of 
black marketing provoked by the slowness on the part of the 
Corporation in issuing refund cheques. 



407 

The records of the AFC show that the rate of recovery of credit to 
Mufurudzl Model A Scheme farmers in 1981-82 was 93 percent. Given this 
commendable feat by the generally productive Mufurudzi farmers there is no 
doubt that the overall ability to pay back these loans is a function of the 
output achieved by these farm households. It is quite certain therefore that 
the Model B Schemes and the Model A Schemes farmers who are unable to perform 
well economically will find it increasingly difficult to honor their 
obligations. In any lending situation, especially like the political context 
within which the AFC operates, there will always be borrowers who will default 
inspite of their financial abilities. 

The non-repayment position can become serious if there are no controls or 
enforceable sanctions. It is equally true also that sanctions which are 
unenforceable or controls that are unrealistic in a given situation would 
encourage apathy and unwillingness to pay. 

One such control, which creates problems for farmers and backfires on the 
AFC, is the way that its "buying orders" and the "stop order" systems operate. 
The former is executed on behalf of the AFC by Cooperative input deliverers. 
The buying order specifies the amount of loan approved by the AFC and hence 
the type and quantity of input that the Cooperative should purchase and 
transport to the farmer. The stop order is executed at the end of the season 
by the Marketing Boards on behalf of the AFC. The particular produce buying 
agency monitors the value of the farmer's sale and deducts whatever credit, 
interest and charges that the AFC had debited against the farmer for inputs 
which the Cooperative supposedly supplied. 

In about May farmers' loan applications are taken by AFC's field 
officers. The period from June through September is when produce marketing 
takes place. Sometime from September to October or November or even December 



408 

farmers get to hear from the AFC as to the status of their application, 
receive their inputs, get their contract plowing done, and receive any- 
possible check refunds from previous season's sales, \7hatever developments 
which take place in the interim relating to these critical concerns of farmers 
remain a confusing mystery to most of them in the Resettlement Schemes as well 
as in the other smallholder systems. 

Between the farmers, the AFC, the Cooperative deliverers and the 
Marketing Boards there are no coordinated networks to channel information 
flow. Other than the common knowledge that farmers had applied for credit or 
sold their crops nothing is done to fully explain to their understanding of 
what goes on in the confines of the AFC, the Marketing Boards, the Tillage 
Team and the Input Deliverers. Even their Resettlement and Extension Officers 
as well as their elected Area Board, which are supposed to represent their 
interest, are kept in the dark. 

Waiting periods of three to six months to hear about a loan application 
or to receive payment for effort expended in producing crops are excessively 
oppressive, inefficient and constitute a great disincentive to farming. This 
development is becoming a common occurence and a source of frustration and 
hardship for many farmers. It may impact negatively on production, create 
opportunities for black or side marketing and influence the farmers' 
willingness and abilities to repay loans. 

There is the urgent need at both the regional and district levels for the 
AFC to vigorously encourage invited participation in its loan consideration 
proceedings. Farmer organizations and groups such as the Area Boards or 
WARDCOs or even VIDCOs , Resettlement and Extension personnel, input deliverers 
and the marketing agencies may all benefit mutually from such participation. 



409 

Of course the final decisions about enterprise viability and granting 
criteria should continue to rest in the Corporation. But merely telling the 
farmers, as the AFC does, that "good repayment equals more loan and bad 
repayment equals less loan" while keeping them in suspense and in the dark is 
never going to facilitate a successful and sustained agricultural productivity 
in Zimbabwe. 

By seriously involving these farmers in particular aspects of its 
programs the AFC can help them to better understand how it operates, what its 
specific duties relating to the loans are, where its responsibil ites end and 
other agencies take over. More importantly, it can by so doing solicit peer 
pressure to operate and encourage self-policing of loan utilization and 
repayment among these farmers. Encouraging the organization of these 
individual households into groups and educating them about the benefits of 
group loans, as opposed to individual households loans, the AFC would find it 
much easier to process, administer and collect such loans than the existing 
system allows . 

Conclusion 

The on-going agricultural resettlement experiences in Zimbabwe offered a 
unique and exciting opportunity to observe the implementation of development 
from both the macro and the micro perspectives. Given the obvious limitations 
of this study and the problems which attend field research many questions were 
not anticipated, explored or even understood. Nevertheless, an attenapt has 
been made here to present the facts bearing in mind the expectations, possibly 
conflicting, of the variety of audiences who have a stake in the sharing of 
any knowledge gained by this study. 



410 



Notes 



1. ) This is the view conveyed on November 3, 1985, by the Honorable Moven 
Mahachi , then Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on 
Zimbabwe television in the interview program "Face the Nation." 

2. ) What the government will do with the current members of the existing 
Cooperatives needs to be studied. Most of them are not fit for agriculture 
and may have to find eraploinnent in the wage sector. Alternatively, since the 
major problem of the Model B Schemes now is inadequate membership those who 
seriously want to remain in farming can be banded together into viable work 
forces and resettled again in selected Schemes. The numbers involved here 
nationally are less than 3,500. It should therefore be possible to work out a 
satisfactory solution for their gainful employment. 

3. ) Mention can be made of the following instances drawn from the DERUDE 
monthly reports. 

(i) Kubudirira Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province where some members of the 
Management Committee in July 1984 drove the Cooperative's tractor for beer 
drinking in the adjoining Madziwa Communal Area. In September 1985 the new 
Chairman of the Management Committee with no driving experience or license 
drove the Cooperative tractor involving it in an accident which totalled it. 

(ii) Batsiranayi Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province where a Madza 3 1600 
Pick-up truck donated by an NGO was involved in an accident on September 15, 
1984, which cost $1,568.16 in repairs. This was exactly two days after the 
truck was returned to the Cooperative from the workshop after undergoing 
earlier repairs costing $1,612.53. 

(iii) Kuenda Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province where a feud between the 
Chairman and the Treasurer of the Management Committee in October 1984 
resulted in a near shooting by the Chairman who was accused among other things 
of exclusively (mis)using the Cooperative's Land Rover vehicle to pursue his 
family interests. 

(iv) Tabudirira Scheme, Mashonaland East Province where in March 1985 an 
International 444 Super Tractor belonging to the Cooperative was sabotaged by 
one of the two feuding cliques. The motors of both the tractor and grinding 
mill were crippled when large amounts of granulated sugar were poured into 
them. Incidentally, about the same time irrigation equipment worth $7,000 were 
stolen from the Cooperative. Later a former State senator, party dignatory and 
businessman, Mr. .Aggripa flakunde, was charged with the theft and convicted in 
a Harare Court in August 1985. The prosecutor in the case pointed out that 
Senator liakunde was very instrumental in the formation of Tabudirara 
Cooperative that he stole from (see The Herald August 15, 1985). 

There are many other documented abuses in these Cooperatives throughout the 
Provinces. The point here is that there appears to be a mentality among some 
of these members of the Cooperatives that as "owners" they are at liberty to 
do whatever they desired with these apparent public properties. 

4. ) Of the six Schemes granted loans in 1981-82 the recovery rate in the 
Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province was the highest 
amounting to 93 percent as compared to Soti Source Model A Normal Scheme, 
Masvingo Province, which was only 20 percent. 



411 



5.) The AFC attached a schedule to this review showing the number of 
resettled farmers who had deserted or were evicted and the total amounts owed 
by each of them. A. total of 65 farmers and the amount of $31,454 were 
involved. An investigation by DERUDE in the affected resettlements turned out 
the following: (1) 22 farmers whose inputs worth $10,707 were transferred by • 
the AFC to other farmers; (2) 4 who had repaid their loans in full amounting 
to $1,700; (3) 11 evicted farmers whose inputs worth $3,934 were repossessed 
by the Cooperative deliverers on behalf of AFC; (4) 11 farmers who were still 
resident in the Resettlement Schemes and owed $5,951; (5) 2 evicted farmers 
who made arrangement with the AFC to repay $1,360; (6) 1 evicted farmer owing 
$1,966 whose whereabouts were unknown; (7) 3 deserted farmers with known 
current address; (3) 3 deserted farmers whose current addresses were unknown 
and who owed between them $1,361; and (9) 8 "ghost" farmers possibly squatters 
who apparently took $3,280 from the AFC and absconded into the Communal Area. 

In all then DERUDE estimated that $26,813 of the amount had been paid or 
were recoverable leaving $4,641 as the possible bad debt. Its point was that 
the AFC had not investigated the issue thoroughly before misinforming itself 
and everybody and crying wolf. 



APPENDIX A 

ZIMBABWE: HOUSEHOLD DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPOLOGY 



CODE 


PHASE 


CONJUGAL 


HOUSEHOLD 


EXTENDED 


HOUSEHOLD 






FORM 


HEADSHIP 


KIN/AFFINE 


STRUCTURE 


A 


Establishment 


Monogamous 


I-Iale 


Present 


Pre-f ission 




II 


1 f 




Absent 




B 


Expansion 


Monogamous 


t-Iale 


Present 


II 




II 


1 1 




Absent 


If 




It 


II 


If 


f 1 


Fissioning 


n 
\^ 


Expansion 


Monogamous 


Female 


Present 


Pre-f ission 








(Spouse Away) 








II 


If 


II 


Absent 


II 


D 


Expansion 


Polygyno us 


Idale 


Present 


ft 




It 


II 


It 


Absent 


II 




II 


II 


It 


?i 


Fissioning 


T7 


Consolidation 


Monogamous 


It 


Present 


Pre-f ission 




II 


1 1 


If 


I f 


Fissioning 




II 


f I 


If 


IT 


Post-fission 




II 


ft 


If 


Absent 


Pre-f ission 




II 


It 


tt 


It 


Fissioning 




11 


If 


It 


II 


Post-fission 


r 


Consolidation 


Monogamous 


Female 


Present 


Pre-f ission 








(Spouse Away) 








II 


II 


II 


11 


Fissioning 




II 


II 


It 


It 


Post-fission 




11 


It 


II 


Absent 


Pre-f ission 




If 


II 


II 


It 


Fissioning 




II 


II 


II 


It 


Post— fission 




Consol idation 


Monogamous 


Female(No Spouse) Present 


Pre-f ission 


1 


II 


II 


It 


II 


Fissioning 




If 


II 


11 


it 


Post-fission 




If 


It 


tf 


Absent 


Pre-f ission 




If 


f 1 


ti 


It 


Fissioning 




11 


ri 


If 


ft 


Pnc;^ — fi =?^"ion 


1 


Consol idation 


Polygyno us 


Male 


Present 


Pre- Ft on 

L 1. - -I, J- 1^ o -1- 1.1. 




11 


ir 


n 


!l 


Fissioning 




It 


If 


It 


II 


Post— fission 




II 


It 


It 


Absent 


Pre-f ission 




f» 


II 


II 


II 


Fissioning 




II 


II 


ft 


II 


Post-fission 


1 T 
' J. 


Decline Monogamous /No Spouse Male/Female Absent 


It 




Other 











1 
i 

412 I 

I 

t 



APPENDIX B 

OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES 



TABLE B - 1 
MODEL A NORMAL SCHEMES 



EVALUATION VARIABLES 



01. Rate resettled farmers' social harmony 

02. Rate resettled farmers' work motivation 

03. Rate resettled farmers' agricultural performance 

04. Rate resettled farmers' political participation 

05. Rate resettled farmers' self-help participation 

06. Rate resettled farmers' youth activity participation 

07. Rate resettled farmers' women affairs participation 

08. Rate resettled farmers' Area Board meetings participation 

09. Rate resettled farmers' Agricultural Finance Corporation loan repayment 

10. Rate resettled farmers' cooperation with Resettlement Team 

11. Rate resettled farmers' compliance with resettlement policy regulations 

12. Rate resettled farmers' progress with resettlement objectives 

13. Resettled farmers' /scheme problem 

14. Problem solution 

15. Differential village progress within scheme 

16. List less progressive villages 

17. List averagely progressive villages 

18. List more progressive villages 

19. Scheme administrative problem 

20. Rate AGRITEX performance in scheme 

21. Rate Department of Veterinary Services performance in scheme 

22. Rate Department of Cooperatives performance in scheme 

23. Rate water development department performance in scheme 

24. Rate medical clinic unit performance in scheme 

25. Rate school headmasters performance in scheme 

26. Rate rural housing department performance in scheme 

27. Rate village health personnel performance in scheme 

28. Rate community development personnel performance in scheme 

30. Rate adult literacy work in scheme 

31. Rate Non-Governmental Organization work in scheme 

32. Rate Tillage Team performance in scheme 

33. Rate road Development Team performance in scheme 

34. Rate Agricultural Finance Corporation service in scheme 

35. Rate input delivery (Cooperative) service in scheme 

36. Rate agricultural marketing authority service in scheme 

37. Rate Zimbabwe Republic Police Service in scheme 

38. Rate relations with neighboring Communal Area residents 



413 



i 
I 

( 

I 

1' 

APPENDIX B i 
OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES 

j 

TABLE B - 2 ; 
MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEMES j 

EVALUATION VARIABLES i 



01. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


social harmony 


02. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


work motivation 


03. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


agricultural performance 


04. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


political participation 


05. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


self-help participation 


06. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


youth activity participation 


07. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


women affairs participation 


08. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


Area Board meetings participation 


09. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


Agricultural Finance Corporation loan repayment 


10. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


cooperation with Resettlement Team 


11. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


compliance with resettlement policy regulations 


12. 


Rate 


resettled 


farmers' 


progress with resettlement objectives 



13. Resettled farmers' /scheme problem 

14. Problem solution 

15. Differential village progress within scheme 

16. List less progressive villages 

17. List averagely progressive villages 

18. List more progressive villages 

19. Scheme administrative problem 



414 



APPENDIX B 

OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES 



TABLE B - 3 
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES 

EVALUATION VARIABLES 

01. Rate cooperative spirit 

02. Rate members work motivation 

03. Rate cooperative scheme's agricultural performance 

04. Rate cooperative scheme's level of stability- 
OS. Rate resettlement progress 

06. Rate prospects for achieving resettlement objectives 

07. Rate prospects for cooperative scheme long-term success 

08. Cooperative scheme's problem 

09. Problem solution 



415 



APPENDIX C 

MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MANAGEMEMT SURVEY 



STUDY VARIABLES 



01. Total membership of cooperative 

02. Number of male members 

03. Number of female members 

04. List of committees 

05. Number of general meetings held in 1984-85 

06. Bye-laws changed 

07. Production arrangement 

08. Reason for arrangement 

09. Cooking/eating arrangement 

10. Reason for arrangement 

11. How earnings distributed 

12. Maximum per capita renuraeration , 1984-85 

13. Minimum per capita renuraeration, 1984-85 

14. Rate assistance from Department of Cooperatives 

15. Rate assistance from Department of Rural Development 

16. Rate assistance from AGRITEX 

17. Rate assistance from the Agricultural Finance Corporation 

18. Rate assistance from Tillage Team 

19. Rate assistance from Inputs delivery (Cooperative) 

20. Rate assistance from Agricultural Marketing Authority 

21. Rate assistance from the mobile health clinic 

22. Rate assistance from the Non-Governmental Organizations 

23. Problem facing this cooperative 

24. Recommended solution to problem on the part of members 

25. Recommended solution to problem on the part of government 

26. Recommended solution to problem on the part of NGOs 



416 



APPENDIX D 

FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES 



TABLE D - 1 

MODEL A NORMAL & ACCELERATED RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES 



STUDY VARIABLES 



01. How first heard about resettlement 

02. Reason for resettlement 

03. Response to resettlement 

04. Should resettlement continue 

05. Where land for resettlement 

06. Where money for resettlement 

07. Should farmers pay resettlement tax 

08. Way no to resettlement tax 

09. Past resettlement problem (1980-81/1984-85) 

10. Current resettlement problem (1985-86) 

11. Source/ cause of current problem 

12. Rate resettlement team's performance 

13. Suggestion to improve team's effectiveness 

14. Resettlement scheme/ settlers basic need 

15. Who to provide basic need 

16. Problem with the Agricultural Finance Corporation 

17. Problem with the Grain Marketing Board 

18. Problem with the Cotton Marketing Board 

19. Communal Farmers rights to grazing in resettlement scheme 

20. Communal Farmers rights to resources in resettlement scheme 

21. Resettlement scheme/ Communal Area boundary fence justified 

22. Relative resettled in Model A (minda mirefu) scheme 

23. Relative resettled in Model B (mushandira pamwe) scheme 

24. Rate government's policy to socialize agriculture 

25. Recommendation for successful agriculture 

26. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka) 

27. Good life possible here for farmer in short term 

28. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term 

29. Inhere if wage job is only option for good life 

30. VJhere if farming elsewher is only option for good life 

31. Farmer's living condition by 1980 

32. Farmer's living condition in 1985 

33. Farmer's living condition at 1990 

34. How farmer will use $1,000 

35. Farmer has watch/ clock 

36. 5^hen watch/ clock acquired 

37. Farmer has radio 

38. \ThevL radio acquired 

39. Farmer has bed/matress 

40. When bed/matress acquired 

41. Farmer has sewing machine 

42. When sewing machine acquired 

43. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985) 

44. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985) 

45. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985) 



417 



418 

TABLE D - 1 continued 

46. Farmer has bicycle 

47. When bicycle acquired 

48. Farmer has scotch-cart 

49. When scotch-cart acquired 

50. Farmer has ox-plow 

51. When ox-plow acquired 

52. Farmer has sprayer 

53. When sprayer acquired 

54. Farmer has wheel barrow 

55. When wheel barrow acquired 

56. Farmer has cultivator 

57. When cultivator acquired 

58. Farmer has planter 

59. When planter acquired 

60. Farmer has tractor 

61. When tractor acquired 

62. Farmer has tractor implements 

63. When tractor implements acquired 

64. Farmer obtained rural housing loan 

65. Stage of house construction 

66. Farmer's age 

67. Farmer's gender 

68. Farmer's marital status 

69. Male farmer's number of wives 

70. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980 

71. Farmer's country of origin 

72. Zimbabwe farmer's home province 

73. Zimbabwe farmer's communal area 

74. Non-zimbabwe farmer's years of residence 

75. Farmer's years of school completed 

76. Farmer's no n- agricultural skill 

77. Farmer's number of living children 

78. Farmer's number of children born since 1980 

79. Farmer's preferred profession for children 
30. Farmer's household size 

81. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender 

82. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age 

83. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status 

84. Number of cattle owned 

85. Number of donkeys owned 

86. Number of goats owned 

87. Number of sheep owned 

88. Hectares of maize planted (1984-85) 

89. Bags (91 kg) of maize harvested 

90. Bags (91 kg) of maize sold 

91. Hectares of cotton planted (1984-85) 

92. Bales (200 kg) of cotton harvested 

93. Bales (200 kg) of cotton sold 

94. Hectares of tobacco planted (1984-85) 

95. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco harvested 

96. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco sold 



APPENDIX D 

FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES 



TABLE D - 2 
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES 



STUDY VARIABLES 



01. Farmer cooperative member before resettlement 

02. Farmer knew cooperative principles/objectives before joining 

03. Years since farmer joined this cooperative 

04. Job performed before joining this cooperative 

05. Where farmer lived before joining this cooperative 

06. Farmer's reason for joining this cooperative 

07. How farmer heard about this cooperative 

08. Farmer's spouse member of this cooperative 

09. Farmer's relative member of this cooperative 

10. Farmer joined this cooperative with any capital assets 

11. Farmer member of any committee in this cooperative 

12. Farmer satisfied with work of management committee 

13. Farmer willing to pay membership fee/ tax 

14. Communal farmers rights to grazing in this cooperative 

15. Explain your answer 

16. Problem of this cooperative 

17. Farmer's recommended solution to problem 

18. Membership of this cooperative adequate to tasks 

19. Members of this cooperative work hard enough 

20. Members appreciate your work effort in this cooperative 

21. Farmer prefers individual or collective farm plots 

22. Explain your answer 

23. Farmer prefers individual or collective cooking arrangement 

24. Explain your answer 

25. Farmer gets on well with other members of this cooperative 

26. Members of this cooperative consider themselves as one family 

27. Money farmer deserves for work contribution during 1984-85 

28. Relative resettled in Model A (minda mirefu) scheme 

29. Relative resettled in Model B (minda mirefu) scheme 

30. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka) 

31. Good life possible here for farmer in short term 

32. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term 

33. Where if wage job is only option for good life 

34. Where if farming elsewher is only option for good life 

35. Farmer's living condition by 1980 

36. Farmer's living condition in 1985 

37. Farmer's living condition at 1990 

38. How farmer will use $1,000 

39. Farmer has watch/ clock 

40. ^^hen watch/ clock acquired 

41. Farmer has radio 

42. When radio acquired 

43. Farmer has bed/matress 

44. I-Then bed/matress acquired 

45. Farmer has sewing machine 



419 



420 

TABLE D - 2 continued 

46. When sewing machine acquired 

47. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985) 

48. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985) 

49. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985) 

50. Farmer has bicycle 

51. Farmer's age 

52. Farmer's gender 

53. Farmer's marital status 

54. Male farmer's number of wives 

55. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980 

56. Farmer's country of origin 

57. Zimbabwe farmer's home province 

58. Zimbabwe farmer's communal area 

59. Non-zimbabwe farmer's years of residence 

60. Farmer's years of school completed 

61. Farmer's non-agricultural skill 

62. Farmer's number of living children 

63. Farmer's number of children born since 1980 

64. Farmer's preferred profession for children 

65. Farmer's household size 

66. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender 

67. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age 

68. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status 



APPENDIX D 

FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES 



TABLE D - 3 
COMMUNAL AREAS 

STUDY VARIABLES 

01. Years farmer lived here in Communal Area 

02. Years farming here in Communal Area 

03. Size of farmer's arable land, hectares 

04. Farmer's arable land adequate 

05. Communal grazing land adequate 

06. Farmer heard about Model A (mlnda rairefu) resettlement 

07. Farmer heard about Model B (mushandira parawe) resettlement 

08. Farmer applied/intends to apply to be resettled 

09. Resettlement model preference if farmer to be resettled 

10. Relative resettled in Model A (minda rairefu) scheme 

11. Relative resettled in Model B (minda mirefu) scheme 

12. Resettlement the solution to Communal Area land problems 

13. Communal farmers rights to grazing in resettlement scheme 

14. Communal farmers rights to resources in resettlement scheme 

15. Resettlement scheme/ Communal Area boundary fence justified 

16. Explain your answer 

17. Communal area expansion or creation of resettlement scheme 

18. Explain your answer 

19. Communal area's urban residents land rights here 

20. Explain your answer 

21. Problem experienced by farmer here in Communal Area 

22. Farmer's recommended solution to problem for government 

23. Farmer's recommended solution to problem for other farmers 

24. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka) 

25. Good life possible here for farmer in short terra 

26. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long terra 

27. Where if wage job is only option for good life 

28. Inhere if farming elsewher is only option for good life 

29. Farmer's living condition by 1980 

30. Farmer's living condition in 1985 

31. Farmer's living condition at 1990 

32. how farmer will use $1,000 

33. Farmer has watch/ clock 

34. When watch/ clock acquired 

35. Farmer has radio 

36. When radio acquired 

37. Farmer has bed/matress 

38. When bed/matress acquired 

39. Farmer has sewing machine 

40. When sewing machine acquired 

41. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985) 

42. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985) 

43. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985) 

44. Farmer has bicycle 

45. When bicycle acquired 



421 



422 

TABLE D - 3 continued 

46. Fanner has scotch-cart 

47. When scotch-cart acquired 

48. Farmer has ox-plow 

49. i-Jhen ox-plow acquired 

50. Farmer has sprayer 

51. When sprayer acquired 

52. Farmer has wheel barrow 

53. When wheel barrow acquired 

54. Farmer has cultivator 

55. When cultivator acquired 

56. Farmer has planter 

57. When planter acquired 

58. Farmer has tractor 

59. When tractor acquired 

60. Farmer has tractor implements 

61. When tractor implements acquired 

62. Farmer's age 

63. Farmer's gender 

64. Farmer's marital status 

65. Male farmer's number of wives 

66. male farmer's number of wives married since 1980 
67= Farmer's j'ears of school completed 

68. Farmer's non-agricultural skill 

69. Farmer's number of living children 

70. Farmer's number of children born since 1980 

71. Farmer's preferred profession for children 

72. Farmer's household size 

73. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender 

74. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age 

75. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status 

76. Number of cattle owned 

77. Number of donkeys owned 
73. Number of goats owned 

79. Number of sheep owned 

80. Hectares of maize planted (1984-85) 

81. Bags (91 kg) of maize harvested 

82. Bags (91 kg) of maize sold 

83. Hectares of cotton planted (1984-85) 

84. Bales (200 kg) of cotton harvested 

85. Bales (200 kg) of cotton sold 

86. Hectares of tobacco planted (1984-85) 

87. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco harvested 

88. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco sold 



APPENDIX D 

FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES 



TABLE D - 4 
SMALL-SCALE COMIiERCIAL FARJl AREAS 



STUDY VARIABLES 



01. Farmer owns property 

02. How farm acquired 

03. Years since acquisition 

04. Tenancy arrangement 

05. Farm size, hectares 

06. Farm adequacy 

07. Will farmer buy more land 

08. How farmer will dispose of property 

09. Farmer shares boundary with Communal Area 

10. Any tresspassing from Communal Area 

11. Any approach for advice from Communal Area farmers 

12. Any offer of advice to Communal Area farmers 

13. Any offer of advice to Model B (mushandira pamwe) farmers 

14. Any offer of advice to Model A (minda rairefu) farmers 

15. Rate policy on food self sufficiency 

16. Rate policy on economic growth 

17. Rate policy on Large-Scale Farms 

18. Rate policy on Small-Scale Farms 

19. Rate policy on Communal Area/peasant Farms 

20. Rate policy on resource conservation 

21. Resettlement policy realistic 

22. Rate resettlement progress 

23. Rate policy to socialize agriculture 

24. Recommendation for successful agriculture 

25. Should resettlement continue 

26. Where land for resettlement 

27. Relative resettled in Model A (minda rairefu) scheme 

28. Relative resettled in Model B (mushandira pamwe) scheme 

29. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka) 

30. Good life possible here for farmer in short term 

31. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term 

32. Where if wage job is only option for good life 

33. Where if farming elsewhere is only option for good life 

34. Farmer's living condition by 1980 

35. Farmer's living condition in 1985 

36. Farmer's living condition at 1990 

37. How farmer will use $1,000 

38. Farmer has watch/ clock 

39. When watch/ clock acquired 

40. Farmer has radio 

41. When radio acquired 

42. Farmer has bed/matress 

43. When bed/matress acquired 

44. Farmer has sewing machine 

45. When sewing machine acquired 



423 



424 

TABLE D - 4 continued 

46. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985) 

47. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985) 

48. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985) 

49. Farmer has bicycle 

50. When bicycle acquired 

51. Farmer has scotch-cart 

52. When scotch-cart acquired 

53. Farmer has ox-plow 

54. When ox-plow acquired 

55. Farmer has sprayer 

56. When sprayer acquired 

57. Farmer has wheel-barrow 

58. When wheel-barrow acquired 

59. Farmer has cultivator 

60. When cultivator acquired 

61. Farmer has planter 

62. When planter acquired 

63. Farmer has tractor 

64. When tractor acquired 

65. Farmer has tractor implements 

66. When tractor implements acquired 

67. Farmer's age 

68. Farmer's gender 

69. Farmer's marital status 

70. Male farmer's number of wives 

71. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980 

72. Farmer's country of origin 

73. Farmer's home province 

74. Farmer's Communal Area 

75. Farmer's years of school completed 

76. Farmer's non-agricultural skill 

77. Farmer's number of living children 

78. Farmer's number of children born since 1980 

79. Farmer's preferred profession for children 

80. Farmer's household size 

81. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender 

82. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age 

83. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status 

84. Number of cattle owned 

85. Number of donkeys owned 

36. Number of goats owned 

37. Number of sheep owned 

88. Hectares of maize planted (1984-85) 

89. Sags (91 kg) of maize harvested 

90. Bags (91 kg) of maize sold 

91. Hectares of cotton planted (1984-85) 

92. Bales (200 kg) of cotton harvested 

93. Sales (200 kg) of cotton sold 

94. Hectares of tobacco planted (1984-85) 

95. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco harvested 

96. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco sold 



APPENDIX D 

FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES 



TABLE D - 5 
LARGE SCALE COMMERCIAL FARM AREA 



STUDY VARIABLES 



01. Farmer owns property 

02. How farm acquired 

03. Years since acquisition 

04. Tenancy arrangement 

05. Farm size, hectares 

06. Value of property, dollars 

07. Farm adequacy 

08. Will farmer buy more land 

09. How farmer will dispose of property 

10. Farmer education level completed 

11. Years since completion of education 

12. Years since farming 

13. Job before farming 

14. Years since farming here 

15. Farmer shares boundary with Communal Area 

16. Any tresspassing from Communal Area 

17. Any approach for advice from Communal Area farmers 

18. Any offer of advice to Communal Area farmers 

19. Any offer of advice to Model B (mushandira pamwe) farmers 

20. Any offer of advice to Model A (minda mirefu) farmers 

21. Recommendation for smallholder farmers success 

22. Rate policy on food self sufficiency 

23. Rate policy on economic growth 

24. Rate policy on Large-Scale Farms 

25. Rate policy on Small-Scale Farms 

26. Rate policy on Communal Area/ peasant Farms 

27. Rate policy on resource conservation 

28. Resettlement policy realistic 

29. Large-Scale Farms available for resettlement 

30. Rate resettlement progress 

31. Rate policy to socialize agriculture 

32. Recommendation for successful agriculture 

33. Farmer's living condition by 1980 

34. Farmer's living condition in 1985 

35. Farmer's living condition at 1990 



425 



APPENDIX E 

ZIMBABWE: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION AND LIST OF RESETTLEMENT 
MODELS AND SCHEMES, DECEMBER 1985 

PROVINCE MODEL A MODEL A MODEL B 

NORMAL ACCELERATED COOPERATIVE 



MASHONALAND 
EAST 



1 Acton Reynold 

2 Sengezi 1 

3 Sengezi 2 

4 Hoyuyu 3 

5 Hoyuyu 1 

6 Hoyuyu 2 

7 Nyamuzizi 

8 Nyadire 



1 Marondera 

2 Wedza 

3 Wheleerdale 



1 Kwaedza 

2 Mt . St.Mary 

3 Shandisai 

Pf ungwa 

4 Tamuka 

5 Kumhanya 

6 Marowa 

7 Tabudirira 



MASHONALAND 
CENTRAL 



1 Mufurudzi 

2 Mt . Darwin 

3 Karuyana 



1 Shamva 

2 Bindura 

3 Alfa 

4 Nyamanj i 

5 Elhandama 

6 Gremlin 

Heights 



1 Nyakudya 

2 Kuenda 

3 Chakoma 

4 Kurima Inhaka 

5 Kushingirira 

6 Simba Youth 

7 Kubudirira 

8 Batsiranayi 



MASHONALAND 
WEST 



1 Nyama 

2 Musengezi 

3 Jompani 

4 Muzvezve 1 

5 Muzvezve 2 

6 Jondale/Burabe 



1 Chegutu & 

2 Torananga 

3 Vuti A & B 

4 Ngezi 



1 Ganyangu 

2 Go we 

3 Tashinga 

4 Mukuwapasi 

5 Mauya 

6 Nyamakate 



1 


Ma yo 


1 


Chizvirizvi 


1 


Rogogo 


2 


Nyagadza 


2 


Nyahod i 


2 


Airlie 


3 


Chiyinka 


3 


Inyashuuti 


3 


Ruponeso 


4 


Rusitu 


4 


Chirlmutsitso 


4 


Ruwaka 


5 


Shinj a 


5 


Shangwe 


5 


Svinurai 


0 


Mupudzi 


& 


Gwindingwi 


6 


Chitimbi 


7 


Murare 






7 


Tangenhamo 


8 


Nyagundi 






8 


Ruj eko 


9 


Mutanda 1 






9 


Zindoga 


10 


Mutanda 2 






10 


Kubatana 


11 


Mutanda 3 






11 


Nyagadzi 


12 


Nyamazura 






12 


Kuenda Masimba 


13 


Nyanga South 






13 


Magura Batanai 


14 


Nyaj ezi 






14 
15 


Tanhi 
Bethel 



426 



APPENDIX E — continued 



PROVINCE 



MODEL A 
NORMAL 



MODEL A 
ACCELERATED 



MODEL B 
COOPERATIVE 



MIDLANDS 



MASVINGO 



MATABELELAND 
NORTH 



MATABELELAND 
SOUTH 



1 


Shurugwi/ Tana 


1 


New Castel 




QVi tiT"ncr ViTT 


0 


o V X o iLtci V dll C 


3 


Tokwe 3 


3 


Takawir a 


4 


Tokwe 4 


4 


Masvori 


5 


Tokwe 


5 


Lower Gweru 


6 


Sessorabi 3 


6 


Ednovean 


7 


Western 


7 


Riverbond 




Sessombi 


8 


Barkly 


8 


Sessombi 


9 


Chikoraba 


9 


Copper Queen 


10 


Chivu 






11 


Hastings 






12 


XJVieelerdfll p 






13 








14 

J. f 




1 


Chizvirizvi 


1 


Mwe n e z i 


2 


Mukorsi 


2 




3 Nyahombe 


3 


Ngomahur u 


4 


Mushandike 


4 


Lake Kyle South 


5 


Chipinda 


5 


Lake Kyle East 


6 


Dewure 


& 


Glen Livet 


7 


Vimvi 


7 


Townlands 


8 


Soti Source 


8 


Victoria 


9 


Gutu South 


9 


Marowa 






10 


Verlos 






11 


Thn rno' rnv p 






1 ? 


VcXccLVU iiU t; 1 1 






1 T 


1 no rns 






i 








i J 


Pastures 






1 h 


ijOOQ n-ope/ onasna 








Fountains 


1 


Umguza 


1 


Sedgewick 


2 


Berabezi 




Syndicate 






2 


Lortondale 


1 


Dombodema 


1 


Inyozane 


2 


Matopos South 




Glen Grey 


3 


Insi za 


3 


Hollins Block 


4 


Shobi 


4 


Undza 


5 


Wanezi 


5 


Norwood Penge 






& 


The Range 






7 


Manyole 



1 Dangarendove 

2 Vimbai Rufaro 

3 Hatineti 

4 Shungudzevhu 

5 Gatsaruzhinj i 

6 Makwikwi 

7 Zezayi 



1 Clarks Farm 

2 Enchuca 

Nyamini 



8 River Ranch 9 Jopempi 
10 Wedza 11 Filabusi/Kentucky 

12 Mbala Bala 



APPENDIX F 
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT APPLICATION FORM 



MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 

BASI REHURUMENDE REZVE MINDA, KUGADZIKWA PATSVA NEKUKWIDZ IRIDZWA KWEJ'IARUWA 

UGATSHA LUKA HULUMENDE OLUBONA NGEZOMHLABA UKWABIWA KWAYO LEOQUBELO 
PHAMBILI YEZABELO 



RESETTLEMENT REGISTRATION FORM 

GWARO REKUNYORWA Kl^EVANODA MINDA MIREFU 

UKUGCWALISA IFOMU YOKUHLALISWA KUTSHA 



Issued free of charge 

Gwaro iri rinopiwa pasina rauripo 

Ifomu leli liphiwa kungela mbadalo 

This form must be completed and returned to your Ward Councillor by 

Gwaro iri rinofanira kuzadziswa rodzorwa kuna Ward Councillor wako musi wa... 
Ifomu kumele igcwaliswe ibiselwe kumeli wakho we khansili , 



1. Name and R/ CI/D Number 

Zita nenhamba dzechitupa chako 

Ibizo lenombolo zesi thupa 

Distr ic t , 

Dhuno rako 
Isigaba sako 

Ward 

Ward yako 
I Ward yako 

Kraal 

Sabhuku wako 
Usabhuku wakho 

2. Age Makore ekuberekwa Iminyaka yokuzalwa 

3. Are you married? divorced?.., or widowed?.., 

Wakaroora here? kana kurambwa? kana chirikadzi 

Uthethe? selehlukana? ungumf elokazi? 



428 



429 



APPENDIX F--continued. 

4. Number of wives Uwandu hwe vakadzi vako . . . . , Abaf azi bahko baagaki 

Number of your children under the age of 18 

Uwandu hwe vana vari pasi peraakore gumi nematsere 

Inani labantwana abaleminyika engaphasi kwetshumi lesi tshiyangalombil i . . . , 

Number of other dependants living with you 

Uwandu hwe vamwe vaunochengeta 
Labanye njalo obagcinileyo 

5. Present occupation , 

Basa rauri kushanda ikozvino 

. Umsebenzi owenzayo khathesi 

6. What is the size of your land in the Communal Area? 

Unenzvimbo yakakura zvakadini muraaruwa? 

Ulomhlaba onganani ezabelweni? 

In which communal land? Muruwa rupi? Kusipi isabelo? 

7. How many of these do you own? 
Zvingani zveizvi zvipfuyo zvaanazvo? 
Zingaki izifuyo olazo? 

Cattle Goats Sheep Donkeys Pigs 

Mombe Mbudzi Hwai Mboagoro Nguruve 

Inkorao Imbudzi Iziravu Obabheni Ingulube 

8. Indicate ownership of the following things: 
Ndezvipi zvaulnazvo pane zvinhu zvinotevera: 
Tshengisa ukuthi ulako yini okulandelayo : 

Plough. . . . . Scotch-Cart Harrows Cultivator Other implements . . . . 

'3ejo Ngoro Hara Karutivheta 

Ikhubu Ingola Ihala Isikhofolo 

I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I AM ALLOCATED A LAND HOLDING IN A RESETTLEMENT SCHEME 
IT MUST BE PERSONALLY OCCUPIED BY ME AND MY FAMILY AND THAT I WILL BE 
REQUIRED TO GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO LAND IN THE COMMUNAL LAND, AND THAT MERE 
COMPLETION OF THIS FORI-l DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAND ALLOCATION. 

NDINOTSIDZA KUTI KANA NDIKAGOVERWA NZVIMBO KUMINDA MIREFU NDINOZOGARA 
PANZVIMBO lYI INI PACHEZVANGU NEMHURI YANGU UYE KUTI NDINBVUMA KUSIYA 
NZVIMBO YANGU YOKUMARUWA. NDINOBVUMA ZVAKARE KUTI KUZADZISA GWARO RINO 
HAZVIREVI KUTI NDATOBVA NDAWANA MUNDA. 



NGIYEZWISISA IKUTHI UMA SENGINIKWE INDAWO KULEZI ZINDAWO EZABELWA ABANTU 
NGIZAHLALA KHONA MINA NGOKWAMI LEMWULI YAMI NJALO NGIZA TSHIYA LE INDAWO 
EBENGIKUYO EZABELWENI UKUGCWALISA LELI FOMU AKUTSHO UKUTHI INDAWO USULAYO 



430 

APPENDIX F — continued, 

I certify that the information I have given is true and correct. 

Ndinodavira kuti zvose zvandataura ichokwadi chizere 

Ngileqiniso elegcweleyo ukuthi lokhu engikulobe lapha kuliqiniso 

DATE SIGNED 

TO BE COMPLETED BY A PERSON OF STANDING V7H0 KNOWS THE APPLICANT 
APA PANOZADZISWA NEMUNHU ANONYATSOKUZ IVA MUNYORI 

LAPHA KUFANELE KUGCWALISWE NGUMUNTU OWAZI LO UHUNTU OGCWALISE LELI FOMU 

I certify that I know the applicant personally and that to the best of my 
knowledge and belief the information he has given is true and complete. 

Ngiyamazi lo urauntu njalo ngokumazi kwami ngileqiniso ukuthi, lokhu 
akulobe lapha kuliqiniso. 

SIGNED 

ZITA NE HOFISI 
IBIZO LE HOFISI 



APPENDIK G 
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS 



TABLE G - 1 
PEMIT TO RESIDE 



Permit Number 

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 

PERMIT TO RESIDE 

Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
(hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER") , in terras of section 6 of 

the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to 

(hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER"). 

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to reside on the residential site 
This permit is subject to the following terras and conditions: 

1. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency 
thereof, including any renewal, raay, without notice, replace it with 
some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may 
determine . 

2. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER 
decides that the holder has failed to comply with any of its terms 
and conditions. 

3. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time 
and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of 
such compensation as the MINISTER may determine. 

4. The said site shall be used for residential purpose for the accomodation 
of the HOLDER and his immediate family only. 

5. The HOLDER shall maintain the said site in a clean, sanitary and tidy 
condition and shall comply with any instructions that the MINISTER may 
issue for the upkeep of the said site and the prevention of nuisance and 
the maintenance of sanitary conditions. 

6. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which may be 
levied on the said site by competent authority. 

7. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any 
trading, commercial or industrial operations on the the said site. 

8. The MINISTER, or any person authorized by him, shall have the right, 
free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain 
roads, boreholes, pipe-lines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and 
ancillary works upon or under the said site. 



431 



432 



TABLE G - 1 continued 

9. On the expiry or revocation of this permit no compensation shall be 
payable to the HOLDER for any improvements effected by him on the said 
site . 

Provided that the HOLDER shall be entitled, within a period of three 
months after the expiry or revocation of the permit, to remove any 
buildings and improvements constructed or effected by him on the said 
site . 

Any buildings or improvements that are not removed by the HOLDER within 
the said period of three months shall become the property of the 
. MINISTER, who may deal with them as he thinks fit. 

10. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terras 
of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such 
officer in the public service as he may designate. 

11. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER permitting the HOLDER 
to cultivate or depasture stock on State Land is revoked, the MINISTER 
may, in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit. 

Issued at .this day of 19. . . 

(Designated Official) . , . . 

for Director of the Department of Rural 
Development on behalf of the Minister of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 
in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of 1980. 



APPENDIX G 
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS 



TABLE G - 2 
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE 



Permit Number 

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMEOT 
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE 

Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
(hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of 

the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to 

(hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER"), 

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to cultivate on an area of State 

Land, approximately. . . .hectares in area, known as . 

and as indicated on the sketch plan attached hereto (hereinafter referred 
to as "HOLDING") . 

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions: 

1. In the event of there arising any dispute as to the boundaries or 
location of the land which may be cultivated in terms of this permit 
the decision of the MINISTER shall be final. 

2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency 
thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with 
some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may 
determine . 

3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER 
decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms 
and conditions. 

4. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time 
and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of 
such compensation as the MINISTER may determine. 

5. The said HOLDING shall be used solely for agricultural purposes for the 
holder's exclusive benefit. 

6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall :- 

i) personally, actively and continuously carry on agricultural 

activities on the holding to the satisfaction of the MINISTER; 
ii) comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations 
made under, the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 150), the Animal 
Health Act (Chapter 121), the Noxious Weeds Act (Chapter 127), 
and all other laws relating to soils husbandry, farming practices 
and livestock management and shall further comply with all 
instructions which the MINISTER may issue for:- 



433 



434 



TABLE G - 2 continued 



a) the prevention of damage to the sources and courses of streams; 

b) the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; 

c) the control or eradication of any plants harmful to crops and 
livestock; 

d) the protectionof the said HOLDING against soil erosion; 

e) the carrying out any other measure that the HOLDER complies with 
clause 6 (i) hereof. 



7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and 
personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the 
MINISTER. 



8. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall renounce and forgo 
all rights to cultivate any land or depasture livestock in any Communal 
A.rea . 



9. The HOLDER shall not construct or erect, nor permit nor cause to be 

constructed or erected, any building or other structure on the HOLDING. 

10. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which may be 
levied on the said HOLDING by competent authority. 



11. The Holder shall not, without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, 
engage in any other occupation or employment during the currency of this 
permit . 



12. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any 
trading, commercial or industrial operations on the the said HOLDING. 



13. The HOLDER shall permit any rights of way necessary Co give access to 
other holdings should he be required to do so by the MINISTER. 



14. The MINISTER, or any person authorized by him, shall have the right, 

free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain 
roads, boreholes, pipe-lines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and 
ancillary works upon or under the said HOLDING. 



15. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms 
of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such 
officer in the public service as he may designate. 

16. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER permitting the HOLDER 
to cultivate or depasture stock on State Land is revoked, the MINISTER 
may, in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit. 

Issued at this. day of 19. . . . 



(Designated Official) 

for Director of the Department of Rural 
Development on behalf of the [4inister of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 
in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of 1980. 



APPENDIX G 
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMEIW PERMITS 



TABLE G - 3 
PERMIT TO DEPASTURE LIVESTOCK 

Permit Number . . . 

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
PERMIT TO DEPASTURE LIVESTOCK 



Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
(hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of 

the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to 

(hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER"). 

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to depasture stock, not exceeding 
in number the equivalent o f ......... livestock units on the area of State 

Land known as (hereinafter referred to as "the 

said State Land"). 

For the purpose of this permit the categories of stock shown in the first 
column shall be equal to the number of livestock units shown in the second 
column: 

First Column Second Column 

Category of Stock Livestock Units 

Cattle under the age of 2 years 0.5 
Cattle over the age of 2 years 1.0 
Sheep and goats under the age of 1 year 0.1 
Sheep and goats over the age of 1 year 0.2 
This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions: 

1. In the event of there being any dispute as to the total number of 
livestock units equivalent to the stock being depastured in terms 
of this permit the decision of the MINISTER shall be final. 

2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency 
thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with 
some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may 
determine . 

3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER 
decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terras 

and conditions or has depastured stock in excess of the number permitted. 



435 



436 



4. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall comply in all 
respects with the provisions of, and regulations made under, the Natural 
Resources Act (Chapter 150), the Animal Health Act (Chapter 121), and all 
other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock 
management and shall further comply with all instructions in respect of 
the said State Land which the MINISTER may issue for:- 

a) the prevention of damage to the sources or courses of public streams 
b) the prevention and control of animal pests and diseases; 

c) the control or eradication of plants harmful to livestock; 

d) the maintenance of livestock carrying capacity through grazing 
and livestock management; 

e) the protection of the soil against erosion. 

5. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and 
personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the 
MINISTER 

6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall renounce and forgo 
all rights to cultivate land or depasture stock in any Communal Areas. 

7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall not, without the 
prior written consent of the MINISTER, engage in any other employment 
or occupation. 

8. The HOLDER shall not without the written consent of the MINISTER, 
construct or erect any building or other structure on a Communal Area, 

9. The HOLDER shall not carry on any trading, commercial or industrial 
operation on the said State Land, 

10. The HOLDER shall not by any act prevent or attempt to prevent any other 
person from exercising any right to depasture stock on the said State 
Land 

11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written permission of the 
MINISTER, cultivate, cut any trees on, or remove any timber, grass or 
other vegetation from, the said State Land. 

12. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms 
of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such 
officer in the public service as he may designate. 

13. If any permit Issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER permitting the HOLDER 
to cultivate or reside on State Land is revoked, the MINISTER may, in his 
sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit. 

Issued at. this day of 19 

(Designated Official). 

for Director of the Department of Rural Development on 
behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural 
Development, in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of 
1980. 



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 



Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw was born on Friday, November 1, 1946, in Kumasi , the 
royal capital of the Kingdom of the Asantes, Ghana, West Africa, to Opanyin 
Kwadwo Awua (Emmanuel Francis Ko j o Yinkah) an electrician and mechanic frora 
Akrof uom-Adansi and Maame Akua Ampomaah (Manu) a farmer from Sawua. 

He attended elementary and secondary schools in various parts of Ghana. 
He entered the University of Ghana, Legon, in October 1967 and graduated with 
a B. A. (Honors) degree in geography in June 1970. Thereafter he worked with 
the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research at the University 
until 1973. Between September 1973 and August 1974 Akwabi-Ameyaw taught 
English and geography at the Kaneshie Secondary-Technical College, Accra, 
Ghana, as Assistant Superintendent of Education. He entered the Ghana Civil 
Service in August 1974 when he was appointed to the position of Research 
Officer in the Chieftaincy Secretariat, Accra. He also served in various 
capacities at the National House of Chiefs, Kumasi, and briefly as the Acting 
Chief Research Officer at the Secretariat before leaving for further studies 
at the University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, in September 1979. 

Having obtained an M, A. degree in anthropology from Cincinnati, 
Akwabi-Ameyaw enrolled in the Ph.D. program in anthropology at the University 
of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, in August 1981. Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw was 
elected a student member of the New York Academy of Sciences in 1982. His 
major interest is in working w-ith smallholder farmers and in interacting with 
rural peoples studying their socio-economic organization and differentiation 
and the dynamic forces which shape their social formations. 



I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 
i certxry uud scholarly presentation and is fully 

conforn^s to acceptable «^^^f^jf \f /^f.t^^^ for the degree of 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a aii^t. 



Doctor of Philosophy. 



.-^rian HTTu Toit, unairfflan 
Ffofessor of Anthropology 



I certify that 1 have read this study and that in my opinion it 



Doctor of Philosophy. 




Professor of^Ash-thropology 



I certify that 1 have read this study and that in my opinion it 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a Qis««,iytcii. 



Doctor of Philosophy. 




Rbbert Lawless 
Associate Professor 
of Anthropology 



I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 

conformrto aLeptable standards of -^°^-i^/,---/^,;,rd:f,erof ' 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree 



Doctor of Philosophy. 



Madelyn <M. Lockhart 
Professor of Economics 



I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 

conforms to acceptable standards of -^^^^^J P"-^^/f,rd:f,e of ' 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree 



Doctor of Philosophy. 




Peter J. van Blokland 
Associate Professor of 
Food and Resource Economics 



Thl^ dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
DeparSe^t'if Anthropology in the College of ^^^"^f^^f .f^r^r 
A to the -ad-te SC.001 and w ^ , ..i.Ulment 

the requirements for the degree or uoluuj. 



, iQQo Dean, '-^Graduate School 

April lyoo